June 8, 1972
Page 20221
THE NORTHEASTERN FOREST FIRE PROTECTION COMPACT
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, 1972 marks the 25th anniversary of an event which resulted in passage of one of the most unique and significant pieces of forest fire protection legislation ever enacted in the history of our country.
The Northeastern Forest Fire Protection Compact, created by an act of Congress, was the first intergovernmental body of its kind and has served as a model of mutual aid for other sections of the country. Its establishment was a direct result of a series of disastrous forest fires which burned throughout New England and the Northeast during the autumn of 1947. In that year, my own State of Maine experienced the most devastating fires in its history in which 220,000 acres of forest and wildland were burned, 2,500 people were made homeless, and nine communities were leveled or practically wiped out.
The events of 1947 pointed up the critical importance of interstate and Federal cooperation to deal effectively and promptly with forest fires. As a consequence, the 81st Congress on June 25, 1949 enacted Public Law 129 authorizing the Northeastern Forest Fire Protection Compact.
Three years later on May 13, 1952, the 82d Congress enacted Public Law 340 authorizing Canadian participation in the compact.
Several Senators well remember the forest fires of 1947, for they participated in passage of the legislation authorizing the Northeastern Forest Fire Protection Compact. Senator AIKEN, of Vermont, with 12 cosponsors, guided S. 1659 through to enactment at Public Law 81129.
Senator PASTORE, as Governor of Rhode Island, on May 8, 1950, executed the document which made his State a member of the first Interstate Forest Fire Protection Agency.
Mr. President, all of us, especially those who were in any way connected with the establishment of this Compact have a deep interest in its development, progress, and accomplishments. The devastation caused by the 1947 forest fires was most severe in the State of Maine. At that time, Austin H. Wilkins, at present forest commissioner for the State of Maine, was supervisor in charge of forest fire control in the organized towns. He is a member of the Compact Commission and served as chairman in 1969-70. His firsthand knowledge of conditions throughout the State in 1947 and action on the fireline provided excellent qualifications for writing "The Story of the Maine Fire Disaster" published in the Journal of Forestry in August 1948.
This account not only vividly describes the disaster, but sets forth the reasons for establishing an intergovernmental mechanism for preventing the recurrence of the events which took place in the fall of 1947.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article entitled "The Story of the Maine Forest Fire Disaster" be printed at this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
THE STORY OF THE MAINE FOREST FIRE DISASTER
(By Austin H. Wilkins)
Never in the history of the state of Maine have a series of forest fires caused such devastation and privation as those which ran rampant in October and November, 1947. There is nothing from historical records of the state to indicate that a major forest fire disaster ever before occurred in the fall. In the recent fire disaster winter set in before the fire lines were totally extinguished. In some sections, hose lines were frozen into the ground while others were buried under snow to be recovered in the spring.
The loss of property was not wholly confined to the forests. When one measures a loss in terms of human privation and hardship, the destruction of many inhabited dwellings and crossroad neighborhoods in the late season was tremendous.
Approximately 220,000 acres of forest, hay fields, and pastures were burned. This is a little over 1 percent of the total 16,783,000 acres of forest land in the state. Graphically, a straight line 313 miles long and one mile wide, extending from one extreme corner of the state to the other, would be an equivalent to the area burned.
It is estimated that the total property loss was $30,000,000, and fire suppression costs $500,000. This loss in a general classification includes the destruction of many fine homes and cottages and most all of their furnishings; sets of farm buildings, livestock, and farm machinery; boys' and girls' summer camps; antiques that can never be replaced; a famed cancer research laboratory; factories, stores, and businesses; telephone, telegraph, and power lines; trucks, tractors, and automobiles; public buildings; sawmills and lumber yards; millions of feet of mature timber and thousands of cords of cut and uncut fuel wood and pulpwood, and even the soil was so severely burned that nature will require many years to rebuild. In the tragic wake of this destruction 16 persons lost their lives, 2,500 were made homeless, 9 communities were leveled or practically wiped out, and 4 other communities suffered extensive damage.
One serious false impression must be corrected here before actual accounts of the fire are related. In spite of heavy property losses and extensive areas swept over, the whole state of Maine did not burn up nor did a major portion of it. It is unfortunate that leading newspapers outside of New England and national radio broadcasts, carried the exaggerated information that "The state of Maine was aflame." The psychological damage done by this false impression can result in a
most serious effect upon the state. As an illustration, the publisher of a weekly newspaper received a letter of condolence from his newsprint supplier regretting to learn that he had been "burned out" (which he wasn't) and advising that his November and December paper supply would be allocated elsewhere. A quick long distance telephone call soon straightened out the situation. There are many other similar cases. It is going to take much true publicity to get the facts across to the people of the country to prevent Maine being "written off" by tourists, vacationers, sportsmen, businessmen, and others.
