April 21, 1971
Page 11307
OPPOSITION TO PIPELINE ACROSS ALASKA
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, on Monday I wrote to President Nixon calling on him to instruct the Secretary of Interior to deny immediately the application for a permit to construct a pipeline across Alaska from the North Slope oil fields to the port of Valdez.
My decision was not reached lightly. I have studied carefully the environmental implication of the proposed pipeline route and have examined suggested alternatives.
On the basis of reasons listed in my letter to the President and the specific information included in this more detailed discussion, I am convinced that unacceptable risks are posed by the pipeline and the tanker transport which would move the oil from Alaska to the west coast.
Unless the oil companies are able to satisfy the President and the Congress that a safe alternative is available, no pipeline should be built. Fortunately, it appears that a trans-Canada route may present greatly reduced risks while providing oil and gas to the fuel-short Midwestern United States and protecting our national security from the risks of ocean transport.
If the permit application is denied, this and other alternatives will be explored. No other course is acceptable. Deferral of action will only encourage the applicants. The President should insist on decisive rejection now.
I ask unanimous consent to include in the RECORD at the conclusion of my statement the text of my letter to the President and supplemental information which identifies the reasons for my concern.
There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows
U.S. SENATE,
Washington, D C.
The PRESIDENT,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR Mr. PRESIDENT: I am deeply concerned by the continuous delay to take action on the permit application by Alyeska Pipeline Company to construct a pipeline from Alaska's north slope oil fields to the Port of Valdez.
I believe you should instruct the Secretary of the Interior to deny their permit application at once. Such a decision is necessary, indeed essential, if we are to prevent grave environmental damage to the lands the pipeline would traverse, the fishing resources of Prince William Sound and the waters of the Northern Pacific on which the oil would inevitably spill. Such a decision is essential if serious consideration is to be given to alternatives of bringing the Alaska oil and gas to American markets via the pipeline route through Canada.
So long as there is prospect, in the future, of approval of the oil companies present plans we cannot really expect development of alternatives which would better serve the public interest.
A considerable amount of information with respect to the Alaskan oil pipeline has been made public. In that regard, the Interior Department's draft, "Environmental Impact Statement" has served a most useful function. Its weakness in attempting to justify the project has dramatically underscored the reasons why the permit application should be denied immediately. More significantly, when the Corps of Engineers, the Department of Agriculture and the Environmental Protection Agency reject the pipeline for environmental reasons it is time to call a halt.
Furthermore, available information indicates that the proposed trans-Alaska route will not optimize our national security, that it will not provide the cheapest source of clean fuel, that it would not assure a supply of natural gas which is in greater demand, and that it will not minimize environmental damage. I believe, on the basis of the outstanding questions listed below as well as other available information, we must conclude that construction of the proposed Trans-Alaska Pipeline would violate many of the most fundamental interests of the American public and must not be permitted.
In the three years since oil was discovered on the North Slope, has there been a searching examination of the best way to develop Alaskan oil resources, in the context of long range national needs for balanced use of our energy resources, and in harmony with a clean environment?
Are not the needs for fuel greatest in the Midwest and Eastern markets?
Would not the Canadian route provide greater volumes of oil and gas to the United States in years ahead?
What are the real alternatives to the present pipeline route?
Are there others that the Administration has failed to examine?
How is it that after three years, the Interior Department is apparently still willing to consider a permit, and a construction of a pipeline crossing some of the worst earthquake areas in North America when an alternative through Canada could avoid this central fault area?
How is it that after three years, the Interior Department is apparently still willing to approve a plan that crosses an unusually large number of virgin arctic rivers and streams, when a Canadian alternative could utilize a route where a pipeline is already planned (the MacKenzie River), and where the potential for catastrophe of pollution and environmental disruption could be greatly reduced.
Why has the potential for catastrophic oil spill along the western coast of Canada and United States been essentially ignored?
How is it that neither the present pipeline nor its alternatives have been discussed in detail and in advance with the Canadian government?
Why did we wait for three years and a Canadian request for formal talks, which occurred on February 26, to discuss Canadian concern over potential oil pollution of the Western Coast of Canada?
Why, indeed, has the Administration not considered carefully the security risk of a water-based route for oil transport, when an overland route through Canada would be more difficult to attack, would bring natural gas and oil directly to the Midwest where need is greatest, would make best multiple use of a single-river corridor, and would entirely avoid the hazards of ocean spills and earthquakes? Such an alternative, which the Canadian government appears interested in considering, would provide an opportunity to join with our northern neighbor in a sensible energy plan, truly serving the interests of the inhabitants of North America
On the basis of these unresolved questions, the step which this government should take – and take at once – is to make clear that the oil companies have chosen the wrong route – that no permit is going to be issued for a pipeline across Alaska and that we intend to join with the Canadians in resolving any uncertainties which remain regarding a United States-Canadian route.
I urge you to make an early decision on this issue.
Sincerely,
EDMUND S. MUSKIE.
THE PROPOSED TRANS-ALASKA PIPELINE
(Supplementary statement of Senator EDMUND MUSKIE)
The proposal under discussion concerns constructing an 800 mile long oil pipeline across Alaska to harvest the deposits of Alaska's North Slope. Some 641 miles of the proposed pipeline route cross Federal lands whose first lien of ownership is retained by Alaska Natives and whose use falls squarely under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970, and a number of other environmental laws.
The route of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, (as proposed by Alyeska, the consortium seeking a right-of-way permit) would go from Prudhoe Bay on Alaska's arctic coast south to Port Valdez on Prince William Sound. The potential for oil spills into coastal waters at either end is awesome. The port at Valdez is unusually narrow, with frequent fog and storms, making it unusually vulnerable to tanker collisions. The tankers now being built to carry oil from this port are 15 times larger than those that caused the recent San Francisco spill, and would take up to one-half hour to bring to a full stop once danger is sighted. Along the Kenai peninsula just west of Valdez, there were close to 100 oil pollution incidents between 1966 and 1968, including a tanker accident which released 63,000 gallons of oil into the water.
Furthermore, because of the tremendous amount of oil to be transported by tanker, some 6-12 barrels worth of oil will be released into Prince William Sound daily as ballast discharge, even after the ballast is diluted to the level specified by the Interior Department and by State water quality standards. These oil fractions will contain the most toxic components of crude oil, and spread rapidly through the water. Fish and shellfish production in Prince William Sound will be gravely affected, which the Interior Department estimates has a potential wholesale value of $24 million a year.
The port at Valdez was the site of the serious Alaskan earthquake and subsequent tidal waves of 1964. In addition, the danger of tidal waves from landslides is an everpresent danger to the region: the 1720-foot high wave that struck the southeast coast of Alaska in 1958 was the fifth such wave to hit the region in 100 years. A University of Montana geologist considers the risk at Valdez to be comparable.
Earthquakes or tidal waves could cause the release of up to 20 million barrels of oil from storage tanks at the terminus as well as damaging or sinking tankers in the harbor. But Valdez is only the southern tip of a highly active seismic region which the pipeline must cross. About 20 earthquakes of a magnitude of 5 or more on the Richter scale are recorded in Alaska each year.
The recent Los Angeles earthquake registered 6.8 on this scale. The Interior Department report states that the southern two-thirds of the proposed pipeline route is subject to large earthquakes of a magnitude of 7 or greater.
The amount of land displacement occurring during an earthquake is even more relevant to the danger of pipeline breakage than is the magnitude of the quake. Land was offset by as much as 40 feet by the Alaskan earthquakes of 1964, yet no stipulations are proposed to require pipeline design to take into account an earthquake of this magnitude.
If the pipeline break does occur, cut-off valves are designed to isolate the broken segment. But the oil which could be spilled from a single segment would amount to 100 times the amount of oil spilled off the coast of Santa Barbara in 1968.
Microwave stations are to be used to communicate breaks in the pipeline, yet microwave towers become useless if even slightly misaligned, as by minor earthquakes.
Furthermore, the planned aerial surveillance may prove unduly hazrdous through much of the fierce arctic winter. It is important to know what plans Alyeska has to keep the pipeline area clear for aerial surveillance. The U. S. Army maintains aerial surveillance of its 625-mile Alaskan pipeline running from Haines to Fairbanks by spraying the right-of-way with herbicides and soil sterilizers. A number of selective and non-selective pesticides are used, including 2, 4, 5-T. This last pesticide was the subject of extensive hearings last year in the Commerce Committee in which evidence was presented for the role of fractions of this pesticide in causing birth defects.
Quite apart from the Army's use of this chemical I am moved to ask what plans Alyeska has for clearing and maintaining a pipeline right-of-way free of vegetation during its 25 years of operation. Will chemical defoliants be used? What will their long-term effects be?
The Haines-Fairbanks pipeline provides some interesting insights into problems encountered with cold-region pipelines. Because of the nature of Arctic soil, buried portions of the Haines pipeline have been plagued with corrosion problems, having caused at least six spills since 1964.
