March 26, 1970
Page 9572
ERA OF NEGOTIATION? – PART I
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, this morning, representatives of the United States, Saigon, Hanoi, and the Vietcong met for the 60th session of the Paris Vietnam peace talks. Nothing was accomplished, just as nothing has been accomplished on the negotiating front at any of the other Paris sessions since Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge resigned his post, 126 days ago.
While the charade of talks goes on, the war continues in Vietnam and threatens to spread in other parts of Southeast Asia. Laos is a battleground and Cambodia is in turmoil. We teeter on the edge of a wider war without a semblance of an effort to negotiate a peace settlement in that troubled part of the world.
A negotiated settlement is the only answer that makes sense in Southeast Asia, for those who live there and for the United States. A military solution is not viable for Vietnam, and it cannot bring peace in other countries of that region.
Unfortunately, Mr. President, the administration does not seem to be committed to a negotiated settlement. While it pursues the goal of false optimism with Vietnamization, the war goes on, casualties are up, and the dangers to world peace escalate. We are now told that the most the administration is planning, and the best it can achieve under Vietnamization is to have 225,000 troops left in Vietnam at the end of 1971 – 21 months from now.
This is a matter of grave concern to me and to other Members of the Senate. It is a matter which cannot be brushed aside by vague assurances and an attitude of wait and see.
I believe the time has come for the administration to turn its attention to a genuine effort toward a negotiated settlement, or to tell the American people why they have written off negotiations as the best way to end the fighting and the killing in Vietnam. For these reasons, Mr. President, I intend to raise the question about a negotiated end to the war in Vietnam each week in the Senate, until a successor to Mr. Lodge has been named and until some meaningful steps have been taken toward a settlement in Paris.
INCREASING DOUBTS
Each week more questions are being raised about the wisdom of the administration's policies and the directions in which they are leading us. A common thread unites the critics. The tragic conflict in Vietnam will know no satisfactory conclusion other than by negotiation.
As Gen. Matthew B. Ridgeway wrote in the New York Times, March 14, 1970: Many continue to argue that a military solution, or 'victory', in Vietnam has all along been within our reach, that nothing less would serve our interests. I believe such a solution is not now and never has been possible under conditions consistent with our interests.
A negotiated settlement, which I think we would all prefer, and which I believe we must ultimately reach, will be unattainable unless we retain the initiative and face up to these problems now.
Regardless of how much this may tax the wisdom and determination of our Government and the patience of our people, our decision is, I believe, the prudent one, and we should channel its execution into the mainstream of our long-range national interests.
Arthur M. Cox, in an article in the "Outlook" section of the March 22, 1970, Washington Post, noted the inconsistency in President Nixon's policies, when he wrote:
The President says Vietnamization is a plan "which will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front." That is an impossibility which has been allowed to go unchallenged. The war will end only when one side wins a military victory or when a settlement has been negotiated. Since Vietnamization rules out serious negotiation, the only conceivable other assumption must be that the President is counting on the South Vietnamese to win their own war.
Commenting on recent events in Laos and Cambodia, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch of March 22, 1970, noted in an editorial:
The coup in Cambodia and Communist military success in Laos reemphasize what has been clear ever since the Geneva Conference of 1954 – that peace in the whole e Indochina peninsula depends on making peace in Vietnam.
If the Nixon administration had the wit to recognize this, it would forget about Vietnamizing the war and set about negotiating a Vietnam settlement, which in turn would make possible peace in both Cambodia and Laos. Unfortunately and tragically, the administration appears to be bent on moving in precisely the opposite direction – toward expansion of the war in Laos and Cambodia as a means of supporting the policy of Vietnamization. If this is an accurate estimate of its course, then the Nation is being condemned to more and more years of war in Asia after being solemnly promised an end to it.
CONFRONTATIONS VERSUS NEGOTIATIONS
Fourteen months ago, President Nixon declared in his inaugural address that the United States would, under his administration, forsake "the era of confrontation" for "an era of negotiation" in international relations. His intentions were applauded.
On our most vexing international relations problem, ending the Vietnam war, the longest war in our history, the President said later that his administration was "proceeding in our pursuit for peace on two fronts – a peace settlement through negotiations, or if that fails, ending the war through Vietnamization."
How do those words square with the administration's failure to name a high-level replacement for Ambassador Lodge as our chief negotiator at the Paris Vietnam peace talks for more than 4 months of the 14 months of the new Nixon "era of negotiation"?
Mr. President, the administration's declarations on trying to end the war in Vietnam through negotiations are in conflict with its record of performance.
Let me focus today on just one aspect of the problem – the impact of the 4-month vacancy in the office of the top U.S. negotiator in Paris.
Our interim representative in Paris, Philip Habib, is an able career Foreign Service officer. He probably knows as much or more about Vietnam than any public servant now working for the Government. But he has not had prior ambassadorial rank. He is not a confidant of the President.
He does not have the prestige needed to deal with the Communists, to explore proposals they may make, or to take initiatives on our behalf. He is at a hopeless disadvantage in his assignment.
Mr. Habib was the No. 3 man on the U.S. delegation, first under Ambassadors Harriman and Vance, and then under Ambassadors Lodge and Walsh. The North Vietnamese and Vietcong delegates have made it clear, time and again, that their top people will not engage in major discussions with representatives from our side who, in their view, lack top credentials.