The writer in describing the scenes, events, and conditions prior and during the disaster cannot be too detailed because of the many aspects of the whole situation. One must realize that there was not just one major forest fire but a series of widely scattered fires. Any oversight in mentioning persons, companies, agencies, or occurrences is not deliberate. There just isn't time to include all in this paper.
The contributing factors should first be considered. They were the character of the season, ground conditions, and fire hazards following lumbering operations building up to and extending through the disaster period.
The snowfall of 1946-47 was normal. But in early March, an abnormal warm spell set in which caused the snow to quickly melt and disappear from the woods along the entire coast line and for several townships inland. Temperatures in the high eighties broke longstanding weather records.
There was also very little frost in the ground. Thus, there was the unusual condition of fields and woods clear of snow at about the same time. To those engaged in fire control this was an ominous sign.
However, for the months which followed to the middle of July, the season was wet and cold. The average precipitation for April, May, and June was over 5 inches. In one section of the state there were five continuous days of rain from April 30 to May 5. Heavy rains also fell in May and June. There were many days of overcast skies and slight drizzles.
In the middle of July, a complete reversal of weather conditions started and remained unchanged for the next four months. This marked the beginning of a prolonged drought which accumulated to 108 days before any appreciable rains fell on November 8. There were several periods of 25 to 35 continuous days without any trace of precipitation whatsoever.
Continued days of warm, drying, gentle winds from the southwest and northwest quarters began to have a marked effect upon the soil moisture, wells, lakes, streams, ponds, and vegetation. By the first of October, with no break in the drought, several danger signs became very real and threatening. The water level of wells and lakes receded to unprecedented low marks, small streams dried up leaving here and there little stagnant pools. Bogs and marshes could be crossed without any sign of wetness, and the forest floor was practically without moisture.
The hardwood foliage began to show the effects of the drought. Lack of moisture caused the leaves to dry while still on the trees. Many fell prematurely and when crushed in the hand were pulverized. During the fire, hardwood trees flamed up just like a conifer. In stands of hardwood growth, fires actually crowned. Sometimes leaves would fall like snowflakes in a storm and quickly ignite on the hot ground and jump across trenched fire lines. There were several early killing frosts but little coloration as in other falls. The nights were hot and very little dew formed.
Conditions were so dry that the soil would not hold together. Very few farmers did fall plowing because of the difficulty of laying over furrows. When crews were constructing fire lines the soil would spill off the workmen's shovels like loose sand. Bulldozers working around fields and woods raised nothing but clouds of dust. Often in establishing a fire line a second run was made to lay up sufficient mounds of earth for a fire stop or for the crews to work with.
Wood in buildings became dry. The moisture in shingles, clapboards, foundation timbers, and wooden steps was greatly reduced by the evaporating rays of the sun.
Added to these physical dry signs were the reports from fire danger stations of a class 4 fire danger day continuing for periods of 15 to 20 consecutive days. There were several reports of a class 5 danger day.
Within the last 10 years four very distinct factors contributed toward the accumulation of this serious forest fire hazard. First, the slash hazard of the hurricane of 1938 had not been entirely eliminated; second, the severe snowstorm of 1945 caused heavy tree bending, branch and top breakage; third, the accelerated cutting operations during the war to supply wood so essential for the national emergency; and fourth, the continuing lumber operations to meet a vast program of post-war reconstruction.
At this point a brief word should be said about the state-town fire protection set-up in order to better understand what happened when the fires raged. The State Forestry Department is a cooperating agency only with the organized towns in forest fire control. Under the existing statutes the municipalities are responsible for their own fires. The state does not have any authority but cooperates by providing services of trained wardens, tools, and equipment, at no cost to the towns. The state further helps by paying one-half of the suppression costs on forest fires up to 1 percent of the town's valuation. It also maintains lookout towers, storehouses, and trucks. The only authority the state can exercise is what the selectmen of towns wish to give. They can and often do deputize the state wardens.
Normally, the state closes the lookout towers, storehouses, and lays off some of the wardens by the first of October. Charged with functioning within a limited budget, and expecting fall rains, the state did close out some districts. As fires began to occur the second week of October, everything was reopened at full strength, although it was pitifully inadequate to handle the situation which was to arise a week later.
Thus, the week of October 20 found the state, as a whole, powder dry and with about 50 small fires going. All were considered under control. By Governor's Proclamation, a ban was already in effect closing the entire woods of the state to smoking or building of any fires. This was made effective at sunrise, October 17, and continued in force until November 12, making one of the longest periods of woods' closure on record.
On October 21, strong winds blew all day and several fires broke out of patrol lines and then began the race of terror, climaxed by the all-day wind gale on the twenty-third. What happened that day and subsequent days is still a nightmare.