A spill due to corrosion of the pipe in 1968 caused significant damage to Dezadeash Lake in Canada. Cathodic protection against corrosion is proposed by Alyeska. Yet, I will submit for the Record at the conclusion of these remarks an article reporting an Army Corps of Engineers study challenging the reliability of current technology to protect against corrosion.
Inadequate attention has been paid to potentially catastrophic oil spills along the northwest coast of Canada and the United States, after tankers leave Port Valdez. Apparently some oil will be taken to Puget Sound for refining, and then transported by tanker southward, exposing thousands of miles of coastline, and our major harbors, to the risk of tanker collisions and oil spills of disastrous proportions. Oil spilled in cold Alaskan waters is particularly slow to degrade.
Furthermore, the Canadian government has indicated concern with the risk of increased oil spills along their coast. Proceeding in opposition to Canadian interests will certainly strain relations between the United States and Canada.
There is little concrete information on Alyeska's members plans, if any, for transporting the oil from the West coast to major markets where the need is greatest. It has been reported that oil may be transported east from Puget Sound by still another pipeline across North Cascades of Washington, and wilderness areas of the Idaho and Montana Rockies.
The proposed pipeline is expected to cross five major rivers and 350 streams in Alaska. The Yukon River which drains hundreds of thousands of square miles in Alaska is crossed several times by the pipeline near its sources. An oil spill into these rivers will be spread rapidly and widely through the vast waterways of Alaska, endangering wildlife, fish resources and spawning grounds. The increased siltation of rivers by construction run-off is expected to interfere with breeding by salmon and other fishes, which are sensitive to minute changes in the chemical composition of the water.
Slight changes in the delicate balance of the tundra will compound ecological effects rapidly. Melting of the permanently frozen soil by hot oil spilling over the ground, will release substantial amounts of water and extensive areas will become muddy swampland, killing the lichens upon which Alaska's caribou and other game feed. Nesting sites of birds may be disturbed. Bird species from all over the Western Hemisphere nest in the Arctic during the summer season, so that the impact on bird life would be felt far beyond the borders of Alaska.
The pipeline project will, of course, disturb the soil and vegetation during turmoil of construction. The Alyeska company has proposed to plant non-native grass species on the disturbed ground to prevent further erosion. Admirable as this may be, no long term experimental data are available to test whether these introduced plants will spread and overtake the native vegetation. No information on the ecological effects of these studies are available lasting more than two growing seasons. Without adequate ecological study the full impact on birds, caribou, and other wildlife will not be known and this lack of information can be disastrous. It took the introduction of but one prickly-pear cactus to Australia to cause the vast spread of this cactus across that continent, decimating thousands of square miles of sheep pasture. Alaska cannot afford this lack of foresight.
The construction road from the Yukon River north to Prudhoe Bay will invite the addition of a crisscrossed pattern of roads and land development subjecting northern Alaska to unplanned development, disregarding the best uses of this land for national parks, homes, industry, ore mining, and other uses. To open up this unspoiled wilderness to unplanned hodge-podge development could be among the gravest and surest consequences of the project.
An extensive land-use plan for Alaska is needed. Extraction of North Slope oil reserves should be considered in the context of the broader long range needs of Alaska, of its native citizens and of visitors to this state, so that wise judgment on the best land-use policy for this valuable wilderness will be rendered. We must ask ourselves carefully and patiently whether the unplanned destruction of this last great wilderness can be avoided in favor of a sounder alternative.
Although the Interior Department's impact statement recognized some of the environmental hazards I have listed, it concluded that the Alaskan oil is needed to decrease our dependence on foreign oil. Assuming that it is important to market the Alaskan oil in due time, it appears to me that an overland route through Canada would be a much more secure route than tankers plying the waters from Alaska to California. Furthermore, it would open a route to market for the vast oil resources in the Canadian north and thus make a far greater contribution to our secure sources of oil in the future.
If national security is to be the basis for final judgment, leaving certain of the nation's oil wells in untapped readiness would best serve our country's interests. There are often times when the cost of imported oil would offset the price of maintaining our own supplies in strategic untapped reserves. We should give this alternative close attention in planning for long-range oil consumption.
If the Administration were really serious about enlarging our supply of secure energy sources we would have been pursuing the Canadian alternative because it holds such great promise for unlocking oil resources in the Canadian north estimated to equal the vast discoveries on the American North Slope. Actually the more pressing energy need is for natural gas, not oil.
The United States need for natural gas is greater than the need for oil, both because gas is a far cleaner fuel and because gas is in short supply. The natural gas from Prudhoe Bay can be transported by pipeline down the MacKenzie Valley of Canada, and companies are planning such a project yet there has been little public discussion of the possibility that the oil pipeline might follow the same route, permitting multiple use of rights-of-way, and minimizing construction damage. There is no adequate discussion in the Interior Department's report of the mode of transport of natural gas.
These considerations illustrate a major weakness in the approach followed by the Nixon Administration in considering a permit for the oil pipeline. It appears that the Administration has looked only at the problem of building a pipeline as designed by the oil companies. It has not addressed the question of what route could best serve the public interest.
There is no reason to make a fundamentally unsound decision just because the oil companies have already amassed $100 million worth of pipeline at Valdez. The construction of this pipeline is too great an environmental and energy issue, with too many implications for the nation's future economic and environmental well-being, for impetuous decisions.
The argument that we must build the Alaskan pipeline at once cannot withstand intelligent scrutiny. Alberta alone has the capacity to produce 1½-2 million barrels of surplus oil per year; this is 3-4 times the amount of oil that we may expect to be extracting from Alaska by 1975.
Along with denying the permit for Alaskan pipeline the President could take no better step than removing the quotas he imposed in the import of Canadian oil. This would give the American consumer a break and make it clear that we are seriously interested in working with Canada for the common good of the people of both nations. It would also be the beginning of the establishment of energy policies with the consumer in mind – a policy which the U.S.-Canadian oil and gas pipeline corridor could go far towards making a reality.
It is worth noting some of the economic considerations pertinent to the State of Alaska. Pipeline construction would require about 9000 people during the 3-year building period, but only about 300 for later maintenance. Many of these jobs will require skilled labor, brought from the lower 48. An economist in the Alaska Department of Labor has predicted that the pipeline will, in fact, increase the unemployment problem in Alaska by attracting large numbers of immigrants to the State for temporary jobs.
The State of Alaska receives a tax revenue from the extracted oil based on the value of the oil after transportation costs. A University of Alaska economist has suggested that overland transport of oil by a Canadian route would be cheaper, thus increasing oil revenues to the State of Alaska by as much as $70 million. This assertion deserves much more attention than it has received to date.
To these considerations must be added the very real problem of the disruption of the traditional hunting and fishing grounds upon which many Alaskan natives depend for their daily existence. The pipeline could do irreparable damage to the economy in Alaska. Beyond this, the claims of Alaskan natives to much of the land along the pipeline right-of-way requires the detailed attention of Congress, and should not be decided under pressure of this decision.
When the economic benefits, the social costs, the environmental hazards, and the available alternatives are considered together, I am led to the inescapable conclusion that the present Trans-Alaska Pipeline route must be opposed – that we must insist that no permit be granted for its construction – that we consider alternatives which are not simply profitable, but which respect the genuine public interest – and that we must take a long look at development of the North Slope in the context of national plans for the use of energy, for the development of land and wilderness resources, for maintenance of national security, and for the promotion of harmonious cooperation with our neighbors.
EVALUATION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT FOR THE TRANS-ALASKA PIPELINE
(By F. Stuart Chapin III, Institute of Arctic Biology, University of Alaska, and Department of Biology, Stanford University)
The draft of the Environmental Impact Statement recently prepared by the Department of the Interior attempts to consider and evaluate the various ways in which the proposed pipeline would affect the environment. The task is difficult in that comparatively little is known about how these would be influenced by oil leakage and disturbance. The report considers most of the environmental problems likely to be encountered by oil transport in Alaska. However, it is deficient in several important respects: 1) It is extremely vague and generalized in its consideration of environmental effects and stipulations for construction; 2) Complexities of ecological systems are ignored or superficially treated; 3) Many important pieces of relevant research were not used in the preparation of the report; 4) Critical environmental problems are not pinpointed and made explicit.
IMPACT ON NATURAL ENVIRONMENTS
Assuming that there are no pipeline breaks, the major ecological impact of the pipeline is likely to occur in the marine environment, especially in Valdez Arm and the rest of Prince William Sound.
