May, 13, 1971
Page 14867
ARMS CONTROL FOR AMERICAN SECURITY
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, as I said in a statement before the Senate on May 6, I believe that it is essential that both the Soviet Union and the United States be aware of the arms control implications of their defense program decisions. We must establish a pattern of mutual self- restraint with other nations when developing new strategic defense systems. Arms control does not mean unilateral disarmament – on the contrary, it can mean greater security for all nations.
The testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 3 by Dr. Herbert Scoville provides a throughtful and provocative analysis relating to this problem. I commend it to the attention of Senators and ask unanimous consent that it be printed. in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the testimony was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ON THE FISCAL YEAR 1972 DEFENSE PROGRAM AND BUDGET.
HERBERT SCOVILLE, FEDERATION of AMERICAN SCIENTISTS (FAS), CHAIRMAN, FAS STRATEGIC WEAPONS COMMITTEE, MAY 3, 1971.
Mr. Chairman: I appreciate very much the privilege of being able to come before this Committee this morning to express my views on behalf of the Federation of American Scientists on the proposed FY 1972 Defense Program and Budget. Rather than an attempt to go through all individual items on the budget and analyze these in detail, I believe it would be more useful if I could concentrate my attention on the strategic forces programs and comment on how these appear to relate to the threats which have been posed. In this period of limited availability of funds and resources, we cannot afford the luxury of prematurely spending large sums to build weapons which provide protection against threats that may not emerge – weapons that will only serve to fuel the arms race and escalate the requirements for additional funds in the future.
The basic aim of our strategic forces is to provide, as Secretary Laird has said in his first two criteria for nuclear sufficiency, a realistic deterrent against nuclear attack by maintaining a second strike capability and eliminating all incentive for the Soviet Union to strike the United States first even in a crisis. Strategic nuclear war would be so disastrous that its initiation must be made unthinkable. All other objectives for strategic forces are insignificant in comparison to the requirement to avoid the outbreak of nuclear war.
At the present time, our deterrent is based on three independent weapons systems. The Polaris submarines with their ballistic missiles (SLBM's) are the cornerstone of the deterrent structure since they, and only they, are invulnerable to a first strike for the foreseeable future. They are capable of overwhelming any ABM system which the Soviets could have for a number of years. This sea based deterrent is supported by a force of more than a thousand land based ICBM's in hardened silos which at the present time are also invulnerable but which, if the arms race is allowed to continue and the Soviets do develop new weapons systems, could appear to become increasingly vulnerable in the next five to ten years. Finally, we have the large B-52 bomber force which our military authorities believe easily capable of overwhelming any Soviet air defenses but which is vulnerable to a surprise attack if the aircraft are caught on the ground. The Minuteman and the bombers, although separately potentially vulnerable, do have a complementary function in that no plausible scenario has ever been put forward in which they could be simultaneously destroyed in a surprise attack.
The United States faces three kinds of threats to the survival of these strategic deterrent forces: the threat of a Soviet ABM neutralizing our retaliatory capability; the threat of Soviet missiles destroying our land based missiles; and the threat of Soviet submarine launched missile surprise attack against our bombers. I will show that – over the last few years – the estimates of these threats have rarely been exceeded and in fact have often been delayed, and that the United States has already over-reacted to these same threats. I conclude that there is no need for further reaction to these threats even taking into account the recent evidence which Secretary Laird has pointed to with alarm. I conclude, in fact, that we can and should defer some programs.
Premature or excessive reaction can in the long run produce less security by stimulating otherwise avoidable Soviet weapons programs and by precluding desirable SALT agreements.
I. THE THREAT TO THE SEA BASED DETERRENT
Let us now look at the estimated threats to the deterrent forces and the programs proposed to deal with them. First, the submarine deterrent. A danger to this can arise from two general developments: ABM's and anti-submarine warfare (ASW).
