April 9, 1970
Page 11031
SUSPENSION OF FURTHER DEPLOYMENT OF OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS
The Senate resumed the consideration of the resolution (S. Res. 211) seeking agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on limiting offensive and defensive strategic weapons and the suspension of test flights of reentry vehicles.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the vote on the pending business occur not later than 4 o'clock p.m. today. This, I understand, has been cleared on all sides.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
SALT AND THE FUTURE FOR STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, it is now almost 25 years since the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. In that quarter-century we have added enormously to our arsenal of nuclear weapons; we have increased the number and types of delivery systems. The Soviets have entered into nuclear competition until now both the United States and Russia have the capacity to destroy each other and much of the rest of the world.
Because we have lived so long with the threat of nuclear war, and because we have become accustomed to the ingenious and terrible weapons which made such a war possible, we sometimes act as if the threat did not exist, and we behave as if the expansion of our nuclear capacity were essential to our security and national welfare.
The fact is, Mr. President, that more nuclear weapons do not buy more security. The only value in having nuclear weapons is to discourage and deter others from attacking us. We and the Soviets have ample numbers of deliverable weapons to serve that purpose today. Adding a new generation of nuclear weapons adds to the danger of global disaster without increasing national security, and it decreases our capacity to deal with those social and economic problems which plague our country and many others.
But we and the Soviets are in real danger of launching our countries into a new round of futile, dangerous, and potentially disastrous competition in nuclear weapons. At the same time, we have an almost unique opportunity to reach an agreement with the Soviets on arms control which can reduce the danger of nuclear destruction, without lessening our national security and without diverting $20 billion a year from the needs of people.
In the years since 1945, our sizable lead in nuclear armaments has meant that proposals to control the strategic arms race had little chance of succeeding. Now, in 1970, there is the first clear opening. There is both a situation of mutual deterrence and an acceptable parity of nuclear strength between the United States and the Soviet Union. This unique and fleeting opportunity must not be allowed to slip away through design or delay. We can act promptly and decisively without committing ourselves hastily to any final solutions.
The choice that presents itself is not that of simply talking to the Russians at length while the arms race continues, or seeking desperately to reach what might be an inadequately thought-out agreement. There is a third choice – taking steps now to preserve the opportunity for effective agreement without locking ourselves into a final position.
Reasonable equality is the all-important new element in 1970. Today the United States and the Soviet Union are roughly equal in technology and in the destructive power of deliverable nuclear warheads. A condition of mutual deterrence has prevailed for many years, because deterrence does not depend on even rough equality. The likelihood of any appreciable nuclear devastation by retaliatory attack is a powerful deterrent to the first use of nuclear weapons. But although relatively little opposing nuclear strength is enough to deter, substantial equality must be reached before both parties will be willing to negotiate. With the balance as it now exists, neither side need fear that an immediate halt to the arms race will mean permanent inferiority.
The present situation of nuclear balance is adequate for our own security needs. We can never hope to do much better and we can do a lot worse. Both sides have learned the costs and the dangers of attempting to win the nuclear race. It is a race with no finish line and the runner in second place always has time to close the gap.
It is therefore in our interest to end the arms race and we should do it now. If it continues, we both at best will continue to squander our resources in a fruitless drive for meaningless superiority. At worst, time will run out for us both – and for mankind.
There have been indications that the Soviets recognize that security is not synonymous with nuclear superiority. A recent Pravda article on the SALT talks dated March 7, 1970 was notable for the absence of the traditional propaganda theme of "general and complete disarmament."
Instead the article extolled the virtues of restraint and limitation, and talked sensibly about parity. It noted that "a new spiral in the arms race could not change the essence of this balance" and that "none of the weapons systems now seemingly within the reach of this or that side can change this fact."
I do not know President Nixon's personal views on the question of seeking nuclear superiority. But to the extent that he recognizes the search for such superiority to be futile and self-defeating, his actions are either inconsistent or incomprehensible.
