June 16, 1971
Page 20210
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, we are no longer debating whether or not we should stay in Vietnam. We are debating how we should leave. I believe that the Hatfield-McGovern amendment, which I cosponsor, is the best way for us to end our combat involvement in Indochina. By requiring the withdrawal of all our combat troops by December 31, 1971, it will insure that the United States will not have combat troops in Vietnam for the indefinite future.
It is unclear what kind of a continuing commitment to the South Vietnamese the President's Vietnamization program requires. Whatever it is, I feel it is essential that we make clear that our commitment to fight with our own troops in Indochina is over. It must be clear to our young people, clear to all Americans, and clear to the South Vietnamese.
By swiftly and cleanly ending our combat role, we can make a definite beginning in the processes of removing from our own political life the harmful battles over the Vietnam war. Not only have we done enough fighting for the South Vietnamese, but we have done enough damage to our own Nation. A lingering and uncertain combat commitment in South Vietnam will only continue the divisions, the bitterness, and the distrust that this war has brought to our Nation.
Just as important to us is the future of American prisoners being held by the Communists. I believe that the Hatfield-McGovern amendment provides the most promising framework for the release of our prisoners of war. There are indications that if we set a date certain for the withdrawal of our troops, we will be able to negotiate the release of our prisoners of war. We should set a date certain contingent upon the release of our prisoners, and then try to negotiate the release of our prisoners as we withdraw our troops. All our prisoners should be returned before the final American contingents leave South Vietnam.
Of course, the Hatfield-McGovern amendment requires that our prisoners be returned as a condition of our withdrawal. It is not a betrayal of the prisoners' freedom or a blow to the hopes of their wives and children. Rather, it is the most sensible way to obtain their release.
By setting a date certain, we also make it clear to the South Vietnamese that they will carry the combat responsibility at the end of this year. As has been said so often, the Vietnamese must be able to do the fighting by themselves. It is most appropriate that we make it clear to the South Vietnamese people that they will have to do the fighting themselves before the upcoming presidential elections. A date certain for our withdrawal will make the choice by the South Vietnamese about their future leadership more realistic.
Hopefully, the setting of a date certain for the withdrawal of our troops will improve the climate for negotiations. Nothing can guarantee the beginning of talks that will lead to a negotiated settlement and an end to the bloodshed in Indochina. But a withdrawal of American combat personnel from that area is probably the best way the United States could move toward creating the conditions for such a negotiated settlement.
Nor will the passage of date certain legislation threaten the safety of our withdrawing troops.
Extensive withdrawal is already publicly scheduled, and if the Communists want to attack our withdrawing forces, they could do so with or without this legislation. The approximate timetable of our present withdrawal is available to the North Vietnamese as it is to every newspaper reader in this country. The only difference between the President's position and this legislation is the question of residual forces.
Neither alternative guarantees the safety of our troops. In fact, the indefinite stationing of the small combat forces in South Vietnam will create long-range threats to our troop safety that would not occur if all our troops withdrew by the end of the year. And certainly there is less incentive for the North Vietnamese or the Vietcong to attack our troops while withdrawing, thereby taking the chance that we would change our minds, than if they were to stay on indefinitely.
Moreover, the setting of a date for withdrawal will, in my judgment, enhance the prospects of negotiating the safe withdrawal of our troops. This legislation does not challenge the President's constitutional authority over the conduct of foreign policy. It does not direct the tactics of the war – it merely is an exercise of Congress' legitimate authority over ending the appropriations for the support of American troops abroad.
Just as important, this amendment is not a political challenge to the President. It does not make Vietnam into an issue in the next presidential election. It does the opposite: it removes Vietnam from politics. There can be no doubt that Democrats and Republicans support this legislation. This amendment should have the effect of sharing with the President the responsibility for ending a war that both parties are responsible for starting.
Mr. President, I think the passage of the amendment is of crucial importance for our Nation. It is important because it will begin to end an issue that has divided us at home more deeply than any other since the Civil War. It is important because it will restore faith in many of our citizens that we can control our foreign policy processes by quickly helping to end a war that the American public does not support. And it is important to demonstrate to Americans that our Government can move in a timely and adequate fashion to rectify past mistakes and move toward directing our energy to the problems at home.