ABM THREAT
The ABM threat to the Polaris deterrent is an old one. In the mid 1960's the United States began to respond to the threat of a very large nationwide Soviet ABM, anticipated for the late 60's, by developing the Poseidon multiple warheaded missile. In 1968, however, the Soviets stopped the further deployment of their Moscow ABM system, the only one they had. Nevertheless, the United States went ahead with Poseidon and the first such submarine has just gone to sea. If we were responding to the threat correctly in 1968, we have at least three years to spare now. And we were certainly acting conservatively then. Thus we have deployed a counter to a Soviet ABM already – and done so many years before it would be required.
Last week, Secretary Laird announced that the Soviets have resumed ABM deployment in the Moscow area with new types of interceptors. However, such new deployment would have to be greatly enlarged and extended to many other areas before it could possibly require the Poseidon MIRV system. This would certainly take five or more years. Nor have we considered, in our threat-estimates of Soviet ABM, the fact that the Soviets are reputed to have accepted the U.S. proposal to halt ABM construction everywhere except around capital cities – a proposal under negotiation, either separately or as part of a package. If we succeed in limiting ABM's at SALT, then we would never have needed the Poseidon system, and about $4 billion would have been saved. This is clearly an example where we have not timed our strategic weapons programs to match the threat, but have gone forward at great expense with a deployment because technology was available. And our rush to deploy MIRV may have made it non-negotiable.
ASW THREAT
In the last two years nothing has changed to increase the ASW threat to our Polaris submarines. Secretary Laird, on March 15, 1971 in his statement to this Committee said:
"... although our continuing investigations have resulted in no immediate concern about the survivability of our Polaris-Poseidon submarines at sea, we are continuing our active program for SSBN defense. Of course, no system can be guaranteed to remain invulnerable indefinitely and we are aware that the Soviets are working on new ASW techniques."
He was more explicit in early 1969 when he said:
"According to our best current estimates, we believe that our Polaris and Poseidon submarines at sea can be considered virtually invulnerable today. With a highly concentrated effort, the Soviet Navy today might be able to localize and destroy at sea one or two POLARIS submarines. But the massive and expensive undertaking that would be required to extend such a capability using any currently known ASW techniques would take time and would certainly be evident".
Although the Soviets are known to be continuing ASW research, there is no reason to think the intelligence estimate that this statement embodies has changed. Polaris submarines can operate over millions of square miles of open ocean on all sides of the Soviet Union. The Soviets cannot rely on killing Polaris submarines with ballistic missiles since the subs could, at normal cruising speeds, move out of the lethal area around the aiming point during the time of flight of the missile. While it might be feasible for the Russians to locate and track a single submarine and destroy it in a coordinated attack on the U.S. continent, it seems almost inconceivable, with foreseeable technology, to kill simultaneously the approximately 30 submarines which might be
found on station at one time. For the Soviets to deploy attack submarines or surface craft so that they could destroy all these U.S. submarines at a specific instant would seem virtually impossible. A wide variety of countermeasures against such tactics would be available to U.S. forces.
The U.S. has over many years spent tens of billions of dollars on ASW and does not even approach such a capability. Indeed, there is every reason to think that the Soviet ASW problem is even greater than our own. The Soviets are significantly behind the U.S. and have for geographic reasons alone a much more difficult task. The Russians do not control the land masses adjacent to many ocean areas, thus complicating tremendously the deployment of a detection and tracking system. Even if, by some technological breakthrough, it were possible to make the oceans transparent so that submarines could be continuously located – and this is most unlikely – it would be necessary to have some mechanism for destroying all the submarines at a given moment. After all, the atmosphere is transparent to radars, but no one has suggested in twenty years that bombers on airborne alert are vulnerable or how to build an ABM system which would provide protection to populations.
All these factors combine to lead to the inescapable conclusion that our Polaris submarines will not be threatened in the coming decade and probably not in the next as well. The Soviets might develop a partially effective ASW defense in the restricted waters in the neighborhood of the U.S.S.R. but not in the open oceans. The U.S. would have ample warning to take counter-action if it saw such a capability developing.