Oil loading operations at Valdez and the large volume of oil transport traffic through Prince William Sound, the Gulf of Alaska and other waters en route to West Coast and foreign ports would result in biologically significant losses of oil to the marine mammals of the Sound, and the biologically productive littoral and intertidal zones of Prince William Sound would be vulnerable to chronic low level oil-pollution and to effects of major spill although effects of the latter should be minimized by the rigorous pollution control measures to be required of the operator. (p. 145 of report)
The report could be much more specific concerning the possible causes and effects of "chronic low-level oil pollution." No oil port in present operation has been able to avoid significant spillage in the daily routine of loading and unloading tankers, no matter how rigorous the precautions taken have been. The report calls for treatment of ballast such that no more than 10 ppm of oil can be present in water returned to the Sound. (There appears to be some doubt as to whether or not it will be feasible to clean ballast water to this extent.) When the pipeline reaches maximum capacity, some 12 barrels of oil contaminants will be released into the Valdez Arm daily in the treated ballast. These oil fractions will be those which are most soluble in water and hence most difficult to remove. Being the most water-soluble, these oil products will also spread most rapidly through the marine environment rather than staying on the surface or sinking to the bottom. The soluble fraction tends to contain the more toxic components of crude oil. It is difficult to predict how the soluble contaminants will affect the marine organisms of Valdez Arm, but these generalizations combined with past experience leave little room for optimism.
In oil ports presently in operation, oil from spillage sinks to the bottom. All these organic deposits provide food for bacteria which then deplete the available oxygen so that larvae which land on the bottom to metamorphose into crabs or clams or whatever cannot get enough oxygen to survive. This situation occurs more readily where fine sediments occur (as in Valdez Arm) because the anaerobic layer is closer to the surface of the sediments.
Studies have been made on the effect of pollutants such as oil on behavior of shellfish larvae. There is considerable information available on the effects of low-level and high-level oil pollution. Studies have been made of behavior and reproduction of fish and shellfish; some studies have been made of the physical and biological characteristics of Prince William Sound and Valdez Arm. It is appropriate that a report on environmental impact discuss the implications of such studies. These are but two examples of the probable ecological impacts of oil pollution on Valdez Arm. Both of these examples could be discussed in greater detail; if it is possible to reach a conclusion concerning probable impact, references should be given to back up the conclusion; if it is not possible to draw a conclusion, the gaps in our knowledge should be pinpointed. There are a large variety of organisms inhabiting Valdez Arm which would be affected in very different ways. For example, 90 % of the pink salmon (the principal salmon of the area) spawn in intertidal zones; oil pollution would probably affect them quite differently than it would phytoplankton or marine mammals. The paragraph from the report which is quoted on page 1 of this evaluation appears to me to be much too superficial in its treatment of the effects of oil pollution on different marine organisms.
The environmental impact of tankers navigating through Valdez Arm, Prince William
Sound and the Pacific Coast of the U.S. and Canada clearly falls within the realm of the impact report in that 1) the impact is likely to be considerable and 2) it is a result of the specific pipeline route proposed. Some facts which the report might have considered are the following: 1) Navigation within the Valdez Arm is difficult even for experienced pilots. Storms and frequent heavy fog add to navigation difficulties. The shores are extremely rocky, and the navigable channel is narrow – in places as narrow as 400-500 yards. 2) There are few pilots experienced in navigating these waters. 3) Oil tankers currently in operation sometimes carry marginal navigation equipment and have no extra propeller, power source, etc. The results of this can be seen in the relatively frequent wrecks and collisions undergone by tankers. 4) Tanker traffic would be relatively heavy once the pipeline is working at capacity.
The effect of the pipeline on rivers and streams – if no breaks occur – is likely to be limited to effects of construction: removal of gravel and siltation. Both these factors and their effect on fish spawning are considered in the report. One possible danger which the report could have mentioned and even emphasized is that salmon normally migrate upriver to spawn four years or less after hatching. It appears that they find their home stream by the chemicals normally leached from the banks. Heavy siltation might eliminate effective spawning in that season by swamping the stream with material from one site and making it difficult for fish to detect chemicals characteristic of their home stream. Construction or heavy erosion occurring in three of four consecutive seasons might permanently endanger a stream as a spawning ground.
If a pipeline leak or break occurs, the river systems are likely to suffer heavily. Points which the report could well have emphasized include: 1) The necessity of avoiding permafrost with high ice content has resulted in placing the pipeline in well-drained river gravels such that the route follows river valleys and is close to rivers for most of its length. Hence, if a break occurs, it is almost inevitable that the river systems will be contaminated. 2) The Copper, Gulkana, Tanana, Koyukuk, and Sagavanirktok River Valleys form the major part of the route. These are rapidly flowing rivers which would spread the oil quickly and be difficult or impossible to clean. 3) As the report notes, the Yukon drainage system is quite large, and includes a large portion of the pipeline route. A major spill within this drainage would have a widespread environmental impact. 4) The nesting grounds of birds which would be damaged by oil spill are discussed in the report. Birds nesting in these areas include many migratory species such that the ecological impact of a major oil spill could well extend beyond Alaska.
The environmental impact of the pipeline per se upon terrestrial ecology is likely to be minimal, even in the event of minor spills. The major difficulties are likely to result from construction in areas of high ice content permafrost such as the area between the Sagavanirktok River and Prudhoe Bay. These difficulties are treated in a general way in the report. The problems of re-vegetation could have been dealt with in greater detail. Neither the studies by ARCO at Prudhoe Bay nor the re-vegetation studies conducted by the University of Alaska have entirely resolved the problems. The success of introduced species over more than 2 growing seasons has not been tested. The ability of apparently successful species to prevent erosion by extensive root growth has not been checked. The ability of apparently successful species to reproduce vegetatively or by seed has not been thoroughly investigated. In the event that an introduced species does successfully reproduce, its ability to compete with native vegetation (i.e. ability to displace or be displaced) should be known before vast quantities of seed are distributed. The impact of an oil spill is not likely to be as serious as in aquatic environments, although the report could well have discussed such problems as greater absorbance of heat by a black oily surface with subsequent melting of permafrost. Such an area would be quite prone to erosion and the presence of oil might make revegetation more difficult.
The impact of a hot pipe on high ice content permafrost is the major unknown in the issue of impact on terrestrial ecosystems. This is dealt with in the report and in greater detail in Geological Survey Circular #632 (see enclosed xerox). This circular should be consulted in evaluating terrestrial impact. The physical processes which are discussed in the circular have obvious and important implication which should be discussed at length with reference to environmental impact.
The report considers the potentials of seismic activity and specifies that "the pipeline shall be designed, where technically feasible. . . . to prevent failure from the effects of earthquakes . . ." (p 7 of technical stipulations). The report does not consider the. possibilities where earthquake proof design is not "technically feasible". Certain points which are not mentioned but deserve consideration are that the communication center for pipeline surveillance is at Valdez, which is perhaps the least seismically stable site along the pipeline route. Communication and monitoring is by microwave; slight misalignment of a micro-wave tower by an earthquake would make communication impossible. In this respect microwave equipment is extremely vulnerable. Emergency monitoring and communication systems might be advisable.
Summary.
The report discusses most aspects of environmental impact but does not in many cases draw relevant information together. It is difficult to evaluate many of the statements made because no reference is made to the source of information. It appears likely that many relevant sources of information were overlooked and that many knowledgeable people could have offered additional information and well-founded predictions and (in cases where doubt exists) alternative predictions which could in part be tested.
ALTERNATE ROUTES
The report discusses various alternate routes. Pipeline routes east to Canada and south to Edmonton are perhaps worthy of further study (as is currently being suggested by some members of the Alaska State Senate). The route along the coast from Prudhoe Bay to the mouth of the MacKenzie River would necessitate crossing the Arctic Wildlife Range. This route is viewed as incompatible with the purpose of the Wildlife Range: the preservation of an intact sample of Arctic Alaska. Perhaps the wilderness quality saved by avoiding of fault zones of southern Alaska and the navigational difficulties of Prince William Sound would offset this loss within the Wildlife Range. It should be noted that seismic studies of potential oil formations are currently being conducted within the Range.
The other major alternative to the proposed pipeline route would go south of the Arctic Wildlife Range of the MacKenzie Valley. This route is discarded in the report because "the distance through continuous permafrost would be substantially greater for the Canadian-oriented route than for the Valdez line. This being the case, the problem area would be merely enlarged" This may not be entirely the case. The three major problems involved in the proposed Prudhoe-Valdez route are 1) chronic low level (and potential high-level) pollution of Prince William Sound and the Pacific Coast, 2) danger of a pipeline break due to earthquakes, and 3) danger of a pipeline break in areas of high-ice content permafrost due to thawing around the pipe and subsequent erosion. It is proposed to minimize dangers of erosion by putting the pipeline above ground where the ice content of the permafrost is high. If the pipeline is elevated in all potential problem areas, the problems of thawing (as discussed in Geological Survey Circular 632) Should be minimal. The question then becomes whether potential problem areas can be located and whether the additional cost of building the pipeline above ground is "justified". The route south of the Arctic Wildlife Range may also avoid a marine terminus in that Edmonton is already connected by pipeline to the American mid-west which is in turn connected by pipeline to other parts of the country. The dangers of seismic activity are completely avoided.
