April 23, 1971
Page 11708
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON MIDDLE EAST
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I am sure that each of us constantly seeks new perspectives on the situation in the Middle East.
The continuing tensions there, the risk of renewed hostilities, and the risk of a great power confrontation underline the importance of a settlement between Israel and her Arab neighbors.
What should be the elements of such a settlement?
As we consider the frustrations of the current impasse, it is useful to review developments since the 6-day war.
Our former Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur J. Goldberg, has given us such a review in an address delivered at Chatham House in London on April 6, 1971.
So that Senators may have the benefit of that review, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of Ambassador Goldberg's address be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.
In his address, Ambassador Goldberg recited three principles which guided our policy in the period following the 6-day war and culminating in Security Council Resolution 242 on November 22, 1967:
1. To return to the situation as it was on June 4, 1967, is not a prescription for peace, but for renewed hostilities.
2. Clearly the parties to the conflict must be the parties to the peace. Sooner or later it is they who must make a settlement in the area. It is hard to see how it is possible for nations to live together in peace if they cannot learn to reason together.
3. That others can and should help, but their contribution should be "to promote and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement."
I agree with Ambassador Goldberg's assessment that these principles still make sense.
The Ambassador also reviewed the history of Resolution 242 and its application to the question of withdrawal of Israel forces. That the question of "secure and recognized boundaries" was to be the subject of negotiations is clear.
Finally, the Ambassador reviewed the concessions which have been made by Israel to date in the search for peace.
I commend Ambassador Goldberg's address to the attention of the Senate.
There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
THE CONTEXT OF PEACE EFFORTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
(By Hon. Arthur J. Goldberg)
It is a natural temptation for one who, as United States Ambassador to the United Nations, for three years played a key role in the debates and negotiations involving conflict and peace in the Middle East to offer his personal blueprint of how peace can best be achieved.
I do not propose to yield to this temptation. It is one thing to express concern about the situation in the Middle East and to voice the fervent hope that a peace treaty between Israel and the Arab states will be achieved – better sooner than later. It is quite another thing to profess a monopoly on the prescription which thus far has eluded Israel, the Arab States, Ambassador Jarring and governments, including my own and Great Britain, in attaining a peace agreement.
Accordingly, in lieu of a blueprint, I wish to offer some general observations about the road to peace in the Middle East. Most of these relate to expressions emanating from my own country. I have noted some similar attitudes from Great Britain.
Perhaps the best way to start is to recall the principle that guided my government, and others at the UN during the long period of debate and negotiations following the six-day war and culminating in the unanimous adoption of the critically important Resolution 242 by the Security Council on 22 November 1967. This is what I said at the time, not once but repeatedly: "To return to the situation as it was on June 4, 1967 is not a prescription for peace, but for renewed hostilities".
I believe that this principle was accurate then. I believe it is accurate now. And, as an American, I express the fervent hope and expectation that our respective governments will remain faithful to this principle, derived as it is from the history of the last two decades.
I think it is appropriate to recall also what my government, immediately after the June war, said about the nature of a peace settlement in the Middle East: In the words of President Johnson,
"But who will make this peace where all others have failed for 20 years or more? Clearly the parties to the conflict must be the parties to the peace. Sooner or later, it is they who must make a settlement in the area. It is hard to see how it is possible for nations to live together in peace if they cannot learn to reason together." I am not aware that the British Government in any way disagreed with or disassociated itself from this formulation when made.
Again, I believe that this insight was right then. I believe it is right now. As an American I again express the fervent hope and expectation that our governments will remain faithful to this insight.
Finally, we might also recall another principle agreed upon by our governments, namely that others can and should help, but their contribution should be "to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement." That is the exact language of Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967; it is also Ambassador Jarring's mandate, and is also binding on both our governments which were principal architects of that resolution.
In light of these principles, the concept recently bruited about in the Four-Power discussions in New York and elsewhere of a Big-Four Power UN peacekeeping force, including American and Soviet "fighting forces" is, in my opinion, a non-starter, completely lacking in substance and fraught with the most dangerous possible consequences. It is true that this proposal has been somewhat blunted in the last fortnight by a welcome declaration of Secretary of State Rogers that my government would not support such a proposal unless both Israel and the UAR agreed.
Perhaps this moots the proposition since it is inconceivable to me that Israel would or should accept it, in light of the tragic experience of 1967. But whether Israel accepted it or not, I would, nonetheless, be opposed to such a proposal on the basic ground that participation by the Soviet Union and the United States in particular, or the big powers in general, through contingents of fighting military forces under a UN peacekeeping umbrella would be contrary to America's interests, Britain's interests and the interests of world peace.