The major fire disaster in southern Maine will be referred to as the York County fire because 15 towns were involved. The situation, prior to the big wind of October 23, was this: This county had been cut heavily for pine lumber for the last 10 years leaving behind a tremendous volume of slash which was powder dry. A fire had burned for several days at North Kennebunkport but was more or less being held in check. Another fire was going on the Shapleigh Plains, an area of scrub oak and pitch pine, which had covered about 1,000 acres. Line patrols had been lessened but not stopped. Still another fire was going in the town of Wakefield, N.H., just over the Maine line. These fires were located at widely separated points. When the day of the big wind of October 23 came these three fires were whipped into a fury never experienced by natives or fire fighters in that section. The Wakefield fire jumped across the state line into Maine and raced until it met the Shapleigh fire – a distance of 8 miles. In the meantime the Shapleigh fire was racing through towns southward and ending at a point 19 miles from its point of origin. The North Kennebunkport fire, fanned by the wind, carried a solid wall of fire clear to the Atlantic ocean, wiping out valuable popular summer beach sections.
After the smoke had cleared away it was found that the Wakefield and Shapleigh fires which had joined did not catch up with the North Kennebunkport fire. Thus, there were two separate major areas burned. The total acreage covered was 131,000 acres with an estimated perimeter of 150 miles of fire lines. It is anticipated that 100,000,000 board feet of timber can be salvaged. Sawmill operators are now busily engaged in this work with millions of board feet cut as logs or already turned into lumber.
It was an awesome sight to see the solid walls of roaring fire sweeping over mountains and across level areas, consuming everything in their path. The smoke hung so thick and heavy for days over the area that it was difficult to determine at times just how near or far away the fires were. The sun did not penetrate through the thick pall of smoke for over ten days. Men using trucks, cars, and bulldozers had to use their headlights as much in the daytime as at night.
The state forest fire watchman on Ossipee Lookout had to abandon his tower together with a state police radio technician. Fortunately, the fire had slowed down at night and just crept over the mountain causing negligible damage to the tower.
The sound of the onrushing fires on fronts of several miles is described as a continuous roar.
The blackout conditions because of several communication and power lines added to the problem of fire suppression and evacuation. Stories of heroism are heard everywhere; fire fighters' making last ditch stands; families just escaping before their homes became enveloped with flames; and efforts to rush help where needed.
In the actual fighting of the fires, there was an abundance of manpower and equipment. However, there was no organization to handle fires at disaster level. When the fire got beyond town size there was no centralized control to coordinate the various protective agencies. It was not until two days later that organizational set-up began to function at state level and orders were handed down through properly authorized channels.
Appreciating that water was scarce, virtually whole fleets of big and small tank trucks were moving bumper to bumper to areas where they could be emptied onto burning buildings, fire in the woods, or wetting down protection strips. One cannot mention here all the names of those who provided heavy equipment except to state that offers to assist came from most everywhere. Grateful acknowledgment is made to all of them.
The intensity of the fire is of special interest. Fanned by gale velocity winds, fires crowned through stands of pine and yet did not drop down to develop a surface fire. In other instances, the crown fire traveled hundreds of feet ahead of the surface fire. In still other places, the fire was blown so hard that only an inch depth of the humus was burned. It is mystifying to see places where the fire virtually blew itself out. Charred leaves and twigs rained down on some sections to actually blacken the ground but contained no live fire brands.
A half-mile out to sea a heavily wooded island burned like a flaming torch.
The burning of the settlement of Newfield was tragic. It is hardly conceivable that a whole settlement could be so completely consumed. In the Goose Rocks, Cape Porpoise districts in Kennebunkport, over 200 dwelling places, most of them summer cottages, were destroyed. The State Forestry Department lost its valuable storehouse at Alfred. Practically all of the equipment was out on the fires. Insurance coverage will permit rebuilding sometime this spring.
The Fryeburg-Brownfield fire is another story of flame and smoke roaring madly over mountains and sweeping across valleys. This fire, like the others, broke out of bounds by the wind of October 23. On that day it traveled a distance of 13 miles. Jump fires were carried great distances ahead of the main fire, making it difficult for fire fighters to make a determined stand.
The technique of back firing was used to good advantage in some instances. Miles of back fires were started from bulldozed fire lines and widened, old dirt roads. It is said that this was a battle of the bulldozers. In the anxiety of many to save buildings and woods this method of fire suppression did not always save the situation. The oncoming head fire was too unpredictable and much effort was wasted.
Conditions were equally dry in this area with numerous cutovers to feed the fire. The loss of the two communities of Brownfield and East Brownfield was indeed tragic. Roads were crowded with people, livestock, cars, teams, and wheelbarrows fleeing before the fire. One could drive for miles and see where telephone poles were completely consumed, while in other places just the tops of poles and the crossarms would be dangling in midair.
The dry stubble of cut hay fields burned like spring grass fires, often igniting house and barn foundation timbers. Pilots engaged to assist in the control work could see little due to the dense rolling clouds of black smoke.
