June 15, 1971
Page 19815
WEAPONS SYSTEMS IN THE PROPOSED 1972 DEFENSE BUDGET
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, on June 10, Dr. Morton H. Halperin testified before the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee concerning a variety of weapons systems in the proposed 1972 Defense budget. Dr. Halperin is the author of a variety of books and articles on strategic subjects, and he has had practical experience in the higher councils of Government as a Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arms Control and Policy Planning under President Johnson, and on the National Security Council Staff in the present administration.
In his recent testimony, Dr. Halperin raised questions concerning such systems as ABM, AWACS, ULMS, aircraft carriers, B-1 bombers, Minuteman III, Poseidon, and the F-14, and urged Congress to provide the executive branch with better guidelines for future Defense Department budgets. His thoughtful analysis of a recurring dilemma – how to determine how much defense spending is enough – can usefully be studied by all students of national security.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Dr. Halperin's testimony of June 10 be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the testimony was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
TESTIMONY OF MORTON H. HALPERIN ON THE FY 1972 DEFENSE BUDGET BEFORE THE DEFENSE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE, JUNE 10, 1971
Mr. Chairman, it is a great privilege for me to appear before this distinguished committee.
I propose to discuss the question of how to approach the problem of the size and shape of the defense budget. I do so with considerable deference. I fully recognize that you and other members of this committee have been concerned with the problem of keeping defense expenditures under control long before it became publicly fashionable to do so, and that the members of this committee have had considerable experience in dealing with defense programs.
Nevertheless, I thought there might be some use in stepping back and trying to look at the problem of deciding on the size and shape of the defense budget in a systematic way. I will emphasize throughout the difficulties in making sensible calculations and the need, in the end, for political judgments based on simple insights. During the course of this presentation I will make a number of specific suggestions for reducing defense expenditures; these recommendations have been approved by the Executive Committee of the Federation of American Scientists and in the case of strategic programs by its Strategic Weapons Committee.
In most cases, the Federation has already presented to various congressional committees, analyses of those systems, and I will attempt only to summarize such discussions.
As the Committee is well aware, there has been much discussion of late about national priorities and about the need to reduce defense spending. In many cases discussion has focused on whether a particular weapons system was or was not needed. Those desiring to control defense spending frequently assume that by cutting out particular weapons systems they can control the size of the defense budget. others have sought to set a ceiling on total defense spending without any concern for how the money appropriated might be spent.
It is important for understanding the problem to keep separate the two questions of (1) how much we should spend on defense and (2) what we should spend it on. We must be concerned both with the size and the shape of the defense program but the efforts to influence each must proceed in parallel.
We cannot assume that by canceling or reducing particular programs we can control the overall size of the budget. Nor is it sufficient to set an overall ceiling if we wish to have a military force which contributes effectively to our security. Let me first consider the question of the size of the defense budget.
HOW MUCH FOR DEFENSE?
There is, in my view, no clear way to determine how much is enough to spend on defense. Conceptually the question is one of marginal utility. How much value do we get on the last defense dollar we spend as compared to the value we might get by other governmental or private expenditures? Even at the present relatively high level of defense expenditures, there is no doubt that additional money spent wisely would increase security. At the same time, there is no question that if we cut wisely and carefully we can make even reasonably substantial reductions in defense expenditures and have little or no detrimental impact on our security. On the other hand, some increases in expenditures could detract from our security by increasing risks and some reductions might actually increase our security.
There is no methodology that I am aware of that enables us to compare the payoff from expenditures on, for example, strategic programs with those for general purpose forces; nor is there any way that we can compare the payoffs of either of these programs with the payoff on domestic programs or from returning the money to the taxpayers to permit additional private consumption. Thus the question of the size of the defense budget is – within wide limits – essentially arbitrary.
There have been a number of attempts to come to grips with the problem of the size of the defense budget by proposing changes in our foreign or defense policy. However, alterations of American policy within conceivable limits will not necessarily bring about reductions in defense spending. One cannot translate a decision to change general foreign or defense policy into a clear directive as to how to cut defense expenditures.