His vague demands for linking SALT to the settlement of other political issues complicate the negotiability of SALT without making the other issues more negotiable.
His criteria for what he calls nuclear "sufficiency" insofar as they are understandable can undermine stability and create a climate of unfounded fear about mutual deterrence.
His negotiating tactics and tentative approach are allowing the essential condition of mutual security to slip away.
While the actions of the Soviet Union have been equally ambiguous, it is not clear whether this is a cause or a consequence of the Nixon administration's policies. The continuing Soviet missile buildup and most especially their recent SS-9 deployments do not square with their hints of stabilizing the strategic balance as expressed in the Pravda article.
I am not prepared to disregard their missile buildup or the possibilities for mischief in their position. But neither am I willing to dismiss the possibilities far serious negotiations. My point is that we do not have to argue about interpretations of Soviet motives. SALT' provides an opportunity to assess their real position and see if we can do business together.
I do not want to assign blame for the past 25 years of the arms race. It is unknowable and unnecessary. I do not want to have to engage in guessing games about President Nixon's goals and strategy. I want to do something about them here and now.
The way to start ending the strategic arms race is to seek agreement with the Soviet Union to an immediate and mutual interim strategic standstill. This would mean freezing the present strategic nuclear balance in all of its dimensions. It would mean time to make sound and lasting decisions later. It would preserve negotiating opportunities.
This standstill would encompass all further deployments of offensive and defensive strategic weapons system and all testing of MRV's and MIRV's. Because of the totality of its scope, because of the necessity of its taking effect immediately, and because of the complexity of the issues involved, I believe that the mutual freeze should first be introduced for a 6-month period.
Starting with a 6-month period would not by any stretch of the imagination impair the security of either the United states or the Soviet Union. It would also enable both sides to determine whether a continuing strategic standstill is both workable and verifiable. It is my understanding that this is consistent with the intent of Senate Resolution 211 as amended. I shall vote for the resolution.
I. A MUTUAL INTERIM STRATEGIC STANDSTILL
Let me describe more precisely why I support Senate Resolution 211, how it would work, what its advantages are, and why I believe it should begin as a temporary arrangement. I visualize five elements in the MISS.
First. The United States should take the initiative in making the proposal. It should be the first order of business at Vienna. If the Soviet Union is not interested, we can move on to other negotiating possibilities. If the Soviets are interested, the entire initial Vienna session can be well devoted to ironing out the details.
Second. The substantive effect of the proposal would be a mutual halt to first, MRV and MIRV flight testing, and, second, further deployments of all other strategic offensive and defensive systems. Only by prohibiting Soviet missile testing that could lead to the development of independently targetable warheads could we have the confidence that Soviet MIRV's would not be deployed. Because of our open society, the Soviets need not have a similar concern about U.S. circumvention. MRV and MIRV testing and deployments would be halted, thus giving neither side an opportunity to gain advantage. Research and development, an area which is inherently unverifiable and hence uncontrollable, would continue. The ban on further deployments would encompass land- and sea-based ballistic missiles, strategic bombers, and ABM radar construction and upgrading along with associated missiles. The halt would apply only to strategic offensive and defensive nuclear systems. It would not in any way affect the current deployment of ground forces, air and sea units, or of tactical nuclear weapons. We would be as prepared to deal with any contingency – strategic, tactical, nuclear, and conventional – as we are today.
Third. The halt would be for a 6-month period with an automatic lapse unless renewed in the same or in modified form by both sides. Initially, this would be long enough to provide negotiating room and short enough to forestall either sides' having the jitters. Of course, if we detect Soviet cheating, we would have the option to call off the whole arrangement. If all works satisfactorily, both sides could extend the temporary halt.
Fourth. Both sides would agree to rely on national means of verification to detect violations. For the United States this means utilization of our ample technological capabilities. For the Soviet Union, it means also the ample supplement obtainable by reading American newspapers. Given the all-encompassing nature of the temporary agreement, both sides would have high confidence of being able to detect cheating. Any new deployment would be a violation, and would bring an end to reciprocal restraint.