The watchman on a nearby lookout had to abandon the tower for two days because of the choking smoke and haze conditions. Typical "yellow days" hung over the area for nearly a week.
Rough estimates place a figure at 20,000,000 board feet of timber to be salvaged. Operations are already in progress.
It is believed that approximately 20,000 acres burned over.
The Bar Harbor fire followed a pattern similar to the others. A small fire was being held in check until October 23. Then the wind came. An all-day blow from the northwest quarter fanned the fire out of bounds and caused tremendous damage to many beautiful palatial residences and surrounding forest growth. Because of the rugged terrain, characteristic of Bar Harbor and Mt. Desert, the problem of fire fighting was most difficult. The dense growth of spruce and other softwoods was sufficient for the fire to travel hard and fast, fanning out into many fingers. As the fire swept over mountains and valleys at will toward the compact section of Bar Harbor there was enacted one of the most dramatic scenes of the disaster. With the causeway road leading to the mainland blocked by flames, a second Dunkerque took place with fleeing residents rescued by Coast Guard patrol boats, the Navy, and many private boats. Inasmuch as the Acadia National Park (federal land) was considerably involved, some form of martial law was in force. Federal soldiers from the Dow Airfield gave valuable assistance to augment the local organizations.
Through long lines of hose, water was pumped by boats from the Coast Guard and the Navy.
Here too, as in the other burns, some timber salvage program is to be worked out. Estimates place 17,500 acres burned over.
The last major fire to be mentioned occurred in Washington County and known as the Centerville-Jonesboro fire. This fire originated in a pulpwood operation. Again the strong wind of October 23 fanned this fire out of control and burned 20,000 acres. Much fine cut and uncut pulpwood was destroyed. Lack of water necessitated long hauls by trucks and tractors, and laying of long lines of hose. Many miles of hose were laid out. It was on this fire that winter set in before all the equipment had been picked up. Heavy bulldozers laid back and buried miles of live fire which continued to smoke late into December.
A brief word should be written here as to the organizational set-up. It is frankly admitted that there was no fire action plan to meet such a disaster. As previously stated, the small municipalities have always handled their own fires. When the fires began to get beyond town lines and whole communities engulfed or threatened, then the job was turned over to the State Forestry Department. The Governor, on the evening of October 23, declared a state of emergency and broadcast to the people of the state that all should turn to and give whatever help at their command to the Forestry Department. The response to this appeal was magnificent. The department was immediately placed on a 24-hour schedule for the duration of the emergency.
It was not until two days later that things began to smooth out and organizations function under a single head. The agencies of the Red Cross, National Guard, State Police, State Fish and Game Department, State Highway Commission, Army, Navy, F.W.A., American Legion, Civil Air Patrol, Boy Scouts, U.S. Forest Service, municipalities, colleges, industries, and many others all contributed toward the tremendous task of patrolling fires and rehabilitation. Even dry ice was dropped by planes in an effort to make it rain.
Over 150 separate fires were going or being patrolled at one time or another during the week of October 20. It was natural that the state as a whole should revert to a set-up reminiscent of the days of the O.C.D. (Organization for Civil Defense). Towns not affected by fires began to mobilize manpower and equipment. Rumors of sabotage caused towns to maintain 24-hour road patrols, form vigilante groups, establish road blocks and watches from every vantage point. The state issued special car stickers for entrance to and from fire areas. Lookout towers were manned around the clock on a 24-hour schedule for over two weeks. Even the coastal lighthouses cooperated in this detection work.
The public was so thoroughly aroused to the fire danger that any new fires could almost be "ringed" by crews of men. In one instance over 200 men with every conceivable fire tool and equipment converged on a small 10-acre fire. It would have had to go between the legs of men to escape. Even a septic tank was mounted on a truck and used to haul water.
This vigilance continued until the crisis was over. Welcome rains came on November 9 and brought to end one of the worst periods of forest fire devastation known in Maine. It is significant to state that man and the facilities at his disposal did in a large measure bring under control most of the major fires before the rains came. In retrospect it should be noted that not a single life was lost of the thousands engaged in actual fire fighting. The reported 16 deaths were due to indirect causes.
It is especially noteworthy to state that in the Maine Forestry District, where over 10,000,000 acres of vast wild timberlands are located, there were no major fires such as those going in the organized towns. This was probably due to better organization and preparation.
In summary, what was the most valuable lesson learned from the disaster? It can be summed up as a need for centralized control, premised on law – a single authority to handle such situations at the various levels of organization, and mandatory training of state and town wardens.
A master state fire plan must be drawn up calling for legislative action combined with appropriation of sufficient funds. It should contain the combined thoughts and ideas of all cooperating agencies and be an expression of what the people of Maine want and are willing to pay to get forest fire protection.
SOME SIDELIGHTS OF THE DISASTER
The State Forestry Department sent the following telegram to the D. B. Smith Company, Utica, New York. "Rush immediately 200 Indians." The astonished Western Union operator asked if we really meant 200 live Indians. The young lady was quickly advised.
