May 11, 1970
Page 14823
AMENDMENT OF THE FOREIGN MILITARY SALES ACT AMENDMENTS
AMENDMENT NO. 621
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, on behalf of myself and Senators JACKSON, MAGNUSON, GRAVEL, SCOTT, PERCY, PACKWOOD, PEARSON, WILLIAMS OF New Jersey, HOLLINGS, CANNON and ANDERSON, I submit today an amendment to the Foreign Military Sales Act, H.R. 15628, which would authorize U.S. assistance, at a level of $200 million, to encourage positive and rapid implementation of a program of land reform by the Government of South Vietnam.
I ask unanimous consent that the text of the amendment be printed in the RECORD following my remarks.
Mr. President, last December, I introduced an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1969 which would have provided American support, in the form of commodities, for a comprehensive program of land reform in South Vietnam. At that time, President Thieu's "Land to the Tillers" bill was in a very precarious position, having been diluted and rendered virtually ineffective by the lower house of the South Vietnamese legislature.
Since that time, however, the status of the land reform program in South Vietnam has altered significantly. On March 26, 1970, President Thieu signed into law one of the most comprehensive land reform programs in modern history. Under the new law, every piece of tenanted land in South Vietnam will be returned to the tenants now farming it. Approximately 2½ to 3 million acres of land will be transferred to some one million families.
Some of the specifics of the land reform bill are as follows:
First, all land not tilled directly by the land owner will be affected;
Second, landlords will be fully compensated by the Government of South Vietnam, on a ratio of 10 percent cash and 80 percent 8-year bonds redeemable according to an established schedule.
Third, farmers receiving land under the new law will be exempt from all kinds of tax relating to the transfer of land, and also from any land tax in the first year of ownership;
Fourth, the Government of South Vietnam will encourage the establishment of farm cooperatives to facilitate the improvement of agricultural methods;
Fifth, bonds used to compensate former landlords may be pledged, transferred, used as payment of credit obligations and land tax, or to buy shares in private or national enterprises;
Sixth, strict punitive measures are provided to deal with any person acting to prevent implementation of this law; and
Seventh, land will be distributed to the following: present tillers, next of kin of war dead, soldiers and civil servants when discharged, soldiers and civil servants forced to abandon cultivation because of the war, in that order.
Mr. President, in recent days we have witnessed new and serious developments in our involvement in Southeast Asia, developments to which a significant segment of the American populace is opposed. Arguing that we need to take additional steps to insure the security of a decreasing number of American troops in Vietnam and to strengthen our own negotiating position, as well as that of the South Vietnamese, President Nixon has chosen to step up military activity. I suggest that comprehensive land reform can serve both these ends, without risking more American lives and resources.
It is estimated that the majority of American casualties incurred in this war are directly or indirectly traceable to peasant support for the Vietcong. We cannot expect to totally arrest peasant defections to the Vietcong – presently running at an estimated 40,000 a year. But by encouraging rapid implementation of land reform, we can strengthen the possibility of a significant shift in peasant allegiance toward the central government.
I suggest further that by broadening the base of support for the central government, land reform can strengthen the negotiating position of South Vietnam – a necessary accomplishment which raises serious questions as to the purpose and success of Vietnamization. By giving the peasants a stake in the preservation of their country, rapid implementation of the new land reform program can supply a new incentive to achieve political settlement – which most of us will agree is essential – by threatening the enemy with the erosion of its rural support.
On the Vietnamese side, I feel that the political will exists in South Vietnam to carry through with this program. Distribution over the past year of some 200,000 acres of government-owned lands lends substantial credibility to President Thieu's intentions. And viewed in an even broader context, this particular program may have broad implications for the success of similar programs enacted in other nations throughout the world.
Therefore, I feel that now, perhaps more than ever, it is important that the United States lend its support and encouragement to a rapid implementation of the program. Opposition among some 100,000 landlord families to the successful operation of land reform will be stiff. Heavy financial demands – brought about by a need to strengthen the credibility of the program by compensating landlords as soon as possible, and by the government's intention to complete this program on schedule – will come to bear on an economy already overextended by inflationary pressures and increasing expenditures for defense.
The United States must move quickly in the direction of encouraging implementation of land reform as rapidly as possible. The Government of South Vietnam has set an outside limit of 3 years for carrying out this program. We who are sponsoring this amendment feel that this schedule can and must be stepped up, if the program is to have an immediate effect on ending the fighting and killing and on the consequent progress of our withdrawal from Southeast Asia.
Mr, President, the amendment which I am introducing would authorize $200 million for support of rapid implementation of land reform in South Vietnam. This amount is less than the cost of several days of the war. Yet a successful land reform program could shorten the war by many more than several days.
There are those who will argue that the support we are advocating represents only a further encroachment by the United States in South Vietnamese affairs, at a time when we are trying to disengage ourselves from these affairs; that American support of this program will have the effect of propping up a government which does not deserve our support.
To this argument I reply that it has long been my conviction that we cannot really wind down this war unless in some way we can find a political solution to the conflict. I think that a political solution inevitably involves a broadening of the base of political support for the Government of South Vietnam – the present one or one which succeeds it as a result of free elections. I think that land reform, by giving the people of South Vietnam a stake in things as they are, could do a great deal to encourage and promote the development of a viable political solution.
Mr. President, the United States has spent a great deal, in terms of lives and money, under the pretense of protecting the sovereignty of South Vietnam. The legacy we leave behind when we are finally disengaged from this conflict may not be a pleasant one to remember. It will be extremely difficult for us to measure the degree to which we have improved the lot of the average South Vietnamese, or strengthened our own national security. In this light, I urge my colleagues to weigh seriously the need for our support of a program which is probably the most important thing to happen in South Vietnam in recent years, in terms of long-range social and economic gain, and which could be the most positive legacy which the United States will leave behind.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ALLEN). The amendment will be received and printed, and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the amendment will be printed in the RECORD.
The amendment (No. 621) was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, as follows:
H.R. 15628, an Act to amend the Foreign Military Sales Act
viz: On page 4, after line 17, add the following new section:
"SEC. 7. (a) The success of a land reform program in Vietnam is a material factor in the future political and economic stability of that nation, and the speed with which such a program is given effect may have consequences with regard to the termination of hostilities there.
"(b) The President is authorized to use funds appropriated pursuant to this section to encourage and support the rapid implementation of the national land reform program enacted in March, 1970, by the Government of South Vietnam. The use of such funds for land reform in Vietnam shall be contingent upon the attainment of mutually agreed goals of accomplishment, stressing economy, efficiency, and advanced implementation of the program by July 1, 1972. Tranches for land reform assistance to the government of Vietnam shall be made at quarterly intervals based upon satisfactory achievement towards the 1972 target goal.
"(c) Grants may also be made, out of funds appropriated pursuant to this section, for the purchase and shipment to Vietnam of goods and commodities, manufactured or produced in the United States, which, by their introduction into the Vietnamese economy, will contribute to sound economic development in Vietnam. Such goods and commodities (1) shall be of a type approved by the President for such programs; (2) shall include goods suitable for agricultural supplies, business inventories in non-luxury enterprises, and capital goods for economic development; and (3) may be exchanged for bonds issued by the Government of Vietnam to compensate landowners whose lands are transferred to other persons under such programs, or used in such other way as the Government of Vietnam may determine, consistent with the purposes of this section.
"(d) In order to carry out the provisions of this section, there are authorized to be appropriated $200,000,000 in fiscal year 1971. Funds appropriated under this section are authorized to remain available until expended."