For example, the Nixon Administration with some fanfare announced a change in our general purpose forces requirements from the so-called two and a half war strategy to the so-called one and a half war strategy. While to some this meant a substantial reduction in defense expenditures would be possible, the view of many military men was quite different. A number of military planners concluded that the gap between the forces required to meet our stated objectives and the forces we had available was now substantially reduced. They nevertheless argued that we still needed a substantial increase rather than a reduction in general purpose forces. The uncertainty surrounding the forces required to meet any contingency are, in fact, far greater than the difference between planning for two and a half wars and planning for one and a half wars. Thus a change of doctrine unless accompanied by an arbitrary ceiling on general purpose force expenditures need not lead to any change to the overall defense budget.
To take another example, there has been considerable discussion of the so-called triad, that is, the three separate strategic systems – land-based missiles, sea-based missiles and bombers – designed to deter a Soviet nuclear attack on the United States. Many have advocated that we go from a triad to a diad or even to a single strategic system usually in the form of a sea-based deterrent. However, again, a change of this kind will not translate directly into a change into the budget. For example, if we decided to go to two systems, and chose to maintain the bombers along with the sea-based missiles, there would be substantially increased pressures to go forward with accelerated production of the B-1 bomber and perhaps for an ABM system to protect bomber bases. These steps could more than wipe out the saving from phasing out the land-based missiles. Similarly if we went to a single sea-based system the pressure to proceed immediately with ULMS would be very great and there would undoubtedly be a substantial increase in ASW Research and Development.
The alternative method of cutting particular programs would be no more successful in leading automatically to reductions in the defense budget. Of course, in any given year the overall budget can be cut by cutting particular programs but the reductions will not be permanent. The Navy budget for tactical air well illustrates this point. The cancellation of the F-111B in 1968 might have been expected to lead to substantial savings but in fact it led to an accelerated F-14 program which over a five-year period will not yield any net reduction in Navy expenditures. Even when the trade-off is not that direct, there are numerous programs within the defense budget which military planners believe are under-financed and which would sop up any funds saved from any particular program unless there is at the same time an overall ceiling.
Thus, I believe that one is forced to the conclusion that an arbitrary ceiling on defense budget authorizations and annual expenditures is necessary to control the size of defense spending.
It is interesting to note that all of our post-war Presidents and Secretaries of Defense have concluded that the only way they could control the size of the defense budget was to provide the military services with an arbitrary ceiling based on Presidential calculations of revenue and domestic needs. Presidents Truman, Eisenhower and Nixon have explicitly provided the services with budget ceilings. During the 1960's there was an attempt to deny that ceilings existed; however, I believe that a close look at how the defense budget was developed reveals that there was an explicit ceiling provided to the Secretary of Defense by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.
If Secretaries of Defense and Presidents, with their substantially greater access to information, have concluded that the only way to get a handle on the total size of the defense budget is to provide an arbitrary ceiling, then I believe the case for the same approach is much stronger for Congressional committees and for the general public.
Relying on an evaluation of expected government revenues and expected required expenditures for domestic programs it is possible to come up with an estimate of revenues that might be available for defense and to relate these to possible defense programs taking into account the likely waste in the defense budget. on this basis, I believe it would be useful if the relevant committees of Congress, particularly this committee and its counterpart in the Senate would provide each year an estimate of the trends it foresees in defense spending perhaps including an indication of the ceilings which it believes Congress should impose on defense funds.
FOR WHAT FORCES?
I wish now to turn to the question of the shape of the defense program. Setting a ceiling is not, in my view, sufficient. We must be concerned about how the money is spent. Here our problems are no simpler. There is no known way to determine the impact on our security, the probability of war, or the outcome if war occurs, of different force structures. Nor should we leave these decisions to the military, or to bargaining between civilian and military leaders in the executive branch.
