May 19, 1971
Page 15860
SENATOR EAGLETON'S TESTIMONY ON INDOCHINA
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, last week, the distinguished Senator from Missouri (Mr. EAGLETON) testified before the Foreign Relations Committee on his recent trip to Indochina. He dealt with two increasingly troublesome problems; what is the administration's plan to end the war in Indochina and what are the implications of that plan?
Briefing after briefing, and the opportunity to talk to the men who run the war on a day-to-day basis led Senator EAGLETON to conclude that there is no plan to end the war, only one to continue it at a lower level. And he concludes that such a policy is terribly dangerous, for the soldiers and airmen left behind and for our prisoners of war who will remain in prison as long as American men, planes, and helicopters continue to kill North Vietnamese. But perhaps the greatest danger and the greatest tragedy is that such a course will continue to divide American from American, and divert our energies from the important business we must be about here at home.
That evening on CBS Eric Sevareid reflected on the implications of Senator EAGLETON's testimony.
I think that Senator EAGLETON's testimony and Mr. Sevareid's comments on it are worthy of'the attention of my colleagues in the Senate. Both are an important contribution to the important public debate over how to extricate this Nation from Vietnam.
Senator EAGLETON concludes, as I do, that disengagement can best be achieved by passing the McGovern-Hatfield amendment to end the war which sets a firm, final, and public withdrawal.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Sevareid's commentary and Senator EAGLETON's testimony together with an insertion, be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
CBS EVENING NEWS
SEVAREID. Back in '68, Governor George Romney seemed to prove the suspicion among politicians that it's their little mistakes, especially those honest little mistakes, that are a public man's undoing. Romney said he'd been brainwashed while in Vietnam. Today, Senator Eagleton of Missouri, recently back from Vietnam, said, he, too had been through the briefing process there, but he concluded something different. He thinks our leaders in Vietnam are brainwashing themselves, or are in serious danger of so doing.
He makes the cautionary observation, the truth of which most of us learned long ago in Vietnam, that there are no experts on this complex war, instant or otherwise, and he includes our military public relations people with the remark that if wars were won in briefing rooms, this one would have ended long ago. Briefings, he says, boil down to progress reports, emphasizing advances, downplaying reverses, concentrating on statistics rather than on their meaning.
By every statistical measure the enemy is near the end of his rope, said Eagleton; yet both the generals and the journalists he consulted out there agreed there is no lessening of the enemy's will to fight on.
If that is so, then great difficulties lie ahead far the American withdrawal plan, because the latest evidence filtering through the intelligence screen is of a big recruiting drive in North Vietnam, and preparation for heavier use of the infiltration routes than is normal in the wet season there.
All this suggests the likelihood of enemy offensive efforts this fall, and, in Mr. Eagieton's view, in the summer of '72, when our troop strength there will be far down and our election imminent.
And what do we do at that point? Would we stop the troop withdrawals, bomb the North again, send more troops back in, or just pull everybody out in a hurry? Eagleton's questions are speculative, of course, but by no means unreasonably so.
During the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy remarked that that was the week when he earned his pay. It seems entirely likely that such a week is going to come some time next year, for President Nixon.
INDOCHINA
SENATOR EAGLETON, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
I do not claim to be an instant Indochina expert because of my recent trip to Vietnam and Cambodia. There are no experts, instant or otherwise, on this long and complex war.
However, my observations while in Southeast Asia leave me even more convinced that the McGovern-Hatfield bill setting a firm, final and public date for withdrawal from Indochina is responsible and necessary.
I come back convinced that the President ... foresees an indefinite United States presence in Vietnam to insure the Survival of a friendly Saigon regime; ... predicates the safety of those U.S. troops left behind on an overly optimistic assessment of South Vietnamese capabilities and an unfounded hope for North Vietnamese inaction; ... has taken a risk, by allowing American. soldiers and prestige to be held hostage to Saigon's survival, that is neither wise nor acceptable in view of what can be gained.
I would like briefly to elaborate on those observations.
First, despite public announcements that eventually there will be a total American troop withdrawal from South Vietnam, none is currently planned, and an indefinite extension of United States air and logistical support is assumed.
Recent comments by Sir Robert Thompson, President Nixon's British Southeast Asia adviser, are an accurate reflection of Administration policy as I discerned it in briefing after briefing, as well as in private conversation. Thompson describes the April 7 troop drawdown, which will leave 184,000 American troops in Vietnam next December, as "just right," and counsels that ". . . the South Vietnamese will be ready to stand alone soon with only logistic and air support from the Americans."