In sum, there is clearly no present threat to our submarine deterrent either from ABM's or ASW; and we do not even know the nature of a threat if it ever were to develop. However, since the sea based component is the cornerstone of our deterrent, we support continued research to be prepared to deal with any such eventuality in the distant future. The ULMS program proposed by Secretary Laird is such an example. (The Federation of American Scientists has recently prepared a position paper on ULMS and I shall append it to this statement.) While we urge that research and development on advanced missile submarine systems should be continued on a broad front, we do not believe that the designs of such a system should be frozen in the near future, or construction of submarines begun. To do so might only result in expensive outlays for a system optimized against the wrong threat. We are disturbed by reports that attention is being concentrated on very large submarines and urge that the trade-off studies look at alternative approaches. While it is not possible to comment in detail on the $110 million included for this project in the proposed budget, it would appear that this is high for the type of trade-off studies and design work which would be required in the near future.
II. THE THREAT TO LAND BASED ICBM's
The threat to our land based missiles has not exceeded and is, in fact, behind past estimates. In submitting his Defense Program in 1969 and in initially justifying the Safeguard ABM program, Secretary Laird referred to the growing threat from the Soviet SS-9 missile force which would be equipped with MIRV's. It was estimated that in 1974 the Soviets might have 420 SS-9's, each equipped with three MIRV's. This extrapolation was based on the continuing deployment of 50 to 60 SS-9's per year and the completion of their MIRV test program and which was feared to have started in August, 1968. In June, 1969, President Nixon stated in this connection that "footprints (of the Soviet MRV's) indicate they just happen to fall in somewhat the precise area in which ... our Minuteman silos are located".
On the basis of this estimated threat, it was decided to go ahead with Safeguard deployment at two Minuteman sites.
RATE OF SS-9 DEPLOYMENT
What has actually happened since that time? The rate of SS-9 deployment has actually been cut back. Beginning in August, 1969, no new construction of these sites was observed until May, 1970 – nine months later – when about 20 new starts were publicly reported. This past winter, however, the Defense Department announced that construction on some of these new silos may have been suspended and that the program had leveled off below 300. On the other hand, this spring it has been reported that the Soviets are beginning construction on several tens of new large silos. Even if one adds this new construction to the few additional SS-9's that may have been started since August 1969, it would appear that the Soviets have only initiated construction on about 50 new large launchers in the past 21 months, a considerable reduction from previous years and far below the rate predicted by Secretary Laird in 1969. At this rate of construction, it would not be until 1975-76 that the U.S.S.R. would have the 420 operational missiles to match Secretary Laird's threat. While this new program could again accelerate over the rate of the last two years, it would be almost impossible for the 420 to be achieved earlier than 1974, the originally predicted date.
Are there any specific security implications about the new large missile construction which would warrant increased alarm and advancing U.S. strategic deployments? It is obviously regrettable that the Soviets have chosen to resume deployment of large missile launchers after almost a year and a half of apparent restraint in this area; however, it is not clear why such new deployment presents any increased threat over that which has been used for planning purposes for many years. One explanation of this new program is that the Russians are building harder silos for their SS-9's to provide protection from a counterforce strike by the U.S. MIRVed missiles currently being deployed. Such hardening would, of course, not contribute to a first strike capability and, if anything, would be an indication that a first-strike was not a critical Soviet policy objective. It would, however, explain why no new missile has yet been tested for these silos.
Alternatively, Senator Jackson had the equally reasonable suggestion that this new construction is to house a new Soviet missile which will be used to deliver a future MIRV capability. In evaluating the significance of this possibility it is important to remember that in all previous estimates of the Russian threats it has been assumed the SS-9 was capable of delivering any type of MIRV system the Soviets chose to develop. It has the payload capacity to carry six, ten, or even more MIRV's, and the only question was the accuracy which could be achieved. The only reason for using 3 MIRV's in the 1969 calculations was that the Soviet tests involved three re-entry vehicles and thus a three-MIRV capability could be operational earlier than a more numerous MIRV threat. If this assumption on the SS-9 capability was correct, then the new construction should have no effect one way or another on the timing of the MIRV threat. It is just another form of the previously estimated SS-9 threat.
