May 18, 1971
Page 15558
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I agree with the distinguished majority leader, Senator MANSFIELD, that there is no magic or sanctity about a European force level of 300,000 Americans.
I have supported him in seeking a reduction in our troop levels in Europe.
I have supported him in pressing our European allies to pick up a greater share of the burden.
I applaud the results he has achieved. It is time to take a new look at Europe – East and West – and to accommodate our policies to the perspectives and prospects of the 1970's.
Mr. President, I do not believe that Senator Mansfield's amendment is the right way to do it at this time.
I believe that negotiated cutbacks by both the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries are now the most potentially productive path to a reduced American military presence in Europe, a reduction of tensions, and more open relationships between Eastern and Western Europe.
The Senate should encourage the administration to vigorously and strongly pursue the opportunity opened up by Mr. Brezhnev's recent call to start troop withdrawal negotiations, and Mr. Gromyko's subsequent discussion with Ambassador Beam. Such an effort would give us the chance to meet the objectives of this amendment while enhancing the stability and security of Europe. And that is what today's debate in the Senate is really all about.
The issue is not whether Congress has the constitutional right and the sworn responsibility to review and reshape our force levels and our overseas deployment. We have that right – and we must meet that responsibility.
The issue is not whether our European partners should carry a partner's share of the economic and military burden of security. They have the strength to do much more – and it is time for them to begin matching their will to their ability.
And the issue is not whether the United States should withdraw troops, but when and how. Not our direction or our purpose, but timing and method are the heart of this debate.
How should we decide?
What are the advantages and risks that we would run if 150,000 American servicemen were unilaterally and quickly withdrawn from Europe?
First, there is the rough military balance of power in Central Europe between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries. For 25 years our troops have helped keep that balance and have contributed to maintaining peace in Europe. A substantial American withdrawal might not upset that balance and the calculus of deterrence – but it might. We should not make such a drastic change hastily.
Second, a substantial American withdrawal at this time could endanger deterrence by increasing NATO's dependence on tactical nuclear weapons. Most of a 150,000-man withdrawal would come from our land-based forces – not from the approximately 20,000 sailors and marines in the 6th Fleet. Consequently, the forces that were left behind would have to be heavily reoriented toward a tactical nuclear capability. But Soviet leaders might find a primarily nuclear force a less believable deterrent to military probes than the present mix of conventional forces. Here again, we cannot know for sure. We do know that the President of the United States should never be put in a position where his only choices when faced with limited conventional attack in Europe are to do nothing or to use nuclear weapons.
Third, the most desirable way to strengthen deterrence in Europe is by mutual cutbacks in the armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. If both sides agree to reduce their forces, they will reduce the threat that either side will gain a military advantage. Such an agreement would also reflect and enhance a more basic relaxation of political tensions. It would strengthen the chances for peace on a continent and in a world that has for too long lived with war. We cannot afford to bypass this kind of opportunity.
Mr. Brezhnev's recent remarks indicate a Soviet willingness to negotiate about mutual withdrawals. Yesterday's discussion between Ambassador Beam and Mr. Gromyko offer encouraging signs that such talks could be undertaken without delay.
Negotiations on balanced force reductions should have been and still should be high on our list of diplomatic priorities. As I said when I returned from my visit to Russia, this is one of a number of areas in which we can and must try to do business with Soviet leaders. We should vigorously explore the negotiating possibilities instead of taking unilateral action which could damage the prospects for their success.
Fourth, we should weigh the impact of force reductions in Europe on situations like the Middle East.
Fifth, U.S. force reductions in Europe could also have a bearing on current East-West negotiations, including the SALT talks. Progress on both sides in reducing conventional forces in Europe could improve the prospects for agreements in other areas.
Sixth, and I believe most importantly, one-sided U.S. troop reductions now would set back vital efforts to reduce East-West tensions and would particularly damage Chancellor Brandt's ostpolitik. The stabilization of East-West relations was the basic purpose behind the original decision by President Truman and the Congress to station American forces in Europe. Chancellor Brandt of West Germany is engaged in extremely delicate negotiations with Moscow and other East European nations to establish more normal relations. His policies, and particularly our joint efforts on the question of Berlin, are of great potential value, not only to Germany, but to all of us. They deserve more than the lukewarm support which the administration has given them. In my recent talk with Chancellor Brandt, he described the strong efforts he is making to maintain the balance between German diplomacy in the East and German commitments to NATO in the West. Unilateral American troop withdrawals at this time could weaken the NATO side of the equation and could make it far more difficult for Chancellor Brandt to keep the necessary balance.
