March 1, 1971
Page 4412
SENATOR MUSKIE'S ADDRESS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
Mr. HART. Mr. President, on February 23, my colleague, from Maine, Senator MUSKIE, spoke in Philadelphia about the dangers of our widening involvement in Indochina. He delivered a compelling call for "wisdom, moderation, and restraint" so that we can help create the conditions for peace. I commend his words to your attention and ask unanimous consent for their inclusion into the RECORD.
There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
REMARKS BY SENATOR EDMUND S. MUSKIE AT THE CONNAISSANCE LECTURE. UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, PHILADELPHIA, PA.
George Kennan once wrote that "A political society does not live to conduct foreign policy . . . it conducts foreign policy in order to live."
Our experience in Indochina is a tragic demonstration that our foreign policy affects us no less than it affects other nations.
Foreign policy is not a game. It should be a means for allowing us to get on with what ought to be our fundamental tasks – of building a whole society here in America, and of helping other nations improve the quality of life for their citizens. The time has come to return to these tasks.
Now is the time to do what we must; to end the war; to end the killing 10,000 miles away; to stop tearing our own country apart. For almost 200 years as a nation, we have proclaimed our belief in peace and in the dignity of man. Yet for too many years, we have permitted that belief to wither away in the jungles of Indochina. We have too often behaved in Indochina as if the use of force
should be a first alternative rather than a last resort. We have too often behaved in Indochina as if our nation's men and resources were bargaining chips in an international game of poker. We have too often behaved, in Indochina and elsewhere, as if the preservation of the status quo abroad were essential to our survival here at home. We have too often behaved, in Indochina and elsewhere, as if international politics were a simple contest between the forces of darkness and the forces of light.
How, then, should we behave in a world where distrust and hostility still run deep, where the aims of nations continue to differ in fundamental respects? While remaining prepared to resist the threat or use of force, we must also be prepared to exercise the wisdom, moderation, and restraint which are necessary if man is to create the conditions for peace.
We must remember that saving men's lives is more important than saving face for governments.
We must remember that a foreign policy which cannot be presented honestly to the American people does not deserve their support. I speak tonight out of deep concern that we have forgotten these very principles in Indochina, and so the war goes on.
I am deeply concerned that after this Administration has assured us it was winding down the war, it has taken new military actions across the face of Indochina. I am deeply concerned that this Administration has ruled out any further initiatives by our negotiators at the Paris Talks. I am deeply concerned by the news blackout before the invasion of Laos, and the conflicting reports of what is happening there now. Eventually, we will know, and the Administration will learn that it can embargo the news, but it cannot embargo the truth.
It is cynical for this Administration to argue that Americans are not engaged in ground combat in Laos when American helicopter gun crews are involved in ground combat, and American lives are being lost. A difference of thirty feet in altitude between helicopter gunners and the ground troops they are firing at is no difference at all in function.
I believe it was wrong to unleash South Vietnamese troops across the border of Laos and support them there, as I believed it was wrong to lead them across the border of Cambodia. What we have attempted, with a limited number of South Vietnamese, is an operation that has been rejected in the past for far stronger U.S. forces. Once again, this Administration has minimized the risks and exaggerated the benefits of a new military adventure. Whatever the apparent or illusory short-term military gains, this action has resulted in a substantial extension of our military involvement and has further undermined the Paris talks.
I believe it was right for the President to have told us last June that no combat support missions would be flown across the skies of Cambodia. I believe it was wrong for his Secretary of Defense, six months later, to characterize this pledge and the words of the Cooper-Church Amendment as matters of "semantics." If these matters are semantics, then neither the pledge nor even the laws of our government can have any reliable meaning.
I believe it is wrong to increase once again the bombing of North Vietnam. And I believe it was wrong for the President to refuse to rule out an invasion of North Vietnam by the South Vietnamese who could not attack the North without our support.
The longer we lend our presence to this expanding conflict, the longer this conflict will endure.
And the longer it endures, the more profound will be the injury done, not only to the peoples of Vietnam and Cambodia and Laos, but to our own country – to our men who are killed or maimed and to their families, to our institutions of learning, to our procedures for governing, to our confidence in our society's ability to reach for its own ideals.
The President has had more than two long years to implement his so-called plan to end the war. But all that he has revealed is a program for maintaining a substantial American military presence in Indochina. Our troop level in South Vietnam will have been reduced to 284,000 men by May of this year. I welcome that reduction. I believe all Americans welcome that reduction.
This Administration has tried to make us believe, however, that its policy is to train the South Vietnamese to take over the fighting so our troops can be withdrawn. But has the President said that this is his policy? No – he would only say last Wednesday that we will withdraw all our troops as part of a mutual withdrawal.
