May 11, 1970
Page 14864
SENATE RESOLUTION 405 – SUBMISSION OF SENATE RESOLUTION
DECLARATION OF PEACE FOR INDOCHINA
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, the time has come for us to substitute new policies for old in Southeast Asia.
Once again we have lost our way in the jungles and swamps of Southeast Asia. The action taken in the last 2 weeks has deepened our involvement, widened the war, and left us even further from the peace we want and need so badly.
We have watched with dismay while American troops are again dispatched to search out and destroy an elusive enemy. Once again we have seen that enemy fade into the countryside and our men left with the mission of destroying the homes of those they have been sent to save. We find ourselves again supporting with American might a military dictatorship which sanctions the slaughter of defenseless civilians, just because of their Vietnamese origin. And we saw again the bombers go north in an effort to end a political struggle in the south.
We have seen all this before and we have seen that it does not and cannot work. It is time that our leaders recognize the following basic facts about our participation in what must now be called the Indochina war:
The way out of Vietnam does not lead through Cambodia.
The way to reduce the level of hostilities and the rate of American casualties is not to send our men on new search and destroy missions.
The way to obtain movement toward a negotiated settlement is not to redouble our efforts for a military victory.
The way to revitalize the Paris peace talks is not to leave our delegation lacking the President's personal replacement for Ambassador Lodge.
The way to regain the confidence of our youth is not by callous disregard or soothing incomprehension of their efforts to communicate their dismay about the war.
The way to heal the divisions in American society is not to intensify our obsessive preoccupation with Vietnam.
The way to restore our reputation and influence as the world's first-ranking power is not by further investment in a fifth-ranking interest.
The way to obtain public understanding is not through manipulation of facts or appeals to passion.
The overriding fact is that our national interest demands not that we do more, but that we do less in Southeast Asia. While we continue to strive there for unattainable military victory, vital international interests are neglected and situations of far graver risk to world peace are allowed day by day to deteriorate. We pursue our policy in Vietnam at great price, in terms of human lives, and diversion of the time, talent, and resources needed to solve major problems at home.
President Nixon has suggested the danger that we may appear to be a "pitiful stumbling giant," if we do not follow his course. No one in the world could so regard us. But there may be some who would remind us that "it is excellent to have a giant's strength; but it is tyrannous to use it like a giant." It is not only tyrannous; abuse of our great strength can be disastrous for us and for all mankind.
With each new explanation of each new act of escalation, the basis for communication between our people and our Government has been distorted and eroded. Both President Nixon and Vice President Agnew insist that U.S. and South Vietnamese forces crossing the border from South Vietnam into Cambodia cannot be called an invasion of Cambodia. The Department of Defense persists in calling between 50 and 100 sorties per day for 3 days into North Vietnam "reinforced protective reaction" or "suppressive fire" for U.S. reconnaissance flights.
These explanations represent more than a travesty on the English language. They break down the way that Government and the people should talk to and understand each other. I am reminded here of a passage from Isaiah where the Lord says:
Shame on you! You who call evil good and good evil, who turn darkness into light and light into darkness, who make bitter sweet and sweet bitter. Shame on you! You who are wise in your own eyes and prudent in your own esteem.
The war has taken its toll in many tragic ways in Vietnam and here in the United States. We must not let it rob us of our basic capacity to distinguish right from wrong.
Over the past several years, Congress had become increasingly concerned about our involvement in military conflicts without declaration of war. The concern has stemmed not solely from fear that our constitutional prerogatives are being usurped but because this shortcutting of constitutional procedures may lead to more and more Vietnams. Accordingly, some have proposed that the Congress should now present a declaration of war, both to reassert constitutional prerogatives and to serve as a test of popular opinion on the Vietnam conflict.
Most Members of Congress, myself included, have believed that this course of action would only complicate the problem of making peace.
I have been searching for something other than a constitutional crisis or test of political strength – a positive expression with a positive program.
We need no constitutional crisis today. We need no declaration of war, even if proposed for the purpose of rallying sentiment for peace. The expression of the American public's fervent desire for peace can be better achieved through a positive expression of our will that the war end. To this end, I am submitting a declaration of peace accompanied by a program of positive action to see that this hope can be realized. The declaration is in the form of a Senate resolution. It offers a program for peace and reconstruction, it calls on the President to develop and present a total withdrawal program, and it provides the basis for congressional action to implement that program. It is consistent with several specific proposals pending in the Senate and goes beyond them.
The resolution I am submitting gives the President an opportunity to exercise his initiative in presenting a total withdrawal plan to the Congress, and opens the way for the Congress to act on expenditures relating to our involvement in Indochina and the withdrawal of military forces from that area, and to provide authorization for economic and technical assistance in Indochina.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the resolution (S. Res. 405) be printed at this point in the RECORD.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ALLEN). The resolution will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the resolution will be printed in the RECORD.
The resolution (S. Res. 405) which reads as follows, was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
S. RES. 405
Resolution declaring a policy for peace in Indochina
Whereas de-escalation of the fighting, withdrawal of united States troops from Indochina, and intensive efforts at negotiations are the only routes to peace in Southeast Asia
Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That the United States of America seek a peaceful resolution of its differences with North Vietnam, and that United States policy encourage peace among all the peoples of Indochina; and be it further
Resolved, That to achieve the objectives of this resolution: (a) the United States immediately withdraw all its military forces from and cease military operations in Cambodia; (b) United States bombing of targets in North Vietnam be stopped henceforth; (c) the United States seek an immediate, standstill cease-fire in Vietnam and other areas in Indochina; (d) the United States Government declare that all its forces and military personnel will be withdrawn from Indochina in a specified time, not to exceed eighteen months from the date of adoption of this resolution; (e) the United States delegation to the Paris Vietnam peace talks be strengthened with negotiators empowered and directed to seek an agreement to facilitate the formulation of a political settlement in South Vietnam; (f) the United States encourage a conference under the auspices of the governments of East Asia or other appropriate international sponsorship to provide for discussions among all the various governments and political groups in South Vietnam and in Indochina for the purpose of resolving their political differences; and (g) the United States pledge technical and economic assistance for the reconstruction and economic development of the war-ravaged regions of Indochina; and be it further
Resolved, that (a) the Senate express its support, and urge the President to develop a plan for the complete withdrawal of United States military personnel from Indochina, such withdrawal to be completed in not more than eighteen months from the date of adoption of this resolution; and (b) the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services and Foreign Relations submit to the Senate by July 15, 1970, appropriate legislative, recommendations, including but not limited to restrictions on military expenditures in Indochina, to implement the objectives of this resolution.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, the time has come for the Senate to act, not simply in response to the President, not simply out of anguish for what has been done, but with a will to do what must be done – to end the war in Indochina, to work for peace in Southeast Asia, to contribute to the reconstruction and development of that part of the world, and to apply our resources to the healing and building of a whole society in our own country.
For these reasons, Mr. President, I urge early consideration of Senate Resolution 405, and action on specific proposals which would carry out the policies it describes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ALLEN). The resolution will be received and appropriately referred.
Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. MUSKIE. I am happy to yield.
Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, I join with my distinguished colleague from Maine in expressing the hope that there may be an end to the war in Southeast Asia, that our troops may come home, that peace may replace the present conflict that exists over there, and that the resources of this country might then be applied to peaceful pursuits to help advance the estate of man wherever he lives.
But I would ask my distinguished colleague, assuming the information I have before me is correct – and, if I may, I hope he will permit me to read, from an article in today's New York Times, a statement that:
By late today, the tentative count reaching Saigon command headquarters stood at 6,757 rifles; 1,232 heavy machine guns, mortar tubes, rocket launchers, recoilless rifles and antiaircraft guns; 865 tons of ammunition; 1,653 tons of rice; 12 tons of medical supplies; 130 trucks, and thousands of other items ranging from radios to mortar cleaning and repair kits.
My question is: Would not my distinguished colleague agree with me that immense amount of war-making material is in better hands for our having taken it than it would be were it to remain in the hands of the enemy, so that it could be shot at American and South Vietnamese people?
Mr. MUSKIE. I say to my good friend from Wyoming that the question involved is not that narrow. It is not a question of whether the other side will be weakened by the loss of 6,700 rifles.
Rather, the question involved is whether the venture into Cambodia, under the circumstances in which it took place – considering the risks that it involved, considering the setback that it may have imposed on the prospects for a negotiated peace, considering the impact upon world opinion and the opinion of countries in Europe with which we are allied, and considering the impact upon the bonds of trust and confidence which ought to bind our people and our Government and our leaders – is worth this price, for a mere 6,700 rifles.
I can remember in the early days of the war when the other side, the Vietcong, fought only with rifles; and largely with rifles captured from us. They did not have their own. Still they sustained the battle; still they stopped the world's military giant; still they continued on, built up their strength, built up their reserves, built up their military equipment to the point where now they have caches of 6,700 rifles.
Is this all? I have talked with people who have made some evaluation of the consequences of this kind of a result. To them, all this venture means may be 2, 3, or 4 months for the other side to build up these supplies again.
