November 23, 1971
Page 42909
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, over the last 6 months, the Nixon administration has both carelessly and unnecessarily strained U.S. relations with some of our principal allies – Canada, Japan, and West Germany, to name a few. Nixon administration actions have been highhanded and unilateral, and they have given scant attention to the problems and interests of our allies.
Many of us in the Senate have criticized the President for these actions. By voting now to reduce American force levels in Europe by as many as 60,000 men without prior consultation with our allies, we would be committing the same kind of diplomatic error.
I do not believe that there is any political or military magic in maintaining our current European force level of 310,000. There is fat in our European forces that can and ought to be trimmed. I am convinced that our European forces must be reduced over time by substantial numbers. But these reductions should be made only after consultations with our allies. And such reductions should be part of a planned and orderly program of withdrawal so that both allied and other nations understand our intentions precisely, and are informed as to how many troops are to be withdrawn and how many will remain.
To withdraw without consultation and without such planning might persuade others that we are weakening a European commitment which we actually want to maintain. We should not create such an illusion where the reality is not intended and not desired.
When I voted several months ago against the amendment to make substantial troop cuts in Europe, I said that consultations with our allies and our decision about U.S. troop levels in Europe depended upon a number of other issues: among them, the state of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's policy of Ostpolitik, the U.S. balance of payments, and negotiations with respect to mutual and balanced force reductions – MBFR.
The fate of Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik still hangs in the balance. His government has successfully negotiated agreements with Poland and the Soviet Union. Berlin negotiations with the East German regime are in progress. At this critical juncture, I fear that German opponents of this policy of normalization could use American force reductions to undercut domestic support for Ostpolitik.
The U.S. balance of payments has continued to deteriorate disastrously, and we must act swiftly to reverse the decline. But the removal of 60,000 men from Europe would have very little effect on that problem. Instead, we must demand from our allies additional offsetting payments to neutralize the balance of payments cost of keeping our troops in Europe. But this can only be done appropriately and effectively by means of tough negotiations. To withdraw some troops unilaterally might only undermine ongoing negotiations with our allies for offsetting payments for our remaining troops.
The situation with respect to MBFR has also changed over the last few months, but in the direction of making it even more imperative that a unilateral American troop cut be avoided at this time. Former NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio has been making the diplomatic rounds, including Moscow, to see what can be done to get these negotiations underway. I believe that mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe represent one of the most critical and important arms control possibilities in the near future, and I urge the administration to move forthrightly toward this goal. But I do not believe unilateral withdrawals, at a time when the Soviets have indicated their willingness to negotiate for mutual withdrawals, will advance the prospects of MBFR.
Mr. President, I do not believe this is the time for making unilateral force reductions in Europe. But I do believe this is clearly the time for tough negotiations and planning for such force cuts in the near future, and I urge the administration to press ahead with negotiations among our NATO allies and with the Soviet Union for mutual and balanced force reductions at the earliest possibility.