In mid-February, 1971, the Alaska State Senate held hearings on a resolution proposed by Senators Bob Palmer and Jay Hammond on the question of whether the alternative route through Canada should be studied. The essence of the hearings was that no serious study of the Canadian alternative has been made. The decision was made in favor of a pipeline from Prudhoe Bay to a suitable Alaskan marine port. Given these prerequisites, the proposed Prudhoe-Valdez route is probably the best alternative. However, the Canadian route certainly deserves study since it avoids the two major disadvantages of the Alaskan route: i.e. the marine terminus and the crossing of major fault zones.
IMPACT ON HUMAN RESOURCES
Recreation: The immediate impact of the pipeline upon hunting and fishing along the route due to increased accessibility and increased pollution is considered in the report. The effect upon recreation in the event of a major spill is not adequately considered. Recreation by Alaskans and by people outside the state has become more important at an ever-increasing rate, as population in- and out-of-state increases and as recreational facilities outside the state become more crowded. The report does not take into account the economic value of recreation which is considered by many to be Alaska's most important resource.
Impact on Natives. During the 1950'S two large lumber mills were built in Southeastern Alaska in Sitka and Ketchikan. There was great optimism that this influx of relatively high-paying jobs would partially relieve the grinding poverty of the natives of the region. However, the natives, who were normally fishermen and were free to work whenever they wanted, considered the loss of freedom associated with a regular job more degrading than welfare. As a result, the natives continued in their previous state of poverty and the mills had to import labor from the lower '48 at considerable extra cost. The situation is likely to be different with the Trans-Alaska Pipeline in that the natives of the Interior hold somewhat different values and in that a training program for natives is planned. Nonetheless, natives of Interior Alaska have a history of unemployment in part because they often prefer to stick with a job only long enough to provide for the immediate future; then they quit. This makes employers reluctant to hire them, especially if a long expensive training program is involved as would be the case with pipeline construction and maintenance.
Another potential impact upon Alaskan natives which could have been considered in greater detail by the report is that once natives are lured into the city by the prospect of high-paying jobs, they are reluctant to return to the native way of life upon termination of the job. For example, in Barrow, the Navy was very conscientious about training and hiring natives in the construction of facilities there. Once the construction was complete, the natives preferred to go on welfare than to return to their former livelihoods. Whether the training of natives for high-paying temporary jobs will increase their standard of living in the long run is difficult to conclude.
Economics and Employment. One of the major arguments in favor of the proposed pipeline has been economic necessity. The relevance of this question to environmental impact was apparently considered important by those who wrote the report. The pipeline during construction will require some 8,000 workers and maintenance will require only 300. As the report notes, many of these jobs will require only skilled workers who will be brought in from outside. A manpower economist in the Alaska Department of Labor predicts that pipeline construction would cause unemployment to rise during construction due to immigration of people looking for jobs. This is what happened in 1969 during the intense phase of oil exploration.
Revenue to the state from oil is based on the well-head value of the oil, which is largely determined by transportation costs. It has recently been suggested that transportation costs (economic and environmental) might be lower if an alternate pipeline route through Canada were chosen. This would increase revenues to the state of Alaska.
The primary economic argument has been that the United States needs the oil to lower balance of payments deficits and because the political upheavals in the Mid-East threaten our supply of oil from this area. The figures on page 185 of the report indicate that the utilization of Alaskan oil would delay by only about 2½ years the time when the U.S. must obtain a given amount of its oil from the eastern hemisphere. In other words, immediate utilization of Alaskan oil delays by only 2½ years the time when the U.S. must come to grips with the same problems of balance of payments deficits, national security and oil shortage. These problems cannot be alleviated by an immediate supply of Alaskan oil; they can be treated only by drastically reducing the dependence of American society upon large amounts of petroleum products.
[From Geological Survey Circular No. 632]
SOME ESTIMATES OF THE THERMAL EFFECTS OF A HEATED PIPELINE IN PERMAFROST
(By Arthur H. Lachenbruch)
ABSTRACT
As one means of transporting crude oil from oil fields on the Alaskan Arctic coast to a year- round ice-free port, a large pipeline traversing most of the state of Alaska from north to south has been proposed. Plans call for a pipe 4 feet in diameter, which will be buried along most of the route in permafrost. According to preliminary estimates the initial heat in the oil plus frictional heating in the pipe are expected to maintain oil temperatures in the neighborhood of 70º to 80º C (158º to 176º F) along the route when full production is achieved. Such an installation would thaw the surrounding permafrost. Where the ice content of permafrost is not high, and other conditions are favorable, thawing by the buried pipe might cause no special problems. Under adverse local conditions, however, this thawing could have significant effects on the environment, and possibly upon the security of the pipeline. It is important that any potential problem be identified prior to its occurrence so that it can be accommodated by proper pipeline design. Identifying a problem in advance depends upon an understanding of the conditions under which the problem will occur. For that reason much of this report is concerned with problems. If the pipeline system is properly designed, and if it is constructed and maintained in compliance with the design, they will not occur. Perhaps "proper design" in some areas will involve abandoning plans for burial or changing the route; in others it might involve burying the pipe and invoking special engineering designs or monitoring procedures. These are matters to be determined by much additional study and an intensive program of field and laboratory measurements of conditions along the route.
In this report a few basic principles are applied to simplified models of permafrost regimes to identify some effects of a heated pipe, the conditions that control them, and the approximate ranges of physical properties for which these effects are likely to result in problems. The computations are approximate, and the problems discussed are only illustrative examples. Comprehensive discussions of these and related effects, taking account of physical and theoretical refinements, are beyond the scope of the report. Refined studies will probably be needed, however, to form an adequate basis for engineering design.
It is difficult to summarize these effects briefly, but a few will be mentioned. The reader is urged to consult the full text for a more complete statement of the conditions under which they are likely to occur. It should be emphasized that whether or not such conditions exist is a matter yet to be determined by measurements on permafrost materials along the pipeline route. Such measurements are essential for predictions of the interaction between the pipeline and its environment.
A 4-foot pipeline buried 6 feet in permafrost and heated to 80º C (176º F) will thaw a cylindrical region 20 to 30 feet in diameter in a few years in typical permafrost materials. At the end of the second decade of operation, typical thawing depths would be 40 to 50 feet near the southern limit of permafrost and 35 to 40 feet in. northern Alaska where permafrost is colder. Except for special materials near the northern end, equilibrium conditions will not be reached and thawing will continue throughout the life of the pipeline, but at a progressively decreasing rate. If the thawed material or the water within it flows, these amounts of thawing can be increased several fold. If the pipeline temperature were only 30º C (instead of 80º C), the depth of thawing would probably be reduced by only 30 or 40 percent. The principal effect of insulating the pipe would be to increase oil temperatures rather than to decrease thawing.
If permafrost sediments have excess ice and a very low permeability when thawed, melting below the pipe could generate free water faster than it could filter to the surface. As a result the material in the thawed cylinder could persist as a semi-liquid slurry. Where permeabilities are very low and excess ice contents are moderate, thawing rates could be sufficient to maintain this state for decades.
If the strength of these slurries is less than 1 pound per square foot, they will flow with substantial velocities on such imperceptible slopes as are characteristic of "flat" basins. The entire thawed cylinder would tend to flow like a viscous river and seek a level. As an extreme example, if these slurries occurred over distances of several miles on almost imperceptible slopes, the uphill end of the pipe could, in a few years, be lying at the bottom of a slumping trench tens of feet deep, while at the downhill end, millions of cubic feet of mud (containing the pipe) could be extruded out over the surface. Where the pipe settled to the bottom of the trench it would accelerate thawing and flow, and the process could be self-perpetuating. The pipeline could be jeopardized by loss of support in the trench and by displacement in the mud flow, and the disruption to the landscape could be substantial. Where such extreme conditions might occur; these problems could normally be anticipated by observations prior to or during construction. Less extreme conditions leading to partial liquefaction might be more difficult to identify in advance.
Where the pipe passed from strong material into a liquefied region, it would tend to float or sink, depending on the density of the slurry. It could be severely stressed by the resulting forces.
Almost imperceptible systematic movements of the thawed material can accelerate the thawing process locally by as much as a thousand times. Hence if flow occurs the ultimate amount of thawing can be very great and difficult to predict.
Seismic vibrations can cause loosely packed saturated sands and silts to liquefy. Hence where such material occupied the thawed zone around the pipe, the flow, buoyancy, and convective effects just discussed could also be caused by an earthquake. The southern part of the pipeline route lines is an active seismic zone.
Differential settlement causing shearing stresses in a pipe can result from a variety of processes – the most conspicuous of which is probably the thawing of ice wedges. These massive vertical veins of ice form tight polygonal networks, commonly invisible from the surface and difficult to delineate with borings.. They are widely distributed in northern Alaska. A pipeline crossing ice-wedge networks at random angles would thaw the wedges quickly and could thereby lose support over considerable spans. A statistical calculation. suggests that in typical ice wedge terrain, conditions which might exceed the design stress of the pipeline could occur on the average of once every mile. Most of these conditions could be anticipated by observations made during trenching.