If we pull back, as the President has said we will, in June – and I take it he meant that – it will be only a matter of a few weeks – 2, 3, or 4 months – before the enemy brings back supplies. The
food that has been captured, the rice, can be resupplied by Communist China. This is not a mortal military setback to the other side.
For years we relied upon body counts as an indication of our progress in the war. Apparently, now we are going to rely on rifle counts. But I do not think either is a very effective measure of prospects for ending our involvement and withdrawing from Southeast Asia.
Second, may I say to the Senator that for years, under the administration of my party, I was persuaded that a measured response to the other side, to deny the other side a military victory, to press them into a negotiated settlement, was the way to end this war. Time after time we were told that if we just take this one additional military step, that will be enough to end the war, that the boys will be home by Christmas, that we see the light at the end of the tunnel. We see exactly the same kind of rationale applied now to this additional military step. I am not confident that the capture of 6,700 rifles makes this rationale more credible or sound or meaningful today than it did in the past, when what we captured was our own rifles from the other side.
I do not think that the figures the Senator has read have any meaning in terms of the prospect of shortening the war or ending the war or bringing our boys home earlier.
I agree with what the President said in the first of the two speeches he has made in the last month. He said to us that negotiations are the key to settling this war. He said it in words which, if read, indicate that he meant it. Just how credible to the other side can that emphasis on negotiations be when, 10 days later, we pursue another military initiative, across another international boundary, in pursuit of the headquarters of the other side? If I were the other side, I would say the President is not interested in negotiations. He just talks about it as a cloak for another initiative.
The Senator and I are good personal friends, and I understand that he wants to get out of this war, and I think he wants to get out of it as badly as I do.
Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at that point? Does the Senator think that the President does not want to get out of the war?
Mr. MUSKIE. I am prepared to accept the President's desire to get out of the war. But motives have nothing to do with judgments. If we get into the business of attacking each other's motives, we becloud our judgment, and reduce the possibility of communicating. I am not attacking motives. I accept the President's motives as being in the direction of peace. That is not the thrust of my argument or my position.
Let me say to the Senator that men, including the Senator and myself, make mistakes of judgment. As I looked over the sequence of events, beginning with the President's first speech announcing the withdrawal of 150,000 more troops in the next 12 months and his speech announcing this intervention – to stay away from the word "inflation," which seems to be debatable – in Cambodia, it seemed to me it was predictable that there would be a revulsion of public opinion in this country to the President's action.
In the first speech, the President said that he was taking the decision to withdraw 150,000 more troops after full consultation with his commanders in the field. He indicated no doubts or reservations about the military soundness of that decision. He indicated that there were no doubts or reservations about the security of our troops in the process of withdrawal. On the contrary, he told us that he was confident that the end was in sight. Then, 10 days later, he told us that in terms of the security of those very 150,000 troops, this venture into Cambodia was – and this was his word – indispensable. That would seem to me to be a material fact. If such information was in his possession when he announced the withdrawal in his first speech, one wonders why the decision was made, if the decision were persisted in, why that material fact was not then made known. If that material fact was not known at the time of the President's first speech, it seems incredible to me that the situation should have so deteriorated in 10 days between the two speeches as to require such a sharp reversal in policy.
That is the way people in this country look at it – as a sharp reversal in policy. It took people off balance. They had been reassured in one speech and then, in the next speech, raised to the heights of alarm about the lives of our troops.
During the administration of President Johnson, we struggled with what was called increasingly the credibility gap. Again, this has nothing to do with the underlying motive of President Johnson. It is a question of whether or not in presenting his policy he did it in a way which commanded full public understanding and support. I say to my good friend on the other side of the aisle that what has developed in the last 2 weeks raises similar questions with respect to full public understanding and support of our present policy, and that we ought to be careful about shaking public confidence in these terms with respect to such an explosive question as Vietnam.
This is why the bells of alarm have rung.
I have never seen such a flow of telegrams, letters, and telephone calls and personal appeals as has come to me since the President's speech of April 30. It has been simply overwhelming. The consistent plea among people is this: You have now let the President decide this policy long enough. Congress must impose its influence upon the shape of that policy.
That is why I have done so. It is not easy to impose legislative judgments. The President is, after all, Commander in Chief. Under the Constitution, he is given dominating authority over foreign policy. Legislative means to deal with foreign policy are at best awkward. Therefore, it is a sound principle that a President have flexibility to use discretion in these areas to meet unforeseen contingencies. But I must say to my good friend that under the pressure of this plea that Congress influence this policy to insure that it moves us in the direction of withdrawal and disengagement, I think that we in the Senate have a responsibility to respond.
Over the weekend – as a matter of fact, over 2 weekends now – I have traveled across the country at least four times. On Friday night I spoke at the University of Kansas. Ten thousand students, on a Friday night, filled the seats of the field house there. I cannot describe the atmosphere of tension.
These young people were concerned young Americans, constructive, caring about their country and what happens to it. It was one of the most difficult times I have had, to answer their questions, to try to reassure them that the political process in this country did respond, would respond, to public opinion, and was open. It was very difficult to get the point across to them.
I went then to Colorado and North Dakota; and yesterday morning I flew to Maine, to meet students from all of Maine's colleges, concentrated in a central place. Again, I was beseiged by the same questions, raising doubts as to whether Congress, the President, or the political process as a whole would respond. They simply doubted that our policy – whatever the President's motives – was designed to get us out of South Vietnam. That is why I have introduced the resolution which, in a sense I suppose, violates some of the principles as to the President's dominance in the military and foreign policy fields, and the desirability of excutive discretion.
We are in a time when we have to reassure the people, particularly the young, that Congress, the Senate and the House, will try to give effect to the concerns that so many Americans, young and old, are expressing about the war.
I do not jump into these kinds of devices easily. I am sure the Senator would agree with that. I have done so, in this instance, out of a feeling of great compulsion that this must be done, to reassure the people that it is not just a power establishment that decides what must be done, but that they can influence policy.
Thus, I hope – whatever legislative results there are in connection with my resolution – Congress will focus upon it, and that in our debates at least, in committee consideration, and in floor discussion, we will undertake to put our stamp on this policy.
If, in addition, we achieve some legislative results which will really put our mark upon the policy which emerges, I think that will be all to the good. That is what is behind my resolution, and what I am saying and doing today, let me say to the Senator from Wyoming.
Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, I have the greatest regard, as my distinguished friend from Maine knows, for him as an individual, as a legislator, and as a former Governor of the great State of Maine. I would like to make a few observations, though, on some of the points to which he has called attention.
He speaks about the President's actions having caught the American public off balance.
I think he is quite right that many people in this country were surprised; but I think that the enemy – the same enemy we have been fighting for 9 or 10 years now in Vietnam – was even more surprised.
I would call attention to the fact that we are still fighting, despite the fact that the battlefield location may have been changed somewhat, the very same enemy who was there when the late President Kennedy ordered in troops, and the very same enemy President Johnson pursued when the forces of this country were under his command. I would point out, further, that undoubtedly it did catch the enemy very much by surprise
Mr. MUSKIE. Will the Senator yield right there, on that point?
Mr. HANSEN. I yield.
Mr. MUSKIE. I ask the Senator to yield because he may be able to clarify something: I have read at least two stories in the press – I understand, of course, that they are not necessarily founded on accurate information – to the effect that the enemy made moves prior to the time we crossed the border, indicating that if it did not know of this proposed venture, at least it suspected it. We have not really caught any great number of them in any great concentration. We have found some rifles. There is little evidence of great disarray to indicate a hasty exit.
I have read stories that the North Vietnamese military have great mobility and do not really have to carry a great supply of anything around with them, in order to maintain their communication and command capacities.
I have read the stories in the press. If they are inaccurate, I would be interested to know. My impression is that the effect of the element of surprise was not so great as some might have thought.
Mr. HANSEN. Well, Mr. President, I rather suspect we could debate this point for a long time as to the degree of surprise that characterized the reaction of the enemy, but I happen to think that the enemy must not have anticipated very long in advance our moves into Cambodia or they most certainly would have taken steps to retrieve part of the great amount of materiel which has been captured by our forces operating in that part of the war theater.
Mr. MUSKIE. Will the Senator yield on that point?
Mr. HANSEN. I am happy to do so.
Mr. MUSKIE. It seems to me that if I were the enemy, under these circumstances, I would concentrate more on saving my troops with whatever advance notice I had. The carrying of rice with me would not be too important because rice is replaceable from Chinese sources of supply. I would not jeopardize troops to save rice.
As to the rifles, I am really not impressed by 6,700 rifles. We do not know what they took with them, either. I do not know whether this is one of the largest caches we have captured in the war, but I do not think this has been claimed as a mortal military blow. I do not think that will be claimed for it. I do not think it was.
