August 31, 1970
Page 30500
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I support the pending amendment to the military procurement bill, H.R. 17123.
It is time to make clear our commitment to end the war in Vietnam.
And this amendment would do so at the same time as it would preserve all of the President's constitutional powers. The cardinal issue is whether our involvement in the conflict in Indochina must be regarded as open ended and indefinite in duration, or whether the time has come to establish a definite deadline for our military participation there.
Those of us who support this amendment believe that the best interests of the United States – both at home and abroad – would be served by its enactment.
Those who oppose it, including the administration, insist that our military presence must continue while the South Vietnamese attempt to win the military victory which has eluded our own efforts for so many years.
I submit, however, that the advantages of a clearcut withdrawal policy would be substantial, not only in terms of our own domestic concerns, but in terms of peace in Vietnam itself.
Control of our conduct would clearly be in our hands, not those of the North Vietnamese or the South Vietnamese. And a climate for meaningful negotiations might finally be established.
The administration has argued that a publicly announced withdrawal timetable would give Hanoi no incentive to negotiate seriously in Paris. But the negotiations are already at a virtual stand
still and, there seems to be no prospect for improvement so long as Vietnamization remains our only policy.
The administration has also argued that a publicly announced timetable would permit Hanoi to attack our forces once they were sufficiently reduced in size. But it seems obvious that Hanoi could do so anyway once enough Americans are withdrawn, whether or not a timetable for their withdrawal is announced.
And finally, the concept of a withdrawal timetable has been criticized as leading to an eventual bloodbath in South Vietnam. However, nothing in our present policy can guarantee against the possibility of reprisals once we are out of Vietnam in any event. For example, even were the Communists to accept the President's proposals for free elections and come to power through this means, nothing in our policy could guarantee against reprisals at that point. Besides, is it not clear that the war itself is a bloodbath, and that this certainty must be weighed against any speculative possibility?,
In formulating our withdrawal plan, we must, of course, accept the responsibility for evacuating and resettling those who wish to leave Vietnam.
On the matters we most care about – the return of our men held as prisoners of war and the safety of our troops as we withdraw – there is every likelihood of reaching an understanding with Hanoi once we indicate our willingness to set a firm date for our withdrawal.
Prospects for a broader political settlement in Vietnam may also improve. For the generals who control the South Vietnamese Government may seriously consider sharing their power once they realize that their weakness can no longer keep us in Vietnam indefinitely. And once the leaders in Hanoi know we are leaving, they may also be ready for serious negotiations as long as we can exercise some leverage at the peace talks in Paris.
No one can argue that our enormous contributions to South Vietnam over a 7-year period have fallen short of the commitment we originally made.
The basic question now is whether a specific deadline should be set for the withdrawal of all U.S. military personnel from Vietnam, not what that date should be. The McGovern-Hatfield amendment provides a realistic and sensible deadline of December 31, 1971.
That amendment represents no challenge to the President's constitutional responsibilities as Commander in Chief. It does not dictate the day-by-day tactics to be employed to protect our forces while military operations continue. But is does reflect Congress' determination to respond to its constitutional responsibility of deciding how long these forces will be committed to that war.
Nor does the amendment constitute a political challenge to the President. Rather, it offers to share the political responsibility for the hard decision that must be made. Whatever date for withdrawal is set, there is no easy way out of Vietnam.
In my opinion, the establishment of a specific deadline is the best among nothing but bad choices, and to make the choice will involve political costs and political courage.
But the issue is one that transcends purely political considerations. It must not be approached from the standpoint of possible political advantage; for only by distorting the motives of those who support. the establishment of a deadline can this cardinal issue be turned into a partisan political debate. A consideration of the issue on the merits is required. And such consideration, in my judgment, can lead only to affirmative support of the principle set forth so clearly in the McGovern-Hatfield amendment.
Mr. President, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. MCGOVERN. Mr. President, before the Senator yields the floor, I would like to commend him on what I think been one of the most thoughtful statements yet made in support of the amendment.
The Senator made one statement that especially interested me, when he said that there is no really good solution to this war.
I think that some years ago it was Mr. Lippman who said:
You can't back away from a mistake with great glory and grace.
But, recognizing the fact that no matter how we settle this war, it will probably draw some objections in some quarters, a good many people will not feel happy with any kind of solution short of a total victory. That being the case, is there not some advantage in a democratic society such as ours of spreading the responsibility for that decision as broadly as we can – in short, of involving Congress, so that Senators and Representatives, representing every district in this country, can vote on the question of whether they would like to see American military operations continued or terminated at a definite date?