The experience of the post-World War II period, and in particular the last two or three years, suggests that giving authority to the military services to determine how the defense budget will be spent will produe three or four separate military strategies and force structures rather than an overall structure based on a unified view. The services will tend to divide the funds available by arbitrary percentages. Each service will emphasize programs related to what it sees as the essence of its activity. Each will tend to emphasize sophisticated hardware for combat operations at the cost of cutting manpower. They will tend to ignore the capabilities of other services and interservice programs such as air and sealift for the Army. For example, in determining requirements for carrier-based air the Navy will tend to ignore Air Force tactical air and the reverse will be true for the Air Force. These problems, which were well understood in the 1950's, seem to be emerging again with the tendency to delegate authority for the shape of the defense budget to the military services. Such a delegation will not produce the most effective military capability within any given budget ceiling.
Allowing the shape of the defense budget to be determined by bargaining between senior officials of the executive branch and the military is also unsatisfactory. Certainly this is true when, as at present, the civilian leadership has explicitly abdicated to the Services the primary responsibility for determining the allocation of resources within a fixed ceiling. But even if civilian leaders in the Pentagon and the White House are reviewing particular programs, Congress and the public can and should make their own evaluations. The experience of the military and the analytic techniques of the civilians are not, separately or even together, an adequate substitute for political judgment. Congress and the public must make their own assessments of the great uncertainties involved, and determine which risks the American people should run.
In thinking about the shaping of the defense budget I believe it is useful to identify in one's own mind three categories of weapons which, at the risk of sounding frivolous, I will label the "good," "bad," and the "just wasteful."
By "good" I mean those programs which have a high marginal return, and enhance stability, and which should be maintained even if defense budgets are cut. Such programs must be protected as changes are made in the size of the defense budget. The military services may attach less importance to them than someone with a broader perspective would. They also must be protected against the danger that Congress will cut them because they are visible. It is my own personal view, for example, that substantially reducing military forces in Europe would be cutting out the part of the defense budget which has perhaps the highest return to our security objective.
The "bad" refers to those programs which one believes make a negative contribution to our security. For example, many believe that the MIRV and ABM programs by stimulating the strategic arms race, in fact increase the danger of nuclear war rather than reducing it.
The "wasteful" refers to those programs which, at current levels, appear to be excessive to our needs and hence could be cut; however, they are not programs which seem to reduce our security by increasing the probability of war or by stimulating an arms race.
In seeking to cut the overall size of the defense budget, it is important to be sure that cuts in overall spending do not lead the services or the Congress to cut out programs which are good. It is also important to note that reductions in defense spending may not lead to the elimination of programs that one considers "bad." For example, President Nixon, in 1969, substantially reduced spending on strategic programs and nevertheless continued the MIRV and ABM programs which, as I have said, many people think in fact reduce our security. Some weapons programs may be relatively inexpensive and yet threaten stability. For example, programs to improve the accuracy of our missiles are not costly but by threatening the Soviet deterrent they could stimulate a further arms race. Thus, in considering the shape of the defense program one needs to focus particularly on (1) those "good' programs which need to be protected as the budget is cut; (2) those "bad" programs which need to be eliminated even if their cost is small; and (3) "wasteful" programs.
In turning to a discussion of the criteria by which one can evaluate specific programs I would like to emphasize the very limited nature of the insights available to use. We can ask which programs are good, which bad, and which just wasteful, but we are not in a position to say with any precision how changes in defense policy, or in the design of our forces, will affect our security. In some cases we can make a decision by comparing two weapons systems. For example, if we first decide that we wish to have a manned bomber force through the 1970's then we can compare the B-52 with the B-1. Such analyses are important but concentration on them can lead to ignoring the more fundamental questions which can affect the probability of war or the results if war occurs. In considering our requirements for general purpose and strategic forces we need to keep in mind these two objectives and our limited understanding of what affects them.
Deterrence depends on influencing the decisions of other governments. We have a very poor understanding of how our force structure is perceived by potential adversaries and affects their decisions.
War outcome calculations are exceedingly difficult to make and fraught with uncertainties. In the case of strategic forces, the calculations of war outcome used to test their adequacy arise from the unlikely scenario in which the Soviets fire all of their weapons at American forces and we respond by firing all of our weapons at their cities. In the case of general purpose forces, there is no agreed methodology for doing any calculations. We simply do not know how war outcomes are affected by alternative force structures.