Mr. HANSEN. I am sorry I do not have the New York Times story before me, because the Senator would understand me not to have underscored only the 6,700 rifles–
Mr. MUSKIE. There was some rice and several other–
Mr. HANSEN. If I could finish, please – if I have been understood to say that was only what was captured, then I did not get over the full thrust of what I meant to convey earlier, because not only were rifles captured, but a great many other things as well, which the Senator must know were captured. It is important to recognize that, despite what many of us may believe, American and South Vietnamese soldiers are killed by explosions of mortars, and they are killed by acts of the enemy in firing rifles. Therefore, caches of war materiel certainly are of significance, and that was accomplished by our entrance into Cambodia.
I must also say that the Senator from Maine compared the steps taken by President Nixon with those taken by President Johnson, saying that we take small steps, that every time we give assurance that if we take the next step, it would be an easy little step, and that peace will be around the corner.
I would remind my good friend from Maine that not too many months ago I heard some of our distinguished colleagues in this Chamber saying that if we would only stop the bombing, if we just stopped the bombing, then the world would understand that we are not trying to take over, that we are not trying to force our will on Southeast Asia, that everything would fall into place and we would have a meeting of the minds and it would not be too long before peace would be at hand. Now we did stop the bombing
Mr. MUSKIE. If the Senator would yield there, I made no such statement as that.
Mr. HANSEN. I did not say the Senator did. If the Senator will be good enough to read the RECORD tomorrow, he will specifically find that I did not say the Senator said that.
Mr. MUSKIE. I understand.
Mr. HANSEN. I said that our colleagues in this Chamber – I repeat this – that our colleagues did – I did not say the Senator did. I said some of our colleagues did say that. They said that if we would just stop the bombing, we would have peace in this country.
Now, I have yet to hear a single one of our colleagues – I did not say the Senator made that statement, because so far as I know, he did not – but I have yet to hear a single one of those Senators who 26 months ago were saying that if we halted the bombing, we would have an end to the war, I have yet to hear a single one of them – I might be mistaken about it
Mr. MUSKIE. Will the Senator yield there?
Mr. HANSEN. I yield.
Mr. MUSKIE. I have never taken that simplistic view of any steps that might be taken in the direction of peace or war. What I believe would be significant are steps that might be taken in the diplomatic field. I do not think there is any single answer to ending this war. I think that ending the war is going to take patience, ingenuity, and consistency. The question is whether we are taking initiatives in the right area. I just do not believe, on the basis of the past, that military initiatives of this kind advance us.
I used to hear that argument from the Senator's side – including President Nixon, himself, when he said that we did not take big enough steps, that we have not informed Hanoi sufficiently of this, or that. I do not see anyone seriously advancing the idea that big military initiatives are the answer any more. That idea appears to have been discredited.
There may still be some who support this idea. Nevertheless, there is apparently still reliance on these smaller military initiatives as the way to bring pressure to end the war. I just do not believe this argument.
I did not believe that stopping the bombing would end the war. I never thought that. I thought that it was the kind of initiative we ought to take to get us moving in the direction of a negotiated settlement of the war. And I think that those kinds of initiatives should be taken. Whenever a good one emerges, it should be pressed.
I do not think that there is a single gesture we could make in the military or diplomatic field that could end the war overnight.
Mr. President, I am holding up some of my colleagues in a markup session on the pollution bill. I ought to stay here. Would it inconvenience the Senator if I were to leave at this point? I am sure he will not take advantage of my absence.
Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, I certainly would not want to take advantage of the Senator.
However, I do feel constrained to make some comments.
I have tried not to deny the Senator an opportunity to respond. I appreciate the colloquy I have had with him. But I do intend to present some other statements.
As I have said, if anything I have to say seems to be unfair or to indicate that I have taken advantage of the Senator, I now offer my sincere apologies.
It is my intention to be here tomorrow, and I will certainly be answerable for anything I have to say.
I hope that whatever I have to offer in the way of statistics will be factual. Any conclusions that I draw from those statistics will be my own.
I do not intend to put any words in the mouth of the Senator. I do intend to call attention to some things so that the public will understand and place in clear perspective what the President has been accomplishing in Southeast Asia.
Mr. President, I call attention to the fact that since President Nixon has taken office, the casualties for the last 15 months are down 37.6 percent from what they were the previous 15 months.
I point out also that we have 115,000 fewer troops in Vietnam today than we did when President Nixon took office. Part of the reason he has been able to accomplish this, I think, is that he has taken some rather courageous steps; not little steps, not poking the enemy with one punch as he hits us with one punch and then stepping back and bowing.
The enemy has been surprised by what President Nixon has done. I know that he wants to bring about the complete Vietnamization of the war as quickly as he can.
It was in pursuance of that objective that the President ordered the troops into Cambodia. It is very clear that the monsoons will shortly be engulfing that part of the world. And, as a consequence, the enemy will be badly hurt if he is denied the use of the material I spoke of initially when he tries to fight back and to kill American men and South Vietnamese soldiers. He will not have the ability he had before our intrusion into Cambodia and before he was denied the use of these materials.
That is the reason, I submit, that the actions that have been taken by the President of the United States are very much in the public interest. They are in support of the very goals that the Senator addressed himself. The time will be hastened when we can leave Southeast Asia and can apply the energies and the wealth of this great Nation to the solution of other great problems facing us.
Until we are able to terminate our involvement in Southeast Asia, that opportunity to act here at home will, to a degree, be denied the President.
That is exactly why President Nixon took the steps he did. That is why he wants to deny the enemy the opportunity and the ability to hit American forces, to kill American men, to hit South Vietnamese soldiers, and to kill South Vietnamese men. It will set their time table back 6 or 9 months before they will be able to build up more strength so as to carry on the burdens of the war.
That, I think, is something that people ought to understand. They should appreciate the fact that President Nixon has reduced the casualties in that war.
I have the statistics on it. From January 1, 1969, to March 1, 1970, there were 10,592 American deaths in Vietnam. But for the previous 15 months, there were 16,980 American deaths in Vietnam.
So I say to my distinguished colleague that the President has pursued a very successful policy so far. I am certain our entrance into Cambodia is in the continuance of a policy which, if successful, will reduce American losses, shorten the war, and will make possible a viable government for South Vietnam, a government not only able to govern its people, but also to defend itself so as to assure a balance of power that will be good for people in this part of the world and will permit this great United States of ours to concentrate on other areas of interest throughout the world as well as in our own country.
Those are some of the things that I appreciate the opportunity to say, because I think that when people have the opportunity of looking back with the advantage that history affords, they are going to say that what President Nixon did was very much in the interest of this country because it hastened the day – and this is my prediction – that peace could come to Southeast Asia and the South Vietnamese would be able to govern themselves, to run their own show, and to protect themselves.
I am sure the Senator would agree with me that that is a desirable objective.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, of course the war has been winding down. It started with the cessation of the bombing. However, I am sure it was not the Senator's intention to suggest that we should not have stopped the bombing of the north.
The stopping of the bombing made it possible to take the next step toward de-escalation of the military activity. That is a desirable thing.
The fact that there was a winding down of our military activity, a withdrawal, I think, bought the President an acceptance – however uneasy on the part of some – of his policy.
The fact is that the emphasis for some months has been on military initiative. I think that a lot of us believe that the only way to leave a viable situation behind is to do it with a negotiated political settlement, to do it with a system of government in Saigon which has the broadest possible political base, bringing into it all elements of the South Vietnamese society.
We fear that without those steps being taken, at some point in the Vietnamization or withdrawal of troops, the political situation in South Vietnam may become so precarious as to threaten us with a chaotic condition. If that happens, what do we do?
There has been no diplomatic initiative on our side, according to the President's speech of last month, since his speech of a year ago last May.
In the summer he said that he was going to take no new diplomatic initiative unless the other side accepted his initiative of May.
Ambassador Lodge resigned last November from the post of chief negotiator in Paris. It is now over 170 days, or 6 months, since we had a chief negotiator in Paris. The President, in his speech last month said negotiations were the key, and yet he gives no reason for not replacing Mr. Lodge in the one place where there is a forum and where parties are assembled for the purpose of discussing negotiations.
Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at that point?
Mr. MUSKIE. I shall yield in a moment. I imagine the thrust of the Senator's question will be that this has been a frustrating experience with no visible momentum on either side, with each side at a standoff from the other without either side taking the initiative.
However, I wish to say that when we entered into negotiations at the time of the Korean war it took us 2 years to work out a negotiated settlement, two frustrating and drawn-out years when we had to suffer humiliation.
Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at that point?
Mr. MUSKIE. The Senator will remember when they took 4 inches off the chairs of our negotiators to permit them to negotiate at a lower level, but we persisted. President Eisenhower came in, but we persisted and got a settlement. Notwithstanding the frustration, we persisted. I happen to think there would have been some softening on the other side; but I have already discussed that heretofore in the RECORD and I will not do so now.
I yield to the Senator from Wyoming.
Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, it should not go unnoticed that in the minds of many commentators and historians of today the decisive change or telling change that came about in the negotiations that had dragged on for more than 2 long years in Panmunjom, which involved the end of the Korean war, was not our further willingness to sit, as we have been siting in Paris, listening to the diatribes of the North Koreans, but rather it was an ultimatum by President Eisenhower that unless they got down to business, he was no longer going to feel himself circumscribed by the rules that America up to that time had been following. I think the message came through very clearly to our enemies, the North Koreans, in Panmunjom at that time that we just might escalate the war and we might not continue to observe the boundaries which had, up to that time, circumscribed our reaction to the war which had been denied north of the 38th parallel.
In the minds of a great many people that was the decisive element which brought some real measure of action to the negotiations in Panmunjom. It was not that we were supplying a new team of negotiators over there, as the Senator thinks we should have in Paris, but rather it was a clear-cut expression of determination on the part of this country that if North Koreans wanted to enter seriously into negotiations and arrive at some peace terms, we would listen; but if they did not, our patience was about exhausted.
I think that was the significant point that brought that whole change about.
I do not know when the President may want to replace Mr. Lodge as the chief negotiator in Paris. I have not seen anything to indicate any willingness or increased desire on the part of the North Vietnamese to do anything except castigate us, criticize us, and call us warmongers. We have done all sorts of things in Vietnam and they have never yet indicated any willingness to respond to any of the repeated movements that this country has made that hopefully might lead to peace.
Mr. MUSKIE. May I respond to the point the Senator has already made?
Mr. HANSEN. I did not want to get too far ahead.
Mr. MUSKIE. We should keep the matter in reasonably good context. I have just finished reading Dean Acheson's description of why we were finally able to settle the Korean war. He did not refer to the incident the Senator discussed, the ultimatum from President Eisenhower – which I have described as an ultimatum – to use nuclear weapons. I have never seen this stated in an authoritative place and I do not know that it did take place. If he did make such a threat, history should disclose it because it would be the first and only time after World War II when the threat to use nuclear weapons has been used by a nuclear power. Maybe that happened; I do not know. Maybe the Senator knows.
Mr. HANSEN. All I know is what was on the record.
Mr. MUSKIE. I have read speculation in the public press but I have not seen any authoritative statement relating to President Eisenhower or his administration or any one in it. I do not know, but I have not seen it authoritatively stated. Dean Acheson did not refer to it in his book "Present at the Creation."
The reason he gives for the North Koreans finally coming to terms and accepting a settlement that was available at the end of the Truman administration was that the North Koreans undertook another offensive in the North which failed, and so ultimately they accepted the settlement which was available to them.
But there was another lesson in the Korean war that we should not forget – that is, the risk General MacArthur took with respect to the Chinese, the volunteers, when he went to cross the Yalu and raised in their minds the risk of an American attack on them, thus prompting a response which almost drove him off the Korean Peninsula. In other words, he pushed his military luck too far.
We might have been able to settle for a much better deal militarily if that had not been pushed too far. Dean Acheson covers that situation well in his book. I commend it to the Senator's attention.
I have not suggested that simply sending a negotiator to Paris is going to end this war. I think I have made this quite clear. But if we are really interested in negotiations, is it really our view, as I understand the Senator to have said, that until the North Vietnamese come to us hat in hand and say to us, "Tell us what you want," we are not interested in talking? If that is the case, our policy is aimed at their surrender and not a negotiated settlement. If that is our attitude, I am really disquieted about the use of military initiatives and military emphasis in connection with this administration's policies, because it suggests we are going to press, and that perhaps by adding small increments we will not allow anyone to surrender to us.
Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at that point?
Mr. MUSKIE. I yield.
Mr. HANSEN. I will try to articulate what I believe. I appreciate the fact the Senator raises the rhetorical question as to whether I was suggesting that we say to the North Vietnamese that they must come to us hat in hand before we are interested in further negotiations and that would be almost tantamount to surrender. I did not say that.
For 9 years we have done a pretty good job of trying to persuade the North Vietnamese that we had certain well-defined goals in Southeast Asia; that we hoped they would be reasonable enough to sit down and discuss them with us.
I was called in, as Governor of Wyoming, just as Governors are being called in here today. Although the distinguished Senator from Maine was in the Senate at that time, I know he can recall his very noteworthy service to the State of Maine as Governor of that State. I served 4 years as Governor of my State. During that time, I have forgotten whether it was twice or three times that President Johnson invited the Governors of the States, of which I was one, to come to Washington for briefings. I note that the occupant of the chair at the moment is a distinguished former Governor of Oklahoma (Mr. BELLMON). He too was in on those briefings. President Johnson detailed the steps that were being taken, the numerous olive branches that were being extended to the North Vietnamese.
We have had no desire to control any of their country, or to impress our form of government upon them, or to enforce our authority over them or their people. Our goals have been well defined. I think it is perfectly easy to understand, after such a long time, the frustration the President feels in believing the North Vietnamese simply have used the Paris peace talks as a ploy to gain time to do the very sort of thing they have been doing in Cambodia.
They always talk peace. They start out every time by saying to us, "Until you get all of your forces out of Southeast Asia, we won't even talk about it, because you are aggressors. You have intruded into our country. Clear out of here and then we will talk." That is the first condition they lay down.
So I do not find any reason for any honest reassurance from the North Vietnamese or the Vietcong that they are interested in anything except our unilateral withdrawal from there, which. they would like to take over.
Mr. MUSKIE. May I respond to that?
Mr. HANSEN. Yes.
Mr. MUSKIE. I engaged in colloquy on this point on the floor of the Senate with the distinguished Senator from Kansas (Mr. DOLE).
The first point I make is that the President is frustrated on the diplomatic side. There are two ways to respond to frustration, with either a diplomatic initiative or a military initiative. He seems to fight frustration always with a military initiative, not with a diplomatic initiative.
Let me give the Senator an illustration. The President, in his November 3 speech, disclosed the correspondence he had had with Ho Chi Minh. The President read us the text of his letter. There were no new initiatives in the letter. The initiative was the wording of the letter itself. As I recall, the thrust of the letter was a plea to Ho Chi Minh to put his personal weight behind the talks in Paris in an effort to find ways to get them moving in a meaningful way.
The President received a reply. He did not read that reply, but he released the text. Although the text was published, in his remarks he described it as a flat rejection of his letter. I accepted it as that, but then I read the letter. I have read the English language for a long time. I read that letter. I did not read it as a flat rejection.
I wish I had the text of the letter here so I could give the Senator the exact language. It represented a distinct softening of attitudes on three critical points. One was the unconditional withdrawal of all our troops before talks could begin. It was not then a hard and fast condition as it had been known for a couple of years. That letter had softened that condition.
Mr. HANSEN. In what respect? Does the Senator recall?
Mr. MUSKIE. No. I do not recall the text, but I ask unanimous consent that the texts of both letters be included at this point in the RECORD, so the Senator can read them himself.
There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN PRESIDENT NIXON AND HO CHI MINH
THE WHITE HOUSE,
July 15,1969
His Excellency HO CHI MINH,
President,
Democratic Republic of Vietnam,
Hanoi.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I realize that it is difficult to communicate meaningfully across the gulf of four years of war. But precisely because of this gulf, I wanted to take this opportunity to reaffirm in all solemnity my desire to work for a just peace. I deeply believe that the war in Vietnam has gone on too long and delay in bringing it to an end can benefit no one – least of all the people of Vietnam. My speech on May 14 laid out a proposal which I believe is fair to all parties.
Other proposals have been made which attempt to give the people of South Vietnam an opportunity to choose their own future. These proposals take into account the reasonable conditions of all sides. But we stand ready to discuss other programs as well, specifically the 10-point program of the NLF.
As I have said repeatedly, there is nothing to be gained by waiting. Delay can only increase the danger and multiply the suffering.
The time has come to move forward at the conference table toward an early resolution to this tragic war. You will find us forthcoming and open-minded in a common effort to bring the blessings of peace to the brave people of Vietnam. Let history record that at this critical juncture, both sides turned their face toward peace rather than toward conflict and war.
Sincerely,
RICHARD NIXON.
HANOI,
August 25, 1969.
His Excellency RICHARD MILHOUSE NIXON,
President of the United States,
Washington.
Mr. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter.
The war of aggression of the United States against our people, violating our fundamental national rights, still continues in South Vietnam. The United States continues to intensify military operations, the B-52 bombings and the use of toxic chemical products multiply the crimes against the Vietnamese people. The longer the war goes on, the more it accumulates the mourning and burdens of the American people. I am extremely indignant at the losses and destructions caused by the American troops to our people and our country, I am also deeply touched at the rising toll of death of young Americans who have fallen in Vietnam by reason of the policy of American governing circles.
Our Vietnamese people are deeply devoted to peace, a real peace with independence and real freedom. They are determined to fight to the end, without fearing the sacrifices and difficulties in order to defend their country and their sacred national rights. The overall solution in 10 points of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam and of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam is a logical and reasonable basis for the settlement of the Vietnamese problem. It has earned the sympathy and support of the peoples of the world.