A family moved all of their furnishings and valuables to another house some distance from the path of the fire only to learn that the house was burned and their own saved.
Army transport planes flying from Newfoundland to Westover Field, Mass., reported 30-mile tail smoke out to sea from the Bar Harbor fire.
Several stories are told of sophomore college students who took charge of some of the fire control work and did a credible job. It was learned later the men were majors in the army during the war.
It is told that a farmer saved his home by using a hard cider barrel and contents as an extinguisher which had been preciously stored in the cellar for enjoyment for the coming long winter nights.
Eye witnesses speak of live embers being blown by the wind onto sides of old houses and barns and held there until the clapboards ignited.
A local mutual insurance company had just reinsured itself shortly before the disaster and was able to pay its burned-out policy holders.
A most peculiar story, verified by several, is told of a patrolman observing several small fires all in straight line of each other leading away from the fire line. Five little fires were found and were traced to a dried up mud hole where a raccoon lay dead and almost completely singed.
A freak is reported of the branches of a pine resting on the roof of a shingled barn. During the fire the branches were burned but the barn did not ignite.
A colony of beavers hindered the suppression work by repeatedly rebuilding their dam which had been dynamited to let the water through.
Another colony of beavers is credited with first beginning timber salvage operations. Hardly had the fire passed near their winter houses when they began cutting the burned trees leaving high stumps to get away from the charred wood.
Mr. MUSKIE: Mr. President, the Maine forest fire disaster of 1947 brought a realization that no single State could afford to employ and equip a forest firefighting organization adequate to cope with such a catastrophe. Gov. Frederick G. Payne of Maine and the citizens of Maine and other States sought better forest fire protection. The first step was a conference of the New England Governors at the Massachusetts State House in November 1947. This led to several subsequent conferences attended by officials of interested agencies.
In the discussions and studies that accompanied this effort, several objectives and several difficulties became apparent. The primary objective was to assure the possibility that a State facing a threat of serious forest fires could be aided by the forest firefighting personnel of a neighboring State. The difficulty was the question of the powers, immunities, rights, and liabilities of the forces of the aiding States.
In essence, this was the heart of the problem, but there were other suggestions that would strengthen such a pattern of cooperation. It was suggested that some permanent agency be set up which, through its membership and its power of reporting and recommending, would by its very existence serve to integrate the forest fire protection services of the States of the region into a cohesive and organized pattern. In addition, it was suggested that a regional forest fire plan ought to be developed, while at the same time each State would be obligated to maintain a forest fire plan of its own. Another interesting problem was the situation along the international boundary with Canada. Some of the States that fronted on that boundary were anxious, if possible, to have any plan for cooperative aid include the adjacent Canadian Provinces.
With the necessity for securing a legally binding agreement among the States and a permanent basis for a joint interstate agency it was decided that an interstate compact was necessary. For this purpose a conference of the State Foresters of New England and New York was organized and met several times during 1948 and 1949 under the auspices of the Massachusetts Commission on Interstate Cooperation and the Council of State Governments. The draft of a compact was formulated to encompass these several objectives.
The Council of State Governments played a major part in the details of drafting the compact legislation which was introduced by it in the Congress and through the several State joint legislative committees on interstate cooperation in the State legislatures.
The enactment of Public Law 129, 81st Congress, approved June 25, 1949, authorized the establishment of an interstate forest fire protection compact in the Northeast. Within 4 months, six of seven specified member States had become party to a northeastern interstate forest fire protection compact. Rhode Island, whose legislature was not in session the previous year, became the seventh State by joining in 1950.
The citations and dates on which the compact was executed by the Governors are as follows:
Connecticut, Public Act 236 of 1949; September 30, 1949 (Chester Bowles, Governor).
Maine, Chapter 75 of 1949; August 23, 1949 (Frederick G. Payne, Governor).
Massachusetts, Chapter 457 of 1949; August 23, 1949 (Paul R. Dever, Governor).
New Hampshire, Chapter 302 of 1949; September 1, 1949 (Sherman Adams, Governor).
New York, Chapter 744 of 1949; October 18, 1949 (Thomas E. Dewey, Governor).
Rhode Island, Chapter 2430 of 1950; May 18, 1950 (John O. Pastore, Governor).
Vermont, Public Act 271 of 1949; September 14, 1949 (Ernest Gibson, Governor).
ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMISSION
By January 1, 1950, legislative requirements had been met and the commission met to organize on January 19 of that year, electing Perry Merrill, of Vermont, as chairman; Arthur S. Hopkins, of New York, as vice chairman; and appointing committees on rules and regulations and organization. After a general discussion on the compact setup, adjournment was had to March 10, 1950.