According to an article by Alvin Shuster in yesterday's New York Times, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker apparently agreed with my reading of United States intentions. The article stated:
"He (Bunker) forsaw the need for American advisers in Vietnam for several years more and for American air power for at least two or three more years."
The South Vietnamese army has became so "Americanized" that it no longer feels it can fight without sophisticated logistical and air support although the enemy can and does. There are no Administration plans to Vietnamize Vietnamization – to force the South Vietnamese army to fight within the limits of its technical capabilities.
What are the implications of indefinite involvement?
For our prisoners of war, it means indefinite imprisonment. The North Vietnamese are not going to release them while American planes and helicopters continue to kill North Vietnamese.
For pilots and support personnel left behind, it means continued hazards in a discredited cause.
For our country, it means continued division.
My second observation deals with the men who run the war on a day-to-day basis. To alter Senator Fulbright's phrase, they seem concerned with "new myths" but overlook or disregard "old realities" that are nonetheless real.
Anyone familiar with "Diem's popularity;" the "capabilities of specially trained U.S. advisers to deal with counterinsurgency," the potentialities of "strategic hamlets," "land reform" and "free elections" for winning "the hearts and minds of the people," recognizes that reality is often sacrificed on the alter of the easy phrase.
Myths aren't created by accident. They are produced by a briefing and public relations system that puts a premium on progress and optimism. In every sense of the word Vietnam briefings are progress reports – emphasizing progress while downplaying setbacks ... emphasizing statistics rather than trying to understand what they mean.
If wars were won in briefing rooms, this one would have ended long ago. During a week of briefings in Vietnam and Cambodia I watched a new and dangerous myth in the making: "Vietnamization." Vietnamization is the way a slow U.S. withdrawal leaving only a residual force to supply air and logistic support is rationalized. Under Vietnamization the enemy will be defeated and our residual force will be protected.
During a week of briefings, I was told that: Ninety-eight percent of the South Vietnamese are "pacified," safe to travel, live, and work;
"Vietnamization" is a success – so successful, in fact, that South Vietnamese troops are fighting not only in South Vietnam, but in Cambodia and Laos as well;
Over one million South Vietnamese in the regular army, four million in the rural and popular forces, and one hundred thousand in the national police are all eager to do battle with the slightly more than two hundred thousand North Vietnamese and Viet Cong believed to be operating in South Vietnam;
The economy of South Vietnam is making rapid strides, with inflation down and unemployment low;
Recent operations in Cambodia and Laos have seriously disrupted enemy supplies and the staggering numbers of enemy dead has swollen their 10-year toll in human lives to 739,897;
The South Vietnamese Army is learning to use the modern tools of war far more rapidly than anticipated;
Bombing already 2½ times as heavy as the total U.S. effort during World War II continues against a rag-tag enemy that has neither air power or sophisticated logistics.
Indeed, never has so much been done, by so many, for so long, to so few.
By every statistical measure the enemy is near the end of his rope. And yet the war continues to continue.
South Vietnam is probably better off today than it was a year ago.
But "Vietnamization" is oversold.
High enemy casualty figures are constantly cited as accurate measures of progress. Yet in private, almost every General I talked with agreed that the North Vietnamese value their lives less than the cause for which they fight. Suicide squads of sappers continue to attack in the face of withering firepower. And more significantly, both reporters and generals agreed that there was no diminution in the enemy's will to fight despite heavy casualties.
Similarly, "time bought" and supplies destroyed are always cited. Time is far more important to an impatient, war weary people than to men who have pursued a cause for over 30 years.
Supplies are essential to a heavily mechanized army far from home, but how important are they to a guerrilla, living off the land and bent on terror?
How does the "briefing syndrome" work? During my visit to IV Corps, the delta showcase of the pacification program, I was told that . . . the ARVN had taken over full responsibility for security in the region;
Rice production was up and enemy activity was down;
This former Viet Cong stronghold was 98% pacified;
Now the ARVN was so strong that it could simultaneously invade the Yuminh Forest, (a Viet Nimh and Viet Cong stronghold since 1945) while maintaining several divisions in Cambodia;
Enemy supplies entering IV Corps from Cambodia were greatly diminished.
Reason for optimism? Yes, until while questioning I discovered:
20,000 United States "advisers" were still in IV Corps, only 4,000 fewer than in December 1969;
Since the Laos invasion began, 40 IV Corps outposts or watchtowers had been overrun as compared to only 63 for the entire proceeding years;
At most 60% of IV Corps was safe to drive at night;
Four out of five helicopters used in the Yuminh invasion of this March and April were American, flown by Americans;
Most of the IV Corps helicopter support is supplied by U.S. pilots flying more U.S. helicopters than the South Vietnamese are programmed to eventually get for the entire country;
The guerrillas had broken down into small units capable of supplying their own food and needing little ammunition to conduct terrorism activities.