Settlement of the pipe due to thawing is a cumulative effect of all of the thawed material beneath it. Only a negligibly small fraction of this material will be directly observed in separated bore holes. Rather small and subtle changes in porosities, moisture content, and other properties occurring over lateral distances of tens of feet could cause differential settlement resulting in excessive stress on the pipe. Such changes may be difficult or impossible to .detect in advance by trenching and boring, even if holes were drilled every 1,000 feet along the route.
Where the sediments are saturated or over-saturated, a trench one or more feet deep and tens of feet wide will probably develop over the pipeline in a few years; it will deepen and widen somewhat as time progresses. Where the trench is discontinuous it could create a series of ponds which could enlarge by thermal processes under certain conditions. Indiscriminate drainage of these ponds could create excessive stress on the pipe by removing buoyant forces that might be partially supporting it in these differentially settled zones.
Where the trench above the pipeline is continuous, it could become a stream channel, altering drainage patterns and creating erosion problems along the pipeline.
Heat conducted from the pipe to the surface will have a significant effect on surface temperatures and plant-root temperatures over a band not more than about 60 feet wide. Directly over the pipe snow will probably remain on the ground only after the heavier storms.
The inflow of water into the depression likely to develop over the pipe will probably more than supply the heat requirements for excess evaporation, and in general conditions will probably remain wet. However, if the material overlying the pipe should be very permeable, thermal convection of water in the sediments could probably increase heat loss from the pipe to the surface one hundred fold. Under these conditions evaporation would probably exceed the rate of local water supply and the region above the pipe could eventually become desiccated. Heat and moisture transfer above the pipe could have a significant effect on the formation of local ground fog.
This study was not exhaustive. Potential problems certainly exist that have not been considered, and some that have been considered may be shown not to exist by further studies. The report represents one perspective on an overall problem that transcends many disciplines and requires the perspectives of many for an optimal solution. It is hoped that the report will provide one reference point for objective discussion between the people of many backgrounds who must communicate effectively on this issue.
[From the New York Times, Feb. 27, 1971]
THE CONSERVATION OF OIL – INDUSTRY CRITICS WOULD INCREASE IMPORTS AND TAP NEW FIELDS ONLY IN EMERGENCY
(By Gladwin Hill)
SANTA BARBARA, CALIF.– Another major oil production problem, thornier in some respects than the Alaska pipeline case, is lying on the desk of Interior Secretary Rogers C. B. Morton, awaiting action. It is the question of expanded oil development in the Santa Barbara Channel, where production already is in progress, and where the attendant environmental hazards were dramatically manifested in the off-shore well blowout of January, 1969.
Five drilling platforms are now operating on Federal leases, and applications for two more are pending. Hearings on the advisability of proceeding were conducted by the Interior Department here in December.
After all the argumentation, however, there are some expert observers who regard the environmental questions, in both the Alaska and Santa Barbara cases, as quite secondary to a larger question of national policy.
Foremost among these observers are economists, and. their question in effect is: "Why are we pumping the oil out of the ground anyway?"
The petroleum industry has a ready answer to this: "We need the oil."
This seemingly simple statement has long been a subject of contention.
The industry argues that oil deposits must be discovered and extracted as a matter of national defense, so the United States will not become too dependent on foreign oil.
But critics of this rationale say that as soon as deposits are discovered, as in Alaska and Santa Barbara, the standard industry practice is to exhaust them – and then go hunting for more oil.
In only four instances, among the thousands of oil discoveries in the United States in the last century, has a figurative padlock been placed on oil deposits in the interests of national defense.
These are the naval reserves at Elk Hills and Buena Vista Hills near Bakersfield, Calif., Teapot Dome in Wyoming (which Harding Administration aides were caught trying to give away to oil companies), and a field in Alaska adjacent to the Prudhoe Bay deposit now the subject of so much debate.
How can the dichotomy of oil exploitation versus oil conservation be resolved? Overlooking the Santa Barbara Channel rigs, on the local campus of the University of California, is the office of a leading petroleum economist, Dr. Walter J. Mead, a frequent witness at Congressional oil hearings.
In concert with a number of other economists, his answer to the oil dilemma in effect is that a number of the recent controversial discoveries could be sealed for national defense, with due compensation to the oil companies involved, at a great saving to the nation's taxpayers, and at great satisfaction to the environmentally concerned.
Dr. Mead starts with the figure that the oil industry's present policy of stringently limiting oil imports (in the name of national defense) costs American consumers $4 billion a year in higher prices.
Citing Interior Department analyses, he says that the import quotas have the effect of stimulating domestic production of 2.17 billion barrels of oil a year, at a "social cost" to the nation (because of the higher prices) of $1.04 a barrel.
WOULD INCREASE IMPORTS
Against this, he has concluded through reams of calculations, that the cost of conserving oil in the ground with facilities for quick use in an emergency, is only eight cents a barrel per year. The impounded oil would be offset by lifting the existing import quotas.
"The difference in social cost between these two methods of providing some degree of national security against the interruption of the flow of oil is very large," Dr. Mead and a colleague, Dr. Phillip Sorenson, said in a recent analysis, "and is clearly favorable to the petroleum reserve proposal. Whereas shut-in petroleum reserves can be maintained indefinitely at the relatively low cost, domestic production of a nonrenewable resource cannot be perpetual."
"The major shortcoming of an oil import restriction program," they continued, "is that it sacrifices future national security in order to obtain a higher degree of self-sufficiency now."
The oil industry's reaction to any such proposals is implicit in its long-term course of action. It contends that the national interest is best served by the present mix of domestic production and limited importation. Oil men also take a dim view in principle of sealing new discoveries, maintaining that the oil must produce revenue to finance the industry's constant costly exploratory activities.
Nevertheless, the idea of sidetracking controversial environmental imponderables by simply sealing the Alaska and Santa Barbara deposits as national defense reserves is in the forefront of proposals being advanced by both conservationists and some members of Congress.
And it could figure critically in Secretary Morton's resolution of the Great Oil Hassle.
CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE TRANS ALASKA PIPELINE
(By Robert R. Curry, professor of environmental geology, Department of Geology, University of Montana)
MAJOR AREAS OF OMISSION OR WEAKNESS
A. Stipulation Q (1st Attachment, p. 50 ff) must be reinstated or similar stipulation should be included to provide for procedures to apply for segment-by-segment authorization for the pipeline. I understand such a stipulation was included in earlier draft(s) of the stipulations. Such a stipulation, or another stipulation, should additionally state that all materials upon which the authorizing officer bases his decisions for each segment of the pipeline are to be within the public domain and are to be released at least 30 days before the authorization is to take place. Space must be provided by the authorizing officer for review of these documents by any interested persons. All data collected by the authorizing officer from the permittee under stipulation B(2), shall be also made available to the public.
Adequacy of data available to the authorized officer and reviewed by the public with respect to decisions to be made by the authorizing officer based upon that data must be able to be challenged by the public – for decisions for each segment of the pipeline, segment by segment. Appeals based upon premise of inadequacy of the data for appropriate decisions should, in my opinion, be made to EPA or a reasonable body of the National Academy of Science and should most certainly not be made to the Department of the Interior who will be supplying some of the data. Thus the appeal procedure outlined in stipulation B(2) (p. 4 of stipulations) authorizing appeal only to the Secretary of the Interior is wholly unsatisfactory.
The makeup of a reasonable appeals body should be carefully stipulated to avoid conflicts that may arise from use of personnel from Interior or any of the power/energy/ petroleum-company scientists. This will be difficult but entirely possible.
B. No mention at all is given in the Impact Statement to the most serious environmental hazard of the proposed pipeline: that of the marine and coastal hazards to that portion of the shipment route south of Valdez, Alaska. The NEPA requires that alternatives be considered and that the environmental impact of those alternatives be outlined. This is not done for the pipeline route through Canada – which is virtually a reality rather than a merely "proposed alternative". Mention is made of the route alternative via Canada (p. 152) but this completely fails to mention the great difference in environmental impact of such a route on the world's marine resources. The alternative is considered as if all the oil transshipped through the proposed pipeline were to be consumed in Valdez.
Without question, and with a wealth of factual basis, the most serious environmental risk of the present proposed routing as compared with the MacKenzie River Valley route is the combined effects of oil spillage at sea; risk of tanker accident in the dangerous passage between Valdez and Blaine, Washington, and Los Angeles, California; and problems of spillage at offloading and onloading facilities at the shores. Threat to the fishery resource of Puget Sound alone should fully justify selection of the Mackenzie route to Canadian and U.S. pipeheads in the Edmonton area rather than delivery of one or more tankers per day at the two major west coast refining ports.
The thesis that the greatest pollution will occur from the oceanic shipment of the North Slope Alaskan oil can be developed easily. Within the proposed lifetime of the pipeline and under present restrictions of liability of the tanker operators, it can be demonstrated with statistical assurity that accident and considerable spillage will occur with the present Prudhoe-Valdez- Blaine and Los Angeles routing. There is certainly less probability of significant ecological damage from expected spill via over ground pipe along the northern boundary of the Arctic National Wildlife Range to Innuvik, Northwest Territories, and up the Mackenzie parallel to the Canadian gas pipeline to Edmonton. The route goes thence via existing or new pipelines to central, eastern, and western U.S. markets.