At that meeting the rules and regulations prepared by Mr. Fred Zimmerman of the Council of State Governments were approved, a budget for expenses to July 1, 1950, prepared, and R. M. Evans appointed executive secretary. The meeting also fixed the date of the first annual meeting for July 17, 1950. Mr. Evans began work May 4, 1950, from office space furnished by the White Mountain National Forest at Laconia, N.H. The commission was now in business a short 9 months after congressional approval of the compact.
The first annual meeting in Boston was an important one. From its deliberations came the pattern which was to guide the commission in its pioneer interstate fire protection work. A budget for the year July 1, 1950, to June 30, 1951, in the amount of $7,500 was approved and assessments made on the several States in proportion to the Clarke-McNary estimates for "basic protection." This method is still in use.
A technical committee composed of the State foresters was established to supervise a coordinated training program and to formulate procedures in all technical fire control problems. Uniform closure laws, regional and State fire plans were also discussed and the officers and secretary reelected for the ensuing fiscal year.
CANADIAN PARTICIPATION
Representatives of the Provinces of New Brunswick and Quebec attended the first annual meeting of the compact in Boston.
On May 2, 1951, the Province of New Brunswick adopted an Order-in-Council giving authority to the minister of Lands and Mines to negotiate and enter into an agreement for participation in the Northeastern Interstate Forest Fire Protection Compact subject to the approval of the Department of External Affairs of the Dominion Government at Ottawa. Representatives of the Department of External Affairs approached officers of the commission as well as the eastern office of the Council of State Governments for full details concerning the compact.
It was now in order to secure the additional consent of Congress as called for in Public Law 129 with reference to participation in the compact by Canadian Provinces. A draft bill to accomplish this purpose was prepared, containing the simple implementing language required by both the compact and Public Law 129. In addition, it contained provisions designed to cover any questions that might arise under the immigration laws or under the tax laws dealing with exports and imports. Public Law 340, 82d Congress, approved May 13, 1952 filled this need.
Although the Province of New Brunswick seriously considered becoming a member of the compact in the early 1950's, it was Quebec which was the first Canadian Province to become a member of the Northeastern Forest Fire Protection Compact on September 23, 1969. The April 1970 issue of American Forests carried an article entitled "The Quebec Joinder" which describes the ceremony at which Quebec joined the compact. The author Alfred E. Eckes is a 38-year veteran employee of the U.S. Forest Service who has spent much of his career in the northeast where he acquired a wealth of information about the North-eastern Forest Fire Protection Compact. For the past decade, he has been assigned to the cooperative forest fire control program in the northeast and has provided liaison to the compact organization.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article entitled "The Quebec Joinder" be printed at this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
THE QUEBEC JOINDER
(By A. E. Eckes)
September 23, 1969, was an historic day in the annals of forest fire prevention and control in North America. In joining the Northeastern Interstate Forest Fire Protection Compact, the Province of Quebec pledged that it is now a full-fledged partner in the task of providing forest fire protection to forests situated along the 500 miles of common border shared with the states of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont and New York. The agreement is called the Quebec Joinder.
The solemnity of the occasion was marked. Dignitaries from both countries who gathered at Quebec's Legislative Council Chamber knew this was an important "first" that brought two neighboring countries into a full partnership. Prime Minister of Quebec, the Honorable Jean-Jacques Bertrand, was there. So was the Minister of Lands and Forests, the Honorable Claude G. Gosselin. Representing the Northeastern Forest Fire Protection Commission was Chairman Austin H. Wilkins, Forest Commissioner of the Maine Forest Service, and Governor Kenneth M. Curtis, of Maine.
Many of those present had long memories of past killing fires, some of mutual concern to both countries. Beginning with Peshtigo Fire of 1871 in Wisconsin and continuing through the Sundance Fire of 1967 in Idaho, there is a long list of fire spectaculars including numerous death-dealing disasters. October 1947, loomed even more importantly in the minds of the new partners. Throughout the northeastern States and eastern Canada, the days had been hot, dry and dark. A summer drought became a nightmare. In Maine, three major fires – Alfred, Brownfield and Bar Harbor – burned more than 250,000 acres. Numerous lesser fires burned in the New England States, New York and Canada.
Property losses ran high. Homes were burned, numerous small industries and businesses wiped out, family possessions lost, and villages and schools destroyed.
In the wake of the fires, there was a new realization in both countries that no single state could afford to employ and equip a forest fire organization adequate to cope with a holocaust as had been experienced.
A Governors' conference, followed by subsequent studies by representatives of interested agencies, led to a decision to employ the Interstate Compact device to provide the suppression forces and facilities which would be required should another catastrophic fire situation occur.
The 81st Congress enacted Public Law 129 granting consent and approval of Congress to an interstate forest fire protection compact: "Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress Assembled, That the consent and
approval of Congress is hereby given to an interstate forest fire protection compact, as hereinafter set out; but before any province of the Dominion of Canada shall be made party to such compact, the further consent of Congress shall be first obtained."