In your letter you have expressed the desire to act for a just peace. For this the United States must cease the war of aggression and withdraw their troops from South Vietnam, respect the right of the population of the South and of the Vietnamese nation to dispose of themselves, without foreign influence. This is the correct manner of solving the Vietnamese problem in conformity with the national rights of the Vietnamese people, the interests of the United States and the hopes for peace of the peoples of the world. This is the path that will allow the United States to get out of the war with honor.
With good will on both sides we might arrive at common efforts in view of finding a correct solution of the Vietnamese problem. Sincerely,
HO CHI MINH.
Mr. MUSKIE. The second was on the point and the degree to which the North Vietnamese insisted that the present Government of South Vietnam go, unconditionally. The letter softened the point on the National Liberation Front 10-point program. Up to that time the North Vietnamese position insisted that the only basis for settlement was the 10-point program of the National Liberation Front. The letter said simply that we could begin our discussions, in effect, on the basis of the NLF 10-point program.
These are three softenings. We are not going to get anything more clearcut than that as an opportunity to begin negotiations. We never had any sharper break at the time of the Korean conflict. These were softening steps, but they were characterized by the President as a flat rejection.
That is the second point I would like to make about the letters.
The President got the letter 3 days before Ho's death. We all remember the discussion in the papers that Ho's successors were going to have to follow a hard line because of Ho's death and because they did not have the political base to support a change in direction. What a time to exercise an initiative. We had just received a letter from Ho 3 days before his death. Why not write to those who succeeded him? I guess it was a sort of committee. We received this letter from Ho. We could have said: "It seemed to us it offered the possibility of discussion on those three points. If you agree, would you agree to go forward?" If they did not agree, what would we have lost?
As far as I know, given the tone of the President's rejection of Ho's letter, that initiative was not taken. That is the kind of initiative that ought to be prepared. Guaranteed to work? Of course not. I am not that naive. But we should have taken such an initiative. I am amazed the President did not, frankly, because I think he wants a negotiated settlement. Why he did not, I have no way of knowing. We had no explanation but the language of the letter itself. I have checked with others to see if I were a little blind about what its real meaning was. I have had a great deal of concurrence in my view from thoughtful commentators and observers, who just could not understand the President's description of Ho's reply.
It is difficult to evaluate a softening in position or language. Sometimes a change in wording is a sign. It is difficult to know when we are getting a real sign, a real signal. I understand that. But I think if we are going to end this matter, we ought to pursue any opportunity, however uncertain, with a view to settling the conflict.
I have to leave. I have appreciated the colloquy. I have found it a constructive exchange that I hope will be useful to those who read the RECORD.
Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I hope the Senator from Maine will not leave at this time, because I have a few comments to make. I think this debate should be, very clearly, a nonpartisan debate.
While I agree with very much of what the Senator from Maine has said and agree almost entirely with what the Senator from Wyoming has said, I think a bipartisan approach is very necessary, insofar as we can acquire it. All four Senators in the Chamber at this time have found that out by reason of being Governors, two of them during the Korean war, I believe, and one or two during the early part of this war. The Senator from Florida was Governor during World War II, and he knows perfectly well that in all those meetings with Governors during both of those wars – and I am sure during every war – every emphasis was laid on a bipartisan approach to what are serious national questions.
So I wish to make a few comments from a little different viewpoint, if I may.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for just a moment on that point?
Mr. HOLLAND. I am glad to yield.
Mr. MUSKIE. I agree with the importance, of course, of closing ranks in a bipartisan way to the extent that we can in the field of foreign policy.
But at the same time, I think that all of us have a responsibility to make constructive inputs to any discussion of foreign policy, if we are to have a policy that truly represents our country. I think that has always been an understood facet of the bipartisan foreign policy concept.
I am particularly familiar, I suppose, with Dean Acheson's experience, because I have just finished reading his book; and I was struck, during the last years of the late distinguished Senator from Michigan, Senator Vandenberg, with the very constructive and solid relationship that existed between Secretary Acheson and Senator Vandenberg at that time.
Yet there are incidents related in the Acheson book of distinct public disagreement on the part of Senator Vandenberg.
So there is, in the concept of bipartisan foreign policy, room for disagreement and differences of opinion, hopefully always in a constructive spirit.
Mr. HOLLAND. I thank the Senator. I think his remarks are quite appropriate. His mention of Senator Vandenberg reminds me that one of the first assignments that I can recall after my coming to the Senate was being assigned – I presume by Dean Acheson, or someone over in the Department of State – to appear on a bipartisan interview beamed toward Latin America, in which the distinguished Senator Vandenberg appeared from one side of the aisle, and the very undistinguished new coming Senator from Florida participated from the other side of the aisle.
Mr. MUSKIE. The Senator was the distinguished Governor of his State at that time. That makes up for it.
Mr. HOLLAND. Well, I was not Governor at that time. I had just come to the Senate.
So I have all pleasant recollections of Senator Vandenberg, who was then President pro tempore, and also of Dean Acheson, of whom I am extremely fond. Now for a few comments.
I have been conferring, as I am sure my friends have, with students from my own State, largely, but with a few from other States, in the last several days. I want to say that I have been impressed with the fact that their attitude has been largely bipartisan and nonregional.
My first large conference was Friday afternoon, with about 50 students from Florida, but attending universities in States of the northeastern part of the Nation – Yale, Columbia, Rutgers, the University of Buffalo, Northwestern, Haverford – I do not remember them all; there were 10 or 12 different colleges and universities represented.
I must say that the conduct of every one of these who participated – and there were about 50 – was very respectful and very constructive. It reminded me a little bit of colloquies on the floor of the Senate; they were just that kind to each other, and to the Senator from Florida.
Mr. MUSKIE. The Senator means some colloquies on the floor of the Senate.
Mr. HOLLAND. Well, I am speaking of the present colloquy, because that is fresh on my mind.
And I had a conference with a representative group sent here by the student government of the University of Florida, of whose law school I am privileged to be a graduate. Those five young people observed the same sort of amenities. I discovered they were bipartisan, some from the one party, and some from the other. This morning there was a similar delegation from the University of Miami, with the same result.
It seems to me that it is very necessary – and that is the reason I have risen at this point – that we emphasize the fact that all of us are hoping that the President will succeed. Some may have greater doubts than others. None of us forecloses his attitude in the future, in the event his hopes are not realized in the future; but the Senator from Florida happens to believe that there is good reason for this recent decision, so much now being debated, to make the effort to destroy the sanctuaries in Cambodia.
In these conferences with these young men and women, I have been somewhat surprised to find that in most instances they were giving little attention to this thought: That so long as Sihanouk was in command, so long as it was his country, in the so-called neutral position which he insisted upon, that we were in one situation; but that, now that there has been a revolution, that there is another government, and that other government, to the best of its ability, is fighting the Communist invader, the situation is largely reversed. That is my first point.
My second point is this: At lunch today one Senator told me about one of his employees who has just come back from something more than a year in Vietnam. He told that Senator – who has not by any means wholly supported the President in everything he has done in this matter – that the most frustrating thing that has happened to American soldiers in this terrible experience in South Vietnam is the fact that so frequently they would pursue the enemy, the enemy had been beaten and was in retreat, they crossed the line into a neutral territory; and he even told the Senator, so the Senator told me, that at times they could see him going uphill on the other side of the frontier into Cambodia, and they could not fire and could not do a thing, because the enemy had reached sanctuary.
Now that the condition has changed, and the sanctuaries can be taken, it seems to me that this effort was worthwhile, and it seems to me, from all I can learn – and I do not pretend to know everything, and I do not believe anyone knows everything yet about the success or failure which has been attained – that there has been a considerable degree of success.
I read from a UPI excerpt which appeared on the ticker tape outside the Chamber this afternoon:
The Pentagon said today that removing U.S. troops from Cambodia under President Nixon's timetable would "present a logistical problem," but that the timetable would be met.
Pentagon spokesman Jerry Freidheim said troops moving into the area had found so much equipment that it would present a "very major problem" to either dispose of it or carry it out of the country. He indicated no decision had been on what to do with the captured equipment.
Nixon said in his televised news conference that part of the American forces would be pulled out by the middle of this week and the rest by July 1.
"It is a difficult situation," Freidheim said. But he added, "the President's timetable will be met"
He said that as of last Thursday, more than eight million rounds of small arms ammunition had been captured in the Cambodian operation, that 4,543 enemy soldiers had been killed and 1,240 had been captured. He said more than 6,000 weapons and more than 1,700 tons of rice had been captured. He said the rice found so far would have fed 6,000 enemy troops for a year.
He said 85 Americans had been killed in action so far, and 249 South Vietnamese had been killed.
Mr. President, I think that that is a rather substantial indication of results. I hope that it will be proved to be true. I hope and believe it will be shown to have been less than the total results ultimately accomplished before the removal; and I hope above everything that the President's timetable will be met. I have been very careful to say already in these remarks, and I say again, I certainly reserve my right to look at the facts that exist at the end of this operation and come to whatever conclusion I think is justified by those facts as being in the best interests of this country.