These general points regarding the shape of our forces will be illustrated by considering first general purpose forces and then strategic forces. Where changes in force structure are recommended, possible budgetary savings will be indicated. However, these should be taken as only general estimates keeping in mind that force structure decisions cannot determine the level of defense spending. Sensible decisions on specific matters, coupled with a ceiling on overall spending, would increase the probability that money is spent where it has a high marginal return, that bad programs are avoided, and that waste is held to a minimum.
I will consider first the general purpose force programs and then the strategic programs.
GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
General purpose forces, excluding expenditures for Vietnam, account for approximately 65% of the current defense budget. Since these forces are designed to protect countries other than the United States, the requirement for these forces depends basically on political decisions about which nations we wish to be in a position to defend against what threats. Fundamental changes in our perspective on those questions could lead to very substantial changes in the defense
budget. For example, if the United States made a firm decision that it would never fight again on the Asian mainland (or would fight only in Korea) this could lead to substantial reduction in force requirements. However, short of such fundamental change, alterations in foreign policy have very little impact on the required size of the defense budget.
At a slightly less general level of what one might call defense policy, there are a number of key issues requiring judgment which can have substantial impact on the requirements for general purpose forces. Some of these are:
1. Tactical nuclear weapons. – During the 1950's American defense policy was derived from a decision to rely on the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the event of any combat which involved a substantial number of American forces. If the U.S. were to return to such a position, and if we were to conclude that tactical nuclear weapons could be used effectively against enemy attacks in likely contingencies, then it would be possible to substantially reduce the size of general purpose forces and spending for general purpose forces could be reduced from its current level of $50 billion.
The major uncertainties here concern both the political implications of using tactical nuclear weapons and the likely effect of their use particularly in circumstances in which the potential opponent also has nuclear weapons available. The evidence of the past two decades is that there may be military pressure to use nuclear weapons but there will also be enormous political pressures against the use of nuclear weapons in any limited war situation; thus it would appear reckless to rely on a Presidential decision that such weapons would be used. Moreover, continuing analysis of the problem suggests that even "tactical" nuclear weapons could cause enormous damage to friendly territory, that they are less effective than some may have believed, and that there is no particular advantage to the U.S. in using them in a situation in which the potential opponent also has access to nuclear weapons.
2. Simultaneity of Requirements.– The decision to go from a two-and-a-half-war to a one-and-a- half-war strategy did not reflect a determination to prepare for war only in Europe. Rather it was a decision not to prepare for war in Europe and Asia at the same time. The judgment was apparently made that wars in Europe and Asia were not likely to begin simultaneously in view of the substantially reduced possibility that there be a coordinated Chinese and Soviet attack.
Decisions about simultaneity are by themselves significantly less important than other factors being discussed here in determining the size of the general purpose force budget. They are also essentially arbitrary.
3. Length of War. – The Department of Defense does not appear to have made a firm and clear decision about how long a war it is preparing for in either Europe or Asia. On the central front in Europe most of our allies seem to assume that a conventional war would be over in a very few days. American planning, particularly for the procurement of ammunition, seems to be based on the assumption that a war in Europe might last as long as 90 days but no longer. However, other components of our forces are procured as if a war in Europe might go on indefinitely. For example, an Army division of 16,000 fighting men requires an additional 16,000 men for initial support for a period of up to 90 days but requires a second increment of 16,000 men for sustained support over an extended period of time. Both increments are maintained for all of our NATO- oriented divisions. Our requirements for naval forces are also based on an assumption that a war
in Europe might go on indefinitely. A serious decision to act on the assumption that conventional war in Europe could not possibly last more than 90 days would permit substantial savings. On the other hand, if we took seriously the need to be able to fight indefinitely in Europe, and sought to get our allies to agree, there would be requirements for substantially increased expenditures. The costs involved in not preparing to fight for more than 90 days must be weighed against the effect, if any, on deterrence and possible outcomes if war occurs.
4. Mobilization Lead Time. – Our emphasis in post World War II period has, by and large, been on forces available on the day that a war begins. In the past, of course, the United States relied very substantially on mobilization to develop needed capabilities in war time. If the political judgment was reached that a war in Europe or Asia, in which the U.S. would wish to be involved, would develop only slowly with a period of considerable political warning, the United States could reduce its number of active divisions and rely on mobilization of reserve divisions for combat. Here again, the decision involves a broad political judgment: Will our leaders be able to determine in advance that the probability of war has substantially increased and will they be prepared to act on the basis of such a warning.