Omission of this alternative consideration is perhaps the very most serious flaw in the draft impact statement. That an eventual coastal Alaskan terminal will be needed for export of petroleum to Japan and other Asian markets before the Southeast Asian oil becomes marketable seems realistic, but we must have time to meet the engineering and geologic inadequacies of knowledge for the proposed crossing of the Alaskan Range tectonic area and we must have time to remove limits of liability by legislation for controlling oil spills at sea. Tanker design technology and navigation systems are approximately 50 years out-of-date but could, through crash programs and incentive, perhaps be brought into reasonable line within 10-15 years. We must exclusively use the Canadian route alternatives until that time and should indeed consider direct purchase of Canadian oil from the MacKenzie River reserves for that first decade to preserve our own reserves while breaking import quota restrictions.
C. Tectonic hazards are very inadequately covered or considered. Mapping of individual faults and detailed seismicity simply has not been done. By removing stipulation Q, the public is being forced to accept a broad- brush approach to route selection without even the most rudimentary data on location of zones of greatest hazard. Thus, design stipulations for the pipeline at fault crossing or suspected fault crossing cannot be formulated.
1. Seismicity data as given on page 19 of the Impact Statement, is of the most gross and dangerously inadequate kind. Prior to 1965 only seismograph stations at College and Sitka operated in Alaska, and the Sitka Station had poor instrumentation. Prior to about the mid-1950's worldwide distribution of seismographic instruments was such that errors in epicenter locations for Alaska were as large as 100 km (62 miles). In 1965 a larger aperture system, including 6 stations, was installed and operated by the Geophysical Institute at the University of Alaska. Now epicenter locations to +10 Km or less, and magnitudes down to noise level are recorded, as opposed to an earlier pre-1965 discrimination ability such that earthquakes of less than Richter magnitude 4.5 could not be recorded (except in the vicinity of College),
Although historical records of Alaskan earthquakes go back to 1788, those with magnitudes greater than 5 were felt and noted at the rate of 1 each 5 years from 1788 to 1888. With recent instrumentation (since 1965) about 20 earthquakes are recorded per year with magnitudes of equal-to- or greater-than 5.
Thus the available seismic data is grossly inadequate upon which to base the extrapolation given on p. 19. Only six years of data sufficiently accurate to locate potentially damaging epicenters is inadequate for both the location of zones of weakness and for the determination of magnitudes of "maximum probable earthquakes". Indeed, the maxima shown (5.5 to 8.5 for various parts of the route) seem conservative to a degree that would be totally unacceptable for site engineering for location of public buildings or power generation equipment and should, in my opinion, be considered conservative for location of facilities such as pipelines and pumping stations where potential for environmental damage exists.
Solutions are available. We need not await the accumulation of 20 years of seismic record to gain an idea of the seismicity and potential hazard of the region. Micro-seismic networks could be established and, in a period of several years, one could learn a good deal about where smaller amounts of energy were being released along the southern portion of the pipeline route, and from this we could better locate potential fault zones and predict their activity.
2. Faulting: In addition, we would need a crash geologic mapping program to locate the obvious faults and fault zones. The total disregard for known faults in the present routing seems inexplicable and there are no doubt many lesser or equal faults along the route that are unmapped at present. Review reconnaissance geology, like that of Clyde Wahrhaftig, whose work is quoted heavily in the impact statement, is not geology of the kind that can be used for engineering site studies. It was never intended for that sort of work and does not address itself to the many geologic problems necessary to predict and evaluate potential environmental impact of human activities. The authors of the impact statement would have us believe that the geology is mapped and known over the pipeline route, but this is so far from the truth as to possibly qualify as a complete falsehood. I know for a fact that some of the authors of geologic reports quoted in the impact statement are sincerely disturbed by the implications and contextual framework of their work.
A serious failing of the technical stipulations (Tech. Stips. p. 7) is the stipulation of "seismic design procedures" related to magnitude of expected earthquakes. It is not so much the magnitude of the earthquake that breaks pipes, but it is the amount of offset along the faults that is the real hazard. There seems to me to be no real stipulations that the pipe must withstand instantaneous offsets of on the order of 40 feet which would, in my opinion, be a reasonable design offset. To equate earthquake magnitude with potential for damage to a pipeline is similar to equating horsepower of an automobile with probability of fatality to the driver. Richter magnitude is essentially a measure of acceleration of the earth's crust but says nothing about where, if anywhere, it may slip or break. It is a measure of the amount of energy released, but not how it is released or concentrated. Even the AEC could never write such a meaningless stipulation for a reactor contractor.
The Richter magnitude should be considered but more important is the potential offset expected. In the Copper River valley near Glenallen, for instance, the proposed pipeline route lies nearly parallel to a fault zone and completely within it, thus greatly increasing chance of failure if the fault should move anywhere along that 50-60 mile long section. Much more sensible would be to cross the fault, if one must, in the shortest possible route with specially designed pipe with pre-built bends and only very limited coupling to its above-ground foundation. This technical stipulation for construction mode for seismic hazard takes no account of the related hazards indirectly coupled with earthquakes. These are seismic sea waves; Lituya Bay, Alaska type "giant" sea waves released by landslide; direct landslide; liquefaction of ground; and glacier surges. All the technical stipulation say, in essence, is that, "where technically feasible" it shall be engineered to prevent failure, and "where not technically feasible" the pipeline shall be designed to provide for "accommodation." What we should ask, is, "accommodation" to a glacier surge on the Black Rapids glacier when the pipe has been shut-off due to failures both north and south of Black Rapids and there is no place to drain the oil from the pipe? Does this mean there are temporary storage facilities adequate to handle all oil in the pipe at any point in time between each shut-off valve? If so, it should say so. If not, what is accommodation? How do you "accommodate" a landslide at a time of earthquake?
As was noted in the impact statement, the largest offset from the 1964 earthquake occurred on a buried or obscured fault. From this and other reconnaissance information, it can be implied that we will never locate all the faults in an area until we begin the actual pipeline construction, and even then we may miss some. However, this does not imply that we cannot learn to predict the approximate location of faults as for instance along valley bottoms, by mapping the bedrock units exposed on the valley sidewalls. For this reason, time must be allowed to conduct the necessary detailed geologic mapping and provision must be made for segment by segment public approval of the route as this information Is learned.
D. Hydrologic Data. General data on hydrology of Alaskan streams is almost as inadequate as that on seismicity. The technical stipulations (4. a, b) specify that the design flood shall be "based upon the concept of the 'standard project flood' as described in Corps of Engineers Bulletin 52--8." and that design for culverts and bridges shall be "to accommodate the 50-year flood or greatest flood of record, whichever is greater." The standard flood project concept was developed in temperate latitudes in areas without permafrost or glacier dammed lakes and such a concept is wholly inadequate to protect the Alaskan river systems. Clearly with little or no hydrologic data, the term "50-year flood" or largest flood of record is meaningless also.
There are, indeed, potential methods to determine the maximum flood of the last 50 years where flood plains are vegetated with greater-than 50-year old vegetation. However the last 50 years may not be very representative of the next fifty years where glaciers exist in the river headwaters, due to the effect of potential formation and release of glacier-dammed lakes. M. A. Kuentzel produced a document for TAPS on the flood hydrology of glacier dammed lakes in which he states that "The magnitude of each flood from a glacier-dammed lake release may exceed the predicted 50-year flood for an equivalent drainage area by many times and must be considered in any development." (p. 1). Kuentzel further stated that the only semi-reliable way to predict the frequency of glacier-dammed lake releases is by using historical records – much of which is unavailable at present. This is not the whole story since historical records tell us nothing about the frequency and magnitude of discharge of yet-to-form glacier-dammed lakes. Some of these could form in a single melting season in a valley blocked by a receding glacier or in a glacier-free valley blocked by an advancing side-valley glacier. There seems little hope of being honestly able to predict the location and magnitude of such glacier dam bursts-which have accounted repeatedly for the largest known floods on earth.
The Alaskan river beds are adapted to these non-cyclic kinds of flooding as well as the seasonal flood. However, the idea of a 50-year flood is entirely a seasonal flood concept which attempts to derive, from the morphology of the channel or from analysis of a few years of seasonal data, the height of water expected in the 50-year flood. In Alaska, the flood height and instantaneous river discharge is based upon the formation of river-ice dams temporarily impounding waters when the river breaks up, and upon the vicissitudes of glaciers impounding meltwaters in the mountains. Thus, on the North Slope, the ice dam problem is nearly as serious as the glacier-dam problem in the Alaska Range, and neither are predictable from Corps of Engineers manuals or short period of record.