I want to make one more point–
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at that point?
Mr. HOLLAND. I yield.
Mr. MUSKIE. In my discussion with the distinguished Senator from Wyoming, we went into the subject of the results so far, and the point I made then I think perhaps might be repeated briefly here.
What is involved is not whether or not it is useful to deprive the other side, or the enemy, of these supplies, military or nonmilitary, but whether or not the price we pay to get them is in proportion to the advantages.
I will not belabor that argument, because the Senator was good enough to listen to our colloquy at quite some length, and I think the argument was rather complete on that point. So I will not add to it. I simply want to refer to it.
Mr. HOLLAND. I did hear the Senator's argument. There was much meat in it. I realize there is a point to it, and think it ought to be considered. I think, also, that the facts I have just read into the RECORD, which I believe to be the facts – I hope they are the facts–
Mr. MUSKIE. I have read the same facts.
Mr. HOLLAND (continuing). –are correct. I think the Senator will agree with me that he hopes so, also, and that he hopes that such equipment and material and food as mentioned here will be largely exceeded by the time we have completed the operation. I am sure he feels that way because he, too, hopes for the success of this venture.
The second thing I found was that these very fine young men and women did not seem to understand – some of them did, but many did not – the geography of the situation. We are approximately 39 miles from Baltimore. The boundary is less far from Saigon than we are from Baltimore while we are in this Chamber. To have all that fighting going on not only in and around Saigon from time to time but also in the areas between Saigon and the boundary, and to have these sanctuaries immediately available, has been, I should think, the most frustrating thing, just as this young returned soldier has said to one of our colleagues today, that could possibly confront men in the field of battle. I have been in combat, and I know something about it. I am sure that some of the Senators now in the Chamber know more of that than I. But I know a great deal about it, myself. I cannot think of anything that would be more frustrating than to see the enemy in full retreat, and beaten and throwing away weapons, going across the boundary and then be in sanctuary. Yet, that is what has happened time after time after time.
The changing conditions created a situation under which there was a chance and under which the President, evidently based upon information he had – and he had vastly more than I have, and I believe vastly more than any other Senator has – thought the time was good for an invasion and a capture of those sanctuaries. They are raids, pure and simple, and they seem to be bringing results. The third thing I want to mention is this: I have not heard anybody talk about this matter who seems to realize that we are also carrying on an errand of mercy. We have a joint fleet, mostly of South Vietnamese ships or small boats, going up the Mekong River, where it turns as you go upstream westward into Cambodia, but also with a good many ships of our Nation going along, and with some larger ships from our Nation supplied, which, as their first errand – so we are told in the press today – landed at a place where a large group of Vietnamese settlers in Cambodia were awaiting relief and awaiting evacuation back to South Vietnam. I did not see any numbers given in the articles I saw on the ticker. I did not see any numbers given in the newspapers. But it said it was a very sizable number, mostly of women and children, who were being evacuated back to South Vietnam.
The statement also was made that a principal object of this small armada of small vessels is, if possible, to reach Phnom Penh, the capital of Cambodia, where several thousand Vietnamese civilians are hopefully awaiting the chance to be evacuated back to their home. I hope that that part of the mission also will be successful. I am sure that every Senator so hopes.
So this is a mission of joint mercy to others and relief and protection to our own, not only for their lives in the immediate future, but also, in the event the President goes forward with his evacuation of 150,000 more of our men from South Vietnam in the next year – I believe he has given himself about a year for that – there must be safer conditions than would result if the sanctuary situation were to continue and to be observed.
So far as the Senator from Florida is concerned, he wants to go on record, first, to this effect: He does not believe that there is any Senator who does not hope, in the depths of his heart, that this mission will be successful, that it will protect our men, that it will save the lives of many of our men, that it will promote an earlier and a more successful evacuation. I am sure that is the case.
In my own heart, I am sure that the President in taking a chance – which he knew was a chance – had good reason to believe that success could be attained.
Speaking for this Senator alone, he is going to hope with all his heart that that success can be sustained. Up to this point, he strongly supports his President, and he speaks for the great majority of the people in his State, if the correspondence, wires, and telephone calls from his State are any indication, in saying that he believes the people of his State very strongly have the same belief.
After all, Mr. President, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Chapman – and the marines still are heavily engaged there – is a native of Florida and a citizen of Florida, and we are very proud of him.
Mr. MCGOVERN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield on that point?
Mr. HOLLAND. I shall yield in a moment.
After all, we of the South are rather proud of the fact that the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Westmoreland, is a South Carolinian, who took terrible punishment for 3 years or more in South Vietnam. And we want to back him up.
We are also very proud of the fact that the newly nominated Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Moorer, is an Alabamian.
Although my distinguished friends do not seem to like the idea of coming South for judicial officers, I am glad that they are quite ready to come South for military leaders. May I add, with a smile, too, that they seem quite willing to come South for people to collect their taxes for them. I notice that we now have Randolph Thrower, head of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, an Atlanta boy, whose grandfather happened to be my Methodcision will be found to be sound, and a small boy. [sic]
All I am saying now is that tremendous values of loyalty are involved here, and I am sure that no Senator fails in entertaining those feelings of loyalty and of hope. Although there may be differences in detail as to how this difficult problem may be handled, I am never going to believe that any Member of this body has anything else but loyalty to his Nation and hope that his President's decision will be found to be sound, and a willingness to support that decision.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, who has the floor?
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BELLMON). The Senator from Wyoming has the floor.
Mr. HANSEN. I thank the Chair.
I now yield to my distinguished colleague from South Dakota, in order that he may present a unanimous consent request.
Mr. McGOVERN. I should also like to make a few brief remarks.
Mr. HANSEN. Yes, indeed.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, before I comment on the colloquy which has just taken place, I want to commend the distinguished Senator from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE) for the resolution he has introduced before the Senate today, and also to make a report to the Senate on the progress we have made in securing cosponsors for amendment No. 609, the amendment to end the war, which calls upon the Senate to cut off further funding for military operations in Southeast Asia except for purposes of effecting the safe and systematic withdrawal of our farces.
Since I last reported to the Senate on Thursday afternoon, seven additional Senators have added their names as cosponsors to this bipartisan amendment.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the names of the following Senators be added at the next printing of the amendment:
The Senator from Connecticut (Mr. RIBICOFF), the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. McCARTHY), the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY), the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH), the Senator from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE) – who has just been speaking on the floor – the Senator from Missouri (Mr. EAGLETON), and the Senator from Michigan (Mr. HART), bringing the total to 21 Senators who are now listed as cosponsors.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MCGOVERN. Mr. President, in addition, some 10 Senators have told me that, if this measure were being voted on today, they would vote for it, but they are not ready, for various reasons, to add their names as cosponsors at this point. In some cases they have minor language changes to suggest. In other cases, they are Senators who ordinarily do not cosponsor legislation, but, nevertheless, 10 Senators on both sides of the aisle, in addition to the 21 who are cosponsors, have told me that they would vote for the amendment.
Mr. President, that means that nearly one-third of the U.S. Senate is already committed to supporting the amendment. This is a perfectly proper procedure under the Constitution. As a matter of fact, it is the only way under which the Senate can express and work its will, the only way it can be effective in terms of bringing the war to a conclusion.
All of us heard the President of the United States say on last Friday at his press conference that Members of the House and Senate have the luxury of making speeches and offering criticism, but that only he carries the burden of making the decisions and taking the risks.
Very frankly, I think that the President's point is well taken. That is exactly what we have been doing. We have been standing here offering criticism and advice to him but, so far, in the long and tragic history of this war, never have we really stood up as Members of the Senate and answered yes or no as to whether we want the war to continue or to end.
That is the purpose of amendment No. 609, the amendment to end the war, to share that burden with the President of the United States – which we are supposed to do under the terms of the Constitution of the United States.
We will be saying to the President, when we vote on that amendment: "No longer will we content ourselves simply to advise you on what you should do in handling your duties. We are willing to face up to our responsibilities. We are willing to bear some of the political risks and some of the political responsibility involved in deciding whether or not to continue the war or to end it."
If it is true, as has frequently been said, that a majority of the Senate wishes we had never become involved in Southeast Asia and would like to find some dignified, constructive way by which we can extricate ourselves, this amendment will provide that formula.
Mr. President, five Members of the Senate, including the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD) and the Senator from New York (Mr. GOODELL) on the Republican side, the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES), the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH), and myself on the Democratic side, are going on television tomorrow night at 7:30 on NBC, to make an appeal to the Nation for support for this amendment.
I want to say to the thoughtful and concerned students who have been with us in Washington over the past weekend, especially since the tragedy at Kent State University, that winning support for this amendment to end the war is the area in which they should be working. This is the area where the action is going to be that counts, in terms of deciding whether the war continues or whether it does not.
We are not going to end the war simply by strikes, protests, wringing our hands, or tearing our hair. All of those things might seem understandable, but not one of them will change our course in Southeast Asia.