We must also face the hard fact that the diplomacy of normalization is not without opposition in Germany itself. There, and elsewhere, powerful voices are opposed to any arrangements with the Russians and any relaxation of tensions in Europe. At the very least, the timing and character of the U.S. force reductions called for in this amendment could unsettle German politics.
For almost three decades, we have recognized that our troops in Europe serve a purpose beyond deterring a Soviet attack. Our NATO commitment helps to provide stability in German politics. Our troops help to cement German confidence in the West. They represent the basis for continued German integration into Western Europe. These purposes would not be well served by U.S. troop withdrawals at a time when the Germans themselves are debating a relaxation of tensions with the East, and have taken important initiatives to do so.
Finally, Mr. President, there are the financial and economic questions. They cannot be dismissed as peripheral or trivial, but I think we should avoid placing too great stress on them, from either side of the issue.
In the current balance-of-payments situation, the cost of America's presence in Europe must be taken into account. While the precise figure is difficult to calculate, the best estimate is that our European troop commitments represent a payments outflow of about $1.5 billion a year.
The immediate cause of our balance-of-payments problem is flows of short term capital – so-called "hot money"and domestic inflation. Each of these problems must be solved, but neither will be solved by reducing our military presence in Europe.
This is not to say that we should avoid cutting the costs of our military support for NATO. We can and should insist that the Europeans – who want our troops in Europe – must pay more of the cost of keeping them there. We can and should insist that the administration cut the fat from our military forces in Europe, and elsewhere. Those must be urgent priorities.
We should not confuse a balance-of-payments savings overseas with a budgetary savings here. Redeployment of the forces based in Europe might contribute to the former – but it would do nothing about overall defense costs, unless the forces were not only redeployed, but disbanded.
Even if this amendment forced the withdrawal of 150,000 American soldiers from Europe, presumably they would be maintained in the United States, specifically earmarked for NATO.
We would still be paying approximately the same budget cost, or more, for exactly the same forces. The only difference is that we would get less for our money. We would lose the political and military advantages of the current deployment in Europe.
These, then, are the issues which should concern us today: the conventional force balance of power – the threshold for the potential use of tactical nuclear weapons – the possibility of negotiation on mutual force cutbacks, as called for by Mr. Brezhnev – the effects of troop redeployments on the Middle East and on SALT – and the impact of unilateral American withdrawals both on German efforts to settle festering issues to the East and on delicate problems in German internal politics.
So the essential question is not whether we should continue to do for the Europeans what they can do for themselves. We all agree on the answer to that.
The majority leader has courageously dramatized our answer – and he is again reminding the Europeans of how we think and what we expect. His reminders have been felt in Europe in the past and will be felt there now and in the future. European governments have responded in the last few years with larger steps toward joint force planning and more equitable defense spending. They have recently made arrangements with the United States to assume a larger share of NATO infrastructure costs of the next 5 years.
Little of this would have come to pass were it not for Senator MIKE MANSFIELD. Our European partners should understand that virtually all of us in the U.S. Senate are with him in expecting them to pick up a fair part of our mutual defense costs. And we are with him in our impatience. We may wait longer for the sake of Europe – but we cannot wait forever.
And just as our NATO partners should not misread what some of us are saying, so our own executive branch should not misread us either. I am opposed to reducing our forces in Europe by 150,000 men at this time and in this way. But this does not mean that I oppose reducing excess military manpower, that is something which could and should be explored. There is plenty of fat in our Armed Forces, including our European forces.
I am not sure that the administration has done all it could to pressure our European allies to shoulder more of the cost of NATO forces. I am not sure that the administration has done all it could to press for a mutual balanced force reduction in Europe. That is why Senator MANSFIELD's efforts are so important. His proposals have motivated more action on these fronts than might otherwise have occurred.
Mr. President, we went to Europe in 1941 to fight a war. We have stayed there ever since to help avoid another war. We have succeeded. I hope and believe that we are nearing the time when peace can be maintained by diplomacy and trade, not primarily by arms and military might. There is evidence in SALT, in Mr. Brezhnev's recent statements, and in the Gromyko-Beam conversation that we have an opportunity now to begin to negotiate seriously about force reductions and the future of a stable peace in Europe.
We must seize our chance. For the time being, our troops in Europe are part of the negotiating equation. We must use them in the pursuit of a negotiated peace, as we have used them to deter war. They can serve no greater cause. It is the same cause the majority leader seeks to serve with his amendment. I disagree with his amendment, because I believe there is a better way.