It seems to me that, from the standpoint of the President, it would be an advantage to him to share this burden and this responsibility as broadly as he can with the elected representatives of the people.
Would not the Senator think that that is one of the ways of minimizing the danger of scapegoating that might set off division and bitterness in our national life after the withdrawal of troops from Indochina?
Mr. MUSKIE. I agree with the Senator.
I should like to add a few thoughts that buttress the point he is making. First of all, I do not know of anybody's plan, including the administration's, that will result in a withdrawal with the tidying up of all the loose ends. The administration has told us that it has an irrevocable policy of complete withdrawal. But whenever that comes, there will be a great deal of untidy loose ends that will create political problems for the government in Saigon, for the government in Hanoi, and for ourselves. So that the question of tidying up is a question that I think has no relevance to the amendment before us.
The second point I should like to make is this: If we were to accept a deadline of this kind, I think that almost immediately we would begin to reap some of the benefits of the withdrawal itself.
These benefits, as I see them, would be these: First, of all, we could begin immediately to heal the divisions in this country which have been created by this tragic war and its consequences for us here at home. Once the country understands that the end is in sight, we could begin to act as though it had arrived, not only with respect to our attitudes toward each other but also with respect to planning the future commitment of our resources here at home and elsewhere.
Second, with respect to nations around the globe, I suspect that the setting of such a deadline would result in an almost audible breathing of relief throughout the world, especially among our friends as they come to understand that their great friend and ally, the United States, had made the tough decision to cut off its involvement.
So I think that the beneficent effects upon our relationships with other countries. around the world would be most useful.
Finally, with respect to the people of Vietnam themselves, it seems to me that such a clear cut target would have less repercussions.
Mr. McGOVERN. I again commend the Senator on his excellent statement.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.
Mr. DOLE. How much time remains?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from South Dakota has expired. The Senator from Mississippi has 5 minutes remaining.
Mr. STENNIS. I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Kansas.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, the focal question appears to be who shall make the determination, Congress or the President, with reference to peace in South Vietnam and the rate of withdrawal and when they may come about.
Some years ago, in his renowned "Commentaries on the Constitution," Justice Joseph Story said:
Of all the cases and concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities, which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand. Unity of plan, promptitude, activity and decision, are indispensable to success; and these can scarcely exist, except when a single magistrate is entrusted exclusively with the power. Even the coupling of the authority of an executive council with him in the exercise of such powers, enfeebles the system, divides the responsibility, and not infrequently defeats every energetic measure. Timidity, indecision, obstinacy and pride of opinion, must mingle in all such councils, and infuse a torpor and sluggishness, destructive of all military operations.
Mr. President, I believe that summarizes very well the basic argument. Some one person must speak for America. Some one person must speak for our country. Some one person must negotiate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 2 minutes have expired.
Mr. STENNIS. I yield 1 additional minute to the Senator from Kansas.
Mr. DOLE. It appears to me that whether that person be a Republican or a Democrat, whether it be this year or next year or 10 years ago or 10 years hence, that one person must be the Commander in Chief, the President of the United States.
Despite the good intentions and despite the wishes of every Member of this body that the war in South Vietnam end and end quickly, we must recognize that only the Commander in Chief can bring about peace and can negotiate peace and bring an honorable end to the war in Vietnam. To impose a timetable on the Commander in Chief and on the President would do a disservice not to Richard Nixon but to the Office of the President and to the President in his efforts for a just and lasting peace; and, above all, it would serve notice on our allies around the world that we will cut and run, that we do not honor our commitments.
Therefore, I strongly urge that the amendment be rejected.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, reference has already been made to this New York Times editorial, which has an analytical question and comment. I want to read one sentence:
The basic question remains, however, is this amendment the right one either to redress the imbalance of power in the government or to advance the prospects for American withdrawal and peace in Vietnam?
It answers that question "no" in both instances. I think that is a very fine summary.
In addition, this amendment, hardened into law, would give away to the other side every possible advantage that we could possibly have. It would take all the judgment and discretion away from the man who has to speak and has the responsibility of negotiating for our side, for the people of the United States.
I am certain in my mind that the majority of the Members of this body never will be willing to walk up here and say, regardless of everything else, "I am going do take away what discretion and judgment and consideration the President of the United States has; I am going to take it away from him and write it into hard law." That must not happen and will not happen.
Mr. President, I judge our time is up. We shall have 1 hour tomorrow. I yield the floor.