There is only one way that can be done – unless the President decides to call off the action – and that is by Congress exercising its responsibility under the Constitution.
Thus, I want to plead with Members of the Senate, with the students, and with our older citizens – all the people across this land – to make our constitutional system work, not to write it off until we have tried it, and not to say that Congress has no power in the area of war or peace.
Let us not be talking about this war as President Nixon's war. He did not start it. Let us not talk about it as Johnson's war, or the CIA's war, or the Pentagon's war. Under the Constitution, only Congress has the responsibility to declare war.
We have surrendered that responsibility. We let it slip away from us. The only way we can reclaim the war making or the war-ending power that resides in this Congress under the Constitution is by exercising it.
Therefore, I ask my colleagues in the Senate and the House of Representatives, I ask all my fellow citizens, to make our constitutional system work the way our Founding Fathers intended.
Mr. President, this is what we hope to accomplish with this amendment.
I do not want to get into a debate with my good friend from Florida, who feels deeply on this question but who is trying to keep his mind open. He has given the students a hearing, as others have done. I want to make a few quick observations here as to what he had to say about the move into Cambodia.
I do not question the President's sincerity, in what he was trying to do, but I do question his judgment. It seems to me that this is another in the long series of efforts on the military front – which were made supposedly to bring the war to an earlier end – which are going to prove disappointing.
When one talks about wiping out rice supplies in Cambodia, capturing small arms ammunition, and capturing rifles and arms of all kinds, we must remember that this is not a traditional type of war. Measured against that must be the impact an the total situation, such as the pictures we all saw on television and in the press of another Cambodian village in smoking ruins, the wreckage, and everything that was destroyed by American artillery and American air strikes.
I understand from the military viewpoint why these things happen, but this war is not just a military operation. Even the military commanders will tell us that this is a struggle to win over the hearts and minds of the people of Southeast Asia.
Well, Mr. President, what is going on in the hearts and minds of the people in that small village in Cambodia which was smashed to the ground and blasted beyond recognition, with young American soldiers amidst the wreckage, looking at the bodies of the horribly burned men, women, and children who were hit by napalm?
The press showed a picture of a young American soldier looking at the remains of a little girl who was probably 7 or 8 years old who had been incinerated by napalm bombing, and the bodies of two women and a man lying beside her.
They happened to be four victims in that particular incident of the war which occurred shortly after we were shocked by the deaths of four students at Kent State University.
Both of those groups were killed as a consequence of this war.
We are terribly shocked and saddened by what took place at Kent State University.
But what happened in the hearts and minds of the people related to those four innocent people who died in the village of Snou in Cambodia?
Is that the way to win the hearts and minds of those people?
How impressed can they be with the argument that by destroying their village, we were able to capture so many rifles and so many bullets and small arms which can weaken the capacity of the enemy to strike back?
I suggest, Mr. President, that every time a village like that is destroyed in Southeast Asia – and they have been destroyed by the hundreds and perhaps thousands – we lose another step in this great struggle for the hearts and minds of the people of Southeast Asia.
I cannot ever get out of my mind the picture of those bodies floating down the Mekong River 2 or 3 weeks ago. They were not Communist bodies. They were bodies of citizens of Cambodia who were killed by the armed forces of their own country – probably with armament supplied by us. We did not supply it for that purpose. We supplied it because we thought that that government shared the same purposes we do in Southeast Asia.
The fact remains, however, that because of longstanding and bitter tribal rivalries that we do not know very much about, these things happen. That is one of the very great dilemmas we face there – that we do not know very much about what we have gotten into in Southeast Asia. Because of things that have very little to do with the concerns of this country, we watched hundreds of bodies of Cambodian citizens, tied together, floating down the river. They had been slaughtered by the forces of their own government.
One has to ask the question: What is the impact of that on the hearts and minds of the people we are trying to reach in Southeast Asia?
Mr. President, this was the incident at Kent State University multiplied several hundred times over. We must balance that against the mission of mercy going the other way up the Mekong River, to which the distinguished Senator from Florida referred a moment ago. Let us recognize that we are involved in far more than a simple military operation in Southeast Asia.
There is no possible way that this struggle can be solved by increasing inputs of military power.
If one were to pursue the sanctuary theory to the ultimate, we would have to move into Cambodia, North Vietnam, China, and the Soviet Union, and, in fact, into the whole Communist world, for that is a sanctuary in a sense for the forces with which we are engaged in Southeast Asia.
I think the time has come, not to widen this war, not to base our hopes on some dubious claim that maybe, by extending the war into yet another area, we can bring it to an end, but the time has come in the interest of our country and in the interest of the highest form of patriotism to do what I believe many Members of the Senate want to do. And that is to correct what we now know was a dreadful mistake.
The way to do that is by supporting the amendment to end the war.
I am very hopeful that amendment will prevail.
Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Wyoming for yielding to me for what turned out to be more than a unanimous consent request. [Applause in the galleries.]
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The occupants of the galleries should be warned that the rules of the Senate do not permit demonstrations of approval or disapproval by the spectators in the galleries.
If it happens again, the Sergeant at Arms will be ordered to clear the galleries.
Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. HANSEN. I yield.
Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I think that the Senator from South Dakota has said many things that are worth while. He calls to our attention the fact that there is more than one side of the coin to look at here.
I am sure the Senator has spoken from a very pure heart. He has a fine record as a bomber pilot in World War II. I am sure that when he dropped bombs, knowing perfectly well that people would be mutilated and that people would be killed, he felt that it was his duty. I feel so, too.
I have been in somewhat the same situation myself, although not in a bomber. I flew on four fronts in France – as the Senator from South Dakota knows – a good long time ago.
I know that the Senator from South Dakota has not given what I think is necessary consideration in this picture – and it is a miserable picture and no one can make it out in any other way – to the fact that we have lost many American men by reason of the privilege of these sanctuaries which has been given to those who come out of the sanctuaries and attack and, after a hit-and-run engagement, generally by surprise, go back into these sanctuaries.
The question is where is the balance in this thing? The Senator from Florida does not know, and he does not believe that the Senator from South Dakota or any of us can know. And he is not entirely sure that the President knows. However, he thinks that the President has vastly more opportunity to know than can any Member of the Senate.
The President has the full reports of the CIA, the full reports of his field Commanders, the full reports of the Ambassador. I trust that my distinguished friend listened carefully to our Ambassador to South Vietnam on the television last night. The President has the reports of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He has the reports of the State Department. He has the reports of every intelligence group that our Nation possesses.
Surely the President knows better than we know how many hundreds and maybe thousands of casualties we have sustained. My understanding is that it is a bitter fact that we have sustained better than 40,000 deaths in the fighting in South Vietnam and over 200,000 wounded. I do not have the exact figures in mind. However, that is a terrible, tragic picture for us to consider.
The President knows better than anyone else how much of that is chargeable to these nefarious sanctuaries which for 5 years have been plaguing our men in the field just a stone's throw across a boundary that is also almost nonexistent in many places. In many places the boundary cannot even be determined with exact accuracy.
The Senator from Florida feels that everyone of us should hope and pray that this decision is a sound one and that it will result, at relatively small loss, in the destruction of large amounts of equipment.
The figures I placed in the RECORD awhile ago would indicate that it was more than enough equipment to fully arm a full division. I understand that they have few full North Vietnamese divisions over there.
The Department of the Army states in that release I had printed in the RECORD that the amount of rice captured and either carted away or destroyed would supply 6,000 fighting enemy for a year.
I do not believe that my distinguished friend was present when the first clipping was read into the RECORD by the Senator from Wyoming. It was a clipping from today's New York Times.
The clipping stated that in addition to the 6,000-odd small arms which had already been captured – I will read the exact figures if the Senator has not heard them. Perhaps he has.
The figures are as follows: 6,750 rifles; 1,232 heavy machine guns, mortar tubes, rocket launchers, recoilless rifles, and antiaircraft guns – it does not say how many of each; 865 tons of ammunition. The rest is confined to edibles and medical supplies, except that it does mention specifically 130 trucks and I think my friend knows that trucks are not built in that section of the world. They have to be brought in from China or Russia. The capture of 130 trucks – it does not say whether they were large or small – is a tremendous raid upon the carrying capacity of those who have been using the Ho Chi Minh Trail now for more than 5 years in building up more and more the reserves that were there. This is just part of the story. We do not know what the full story will be. The only thing I plead for now is that we not do that thing we so frequently regret later and use snap judgment.
Mr. MCGOVERN. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. HOLLAND. I shall yield in a moment. I plead that instead we wait until the story is told.
The Senator from Florida has already said that in the event this raid or series of raids – and it is now five or six of them – should last longer than the President has assured us, or proves less successful than hoped for, or brings greater losses than expected, the Senator from Florida reserves his entire freedom of decision.