In 1952, the 82nd Congress enacted legislation which gave consent and approval for Joinder of the Canadian Provinces.
These Acts made it possible to establish the first interstate compact for prevention and control of forest fires. The six New England States and New York, along with any State or Canadian Province contiguous to a member State, were specified in the law as eligible for membership. Six states enacted necessary legislation in 1949 and the Northeastern Forest Fire Protection Compact became effective. The legislature of Rhode Island met in 1950 and approved a measure that enabled compact membership.
For 20 years, 1949-1969, membership in the Northeastern Forest Fire Protection Compact remained at seven States, though the latch string was out. The Canadian Provinces of Quebec and New Brunswick indicated interest in membership but encountered obstacles which prohibited an early Joinder. Throughout the years, representatives of the forest agencies of these provinces worked to remove the obstacles. Persistence paid off and by mid-1969 it was clear the Province of Quebec would soon be ready for Joinder. September 23, 1969 was the day selected for Quebec to become a full partner.
Invitations were sent out to selected forest fire control people in the United States and Canada to participate at the ceremony. During the ceremony Minister of Lands and Forests Gosselin stated "This agreement will make it possible for Quebec to provide fire protection to the forests situated along the five hundred miles of common border that we share with the States of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont and New York and this in a manner that will be altogether more efficient and economical.
"We have had in the past a profitable experience in dealing with this commission particularly in the field of personnel training but we felt that we should join this group in order to establish a more systematic approach in our efforts. The agreement will permit the establishment of integrated programs for the conservation of a resource that spreads on both sides of the border and that is equally important to our countries. The compact bears on all aspects of the prevention and suppression of forest fires and includes the conditions under which mutual assistance will be granted.
"It must be remembered that fire knows no border and that therefore coordination of efforts is vitally important. Furthermore modern techniques of fire control rely on extensive use of aircrafts as well as other heavy equipment and therefore it is necessary to spread the utilization of that costly material over the largest possible area in order to keep operating costs within reasonable limits. This is why the agreement which is signed today opens a new era in the protection of our south shore forests and we deem that we are fortunate to be able to profit from over 20 years of experience in fire control."
Speaking for the Governors of the seven member States, Governor Curtis of Maine, replied:
"A great American poet, Robert Frost, once wrote that good fences make good neighbors. It was the sort of remark that a New Englander might be expected to make for it tells us in a brief, pointed way that while we respect one another, we recognize each other's right to independent thoughts and action. Today's compact signing ceremony is but another example of this. In reality, of course, we have been able to call for help and receive it when fighting fires in our vast woodlands for some time.
"Just two years ago a disastrous blaze was sweeping across our northern region and it was the airborne firefighters from Quebec who rushed to our aid and helped drown the fire.
"During many emergencies along our border there have been men from Canadian cities and towns who have hurried to our aid, and when the need has arisen, we have reciprocated.
"The idea of a compact to formalize this Gentlemen's Agreement between nations and states is but a reaffirmation of this agreement."
Then the agreement was signed by the Minister of Lands and Forests Gosselin, representing the Province of Quebec, and Commissioner Wilkins. The Province of Quebec was now a member of the first forest protection compact, and the compact had become an international fire control agency.
Mr. MUSKIE. Within a year, following "The Quebec Joinder," the Province of New Brunswick became a member of the Northeastern Forest Fire Protection Compact. A news item released at Fredericton, New Brunswick, on June 9, 1970, describes the ceremony at which this Province became a member of the compact.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the news article entitled "New Brunswick Joins Fire Compact" be printed at this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
NEW BRUNSWICK JOINS FIRE COMPACT
FREDERICTON. – The province of New Brunswick today (June 8, 1970) joined the Northeastern Forest Fire Protection Commission, an agency which includes the New England States, the State of New York and the Province of Quebec.
The agreement calls for mutual aid in fighting forest fires and integration of regional fire plans and training programs.
Premier Louis J. Robichaud and Natural Resources Minister W. R. Duffle signed the Northeastern Forest Fire Protection Compact" on behalf of New Brunswick.
Signing for the Commission was its Chairman, Austin H. Wilkins, Forest Commissioner for the State of Maine. Governor Kenneth M. Curtis of Maine also signed in his capacity as representative of the New England Governor's Conference.
The mutual aid provisions of the Agreement cover 5.4 million acres of New Brunswick forests, and includes all of Charlotte, Carleton, Victoria and Madawaska counties and parts of Saint John, Kings, Queens, Sunbury and York Counties.
The Northeastern Forest Fire Protection Commission was formed following the disastrous fires in New England in 1947 to provide for mutual assistance in meeting extreme forest fire emergencies.
New Brunswick Forest Service personnel have taken part in the Commission's training programs in the past and the agreement signed today will formalize such participation.