5. Forward Defense. – Another critical criteria which affects the required size of general purpose forces is where we wish to hold ground. For example if, in the event of a Soviet attack in Europe, we want to hold at the Eastern German border – or in the case of a Chinese attack on Thailand on the Thai-Chinese border – requirements for general purpose forces, particularly forces in being, are substantially larger than if we are willing to plan on holding an alternative line which involves some substantial retreat. We would, in the latter case, plan to mobilize and counterattack. Would such a posture increase the risk of war? How do we weigh peacetime costs of preparing to hold a forward line against the increased wartime costs of capturing lost territory?
6. Confidence Levels. – Military planning to develop requirements for any particular contingency is generally based on very conservative assumptions about the limited capability of allied forces and the substantial capability of enemy forces. The "requirements" also assume that one's objective is to have high confidence that one could defeat the enemy and defend the territory under attack. An alternate possible criteria is to view the problem as one of deterrence. If we need sufficient forces to deter the enemy from launching an attack, it is possible that we need only to deny the enemy any substantial confidence that his attack would be successful. Such a change in requirement would focus on forces large enough so that the enemy could not calculate that victory was at all likely in any finite period. Such an approach could lead to significantly reduced requirements for general purpose forces.
Judgments about simultaneity, length of war, mobilization lead time, forward defense, and confidence levels can lead to specific decisions in some limited areas such as ammunition requirements. However, they can have only a limited impact on determining overall force requirements because of a lack of any agreed method for determining the relationship between opposing force structures and war outcomes. For example, the question of the relative balance of forces on the Central Front in Europe has been studied more often, more intensively, and by more groups, than any other defense question. Yet the differences of opinion remain enormous, ranging from the view that NATO forces are in all important respects equal to those of the Warsaw Pact to the view that the Soviets could sweep across Western Europe in a matter of a few days. To take another example, we have recently been warned of the dangerous growth in Soviet naval power. Comparing the two navies, we find that the United States continues to spend the bulk of its naval funds to procure, maintain, and defend aircraft carriers while the Soviets have only two small helicopter carriers. Would likely war outcomes be improved by switching to a force which imitated that of the Soviet Navy? Few Naval officers would favor such a move and yet they remain concerned about the Soviet forces.
Even more uncertain is the relationship between force structures and deterrence of attack. We do not know what the Soviet evaluation of forces on the Central Front is, nor how it would be affected by possible changes in force structure. In Asia where we have several potential opponents the relation is even less clear. Certainly the substantial American build-up of our capability to intervene in conventional and insurgency warfare in the early 1960's did not deter enemy moves in Vietnam.
These uncertainties do not mean that meaningful choice is impossible. It does mean that choice is a matter of broad judgment based on a combination of simple decision rules and careful computations when relevant.
In the general purpose area the key choices concern: (1) the size and deployment of Army ground forces, (2) the size and shape of tactical air forces, and (3) naval force design.
Army ground forces
The tendency of the military to seek to maintain an authorized force structure at the expense of ready forces tends to be particularly acute in the area of ground combat units. Experience has shown that political leaders wish to have forces available quickly in a crisis. Thus both executive branch and legislative oversight will be needed to ensure that some ready combat capability is maintained as forces decline.
An illustration, I believe, of the tendency to ignore the "good" in efforts to cut the defense budget is the high interest in cutting troops in Europe. Indeed, if one wanted to cut manpower one could, with smaller impact on military effectiveness, reduce the forces maintained in the United States that are earmarked for European defense or the central reserve. My own personal judgement is that the keeping of one American division in Korea, and the maintaining of the current number of American divisions in Europe, would yield high payoff in terms of reducing the likelihood of war and permitting a political evolution favorable to the United States.