The Senator from Florida has not failed to buck presidents in the past, whether they were Democratic or Republican, and he will not fail to buck them in the future when he thinks they are wrong. But I think this decision has promise and hope for working out and I hope my distinguished friend will continue to nurture some hope for this success. I feel, knowing as little as we do about the essential facts in this case, that it is the better part of wisdom and loyalty for us to have hope that it will be successful and I believe most Members of the Senate will come to that conclusion.
I yield to the Senator from South Dakota.
Mr. MCGOVERN. Mr. President, I wish to say to the Senator that it does seem on the surface that the argument that he makes about the President having more information than the rest of us should bring him to a more sensible judgment than any of us can make. However, that is precisely why Congress has surrendered much of the responsibility that we were intended to carry under the Constitution.
Years ago when anxieties were expressed about the commitment of American forces into Southeast Asia, that same argument was raised, the argument that the Commander in Chief had information that was not available to us. Very frankly, I am embarrassed when people come to me with questions about to what extent we were involved, for example, in the collapse of Prince Sihanouk, and I have to say that I do not know; I am not privy to that information.
Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at that point?
Mr. MCGOVERN. I yield.
Mr. HOLLAND. The Senator does know, however, does he not, that Prince Sihanouk did not come to us; he did not go to the French; but he went to Moscow and Peking and he is enlisting Communist forces to put him back in power.
Mr. MCGOVERN. I know that happened since he was deposed, but I do not know that that would have been the situation with a little more imagination on our part prior to the time he was deposed.
I am getting impatient with the argument that the President has information more dependable than ours and that we should accept his judgment. That is not the way I read his responsibility or our responsibility. I think every Member of the Senate has some obligation to act on his own best judgment. I think that is why the war making power was vested not in the President of the United States but in the Congress of the United States. For various reasons that perhaps the Senator understands better than I, we have abdicated that power.
Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. MCGOVERN. I yield.
Mr. HOLLAND. Did the Senator vote for the Gulf of Tonkin resolution?
Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, and I regret it very much. I do not want to repeat that mistake 6 years later.
Mr. HOLLAND. The Senator from Florida is in exactly the same position. The Senator from Florida, standing here, addressed question after question, as the Senator will see if he looks at the record of debate, to the distinguished Senator from Arkansas, who was leading the debate for the adoption of the resolution. All but two Members of this body voted for giving the President the power to act as he saw necessary in his discretion to whatever might occur in that theater.
I am not trying to pass judgment in advance on what the distinguished Senator is offering today. I have not seen the Senator's resolution. But I am pleading for continuance of some confidence and hope and support of the one man that we have as President, for whom I did not vote, but who is my President and the President of this Nation, and who has vastly more information than any other citizen can have.
He wants peace; of course he wants peace.
Mr. McGOVERN. I do not have any doubt of the President's motives. I feel exactly as the Senator from Arkansas said so many times: that he does not question the motives of the President he questions whether he is following the proper means to achieve his object, which is an early peace in Southeast Asia.
Even from a military standpoint, the Senator knows that, just prior to the Tet offensive, there were tremendous military operations that were directed into the so-called iron triangle area around Saigon which were believed to be the very center of the North Vietnamese and NLF military operations in South Vietnam.
There were two of those offensive operations which we conducted in 1967 which led General Westmoreland to the conclusion that we had destroyed the base camps, staging areas and the principal supply areas for Communist forces operating in South Vietnam. The Senator will recall there were all kinds of optimistic reports that we had virtually destroyed the underpinning of the enemy in the south. Then came the Tet offensive and the whole apparatus fell apart. The Senator knows the impact of that on domestic policies in the United States.
To say we have captured so many pounds of rice, so many guns, and so many boxes of ammunition in Cambodia and that, therefore, we are going to have American forces in South Vietnam conjures in my mind similar optimistic predictions made before. I have no doubt that the kind of Vietnamese Pentagon they were looking for in Cambodia was probably a handful of people with a few radios on their backs, and a floating operation that vanished in the jungle in a few hours prior to our invasion.
I do not have the slightest hope that we have broken up the North Vietnamese and NLF apparatus. Basically that is a political apparatus; military considerations are secondary. What we are contesting is a vast political network spread through a vast jungle area. One cannot tell friend from foe. To use our military power in the way the Senator is talking about, the way he used it in World War I and in World War II, would defeat the purposes we have in mind because we would be killing the very people we are trying to save. I think the President is asking us to make the same mistake we have made time after time based on the mistake that our progress is winning the minds of Southeast Asia can be evaluated in military operations.
The Senator remembers the charts that former Secretary of Defense McNamara brought with him when we would go to the White House for a briefing. He would say, "We killed so many Vietcong and so many North Vietnamese and, therefore, on April 15, 1966, they should surrender according to my computations."
It never worked that way because of this "hearts and minds" business that cannot be measured with computers. This is the other side of the equation we have to keep in mind. We have to measure what this war is doing to us. I think the question has now become not so much whether we can continue this operation in Southeast Asia, but the question really is becoming whether we can hold our own society together if we stay on this course much longer in Asia. To me that is the crucial question.
I am doing what I think is the right thing to keep our society together by giving Congress and the American people an opportunity to register a decision in this matter in a way provided by the Constitution.
Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield further, I am very sure that the Senator from South Dakota has completely and correctly stated his own feelings and his own objective.
The only difference between us is that I do not agree with that objective, and I call the Senator's attention that the very thing he has done here today in offering a resolution is to try to put a date on the end of this whole thing when he has just remarked, so truthfully, that frequent predictions in the past as to when the war would end would come to naught.
So far as the Senator from Florida is concerned, he is going to give careful attention to anything that comes from the Senator from South Dakota, for whom he has much admiration. He was a great soldier. I say again, I am sure he knew when he dropped his bombs there would be great loss of life. And I am sure he knows that in war there will be loss of life. And I am sure he knows that nobody can state with certainty now what is going to happen. But he also knows that that handful of men with walkie-talkies could not carry away those 6,700 muskets, much less the mortars, rocket launchers, the 130 trucks, and all the rest of the tremendous amount of equipment.
We are not talking about simply hauling equipment from Washington to Alexandria. We are talking about replenishing their supplies from remote parts of China – and China itself is a long, long way off – and from remote parts of Russia, which are even more remote. There is bound to be tremendous difficulty in replacing the amount of equipment already reported as having been captured.
Surely, the Senator from South Dakota, once with the military himself, will take at face value the numbers given by the Pentagon as those weapons, trucks, launchers, and rockets that have actually been captured.
That is no mean accomplishment. That is a tremendous backset to people who have to look as far away as they have to for a replenishment of their equipment so they can fight again.
I just plead again, let us not make up our minds too quickly. The Senator from Florida is retaining completely freedom of decision after we have gone far ahead to see how hopefully a situation we will be in after this effort is over. He is retaining, however, still his feeling that the President is entitled right now to our support, and he is going to have the support of the Senator from Florida.
I yield the floor. I thank my friend for yielding to me.
Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, I think just for the record I would like to ask my distinguished friend from South Dakota if I understood him correctly to speak about the Cambodian bodies floating down the river.
Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, I did speak about that, which goes back to perhaps 3 weeks ago. I am not referring to anything that happened in the destruction of the village to which I referred previously, but this took place shortly after Prince Sihanouk was deposed.
Mr. HANSEN. And these were Cambodian bodies?
Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, the ethnic background of those people is Vietnamese, but they are residents of Cambodia and have lived there, as I understand it, for many centuries. There has been longstanding bitterness, a kind of tribal rivalry between these groups in Cambodia and some of the others in that country. But it was not a case of Communists being killed by anti- Communists. These people were not killed on ideological grounds.
Mr. HANSEN. My only point in asking the question was that I have in my hand a copy of Newsweek magazine. While I think the Senator's explanation now does clear the point I wanted to make, I believe it ought not to go unnoticed that, according to Newsweek – and I have the April 27, 1970, issue in my hand, and I read from page 37:
As we approached the car-ferry crossing the Mekong River at Neak Luong, everything was oddly silent. None of the usual fruit peddlers were in sight. The Vietnamese-owned shops were boarded up and the names of their owners hastily painted over. But once on the ferry a far more dramatic sight occurred. As far as the eye could see, odd shaped bundles were slowly drifting toward us. At first I thought they were clumps of water lilies. But the Cambodian passengers – I repeat that:
But the Cambodian passengers on the ferry identified the bundles immediately as the bloated bodies of Vietnamese men and women, still clad in their black pantaloons.
Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, but the Senator should keep in mind that they were citizens of Cambodia. That is like saying that if our Government turned on the Boston Irish, it was shooting Irishmen, not Americans. These people were citizens of Cambodia who happened to have Vietnamese origin, but they had lived in Cambodia for many, many centuries. The rivalry between the forces that killed them and the people who were killed had nothing to do with communism versus the free world, as we sometimes describe this war.
Mr. HANSEN. I would suggest, Mr. President, that that is the Senator's interpretation and conclusion. It may be that not every one would agree with him. Nevertheless, that is certainly his opinion, and I respect him for it.
I yield the floor.