E. Valdez loading and storage facility: Oil transfer facilities at the southern terminus of the pipeline need better protection than stipulated. Although not specified, I presume that the facilities, including all storage tanks, are to be located on bedrock, and not on the flatter marine muds and glacial outwash, both of which are subject to spontaneous liquefaction during earthquake. If the terminal facilities are located on bedrock, it is difficult for me to envision areas large enough at a high enough elevation to be clear of sea-wave hazard to permit construction of complete enclosing berms around the facility to catch all oil that could be spilled in the event of rupture of pipe and storage tanks. The difficulty is that, unlike the design seismic sea wave stipulated (Tech. Stip. 5), the area is in fact subject to much higher wave slosh associated with landslide or other land failure into the narrow Valdez Arm. Such events have occurred in the region – the best known being that at Lituya Bay, Alaska, about 80 miles west of Juneau (see U.S.G.S. Prof. Pap. 354-C, 1960). On July 9th, 1958, the Lituya Bay wave reached a height 1,720 feet. The wave traveling up to 130 miles per hour surged up to 1,740 feet up the fjord-valley wall with great destructive force – cleaning everything off the valley wall down to bare bedrock. These are not freak occurrences, but happen repeatedly, this being the 5th in Lituya Bay since 1854. The height reached was 8 times the maximum known for a seismically induced sea wave. Geologic and physiographic conditions in Valdez Arm are similar to those in Lituya Bay in many respects. Evidence of past landslide-induced sea waves should be discernable in the Valdez Arm region if they have occurred there but even if they have not, they could occur in the future. Terminal facilities should take this hazard into account and I can find nowhere in the statement any mention of precise location of south terminal facilities.
Similarly, the design stipulation for the southern terminal merely refer to the pipeline itself, not to the necessary tanks and transfer equipment. It is the transfer and storage tanks, not the pipe, that is in imminent danger of rupture in the event of earthquake. Partly filled tanks may rupture before full tanks due to the sloshing of the fluids in earthquake. Large tanks cannot be simply designed to withstand such sloshing and the usual contingency design is to place the tank within a sealed closed depression so that when it does rupture, its contents do not get away. Such must be stipulated for Alaska and the other west coast pipeline-tanker terminals.
F. The National Security Argument: The entire concept of development of Alaskan petroleum as a means of securing the nation is so patently fallacious that it seems shameful to have to waste time in rebuttal. I feel that the best and strongest rebuttal is to be found in the answers of the Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import Control's 1970 report on the Oil Import Question. If Melvin Laird and Maurice Stans, as well as David Kennedy, William Rogers, Walter Nickel, George Schultz, Hendrik Houthakker, and David Freeman claim the statement "We must be protected against any contingency that might impair the national security" is "overstated" (405 d, p. 123), and that, indeed, the nation's security may be enhanced if oil supplies are depleted abroad before at home, and that even if all Middle East supplies should become unavailable in time of international crisis, the U.S. could increase domestic production by 21% after three years and for even a 1-year interruption we would actually have a surplus of supply over demand (Table K, p. 65, The Oil Import Question), then who can Interior find that claims there will be weakening of national security?
Of critical import here is the question of volumes of petroleum reserves left in North America. I estimate that, including the offshore Arctic Ocean, the North Slope of the Brooks Range in Alaska has about 40 billion barrels of petroleum. We may add to this perhaps 40 more billion bbls that I estimate may exist in the Mackenzie Delta region and the offshore and Arctic Archipelago Island regions of Canada, to arrive at the total potential reserve in the Arctic of North America of 80 billion bbls (compared with a proved U.S. reserve of 30 billion bbls). Thus, the Arctic is where our petroleum will come from for most of our petroleum-based future. Use of Canadian crude and transshipment of north slope U.S. crude to markets via Mackenzie transportation corridor routings cannot be construed as not being in the interests of national security except for the fact that we will be depleting our own reserves faster than world reserves. Certainly we are more vulnerable to attack by submarine with Valdez-terminated oil than an interior pipeline.
The real reason behind the security specter is, of course, that the administration considers it not in the nation's interests to let other countries have our funds for petroleum while our own oil companies suffer. This also is untrue because our own companies own rights or interests in much of the world's oil and to use Canadian oil rather than Alaskan oil for 10 years is merely a shift of funds from one pocket to another, not a transfer of funds out of the country.
PART II. SUMMARY OF SCIENTIFIC CRITICISMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. In my professional opinion geologic hazards along the southern one-third of the proposed pipeline route are such that the pipe should not be laid and operated until adequate geologic mapping has been done to delimit the active and inactive faults in the area and until adequate geophysical instrumentation and research has been done to establish the potential seismicity of the region so that the pipeline can be designed to withstand expectable fault offsets of expectable magnitudes during times of expectable earthquakes.
B. In my opinion, the proposed stipulations do not adequately protect the entire route of the proposed pipeline from damage due to erosion associated with pipeline construction and from thermal erosion in areas of permafrost. Neither the indices of soil erodibility nor the presence of permafrost have been mapped along the proposed route and I would feel that this was mandatory before approving any construction plan designed to minimize these conditions.
C. In my opinion, the proposed stipulations do not afford the scientific community or the public an opportunity to revise or suggest revision of design criteria or stipulations as work on the pipeline progresses and excavation reveals new un-mapped hazards or potential hazards. I feel that provision must be made for this action by persons other than the authorizing officer.
D. In my opinion, the potential environmental effects of oil spills associated with transfer and refining of Alaskan oil en route to and within the sea coast ports of the states of Washington and California have not been adequately considered in the Impact Statement under "alternative route" sections. It is my belief that the most serious potential environmental and economic hazards of the proposed pipeline route are in that portion of the route from Valdez to Los Angeles. I believe that environmental impact hearings should be held in Puget Sound (at Seattle or Bellingham) and it Los Angeles so that we may present the scientific data to back this contention. Proposed refinery effluents from pending Corps of Engineers applications for permits to dump byproducts of the Alaskan pipeline oil made by ARCO (Public Notice NPS-71-18, Seattle District, Corps of Engineers, 15 January, 1971), are alone adequate, in my opinion, to favor the Mackenzie corridor route over the proposed route.
E. I believe that the proposed transfer facility site at the southern terminus of the proposed pipeline in Valdez is, very poorly protected from seismic risk and from risk of landslide-generated sea wave. Much geologic evidence is available to indicate that this is an exceptionally poor Choice of locations for the transfer facility.
F. Hydrologic data and glaciologic data are wholly inadequate upon which to base reasonable stipulations to protect the pipeline from accidental failure or breakage during flood or glacier surges in the southern one _third and the northern one third of the proposed route.
In direct summary, it is my opinion that many fewer environmental hazards are to be encountered by construction of a pipeline along the northern border of the Arctic Wildlife refuge to connect with Canadian pipelines running up the relatively permafrost-free Mackenzie River corridor and eventually to U.S. markets at pipeheads in the Midwest and throughout the country. The present proposed route is scientifically indefensible from an environmental standpoint in view of viable economically feasible alternatives.
SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN UNDERGROUND PIPE CORROSION CONTROL
(By Betzi Woodman)
Recent and pending legislation regarding steel pipelines emphasizes that such facilities will be structurally sound and will remain so indefinitely.
"The problem of building a structurally sound facility is academic," says Will Knoppe of the Corps of Engineers in Alaska. "But problems of maintenance are something else. Much depends on corrosion control facilities installed during the construction of the line."
That's not as simple as it sounds, especially in Alaska. Unique aspects of intense winter cold, soil differentiation, flood environment, changing patterns of erosion and stream flow, permafrost saturated with oxygen and the waters of breakup have a way of nullifying present methods of protecting against corrosion from electrolytic causes.
Pipeline people have long been aware that once a fuel oil transportation line (or any pipeline) is buried, the material constructed of steel generally tends to revert to its original state by the various corrosion processes involved.
A more involved explanation comes from the Corps relative to its recent and continuing survey of pitting on the 8" Haines-Fairbanks line which supplies fuel to the military bases in the Fairbanks area, the more recently constructed 8" line from Whittier to Anchorage, and the 92 miles of buried 12" line supplying Anchorage with natural gas.
"When a piece of metal, such as a pipeline, is placed in contact with the soil, there exist a multitude of differences between different areas on the pipe. Each of these differences – in surface condition, in soil contacted, in aeration, in many other factors – is capable of setting up an electrical potential difference which acts as the driving voltage of an active corrosion cell.
Thus, the entire line is in a network of overlapping cells, of varying dimensions and potentials giving rise to a bewilderingly complex array of anodes (corroding) and cathodes (protected) on the surface of the pipe. With passage of time, polarization alters the potentials and the resistances of the circuit elements; changes in soil moisture and temperature alter conditions; and soil and pipe movements contributes to the confusion.
"Experience has taught that where the soil resistivity is low, pipe can corrode; and, in any given section lying in low resistivity soil, some of the pipe is corroding. Accordingly, where bare lines are concerned, our principal criterion of corrosivity is the resistivity of the soil.