They made this clear in the past as well as in the present. When Averell Harriman was not present, his able deputy, Cyrus Vance, was never able to meet with their top man. I believe the same situation prevailed during Ambassador Lodge's tenure. Since Ambassador Lodge resigned, the Communists have not once sent their chief negotiators to the talks, and they have told us publicly and privately that they will not engage in serious talks with Mr. Habib.
This may seem a mere matter of protocol to some, but I believe it amounts to shortchanging the negotiations on the part of the Nixon administration. Obviously, North Vietnam, a country of fewer than 20 million people, is going to be acutely conscious of such matters in dealing with the United States, one of the world's two superpowers, with more than 10 times its population.
This is, moreover, an unfortunate and foolish time to be disadvantaged by the level of our representation in Paris. Le Duc Tho, a member of Hanoi's politburo and acknowledged as one of the top 10 in the North Vietnamese power structure, returned to Paris recently after an absence of many months. But we have been unable to engage in any discussions with him because he will not do business with anyone Hanoi considers of lesser rank.
This imbalance is accentuated by the representatives of the two South Vietnamese parties. The Vietcong representative, Madame Binh, holds the rank of "foreign minister of the provisional revolutionary government." Since General Ky left Paris early last year, the Government of South Vietnam has been represented by Ambassador Lam, who now frequently fails to appear and sends a deputy to the weekly meetings. Apparently he wants to strike a pose of equality with the second-rank representation of the Communists.
This is a problem we have caused by our failure to replace Ambassador Lodge with a representative of equal rank. Even when Lam has been present at the sessions, he has been a negotiator of limited means, who has to obtain authority for virtually every move, no matter how minor, from his superiors in Saigon.
QUESTIONS NEEDING ANSWERS
Mr. President, what is the administration trying to convey by this unfortunate diplomatic-protocol gap in Paris?
Is it so pleased with the progress and future of Vietnamization that it feels that the whole conflict can be settled to our satisfaction by force? Or does it feel that the reduced but still enormous U.S. troop presence in the south is inadequate to let us speak effectively to Hanoi or Saigon, to get them to resolve their differences by negotiation?
What has the administration done to get Saigon to send to Paris a representative both able and willing to negotiate?
How does the administration propose to deal with the related instability and conflict in Laos and Cambodia?
Is the administration so certain, in the face of some contrary evidence, that Hanoi's position in Paris is one of total intransigence? Even if the administration is so convinced, does this mean it has no obligation to probe and to try? Does it believe the tough bargaining necessary to achieve a negotiated end to the war is not worth the time of a top-level appointment as our chief negotiator in Paris?
Has the administration written off negotiations? If not, what are its preconditions for resuming meaningful negotiations? Is it, in effect, asking North Vietnam to surrender?
Is the administration playing a game where the next move can be made only by the other side?
Have we given up the initiative toward peace to the other side?
I raise these questions, Mr. President, because they must be answered if we are to know what the administration's real intentions are with respect to Vietnam and the rest of Southeast Asia. We have been told that the administration has a plan for peace in Vietnam, but the hard questions remain.
I believe the American people have a right to get some answers to those questions, and I intend to raise them each week until they are answered.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a moment?
Mr. MUSKIE. I yield.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, I listened with interest to the statement of the distinguished Senator from Maine. I am sure he does not intend to leave the impression or suggestion that the North Vietnamese have been negotiating or seeking to negotiate in good faith in Paris; or does he believe that is the case?
Mr. MUSKIE. I understand the questions I have asked leave impressions. The questions were very carefully asked.
These impressions would not exist if we were to get tangible reassurance from the administration that it considers the negotiations, though difficult, important to our national interest.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 2 additional minutes so that I may respond to the Senator from Michigan.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MUSKIE. We have learned from our experience of over a quarter of a century that negotiating with the Communists can be a time-consuming, drawn out, and frustrating experience; we learned that during the negotiations following Korea; we learned that from our experience in Berlin.
The question is whether or not, notwithstanding these difficulties and frustrations, we regard this process, however difficult, as significant and important to our interests.
The question raised by the Senator's question is whether or not the administration – which he is in a better position to represent than I – has decided that the next initiative in Paris will be taken only by the other side and not by us.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further for a brief observation?
Mr. MUSKIE. Yes.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Of course, I cannot let the record stand without noting that for many months the distinguished and very able former ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Lodge, represented us in Paris; that every effort was made and has been made throughout many long, long months of negotiating to reach some kind of agreement with the Communists at the negotiation table in Paris; and I also would dispute any suggestion that his successor, who now represents the United States in Paris is not most able, most capable, most distinguished, and most qualified to represent this Nation at Paris.
Further, I wish to remind the Senator and note for the RECORD that the United States at all times has been willing and eager to consider any good-faith offer or serious suggestion which the North Vietnamese might put forth at any time. That has been true, it continues to be true, and it will continue to be true.
I thank the Senator for yielding.
Mr. MUSKIE. Whatever any of us say on this subject leaves impressions. The impressions I get from the Senator's comments are: First, because of the frustrations Ambassador Lodge faced prior to his resignation, we decided not to seriously pursue negotiations in Paris, and second, as a result of that experience, if any initiative is taken in Paris, it will have to be taken by the other side. I hope those impressions are erroneous. I raised questions in my prepared remarks which, if answered, would correct those impressions.