Tactical air
Most analysts believe that the evidence of the Korean war and the Vietnam war indicates that deep interdiction does not produce any substantial payoff for the large sums invested in it. In Asian theatres the ability to move goods by using large amounts of manpower over primitive trails means that interdiction cannot put an effective limit on the size of military operations. In the European theatre, the redundancy of supply systems suggests the great difficulty of having deep interdiction play a decisive role. Thus despite the difficulty of calculating likely war outcomes it is possible to conclude that we have overemphasized interdiction capabilities. If these observations are correct the F-15 is poorly designed and too sophisticated assuming it is needed at all.
Naval forces
If the United States proceeds according to current plans for the size of its Naval forces there will need to be a major increase in spending for construction because of the age of the current fleet. Budgets for ship construction could vary from $600 million to over $5 billion per year for the next five years depending on the choices we make.
These largely turn on whether we decide to maintain aircraft carriers for bombing operations against the Soviet Union, and whether we decide to maintain substantial capability to protect shipping, using sea-based systems in the event of prolonged war with the Soviet Union.
The key issue of affecting carriers centers around whether or not we can count on carriers to operate off the shores of Europe in the event of a Soviet-American conventional war. Most analysts, except those in the Navy, have concluded that the vulnerability of aircraft carriers to Soviet land-based and seabased missile systems is so great that carriers are likely to be put out of operation rather quickly in the event of an all out SovietAmerican war. If this is true, then buying the F-14, which will increase the carrier's ability to defend itself against Soviet airplanes, is a totally wasteful step since the carriers will remain vulnerable to Soviet seabased and land-based missile systems. If we are going to confine carriers to limited war situations outside of Europe, and to crisis diplomacy, it would appear that the number of carriers can be reduced to nine.
The United States would operate one carrier on station in Europe with two back-ups, and two carriers on station in the Far East with four back-up carriers. This would mean that we should build no additional carriers, and as the current carriers wear out, phase down to a fleet of nine carriers. It would also mean that we would not need to procure the F-14 since it is not needed to protect carrier against countries other than the Soviet Union.
The role of carriers in ASW operations has also come increasingly under question. Two issues arise here. The first concerns whether or not we should maintain large expensive forces on the assumption that a war at sea is conceivable and needs to be deterred again. The second question concerns whether sea-based systems make a significant contribution to ASW activities. In virtually all areas in which we want to conduct ASW operations, land-based airplanes can operate fully. A decision to phase down the ASW role of the Navy would permit the cancellation of the S-3A aircraft.
STRATEGIC FORCES
While general purpose force issues mainly raise questions of waste, strategic forces raise crucial questions of good and bad consequences. The amount of money which can be saved by likely and reasonable alterations in strategic programs is not very large in the context of the total defense budget. Moreover, more than half of the cost of strategic forces are indirect costs for intelligence and communications, R&D, and support, and it is difficult to relate reductions in these expenses to changes in the direct costs which involve only 7.6 billion of the total of 19.7 billion in the FY-72 budget for strategic forces. The range of plausible strategic budgets would appear to go from 13 billion for a single weapons system with limited modernization to perhaps 22 or 23 billion for a triad with extensive modernization and a new bomber and a nation-wide ABM system.
Our major objective in designing strategic forces is to reduce the probability of a Soviet nuclear attack on the United States. In order to do calculations we make two major simplifying assumptions. We assume that the Soviet leaders' decision to launch nuclear war will depend on the amount of damage the United States can inflict on the Soviet Union after a Soviet first strike.
We also assume that the Soviets calculate war outcomes in the same way that we do. Although the SALT discussions have to some extent clarified Soviet views, we still have no real basis for determining how our strategic force decisions affect the probability of nuclear war. For example, our calculations do not take into account at all the damage which our airplanes based in Europe, or on carriers, could inflict on the Soviet Union. Yet the Soviet leaders are sufficiently concerned about these forces to insist that they be included in any comprehensive arms control agreement.
Nor do we really know how to calculate war outcomes, if indeed such calculations have any meaning in a war in which more than 40 million Americans would be killed.