Then what are we to make of the President's refusal to say his policy will lead to a complete withdrawal of American troops? Must Americans fight and die indefinitely in Vietnam and Cambodia and Laos? Must our men in South Vietnam remain indefinitely as props for the Thieu-Ky regime? And how long must further thousands of our men in Thailand and on the seas off Indochina be committed to this war? These are the things we want this Administration to make perfectly clear.
This much we already know: Vietnamization is not the answer. Vietnamization is no answer for our American men still held captive as prisoners-of-war. Vietnamization is no sure answer for the safe withdrawal of our remaining troops. Vietnamization is no answer for a negotiated settlement to end all of the fighting. Vietnamization perpetuates the illusion of ultimate military victory.
This Administration now argues that its activities in Cambodia and Laos will protect Vietnamization and thereby hasten an end to the war. It is a curious logic that would conclude a war by widening it. What will happen if American troop levels continue to drop and our forces become more vulnerable to attack? Will there then be more invasions of Laos by the South Vietnamese, with continuing American support? Or will the President then resume the air war against North Vietnam beyond the vague limits of what is now called "protective reaction?"
Only last Wednesday, the President said he was "not going to place any limitation" on the use of conventional air power anywhere in Indochina, including North Vietnam. Let us remember that the bombing of North Vietnam accompanied a massive increase in American troops from 1965 to 1968. The bombing left hundreds of American pilots prisoner in North Vietnam. The bombing did nothing to prevent the TET offensive. And when we stopped the bombing in October 1968, our objective was to begin substantive negotiations.
The President now says he will take no new initiatives at the Paris talks. All that is left of the President's so-called plan is Vietnamization. Some say that plan will work. Some say it will not work. I say it is the wrong plan in either case.
If the plan does work. we can look forward to continued warfare among the Vietnamese and an indefinite American presence. If it doesn't work, this Administration does not exclude the possibility of attacks on North Vietnam itself. The dangers are incalculable. A plan which leaves only these alternatives, which gives us only these bleak expectations, is the wrong plan. It is the continuation of a war which must come to an end.
I am convinced that for the right policy we must look – not toward Vietnamization, but rather toward the peace negotiations and toward creating the conditions for peace. We must seek to negotiate in Paris what is negotiable and what can never be settled on the widening battlefields of Indochina.
We cannot hope to dictate the lasting terms or even the shape of a political settlement of this conflict. Only the Vietnamese can settle their political differences. Only they can fashion a settlement in which they have a stake. Only they can understand the political realities which such a settlement must reflect.
It should be clear to all of us by now that this war is essentially a war fought among the Vietnamese people for political ends. And therein lies a lesson of this tragedy. We cannot substitute our will and our political system for theirs. We cannot write the social contract for another people. We may, however, be able to reach agreements on those issues which concern us most, provided we make clear our intention to withdraw all our troops from Vietnam by a fixed and definite date.
I have no doubt we could then negotiate the release of our American prisoners of war before that deadline. I have no doubt we could then negotiate the safe withdrawal of all our troops now stationed in South Vietnam. In addition, there could be a cease-fire between our troops and theirs which could be the first step toward a complete standstill cease-fire among all the parties. At the same time, we could work toward agreements to end the fighting in Cambodia and Laos. And we could encourage the Vietnamese parties to negotiate a political settlement that would restore a measure of peace to all of Vietnam. These must be the goals of our policy in Indochina.
Many Americans believe that events have taken over, that things have gotten out of hand, that nothing they can do will change the policy of this Administration. But I believe you can make a difference, even before 1972. You can exert responsible public pressure upon the Executive Branch for an American commitment to complete withdrawal, before 1972. You can support initiatives in the Congress to establish an Indochina policy which makes sense, before 1972.
That is why I introduced a sense of the Senate Resolution last May, calling on the President to establish a timetable for the complete and orderly withdrawal of all American troops. That is why I co-sponsored the McGovern-Hatfield Amendment in the last Congress. And that is why I have agreed to co-sponsor it in this Congress, and to support its establishment of a deadline of December 31, 1971.
It should be clear to us by now that for too many years, we have pursued the wrong policy in the wrong place in the wrong way. The price of that policy has been a terrible cost in American lives and resources. The price has been a terrible cost in the suffering of the peoples of Indochina.
We have helped to destroy their countryside, their towns and their villages, the very fabric of their lives. And if we now have any commitment in Indochina, it must be this: we must help the people of this region rebuild their countries and heal the wounds of war. We must show in Indochina that we understand what foreign policy is all about, what wisdom and judgment and restraint are all about, what compassion and moral obligations are all about.
Isn't it clear then what we must do? After so many young Americans have felt compelled to demonstrate against their own government;after so many Americans of every description have come to doubt what their government says and to doubt that their government will listen; after so much division and disillusionment throughout this land; isn't it clear?
Of course, it is clear. It is clear that the only light at the end of the tunnel will be the one we strike ourselves. We must withdraw all our troops from Vietnam. We must do so by the end of this year. We must be willing – all of us – to say, "Enough."