"This can be justified by the observation that, regardless of the physical and chemical factors which may give rise to driving voltages, the actual current flow will be small when the circuit resistance is large; and, since metal dissolution, according to Faraday's Law, is proportional to current flow, corrosion cannot be severe in high resistivity media."
A soils resistance survey was taken by the Fluor Corporation along the Haines-Fairbanks line in 1957. Generally, results of the testing indicated that corrosion would not be a major problem and although occasional leaks might occur in select areas, such as Kluane Lake, the line would retain its structural integrity. Anode beds were installed in areas where it was felt loss of steel from the corrosion processes would occur.
Since that survey installation of anode beds, however, four leaks developed where the soils tests indicated corrosion should NOT occur. Initial resistivity readings, respectively, for the four leak locations were 45,000 to 180,000 ohms-cm; 100,000 ohms-cm; 130,000 ohms-cm; and 84,00 ohms-cm. All were high enough to substantiate the expectation of non-corrosion.
SOIL NOT ONLY FACTOR
The tests were made in the summer, but it is now determined that soil alone is not the only electrolyte that creates favorable corrosion conditions in cold climates. Soil resistance becomes very high during cold periods or when frozen, but flowing water high in oxygen and carbon dioxide but low in carbonates is capable of removing up to 15 mills of steel a year at a temperature of approximately 40º F. Two of the previously mentioned leaks were attributed to the chemical composition of spring run-off water following the buried pipe.
Backfilling adjacent to the steel structure with mixed moist soils can result in an unfavorable environment. In the Lake Dezadeash area of Canada, the fill adjacent to the pipe that failed was composed predominately of high resistant gravels (over 180,000 ohm-cm) and occasional lumps of low resistant clays (under 2,000 ohm-cm). Isolated anodes developed in the steel under the clay portion of the backfill with a resultant loss of metal.
Surface-laid pipes are not immune to the corrosive factors, either. Sometimes a pipe is self- buried because of the nature of the ground; erosion paths and stream bed changes can bring differing materials and fresh oxygen-laden water to cause trouble.
It is doubtful that any resistivity testing other than continuous testing for design throughout the various seasons will produce adequate data to install an effective cathodic protection system. And even this protection may be ineffectual during the winter months when the anode beds are frozen and a frozen cocoon develops around the cathodes, but the soils adjacent to the pipe are heated by the transportation of warm fuels and remain thawed.
GALVANIC METHOD
The galvanic method uses another substance, usually magnesium, as an auxiliary anode for the pipeline. When a deposit of magnesium, which has an inherent absolute potential of +2.123 volts, is connected electrically to a pipeline with an inherent iron potential of +0.067 volts, the pipeline will then be negative to the surrounding soil and cathodically protected in the vicinity of the anode. The auxiliary anode of magnesium becomes the source from which the current will flow causing the corrosion to take place in the anode instead of the pipeline. The weight and number of magnesium anodes required is dependent on the soil resistivity, the pipe surface area and the anode life desired.
Cathodic protection can only be effective on that part of the line which is in contact with the soil; it will not protect against atmospheric corrosion, nor against all of the attack on a structure which is subject to intermittent immersion.
These observations, of course, relate to bare pipe as was the case in 1954 when budgets were low and a leak now and then was a calculated risk. Now, as Knoppe observes, "it's a whole new ball game" and the Haines line survey in particular was directed for rehabilitation and protection to avoid any further leaks. It was in this process that intricacies and great variants of corrosion potential in Alaska were spelled out.
At one point in the report, a summary reads: "Resistivity and pipe-to-soil potential tests are accurate for general design use if moisture contained in the soil does not exhibit seasonal changes such as flowing water in a gravel bed during spring break up periods. Neither test will point directly to all existing elements that favor rapid loss of metal"
Knoppe then points out that obviously "in any given area in Alaska, all buried lines should be protected by wrapping. In addition, both buried lines and surface laid lines should receive a cathodic protection system to overcome corrosion from any electrical leaks that may develop"
At the same time it is stated that the "best corrosion protection is given by isolating the line from the ground." All the drawbacks connected with this procedure are readily noted, whether for an 8" short line or the 48" TAPS multi-hundred-mile line.
Thus, it is warned that adequate maintenance of the cathodic system is also a requisite. If not properly maintained, it gives the delusion of preservation, and within a few years there is no protection.
Problems exist also in the matter of wrapping. The Corps report indicates there is not any known chemical wrap which would do the job. Protective coatings normally used on POL lines deteriorate rapidly when exposed to sunlight. Polyurethane plastic and neoprene hypalon rubber, properly applied, will withstand considerable abrasion and are not subjected to deterioration when exposed to sunlight. Shopcoated line under controlled conditions is probably superior to field protected lines.
Inadvertent penetrations of the coating may occur during burial process and this invites a concentration of the corrosion process on the small amount of pipe exposed. Thus cathodic protection is indicated.
Problems likely to arise from permafrost melt as hot fuel passes through have been considered in every discussion regarding building of the TAPS line. But little has been said about corrosion potential from bare pipe in permafrost. Knoppe points out that the oxygen saturated permafrost which melted would have the same effect on unprotected pipe as melt water on any other pipe it sets up the corrosion situation.
It is reported that TAPS is considering a wrap product recently developed by the Japanese. It would include an outer casing of polyvinyl chloride, glass reinforced. An inner insulating section of poly urethane would be against the pipe.
Abnormal corrosion conditions in Alaska are not confined to underground steel structures, Knoope points out. Take the Whittier pernament docking facility for example, completed in 1955 of unprotected steel piling.
Design testing of the salt water in Whittier harbor area indicated that the corrosion rate would not exceed the world-wide average loss rate of 15 mills per year; in fact, the low temperature of the water (40º F) indicated loss would be less. Available samples of steel exposed to the harbor waters – examined during the design of the facility – confirmed that excessive corrosion should not occur. To compensate for anticipated loss, additional structural steel was used in the design with the future installation of the cathodic protection, if required after the expected design life.
Inspection 4½ years after start of construction showed corrosion in some areas accounted for steel losses to the piling as high as 66.4 mills per year. It was also noted that cold water lines from the Whittier wells were rapidly deteriorating and that barnacle growth present on structures in the harbor had all but disappeared.
Loss of metal in both the water lines and steel piling was attributed to the high oxygen content contained in the melt water of adjacent glaciers flowing into the water table and the bay – the "fiord environment."
Ice formation in tidal regions can also contribute to excessive loss of metal. The ice forms on the piling as the tide recedes and as the weight of the ice increases, tidal action floats the ice and all protective oxides that form on the steel are removed, exposing white metal. This metal corrodes and the cycle is repeated. Such a situation has occurred at Kodiak.
In sea water installations north of the Brooks Range and in other areas where the water temperature is exceptionally low and the structure is not heated, corrosion is negligible. Steel piling in the Nome harbor where water hovers at the freezing level has shown no distress in over 50 years service.
Except for the tremendous scouring action of the Arctic ice pack, this fact augurs well for steel dock installation out of Prudhoe Bay where tidal action is slight But if, as has been suggested for one method, heat is used to keep a dock area ice free and temperatures in the water rise to where ice melt and oxygen release occur, then the picture would change.
Meanwhile, methods to determine if and how much buried pipe has corroded – short of digging it up and looking at it – need much refinement to be of great use. An instrument pig called Linalog permits surveillance and to some degree of accuracy locates areas where extensive loss of steel has occurred. The system employs an instrumented pig capable of inducing a magnetic flux in the pipe and of recording variations in flux induced by the loss of metal. The pig is transported with the fuel being pumped and a tape recorded in the pig notes the variations. The tape is photographically transferred to a continuous log.
The instrument shows loss of metal in the pipe wall, but does not differentiate between deep pits, "BB" type pitting and breaks in the wall structure such as welded joints. Since the unit does show all welds, flanges, and valves, it is easy to differentiate between a weld and actual loss of metal. Marker magnets are used to indicate locations so that corrosion can be placed precisely according to charted distance of the buried line.
This dissertation merely touches on the basic matters involved in one type of corrosion of steel pipelines. Consider the problem which can arise in soils above 50º F. A bacteria exists whose metabolic byproduct includes sulfide compounds which serve as excellent electrolyte materials conducive to development of corrosion cells. One can merely speculate on whether heat transfer from a hot fuel flowing through a buried and uninsulated pipeline could create the conditions for this bacteria – and whether it exists dormant waiting for such – conditions or would be introduced!
Engineers in Alaska are confining their investigations to the matters presented here for the nonce. Effectiveness of the various cathodic protection systems during the winter months in Alaskan and northern Canada are unknown, Knoppe says. Additional testing is required.
The Campbell Creek drainage system is presently protected with an over-designed imprest current system placed in operation during the spring of 1969. Additional testing was being done during the past winter to see if the system is indeed adequate. If freezing the anode beds reduces the effectiveness of the system, a research project using a plating system for winter protection will be initiated.