May 12, 1970
Page 15074
THE COST OF THE VIETNAM WAR
Mr. HART. Mr. President, in a speech at Colby College, May 10, the Senator from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE) put the cost of the Vietnam war this way:
Can we buy them (the Saigon government) more time? Not if the price is the destruction of fundamental values and relationships in our own country.
Mr. President, I agree with the Senator's position, and I agree with the reasoning which led him to that position.
First, at most our commitment to the Saigon government was to give that government time to build the public support needed to build their own country.
In the words of Senator MUSKIE:
We have bought that time at tremendous cost to ourselves – in treasure, in lives, and in the neglect of pressing problems here at home.
Now it is time for the Saigon government to live up to its commitment to us.
Second, and again in the words of the Senator from Maine:
We who are older must be concerned that the policies for which we are responsible do not cause you to lose faith in our country's purpose and basic humanity. This is the challenge which hangs over all other questions raised by our policy in Southeast Asia.
Having reached the conclusion that "the most important immediate objective of our foreign policy must be to end our military involvement in Southeast Asia," Senator MUSKIE outlined the resolution he submitted yesterday, which he correctly called a "declaration of peace."
As a cosponsor of that resolution and as one who agrees with the points outlined in Senator MUSKIE's talk at Colby College, I ask unanimous consent that excerpts from his speech be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the excerpts were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
EXCERPTS FROM REMARKS BY U.S. SENATOR EDMUND S. MUSKIE
I am here today because you asked me to come. And because I believe Americans must talk to each other about our war policy, which divides us so deeply and so bitterly.
We must do so calmly and rationally.
We must do so without attacking each other's motives. And without attacking each other physically.
Our objective is to improve our country – not destroy it.
I know that you share that objective.
I know that, whether you agree or disagree with our policy, you do so because you care about what happens to our country.
I have met with hundreds of thousands of young Americans in the last two years – and I know that the one thing you want above all is that the United States should be wise, humane, compassionate and just. My generation wants that too.
The young people I speak to in every corner of our land are like you – not aliens, but Americans, born in our villages and towns and cities, raised in our families, educated in our schools. You are our children, and the only future America has.
We who are older must be concerned that the policies for which we are responsible do not cause you to lose faith in our country's purposes and basic humanity.
This is the challenge which hangs over all other questions raised by our policy in Southeast Asia.
And so I reach what seems to me an inescapable conclusion.
The most important immediate objective of our foreign policy must be to end our military involvement in Southeast Asia. The rights and the wrongs of our intervention in Southeast Asia are the subject of continuing debate and they await the verdict of history.
Simply stated, our purpose was to buy the people of South Vietnam time to build a country.
We have bought that time at tremendous cost to ourselves – in treasure, in lives, and in the neglect of pressing problems here at home.
Whether that time has been used as effectively as it might have been–
Whether, indeed, the South Vietnamese people have built a viable country–
Whether they have built something that will survive after we leave–
Questions such as these will be answered only when the South Vietnamese people are completely on their own.
Can we guarantee them success?
Can we afford to buy them more time? Not if the price is the destruction of fundamental values and relationships in our own country. And that is the price which faces us.
To avoid paying that price requires that we make a clear, definite, unqualified commitment to our own people to withdraw all our forces from Southeast Asia.
Until April 30th, enough Americans believed that to be our objective to make the President's policy acceptable – notwithstanding its ambiguities – notwithstanding its emphasis on military rather than diplomatic initiatives.
The President's Cambodia venture undermined that uneasy support for understandable reasons:
1. Whatever its military justification, it sounded like just another replay of an old record – "if we will just take this one more military step, we can end the war quickly." How many times have we heard that record before as our involvement grew from 16,000 advisers in 1963 to more than 500,000 men in 1968.
2. Just ten days before his Cambodia speech, the President made another speech, announcing the withdrawal of 150,000 more troops in the next twelve months.
He said he made the decision after "full consultation" with his commanders in the field. He expressed no reservations, no doubts – no security risks to the troops.
And yet, just ten days later, he told us the Cambodian venture was "indispensable" to that troop withdrawal.
And, at his press conference the other night, he told us it was necessary to save "hundreds, if not thousands" of American lives.
3. In the first speech, the President told us that "negotiations" are the "key" to a settlement of the war. Whatever the military outcome of the Cambodia venture, how can it possibly add to the credibility of our commitment to negotiations?
4. It seems obvious – after the terribly divisive two years through which we have moved – that any policy in Indo-China – to be successful – must rest on a base of full public understanding and support. And yet – what was the sequence of events?
The reassuring first speech, expressing confidence that the end is in sight;
The reassuring appearance of the Secretary of State on Capitol Hill;
The failure to give Congress any advance notice whatsoever;
And then, suddenly, like a bolt out of the blue, the Presidential announcement of the Cambodian venture.
In one stroke, the President–
Raised the risks of a deepening and prolonged military involvement;
Reduced the prospects of a negotiated settlement;
Seriously undermined public and Congressional confidence in his policy;
And imposed additional strains upon the bonds of mutual trust and confidence which are essential to our unity as a people.
We in Congress – as a result – are being besieged by pleas to assert our responsibility in shaping Southeast Asia policy.
I cannot recall a similar flow of mail, telegrams, telephone messages, and personal appeals on any issue.
To respond – under our system of divided powers – is not easy.
The President is Commander-in-Chief. The Constitution does give him dominating authority in the field of foreign policy. It is a desirable principle that in these areas of responsibility, we have the flexibility to exercise discretion in response to unanticipated contingencies.
Nevertheless, in the unprecedented circumstances in which we find ourselves, we in Congress have a responsibility to find legislative ways – awkward though they may be – to express our views of what our policy ought to be. The effort, whatever the legislative result, should influence our policy in a useful and constructive way.
A number of such proposals have been offered.
Tomorrow, I shall introduce my own resolution which provides the following:
1. That we commit ourselves to seeking a peaceful resolution of our differences with North Vietnam.
2. That we withdraw all our military forces from and cease military operations in Cambodia.
3. That we seek an immediate, standstill ceasefire throughout Indo-China.
4. That we commit ourselves to the withdrawal of all our forces and military personnel in a specified time, not to exceed 18 months.
5. That our delegation in Paris be strengthened with negotiators empowered and directed to facilitate a political settlement.
6. That we encourage a conference of Southeast Asian nations to settle political differences.
7. That we pledge technical and economic assistance to repair the damage of war.
8. That we urge the President to develop a complete withdrawal plan, such withdrawal to be completed within 18 months.
9. That appropriate committees of the Senate submit legislation, not later than July 15, 1970, to implement these objectives.
Such a resolution, if adopted .by the Senate, would constitute our declaration of peace.