May 25, 1971
Page 15727
HARRIMAN ON EUROPEAN TROOPS
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I would like to bring to my colleagues' attention a recent article by one of our Nation's most distinguished diplomats, W. Averell Harriman.
In the May 16 Outlook section of the Washington Post, Governor Harriman discusses the recently defeated Mansfield amendment from the unique perspective of a man who has been directly involved in the issue of our NATO commitment from the very beginning.
Noting that our troop commitment to NATO has extended far beyond the original intention, Governor Harriman stresses the need for a thorough reevaluation of what he terms an "unhealthy" situation.
I commend Governor Harriman's thoughts to my colleagues in the Senate, for although the Mansfield amendment has been defeated, the issue is one which we must face again in the near future and which will demand the most thoughtful deliberation for its resolution.
Certainly, Governor Harriman's views will be helpful to us in this process.
I ask unanimous consent that the article, entitled "An Unwise Reaction to Unwise Policies," be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
THE MANFIELD AMENDMENTS TWO VIEWS – "AN UNWISE REACTION TO UNWISE POLICIES"
(By W. Averell Harriman)
For the Senate to act precipitously to reduce our forces in Europe at the very moment the Soviets are offering to negotiate for a mutual withdrawal of forces would be highly irresponsible.
Brezhnev stated, in his speech to the party conference in Moscow, just six weeks ago, "We stand for a reduction of armed forces and armaments in areas where the military confrontation is especially dangerous, above all in Central Europe." Again speaking in Tbilisi, Georgia, last Thursday, Brezhnev called upon the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to open negotiations, in one form or another, for mutual reduction of forces in Europe.
I can well understand the frustrations of Senator Mansfield and other senators who have been calling for the last six years for reduction in our forces stationed in Europe. I share this frustration. This administration has been cool to discussions which might lead to the withdrawal of some of our forces either by agreement among our allies or, preferably, by agreement for balanced mutual force reduction with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries.
The Soviet Union has been urging the convening of a European Security Conference which could be a good forum to discuss such a reduction. I agree with the administration that a discussion of a force reduction would be greatly facilitated if an agreement were first reached on Berlin, eliminating the most explosive point of East-West tension. However the administration has been less than enthusiastic about Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik initiative, as well as Berlin. In spite of Brandt's specific assurances there has been a suspicion that ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties would turn West Germany toward Moscow rather than the Western alliance.
This mistrust is shared by some of our old time cold war warriors who still live in the Stalin era. I recall a conversation I had with one at the time Brandt was first launching his Ostpolitik. I asked what he thought about it. He replied "It is terrifying, isn't it?" NATO seems to be viewed by them as an institution to be protected for its own sake rather than as an instrument for improving the long term security of its members.
This attitude also fails to look at the other side, Moscow's relations with Eastern European countries. Take Poland. Clearly one of Warsaw's gravest concerns has been the uncertainty about its border with Germany. While this fear exists, the tendency must be to depend on Moscow. If the Oder-Neisse line is accepted and if there is other progress made toward improving relations between Poland and West Germany, Poland's dependence on Moscow will lessen and the natural desire of the Polish people to look to the west will be encouraged.
Despite Brezhnev's invitation, we cannot be sure that an agreement on a reduction of forces can be reached. But surely we should make an attempt and not throw away a position we have attained at great cost and effort.
In 1951 I was chairman of the so-called "three wise men" which included British Chancellor of the Exchequer Gaitskill and Jean Monnet of France. This committee made the first detailed analysis of the capabilities of NATO members and attempted to indicate a fair division of the burden of the forces needed. I strongly supported the stationing of our troops in Europe at that time. But it never occurred to me that we would continue to keep such large forces for as long as we have. I thought that with the extraordinary economic expansion of Western Europe stimulated by the Marshall Plan it could and would build up its forces while we would gradually reduce ours although continuing where necessary to contribute sophisticated arms.
Unfortunately, we have substantially maintained our force levels and ended our supply of weapons, except for the special cases of Greece and Turkey. This has become such a rigid tradition that any reduction of troops on our side gives credence to the feeling among Europeans that we are turning our backs to them and retreating to isolationism. This is an unnatural and unhealthy situation which should be corrected by careful handling, but is not helped by a move in the Senate to take abrupt action to cut our forces in half.
I firmly believe that the Senate should assume greater responsibility in foreign affairs but surely this requires careful consideration including full public hearings and committee reports before action.
A pressure for reduction in forces in Europe is our balance of payments crises. We have continued our forces in Europe at substantial balance of payments loss. In addition we have been engaged in the war in Vietnam without the slightest regard to its effect on our balance of payments.
Our first action should be the prompt end of our reckless expenditures in Vietnam. The slow reduction now promised by the administration would withdraw only two-thirds of our forces from Vietnam after three years in office. There has been no assurance given about the balance, the air support by our Navy and our Air Force stationed in Thailand, and no estimate of the vast sums needed for continued economic and military aid to the Thieu government if the Vietnamization of the war is to be perpetuated.
Because of the unwillingness of the administration to act to end the war in Vietnam I strongly endorse the suggested Congressional moves to cut off the use of funds for continuing the war if all our troops are not withdrawn by the end of the year. The polls indicate that this has the support of the overwhelming majority of the American people. The administration is continuing the war in defiance of the will of the American people. I fully agreed with last Friday's Washington Post editorial when it succinctly asked at its conclusion, "Why Europe, why not Vietnam?"
President Nixon maintains that the alternative to support of his continuation of the war in Vietnam is neo-isolationism. He is wrong. The fact is that continuation of the war is turning more and more people in their frustration toward isolationism. The action proposed in the Senate precipitously to reduce by half our forces in Europe is an unwise reaction to his unwise policies in Indochina.