Instead of taking the optimistic briefing picture with me from IV Corps, I left with a different perspective. The delta may not literally be up for grabs, but it is far from pacified, computer ratings notwithstanding. Over 30,000 enemy troops, mostly indigenous Viet Cong, control the level of fighting and engage in terrorism which the Saigon government cannot prevent.
I don't believe there is any longer a danger that the Pentagon's interpretations will sell the public on an unwise policy. The real danger is that the military will believe its own propaganda and act accordingly. The ultimate danger is that the President will commit his power and stake his prestige on these biased interpretations.
He did during Lam Son 719 – the Laos Invasion.
Lam Son 719 revealed the way significant decisions are made, explained, carried out and analyzed.
President Thieu, in a classic understatement, described the operation as "limited in time and scope."
As originally conceived, the ARVN would have thrust further west after quickly taking Tchepone, would have "blocked" the major arteries of the Ho Chi Minh trail in an attempt to cut the "supply line jugular," would have stayed until approximately May 1 and would have cleared new territory on the way out.
In execution, the ARVN did not go beyond Tchepone – which itself was taken two weeks later after massive B-52 strikes completely destroyed the area, annihilating any possible opposition; temporarily disrupted some trails but failed to even touch the "jugular," and retreated more than a month early without clearing any new territory.
Charts showing high enemy body counts and destroyed enemy supplies were wheeled out, as usual, to demonstrate success. And even this type of "success" was achieved only with truly massive – I mean massive – American air support and with 80,000 American ground troops and even more air support across the border in South Vietnam to protect I Corps.
This limited success was partially offset by considerable South Vietnamese casualties, especially from several of their best units, and a memory of retreat that can only haunt the ARVN in the future. The U.S. lost almost 1/6 of the helicopters involved and many more were disabled. Other supplies were also lost.
The most that can reasonably be claimed for Lam Son 719 is that South Vietnamese ground forces, with massive American air power and with massive American ground backup across the border, maintained, for a short period of time, a measure of success against North Vietnamese ground forces in Laos.
What went wrong? When General Vogt briefed this committee on Lam Sam 719 on February 9 – and I checked the truth of this specifically during an extensive briefing on Lam Son 719 when I was in Danang – the enemy capability in the area, the enemy troop movement toward the invading force and the intention of the North Vietnamese to fight all were well known.
General Vogt's expressions of confidence in the attainability of Lam Son 719 objectives on February 9 were another example of the briefing syndrome, with exaggerated estimates of South Vietnamese capabilities and/or underestimated enemy capabilities.
Lam Son 719 was either a blunder of major proportion or General Vogt's testimony widened the gap in candor between the President and Congress.
The President and the Pentagon predictably hailed Lam Son as a master stroke. Sadly, Lam Son is not unique. All the classic faults that have plagued our Vietnam decisions were there:
Overstating our capabilities, understating the enemy's, and rationalizing the outcome.
As we enter a politically volatile year here at home, fewer U.S. troops in Vietnam will be more dependent on the South Vietnamese for protection from likely North Vietnamese attacks.
The North Vietnamese, especially in 1972, will be able to call most of the shots in the war.
What are North Vietnam's intentions? The only certainty is that neither North Vietnam's leaders nor soldiers have lost their desire to keep fighting. Indeed, that is the only statement on which journalists and military men in Vietnam seem to agree, and it is extremely important when juxtaposed against our own war weariness.
The North Vietnamese well recognize the depth of American disillusionment over the war from the left and the more recent post-Calley disillusionment of the right; the volatility of the U.S. electoral process which begins in New Hampshire on March 14, less than 10 months away; and the influence of their actions on both American public opinion and politics.
I suspect that the North Vietnamese will stage something dramatic by the summer of 1972. This dramatic endeavor need not be as massive as Tet in 1968. It might be an assault on Phnom Penh or perhaps even Vientiane. It might be several systematic assaults on American-manned installations or a sweep through several "fire bases" or towns in an attempt to exact sizeable American casualties. Or it might be a terrorist blitz in Saigon.
Whatever the mode, the intent would be to force the war back on page one and at the same time force President Nixon to act.
An enemy offensive, depending on its nature, could force President Nixon to take escalatory action, send in U.S. troops or heavy air support, resume bombing of the North, or simply stop withdrawing soldiers. Or, far less likely, it could force him totally to withdraw, Dunkirk-style.
These are the dangers and risks of our present policy.
This leads to my third point. What can possibly be gained by allowing American soldiers and American prestige to be held hostage to the Saigon regime's survival?