Speaking at a luncheon following the signing, the Premier welcomed Gov. Curtis and officers of the Commission to the Province and expressed his pleasure that New Brunswick had joined with its neighbors in a cooperative approach to the problems of forest protection.
The Premier referred to the agreement as further evidence of the friendly co-operation that has always existed between the two countries, especially in the Atlantic area.
"For many years the province has benefitted through the attendance of our fire protection personnel at the kind invitation of members of the Compact. With the signing of this formal agreement we are now in a position to take an official part in assisting the activities of the Commission. I am sure that such direct participation on our part will be mutually advantageous to all concerned," said the Premier.
THE COMPACT IN ACTION – MUTUAL AID
Mr. MUSKIE. Mutual aid provisions of the compact were invoked for the first time in August of 1952 when extremely dry conditions and stubborn fires were affecting Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island. Arrangements were made through the Secretary and when calls for assistance resulted Vermont provided New Hampshire with pump operators and standby service. Maine received pumps and hose from New York in less than 5 hours from time of request.
In October of 1963 extreme conditions in New York resulted in requests for hand tools, pumps, and hose. These requests were honored by Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Maine. Maine also had standby manpower ready to go.
Later that month Massachusetts reached a "state of emergency" and requested assistance through the Secretary. Standby men and equipment were made available from Maine, Rhode Island, and the U.S. Forest Service.
Massachusetts had problems again the next year and in May of 1964 utilized manpower and tank trucks from Connecticut and Rhode Island.
In August of 1965 a large, uncontrolled fire in Maine resulted in five member States providing aid. Pumps and hose were furnished by Massachusetts, New York, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island.
Although over 12,000 acres of forest land had been burned over, compact aid had helped prevent a recurrence of the disastrous fires 18 years before under similar conditions.
The latest call for compact assistance came through the U.S. Forest Service in Washington for possible assistance to the Province of Ontario. Fifty thousand feet of hose and 23 portable pumps were made available for transport by military aircraft. Fortunately the situation cooled and dispatch was not necessary.
TRAINING
On November 14-16, 1950, the fire control officers of the region met at Laconia, N.H. This was an important meeting because out of it came agreements and recommendations which determined the direction and kind of the training programs of the commission. The basic purpose of such a program was determined to be as follows:
To enable the compact "on short notice to assemble from its several States fire control personnel capable of functioning as a well-coordinated, smoothly operating team to take on the handling of a large forest fire," it was recognized that the same principles of organization would apply to fires of any size in varying degrees. It was also emphasized that instate training based on the commission's standards was a must if uniformity was to be secured.
Two months later the commission held its first training session in Laconia, N.H., on January 29 to February 1, 1951. The subject was "Fire Control Organization and Its Operation." In August of the same year the technical committee approved the proposed scheme of interstate training and urged its continuation.
A second training meeting on organization was held October 2-5, 1951, at Norfolk, Conn. This was a simulated exercise or dry run. This exercise, participated in by fire personnel from all seven compact States, clearly demonstrated the need for the proposed type of training.
Following this dry run, the technical committee on November 13-14, 1951, formally adopted a detailed training policy under which all subsequent training sessions have been conducted.
The program originated with the need for uniformly trained personnel who could move from State to State as needed, and be fitted into the firefighting organization of a sister State without further instruction as to how the firefighting job was to be done. The training program is conducted by the commission in cooperation with the U.S. Forest Service, State forestry departments, State university forestry departments, and private organizations.
In brief, the purpose of the program is to train persons who, in turn, are expected to train others in their home States. The aim is to teach such persons how to cooperate in controlling large or "campaign" fines.
Since the inception of the compact training program in 1951, 23 training sessions have been held, providing more than 650 hours of instruction in the various facets of forest fire control. Subjects covered include compact fire control and organization, campaign fires, fire suppression fundamentals, weather forecasting, management of men and equipment, presuppression planning for critical high hazard areas, interpretation of fire records and data, fundamentals of ignition and combustion, fire prevention, law enforcement, instructor's training, air operational procedures, weather and fire behavior, mechanized forest fire control, fire planning, organization for large fires and other related subjects.
Some State forest fire control personnel have attended nearly all of the training sessions, and hundreds of individuals have attended one or more training sessions. Attendance has not been limited to member States, but forest fire control people from outside the area have been invited to attend either as trainees or program specialists.
An analysis of the forest fire record of the seven States joining the compact shortly after the fire catastrophe of 1947 shows that these training sessions have paid good dividends, as there has been a substantial increase in efficiency in controlling fires. Unfortunately the prevention of man-caused fires has not had similar success. Forest fire prevention is made difficult by an expanding and mobile population and increased hazards.
[Table omitted]
The Northeastern Forest Fire Protection Compact is effectively accomplishing the purposes intended by the Congress. It is indeed a pleasure, Mr. President, to review a program which, over the course of 25 years, has filled an important need and has served as a model for similar efforts in other parts of the Nation.