Despite the changes made by the Nixon Administration in developing the concept of sufficiency, the cornerstone of strategic policy remains the notion of Assured Destruction – confidence in our ability to kill many Russians after a Soviet first strike. We maintain three separate strategic systems – the land-based ICBM base, ballistic missiles and intercontinental bombers, each separately capable of inflicting massive damage on the Soviet Union amounting to at least 25% of the population and 50% of Soviet industry. Each of the three forces is now invulnerable to a Soviet attack. The Soviets have no way of locating and destroying American Polaris submarines. Their intercontinental missile force is neither large enough nor accurate enough to destroy our fixed land-based missiles. Our bombers are capable of getting up in the air in less than 15 minutes and hence they can be airborne upon receiving warning of Soviet ICBM attack. As the Soviet fleet of submarines carrying ballistic missiles increases, a large part of our bomber force will be subject to destruction on the ground since they would get less than 15 minutes warning. In the long run if the Soviets develop accurate MIRVs for their SS-9 missiles the Minuteman force could become vulnerable to destruction.
These threats to the bomber and landbased missile forces have raised the question of whether or not the Uhited States needs to continue to maintain a triad. The argument for the triad is that it adds to our confidence that we can deter Soviet attack and prevents the Soviets from concentrating their R&D in a single area in order to achieve a breakthrough which would make the single farce vulnerable. On the other side it is argued that there is no prospect of the submarine force becoming vulnerable and that destruction that can be done by even a small number of surviving submarines is sufficient to deter a Soviet attack.
One way to proceed would be to rely primarily on the Polaris missile force as the backbone of the American deterrent to maintain the other two systems without spending substantial sums on their modernization or improvement. The specific force issues in the strategic field concern: (1) MIRV; (2) ULMS; (3) Bombers; (4) ABM; and (5) Air Defense.
MIRV
Our MIRV decisions illustrate the importance of focusing on those elements of our force posture which may actually reduce our security. Many now believe that an effort should have been made to ban MIRVs before the United States began to test them (in the summer of 1968) and to deploy them (beginning in the summer of 1970). MIRVs are destabilizing in that they pose a threat that the side deploying them can develop the capability to destroy the other side's fixed land based missiles in a first strike. The threat of Soviet MIRVs has led to the U.S. Safeguard ABM program and to R&D for a system to replace Minuteman. The Soviets must be equally concerned with our testing and deployment of MIRV. The Administration has argued that the Soviets need not be concerned because our MIRVs are not accurate or large enough to pose a threat to their missiles. However, the calculations which affect the arms race in this case are those made by the Soviets and they almost certainly are as conservative as we are. If so, they must assume that our MIRVs will be made accurate enough to destroy their missiles.
At the present time there is no justification for proceeding further with the deployment of MIRVs. The Soviets are not now deploying an area ABM system which the MIRVs are designed to penetrate. If they do begin to deploy such a system we could deploy MIRVs much more quickly. Moreover if the SALT negotiations do lead to an agreement holding ABM to very low levels, MIRV will, at best, be "wasteful" and, at worst, be "bad" insofar as it makes more difficult the negotiations of an offensive arms limitation agreement. While halting the deployment of MIRV, we should also review our R&D programs to ensure that we are not developing a first strike capability by improving accuracies.
ULMS
ULMS primarily raises an issue of waste. As long as our current submarines are invulnerable to a Soviet attack, there is no need to go forward with a new system. ULMS also may illustrate the tendency of the military to go forward with new systems which incorporate all of the available new technology regardless of cost or need. If a large Soviet ABM posed a threat to Poseidon's ability to penetrate, or if a Soviet advance in ASW posed a threat to the survivability of the submarines, we should proceed with ULMS. However, until we know what the threat might be, we have no way of sensibly designing the new submarine. The current design for a bigger, more sophisticated, boat with more and larger missiles is almost certain not to be the optimum solution. We need to slow down the program while exploring a range of possible designs.