Very few people in Vietnam talk about this anymore.
Is it to show Europe that we honor our commitments? Do they really think that after 17 years, 135 billion dollars, 55,000 lives 300,000 casualties and bitter and deep domestic division, we are wise to continue to support a regime whose survival means so little to United States security?
Is it to prove to other countries that we can handle communist-inspired wars of "national liberation?" If so, does any country anywhere in the world believe that after Vietnam the United States will soon engage again in so foolish a venture?
Is it to stop an expansionist China? I doubt even Dean Rusk believes that anymore.
President Nixon has said that we have fought "not for conquest, not for glory, but only for the right of a people far away to choose the kind of government they want."
A war between one people, in one country, over who governs, is a form of self determination like our own civil war.
I agree with President Nixon that the Vietnamese should determine their own future. That is, in essence, what the McGovern-Hatfield bill would permit.
BUNKER ASSAYS VIETNAM YEARS
(By Alvin Shuster)
SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM, May 9. – Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker has just completed his fourth year in America's most crucial diplomatic post, conscious of past mistakes here, proud of the progress, confident of the future but aware of the dangers that lie ahead.
He celebrates his 77th birthday tomorrow, feeling physically fit but clearly ready to move to other duties. He does not, as he says, "choose to run for another four-year term," and the expectation is that he will be leaving shortly after the South Vietnamese presidential elections in October
A slim man who looks taller than his 6 feet 2 inches because of his erect bearing, Mr. Bunker has served here longer than any of his predecessors, presiding as the supreme American influence here as American troops poured in and now, as they pull out. He was behind the policy of expansion of President Johnson, who sent him here, and he is a staunch supporter of the withdrawal policy of President Nixon, who won't let him go. Sitting in an easy chair in his office, amid the pictures and mementos recalling a diplomatic career that began 20 years ago, after 25 years as a sugar-industry executive, Mr. Bunker marked the start of his final months in office with a rare and wide-ranging interview.
He foresaw the need for American advisers in Vietnam for several years more and for American air power for at least two or three more years. He said that American troop strength, now about 280,000, should drop to about 100,000 by next May 1. President Nixon has announced that the troop level would decline to 184,000 by Dec. 1.
"I thought from the beginning that if we stayed with it, it would come out all right," Mr. Bunker said. "My only doubts are whether we are going to stay with it, not because of the situation here, but because of the situation at home. I've never had any doubt that if we have the determination, the patience and the will, we would achieve reasonable success here."
On the political side, Mr. Bunker said that he thought constitutional government in South Vietnam had worked "remarkably well." On the military side, he said that there had been "very great progress."
PAST ERRORS ACKNOWLEDGED
But Mr. Bunker also acknowledged some past errors that helped feed the antiwar feeling and that in turn raised his own doubts about the determination of the United States to stay the course in Vietnam.
"I think we talked too much in the early days," he said. "I think that many of our mistakes were compounded by over optimism as to how the situation was developing and how it could develop. My theory has been that the facts speak for themselves."
Because of the resentment at home over the war, Mr. Bunker emerged over his four years here as two men. One is the Bunker seen by the war's critics at home, a villain who has been responsible for the mistakes and miscalculations of American policy, who has resisted dramatic changes to bring about political accommodation and who has been overly protective of President Nguyen Van Thieu.
The other Bunker is the one seen in Saigon, a charming host, a courtly and skilled diplomat, an efficient administrator, and an envoy who aides say is more responsive to, than responsible for Washington policy, of which he undoubtedly approves. Barely does one hear a critical personal remark against Mr. Bunker here, even from those outside the embassy who disagree with him and think the American involvement has been a disaster.
A KEY MAN FOR NIXON
"He's one of the three or four men President Nixon listens to when he's got an important decision to make about this country," one embassy official said. "But he is way out here and obviously those closer to the White House probably have a better chance of being heard"
Another embassy aide said: "Bunker is probably important in shaping policy, if not in making it."
Mr. Bunker has held his public words to a minimum, reflecting the caution and tact that endear an envoy in a sensitive post to his colleagues in Washington. A few wrong words from Mr. Bunker could not only stir the critics at home but also upset the close relationship he has developed with the Saigon Government.
In his interview, Mr. Bunker said that he was frankly worried about the economic future of South Vietnam, that "difficult economic problems" lie ahead because of the departure of American troops and that "economic assistance on a major scale" would be necessary from the United States for a considerable period of time.
CONCERN ABOUT ECONOMY
"I think that the economy will be a greater concern than the military situation," he continued. "The Vietnamese have confidence now in their ability to handle the military situation."