If it was wrong, and the Soviets are developing a new missile system for their MIRV's, then the former estimated dates were much too early. If they have to go through the development cycle for a completely new missile in order to have a true MIRV capability, then an initial operational capability would not occur at the earliest before two to three years from now. More importantly, if they are going to have to construct new silos for their MIRVed missiles and not use the existing 280 SS-9 silos, then the time at which they would have a force which could threaten Minuteman is several more years away. Even at the rapid rate of 50 MIRVed missiles per year they could not have as many new missiles operational as they now have SS-9's, until 1977. Thus the new silos could mean a delay of three or more years in the threat. At worst, the new missiles are a slowed continuation of the previously estimated large missile threat.
Furthermore, the Soviet MIRV test program is also behind that estimated in 1969. It is no longer thought that the MRV system of 1968 had a MIRV capability, and it was only in late fall of 1970 that the Defense Department announced what they thought may have been a true MIRV test. Since this test only involved three re-entry vehicles on the SS-9, this development would not provide any threat to Minuteman until the Russians had at least 420 and, realistically, many more large missiles. There is, of course, no technical reason why the Soviets could not start at any time to develop a MIRV system which deployed six or even more independent warheads, but such a system could not begin to become operational until about two years after the first tests.
In his 1971 statement to this Committee (page 46), Secretary Laird says "It is estimated that the accuracy of the SS-9 could be substantially improved by 1975-76. With this improved accuracy the projected Soviet SS-9 missile force would pose a serious threat to the future survivability of undefended Minuteman silos". Thus, even Secretary Laird puts off the threat to Minuteman to the 1975-76 period from the 1974 proposed when Safeguard was first justified. Certainly, this does not justify an acceleration or expansion of the Safeguard system from the original two sites as has been proposed by Secretary Laird.
In view of the fact that Safeguard is poorly designed to defend Minuteman and that the new Hardsite System is under development, it would be better to withhold all funds for Safeguard and concentrate on designing a better system. Safeguard is another example of a hastily conceived and expensive program, planned without realistic evaluation of the threat to our overall deterrent. If an agreement severely limiting ABM is achieved at SALT, then it is also quite likely that no Minuteman ABM will be needed, so further deployment at this time of an unnecessary and inadequate system would appear unwise.
MINUTEMAN MIRVING
Finally, the Budget calls for $839 million for continued procurement of Minuteman III and Minuteman force modernization. For the same reasons referred to under the Poseidon program, it is premature, and also an extravagance, to be placing MIRV's on Minuteman now. Secretary Laird justified both these deployments as follows:
"Should part of our missile force be unexpectedly and severely degraded by Soviet preemptive actions, the increased number of warheads provided by the remaining MIRV missiles will insure that we have enough warheads to attack essential soft urban industrial targets in the Soviet Union. At the same time, the MIRV program gives U.S. increased confidence in our ability to penetrate Soviet ABM defenses, even if part of our missile forces are destroyed.”
As previously mentioned, Secretary Laird himself places the initial threat to Minuteman in the 1975-76 period, and the Soviets even with the resumption of ABM deployment around Moscow could not have a defense requiring MIRV's for penetration even by that time. If some unforeseen danger to the entire deterrent arose earlier, it would always be possible to deploy our already developed MIRV's before the threat became a reality. Thus, the funds for Minuteman improvements, as well as for the Poseidon conversion are certainly premature. In fact, in the case of the Minuteman, it is questionable whether such improvements would ever be justified, regardless of how the threat develops. Expenditure of $5 billion to put three warheads on each missile on the ground that 95% of them may be destroyed hardly seems a good investment.
Furthermore, by such unnecessary deployments, we are making it impossible to achieve a MIRV limitation at SALT and are fueling an arms race which, because of the larger Russian missile payload capacity, could, in the long run, be a much greater threat to the U.S. than the U.S. MIRV is to the Soviet Union.