Bomber
The question of a new manned bomber is almost entirely a matter of waste since the issue is not whether the bomber should be maintained, but whether one needs at this time to procure a new bomber. Secretary Laird has indicated that the B-52's can last at least until the early 1980's. There appears to be little doubt that their life could be prolonged further by reducing the number of flying hours. The Air Force appears to have conceded that the issue is not whether the B-52's can be kept flying. It is now arguing that the B-1 would be cheaper than continuing to operate the B-52's. However, this is only true if one assumes that the B-1 will operate for 17 years or longer and if the current cost estimates on the B-1 hold firm. Since costs are certain to grow substantially, it appears to be the case that the B-52 's can be operated for considerable number of additional years and at less cost than the B-1. Moreover the B-1 has no significant operational advantage over the B-52. Thus, at this time, a B-1 program should be continued only at the level of design studies.
To these arguments regarding the relative effectiveness of the B-52 and the B-1 must be added concern about the likely Soviet reaction to an American decision to deploy a new manned bomber. It appears that the Soviets take our bomber capabilities more seriously than we do; we know that they spend large sums on air defense. An American decision to build the B-1 could complicate efforts to negotiate an offensive freeze at SALT.
ABM
ABM raises not only the issue of waste but also of the impact of the American and Soviet ABM programs on the arms race, and on the problems of deterring nuclear war. Large ABM systems on both sides would vastly increase the value of a first strike and raise the danger of a situation in which leaders on both sides might conclude, in a crisis, that they must strike first. They might come to believe that a first strike could saturate the enemy defense and destroy the enemy society while his ragged strike back could not penetrate the existing defense. For this reason, avoiding ABMs on both sides deserves the high priority it has now been given at SALT.
The only current issue is whether to proceed with the 2-4 sites designed to protect Minuteman. Since Secretary Laird has conceded that the system makes sense only against a narrow range of Soviet threats, it would appear prudent to delay any additional expenditure until the results of the SALT negotiations become clear.
Air defense
The American air defense program dramatically illustrates the waste which results from routinely seeking to develop the most sophisticated system available, without asking how it relates to deterring an attack or reducing damage if war occurs. The Administration proposes to proceed with AWACS, a complicated and sophisticated system designed to enable the United States to develop an effective air defense against a possible (but thus far non-existent) new Soviet bomber.
However, the United States has decided that it cannot, and should not, build an ABM system against the much larger Soviet ICBM force which is fully capable of destroying the United States. It makes no sense to defend against Soviet bombers at great cost when we cannot stop their missiles. AWACS should be canceled and the remaining air defense system phased down to a "coast guard" type capability.
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
1. An overall ceiling on Defense Expenditures should be established. Based on expected revenues, on competing domestic priorities, and on cuts in specific weapon systems pinpointed by PAS, the often mentioned expenditure limit of $68 billion on FY 72 would be feasible. Declining limits could be established for succeeding years.
2. The Congressional Appropriations Committees should publish their estimate of the likely level of Defense expenditures, and appropriations, which they believe Congress should approve over the next five years.
3. The continued procurement of Minuteman III, and Minuteman Force Modernization, be canceled with a saving of $839 million.
4. The conversion of SLBMs to Poseidon configuration be deferred with a saving of up to $800 million.
5. Further research on advanced MIRV guidance systems for improved accuracy be halted, and the $87 million proposed for ABRES be reduced appropriately.
6. Defer a decision to move forward with the B-1 by deleting $300 million of the $370 million requested, thereby keeping the program at its previous level of effort and delaying the procurement of a prototype. Explore alternative designs for a new bomber for the mid-1980's.
7. Withhold or escrow all additional funds for the first two ABM sites and appropriate no funds for the third and fourth sites pending the results of the SALT negotiations. Proceed with Prototype Development of Hard-Site Defenses. Those actions would result in a saving of about $1.2 billion.
8. The AWACS program be canceled with a saving of $145 million; continue to phase out obsolescent and costly components of the existing defense system.
9. Defer any decisions on design of ULMS, and do not plan to deploy until a clear threat to existing submarines develops. This approach should permit some reduction of the $110 million requested.
10. Maintain only a total of nine carriers. Phase out three CVS's and the six oldest carriers as the two additional nuclear carriers enter the fleet. Phase down related ships and costs as appropriate and cancel the F-14 program with a saving of $1 billion.
11. Delay a decision to procure the F-15 with a saving of $415 million. Direct the Services to investigate either an improved F-4 or an alternative relatively unsophisticated follow-on fighter.