Mr. Bunker, who as chief of the United States mission here outranks Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, the military commander, also made the following points:
Among the mistakes of the past were the lack of official understanding of the type of war being fought here, a late realization that the United States could not finish the job alone and had to train the South Vietnamese to take over, and the tendency to oversell progress here.
"We really didn't understand the kind of war we were engaged in," he said. "So it was difficult, it took time to learn and therefore people became impatient with war. Then, at the same time, other problems arose at home – problems of the cities, racial problems, pollution, all of these crowded in and demanded attention. So the feeling developed, understandably, that domestic problems should have priority."
Chances for a political settlement may improve after the South Vietnamese presidential elections because Hanoi may decide to negotiate seriously when it sees a regime that "will be in power here for the next four years." Hanoi may also wait to see the outcome of the American elections next year, he said, but he did not rule out the possibility of an eventual outcome here of no settlement, no peace and no war.
While the recent allied thrust into Laos "had some effect," it was still too early to judge how much it succeeded in curbing Hanoi's efforts to supply the Indochina war. The operation showed that the South Vietnamese needed to develop better coordination in command.
President Thieu is a man of "considerable intellectual ability" who has grown in his job. But the United States will take no sides in the forthcoming political campaign here, although "we hope to see fair, honest elections." It would again be a "good idea" if observers from other countries, including the United States, came for the elections.
Despite the view of many war critics at home that President Thieu stands in the way of a settlement, it is not up to the United States to see that he is removed. The South Vietnamese "have a constitutional system."
RELATIONS WITH THIEU
The relationship of Mr. Bunker to President Thieu, who rose to power during the Bunker years, has often been a subject of controversy among critics of the war. Some of the ambassador's associates say that he represents "a father figure" to President Thieu and that Mr. Bunker tries to "persuade rather than push" him.
According to an aide of President Thieu, "Thieu and Bunker are open and frank with each other and like each other, but when Thieu says he doesn't like something and wants Bunker to ask Nixon about it, Bunker just sits there and nods and we never quite know what he's thinking. He never tips his hand."
As Mr. Bunker noted in the interview, American leverage on the Saigon Government is not what it was when half a million American troops were in the country. But Mr. Bunker said it would remain considerable because of the economic aid that Saigon will need.
The two men meet frequently, sometimes two or three times a week, depending upon the burning issues. They discuss, often with General Abrams on hand, the specific areas from which American troops would withdraw, the question of financial support, and last week, American proposals for an intensified campaign by the South Vietnamese to curb the alarming flow of drugs to American servicemen.
Outside the top levels of the Saigon Government, Mr. Bunker, as might be expected, has kept his contacts with the Vietnamese to a minimum. For example, he has never had more than a social conversation with Gen. Duong Van Minh, who is likely to be President Thieu's challenger in the election.
Accordingly, Mr. Bunker seems a distant, forbidding figure to the South Vietnamese who have had no contact with him. The local press has nicknamed him Ong Gia Tu Lanh or "Mr. Refrigerator." Sometimes the papers call him "the governor" of South Vietnam.
For the Ambassador to avoid showing partiality in the elections will take all the diplomatic skill he demonstrated as a troubleshooter in the 1965 Dominican crisis, where he supervised the transition to constitutional government, and earlier assignments in which he mediated the disputes between Indonesia and the Netherlands over Dutch New Guinea and between Egypt and Syria over Yemen.
Virtually every ambassadorial act – a visit to the palace, a trip to a ceremony with the President – will be seen by opponents of the Government as new gestures of American approval of Mr. Thieu.
CLOSE TIE WITH ABRAMS
Apart from the close relationship with President Thieu, Mr. Bunker has developed an effective and friendly partnership with General Abrams, the "political general" who understands that military actions of this war must often be governed by political considerations. When General Abrams succeeded the outspoken Gen. William C. Westmoreland, Mr. Bunker advised him against doing "so much talking about developments here and just see how it worked."
"I keep him thoroughly in touch with political developments and he keeps me thoroughly briefed on the military situation," Mr. Bunker explained.
Inside the embassy itself, Mr. Bunker has earned the respect and admiration of his staff, although some of the younger members sometimes complain that their views are not listened to in the higher councils and that, despite public caution about events at the top, they are expected to accentuate the positive in their reports.
Mr. Bunker and his wife, Carol C. Laise, who is Ambassador to Nepal, own a farm in Vermont. He said he would like to go back there for a while when this assignment ends, but indicated he would not object to returning to his old job as a trouble-shooter witli ambassadorial rank – "it gives you a little more freedom."
Asked what his advice would be to his successor, Mr. Bunker replied: "Stand fast. And let the facts speak for themselves."