This is an example of a reckless gamble with U.S. security.
III. THE THREAT TO U.S. BOMBERS
During the past few years, there have been no changes in the estimated threat which would justify new strategic bomber deployment. The U.S. is still maintaining a large but slowly decreasing force of B-52 bombers as the third component of the strategic deterrent. To reduce their vulnerability on the ground, a portion of these are kept on less than 15 minutes alert. In 1969, fears for even this alert force were expressed because of the increasing Soviet SLBM force. While the most logical explanation of the Russian buildup was simply to improve their deterrent with a parallel system to our Polaris (no one has claimed the Polaris is a first strike force), it is true that such missiles, if fired on a depressed trajectory, could significantly reduce alert time. There have been no reports that the Soviets have ever actually tested sub-launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM's) in this way. However, countermeasures, such as deployment of B-52's to satellite bases in the interior would alleviate this danger if the threat became imminent, and these are being taken.
This danger was apparent in 1969 and has not materially changed from that estimated at that time. Although the Soviets are continuing to build up their Y class submarine force, the number of these submarines is largely irrelevant to the bomber threat. With the limited number of present SAC bomber bases and the vulnerability of aircraft on the ground, ten submarines could carry more than enough missiles to largely destroy all bombers on the ground. We have long estimated the Russians would have more than ten such vessels. The only new development is the report of Secretary Laird this year that "a longer range SLBM is under development." Recent testimony before this Committee indicated that the submarine for this missile was unknown. This missile when deployed could make it easier to bring interior bases under attack, but certainly it has never been thought that any base would be out of range. The interior bases do, however, provide a potential for longer warning time.
The FAS has previously testified before Congress on the need for the B-1 (March 23, 1971, before the House Armed Services Committee), so I shall not repeat these views here. However, suffice it to say the B-1 is not the answer to the SLBM threat. Because of its great cost it will always be deployed in small numbers, and in the time period when it could be available, it would almost certainly be vulnerable on the ground to SLBM attack. Its shorter endurance, i.e. ability to remain airborne, than the B-52 will also make it a less reliable deterrent because of its greater reliance on vulnerable tankers and the necessity for it to return to base if prematurely launched.
There has been no new developments in Soviet air defense since 1969 which would warrant early replacement of the B-52's. In fact, recent estimates have extended the life of this aircraft. Therefore, we see no need to press forward with the B-1 program which may never be necessary in its present form and may be the wrong way to proceed if a threat does develop.
IV. AIR DEFENSE AGAINST BOMBERS
Here also the requirement for U.S. air defense has declined. In the past two years, the Soviet intercontinental bomber force has decreased slightly from its already low level. More importantly, there have been no reports of any new truly intercontinental bomber being under development in the U.S.S.R., only a new model of a medium range aircraft. Therefore, there would appear to be no new threat requirement calling for the deployment of Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS), and Over the Horizon Radar (OTH) against aircraft beginning in 1972. The Federation of American Scientists testified on this subject on March 11 to the Special Subcommittee on Bomber Defense of this Committee and I shall not summarize its statement of that date. But it should be noted that, as we pointed out then, even if the Soviet bomber threat increased, there would be no point in building a bomber defense of population without a missile defense of population – one which the President has noted we have "no way" of constructing.
V. MISSILE GAP
Finally, one has heard considerable reference to the developing "missile gap" and the possibility that unless the U.S. deploys more weapons, we will be subject to diplomatic nuclear blackmail. But neither side can blackmail the other so long as each can retaliate decisively against the other. We have long ago learned how fallacious it can be to measure this strength in terms of numbers or size of missiles, warheads or bombers. And we recognize that each side will always be ahead in some categories.