I think it therefore essential that those governments and statesmen seeking to help the parties resolve this dispute, as well as responsible commentators, should recall the history and language of Resolution 242, since all seem to agree that this resolution is the key to a peace agreement between the parties. If the dramatic events preceding and occurring during the six-day war of early June, 1967, have dimmed in public recollection, this is doubly the case with respect to Resolution 242. Just last week, for example, the New York Times reported a meeting between Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and Secretary Rogers, following which the Soviet Ambassador told newsmen that it is up to Israel, if peace is to be achieved, to accept the November 22, 1967 resolution and implement it. The Soviet Ambassador seems to have a lapse of memory. Israel has accepted the resolution. The important thing to recall, however, is that the Security Council, when it adopted the Resolution, did not adopt the Soviet version of it, and with good reason.
Moreover, the resolution is not self implementing but depends ultimately upon agreement of the parties.
Resolution 242 was not adopted in a vacuum. It was the product of months of debate and negotiation at the United Nations extending from May 1967 before the war actually broke out, until November 22 of the same year, the date of its adoption.
In May of 1967 the late President Nasser of the UAR moved substantial Egyptian forces into the Sinai, ejected the UN peacekeeping forces, reoccupied the strategic and previously demilitarised Sharm-el-Sheik and proclaimed a blockade of the Straits of Tiran.
These were ominous measures. Israel, which under American pressure had withdrawn its forces from Sinai and Sharm-el-Sheik in 1957, had consistently affirmed that a blockade of its ships and cargoes seeking to pass through the Straits of Tiran would be a causus bellum. Moreover, faced with divisional forces of well armed UAR troops on its borders and increasingly provocative statements by Nasser and other Arab leaders, Israel had little choice but to order mobilization of its largely civilian army.
It was justified concern which, therefore, prompted the Western powers, including our two countries, to take the initiative in convoking the Security Council in an attempt to avert a conflict by restoring the situation.
These attempts in the Security Council and through private diplomatic channels failed because of Arab objections supported by the Soviet Union. Apparently, whatever the reason, both were ready to risk war rather than reestablish the conditions which had previously prevailed in the area.
It was only on the second day of the war, after it became publicly apparent to all that Israel for all practical purposes had already won the war, that agreement was reached in the Security Council on a simple resolution calling for a cease fire.
The cease fire resolutions which were ultimately adopted during the tense days of the war differed dramatically, however, from previous resolutions of the Council in the Israeli-Arab wars of the preceding nineteen years. In the earlier resolutions, the call for a cease fire was usually accompanied by a demand for a withdrawal of troops to the positions held before the conflicts erupted. In June of 1967, however, no withdrawal provisions were incorporated as part of the cease fire resolutions. This was not by accident but rather as a result of the reaction by a majority of the Security Council to what had occurred.
As the debates revealed, the Council was unwilling to vote forthwith withdrawal of Israeli forces because of the conviction of a substantial number of the members of the Council that to return to the situation as it was before the June 1967 war would not be a prescription for peace but a formula for renewed hostilities. Proof that this was so is provided by the action of the Council with respect to a resolution pressed at the time by the Soviet Union. The Soviet representative , offered a specific resolution not only reaffirming the Council's call for a cease fire, but additionally, condemning Israel as the aggressor and demanding a withdrawal of its forces to the positions held on June 5, 1967 before the conflict erupted. But this resolution of the Soviet Union, although put to a vote, did not command the support of the requisite nine members of the Security Council.
The unwillingness to support the Soviet resolution for a withdrawal of Israeli forces to the positions they held before June 5, 1967, was based upon the conviction of a substantial number of the Security Council members that the withdrawal of Israeli troops should this time be in the context of a just and lasting peace settlement putting an end to the state of belligerency which had prevailed for two decades resulting from the Arab states unwillingness to acknowledge and respect Israel's sovereignty and right to live.
The Soviet Union did not allow the matter to rest with its defeat in the Security Council. It called for a special session of the General Assembly which convened on June 17, 1967. It is important to recall that the General Assembly also refused to adopt by the requisite 2/3 majority a resolution offered by Yugoslavia and several other members and supported by the Soviet Union and the Arab states, differing somewhat in tone but not in substance from the prior Soviet resolution.
With the adjournment of the Special Session of the General Assembly in September 1967, the matter once again reverted to the Security Council and again became the subject of further public debate as well as intensive private negotiations. These finally culminated in the November 22 resolution.
The resolution offered by the British Representative, my distinguished friend, Lord Caradon, stemmed in substantial degree from the General Assembly resolution of the Latin Americans and a United States resolution offered to the resumed Security Council meeting. The unanimous support for this resolution was the product in considerable measure of intensive diplomatic activity by the United states and Great Britain both at the United Nations and in foreign capitals throughout the world. This is not to say that the various Latin American countries, India and others were not actively engaged in the negotiations and diplomatic activity, but it cannot be gainsaid that the United States together with Great Britain took the lead in the adoption of the November 22 resolution. Impartial observers reported at the time that the United States' role was the primary one. As its representative, I now confirm the validity of this observation.