We do not accept that there is a gap in favor of the Soviets. True, the Russians are continuing to deploy additional missiles, but the U.S. program also has tremendous momentum. Secretary Laird himself points out in this year's statement to this Committee that between December 30, 1970 and mid 1971, the U.S. offensive strategic nuclear weapons will increase in number from 4,000 to 4,600 while the Soviets' during the same period will only increase from 1,800 to 2,000. This is an addition of 600 warheads for the U.S. as compared to 200 for the U.S.S.R. with the U.S. already in the lead. Furthermore, this rapid U.S. increase is only the beginning of a vast program in which, during the next five years, U.S. missiles warheads proposes to increase to more than 7,000 as we place MIRV's on our Minuteman III and Poseidon missiles. The momentum of these programs has been so great that to date we have not been able to curtail them despite the fact that the threat against which they are being deployed has been delayed many years.
This cannot be discounted by saying that the number of warheads is not as important as megatonnage since this program of replacing higher yield single warheads with MIRV's has been endorsed by almost all Defense authorities because of the increased security they provide. Each of these MIRV warheads still has a yield at least several times that of the explosions which destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the early sixties, virtually all U.S. authorities reached the conclusion that our security would be enhanced by substituting multiple small bombs for a very large single weapon in our B-52 loads, hardened Minuteman missiles in lieu of the larger Titans, and MIRV's with lower yields in place of single large warheads. Senator Jackson in recent hearings of this Committee confirmed that he had also endorsed this concept. The Nixon administration with its programs has adopted this approach. Megatonnage has long been outdated as a critical measure of relative strength.
Further, it is anything but clear how the Soviets could use a superiority in numbers of ICBM's to exert political pressure unless we talk ourselves into such a position. Statements that the Russians might threaten to take Alaska are not only laughable but irresponsible. As long as we maintain a strong deterrent, threats of nuclear war have no substance. As sane men we must learn to live in a world of mutual deterrence. Secretary Laird's third sufficiency criterion: "Preventing the Soviet Union from gaining the ability to cause considerably greater urban/industrial destruction than the U.S. could inflict on the Soviets in a nuclear war" is, in a world where both sides can kill tens of millions of each other's populations, only an excuse for an unlimited arms race, unlimited military budgets, and increased risk of nuclear catastrophe. This objective cannot be reached for all war scenarios because, for example, the population destroyed by a strategic attack will vary depending on whether the attack is a first or second strike. The procurement of the types and numbers of weapons needed to produce equivalent destruction in a U.S. second strike to that produced in any Soviet first strike would escalate the arms race astronomically.
VI. PROGRAM AND BUDGET RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing considerations, it is our opinion that the proposed Strategic Forces Program should be modified in the following ways:
1. R & D on ULM's should be continued with only that funding necessary to continue, on a broad front, trade-off and design studies which do not commit funds to any future hardware programs.
2. The further deployment of MIRV's for Minuteman and Poseidon and Minuteman modernization should be held in abeyance with a saving of about $1.6 billion in FY '72.
3. The development of the B-1 should be restricted to design studies and these should be conducted on a variety of bomber systems without commitment to build test aircraft; the funds should be appropriately curtailed from the $370 million requested.
4. The Safeguard ABM deployment should be halted and ABM funds limited to those required for prototype development of Hard Site Defense and research on advanced systems. This would save about $1.2 billion in FY '72 funds.
5. The further research on advanced MIRV guidance systems for improved accuracy should be halted by reducing the $87 million proposed for ABRES.
6. The AWACS program should be terminated.
VII. SUMMARY
An analysis of the anticipated Soviet threat based on statements by DOD officials provides no basis for increasing U.S. strategic weapons programs at this time. In essentially all cases the threat to the U.S. deterrent is less than was estimated in 1969, and the U.S. already has programs in being, or available for rapid deployment if required, which can ensure the maintenance of a secure deterrent for the foreseeable future. The Soviet ABM threat to our deterrent is far behind estimates when the U.S. set present schedules for Poseidon and Minuteman III deployments.
Similarly the Soviet large ICBM-MIRV threat to Minuteman is lagging behind that predicted when Safeguard was first justified. By reducing proposed FY '72 programs, significant savings in funds can be effected while providing opportunities for improved future U.S. security through arms control. We should not again fall into the trap of perennial compulsive reaction to timeworn exaggerated threats.