It should be noted that before the vote on the November 22 resolution, the Soviet Union offered a draft resolution again calling for withdrawal of Israeli troops to the June 5 lines. It did not, however, press the resolution to a vote. Then, and only then, was the stage set for the adoption of the November 22 resolution.
It is to the text of the resolution that I now turn, since it is the text of the resolution, illuminated by its legislative history, which expressed the will of the Security Council.
It is of great significance in interpreting the resolution that it does not specifically require Israel to withdraw to the June 5, 1967 lines. Rather, it enunciates as a principle "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict"
The word "all" does not precede "territories" in this formulation or principle. Nor does the article "the" precede "territories" in the English text which was the negotiated document. This was not accidental but was the product of negotiated design.
Coupled and linked with the withdrawal provision is the enunciation of the deeply held conviction by many UN members: the time had come for the termination by the Arab states of all claims of a state of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment by them of Israeli sovereignty and its right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. In this linkage, the Security Council realistically acknowledged that the Arab states could not be left free to assert the rights of war, as they had been doing, while Israel was being called upon to abide by the rules of peace. While the resolution speaks in terms of respect for the sovereignty of all states in the area. it is obvious that its main thrust is to obtain acknowledgment of Israel's sovereignty, something the Arab states have been unwilling until now to do.
The resolution further affirms the necessity for guaranteeing freedom of navigation of international waterways in the area, of achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem, and for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones. In light of reports concerning the role of the Security Council, and particularly its four leading permanent members. in connection with the peace settlement, it is important to note that the language of the resolution speaks in terms of guarantees rather than imposition.
While the provisions relating to withdrawal, renunciation of belligerency, freedom of navigation and settlement of the refugee problem are numbered paragraphs 1 and 2 in the resolution, they are all stated in terms of principles for a settlement. The really operative part of the resolution is in paragraph 3 which requests the Secretary General to designate a special representative to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the states concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement.
It is this paragraph pursuant to which Ambassador Jarring was designated to undertake his delicate mission. It is his mandate and sets forth the ultimate object of the whole enterprise, namely, to help bring about agreement between the parties to ensure a just and lasting peace in the area. The concept of a just, agreed upon and lasting peace in which every state in the area can live in security is emphasized and repeated throughout the resolution. It cannot be disputed that this concern is the very essence and goal of Resolution 242.
Given this diplomatic history, it is appropriate for me to take note of some recent developments.
President Sadat of the UAR has advised Ambassador Jarring that his government is willing to sign a peace agreement with Israel, although this offer is conditioned with reservations not embodied in the November 22 resolution. And Israel, of course, has long stated its fervent desire to conclude a peace treaty with the UAR. In this connection, I would like to emphasize the value of patience in the resolution of grave diplomatic dilemmas such as this. Patience and fortitude can bring their own rewards. In the years following the 1967 war many diplomats adhered to the view that the UAR would never agree to sign a peace agreement with Israel under any circumstances. Israel's insistence upon a peace agreement led to charges of unrealism and inflexibility on its part. But events and the recent offer of President Sadat have, at least to some extent, justified Israel's patient resolve on this point.
And not only has Israel proved to be right in this respect, but I have always believed that, given the opportunity through appropriate negotiations, Israel will effectively discredit the all-too- prevalant conception, held even among some friends, that Israel is inflexible and unwilling to display magnanimity for peace. The concessions to date made by Israel in the search for peace are too often overlooked.
Israel wanted to start with direct negotiations but agreed to begin with indirect negotiations under Ambassador Jarring's auspices.
Israel wanted the Jarring talks to be held on the foreign minister's level, but agreed to begin on the ambassadorial level.
Israel wanted the discussions to be held close to the Middle East, but agreed to commence in New York.
Israel wanted a restoration of the agreed-upon cease fire with an indefinite duration but agreed to resume negotiations through Ambassador Jarring with the ceasefire limited by a unilateral declaration of the UAR.
Israel wanted the removal of missiles and sites constructed in violation of the ceasefire understanding arranged by the United States, but agreed to proceed with the talks despite the Soviet and UAR breach of this understanding.
These are not insubstantial concessions. In my view, they reflect the fervent desire of the government and people of Israel for the long sought goal – a just and enduring peace in the area.
In light of these considerations, I welcome the assurances of my government that Israel will not be pressured in the search for a just and lasting peace which will serve the interests of Israel and its Arab neighbours. It is precisely such a peace that is mandated by Resolution 242.
The time has long passed when great powers can or should impose their views on small states.
Greatness alone does not assure a monopoly on wisdom. Rather, all powers and people genuinely interested in a settlement in the Middle East should lend their influence for a negotiated peace treaty between the parties to the 1967 conflict. In this uncertain world, no one can guarantee that anything done today will endure forever. But I am strongly of the conviction that there is no other way to lasting peace in the Middle East than the way in which nations throughout history made peace which lasts – through negotiated agreements between the affected parties reflecting both magnanimity and a true and realistic recognition of the needs and interests of those directly concerned.