Problems associated with detection and verification need to be looked at closer when it comes to making a final agreement. These problems are not an excuse for rejecting the interim arrangement I propose.
Fifth. As a measure of precaution, we should maintain a high state of readiness to resume testing and deployment programs.
The limited duration of the initial suspension makes possible the breadth of its coverage. As I see it, this approach has the advantages of more limited proposals to ban MIRV testing or ABM deployment and the like, without involving their disadvantages. More limited proposals which focus on banning one or more weapons systems are open to the charge that compensatory actions in other weapons systems could upset the balance. For example, simply prohibiting MIRV testing and deployment would do nothing about ABM systems, and simply banning ABMs would leave the MIRV threat intact. Pressures to resume deployments and make new deployments are bound to arise in such situations.
A mutual interim strategic standstill takes no chances with our security. No one in the Nixon administration has argued, and I believe no one can argue, that no matter what happens, our security could be impaired over such a short period of time. The President and the Secretary of Defense have said that we are in good shape now and in the short term, and that our only cause for concern might be the possible situation in the mid-1970's. For example, even the very first stage of the supposedly "vital" Safeguard ABM system is not due to become operational until 1973 at the earliest.
The immediate benefit to the United States of a MISS is that it would halt Soviet ABM and SS-9 buildups and multiple warhead tests. The Nixon administration points to these ongoing Soviet programs as the cardinal reasons for U.S. ABM's and MIRV's. To be specific, Secretary Laird has said that 420 SS-9's with three warheads per missile could destroy almost all of our Minuteman missile force. But if we do not act now to hold off this MIRVing potential, the situation could only become worse. The Soviets eventually could develop a five or a 10 headed MIRVed missile, and with a force of only 300 SS-9's do more damage that at present. Can this kind of development be checked by anything other than an arms control agreement? Would a 6-months freeze, which I have proposed, make the threat of the SS-9 greater?
Of course, U.S. ABM and MIRV programs would be suspended as well. But this should be no cause for concern. Those who still take great comfort in U.S. "superiority" in numbers of nuclear warheads and technology ought not to be disturbed by the mutual freeze. To the extent that this superiority is translatable into diplomatic and strategic currency, the mutual freeze leaves the United States with those advantages as well.
Another benefit from a mutual interim strategic standstill is that it keeps the door open for permanent agreement either along the same overall freeze lines or along more limited lines. So in a sense, Mr. President (Mr. HOLLINGS), it would be a negotiator's pause.
Without this pause, all chances of banning MIRV's and ABM's are lost. Once both sides go beyond present testing of MIRV's and deployment of ABM's, banning becomes impractical. In the case of the MIRV's, we would not be able to detect with confidence whether or not they are being deployed. The Soviet Union is not nearly far enough along – if they have started at all – on a MIRV testing program. If an agreement is not made which prevents their testing and they do develop MIRV's, they could deploy this weapons system by the simple process of putting new upper stages on their present missiles and by changing internal guidance systems. These operations present some difficulty for detection. As is now well known, our own country is well down the road with MIRV testing. MIRV deployments are readied for next January. Once these take place, the door is completely shut on the possibility of banning MIRV's. For once MIRV's are placed on missiles, the only means of verification is onsite inspection and a can opener.
Neither the Russians nor ourselves are prepared for this degree of intrusive inspection.
So far as ABM's are concerned, deployment would create problems of political inertia as well as problems of verification. Once present ABM deployment schedules are met, political pressures would make it difficult, if not impossible, to tear it down. The technical verification problem concerns the potential for upgrading present radars which are associated with air defense. Some try to argue that the radar support for an ABM system cannot be banned effectively because of this. Given all the difficulties with sophisticated radars in general, this argument seems to me overdrawn. It is no easy task to make existing radar much better, and my proposal would ban the construction of new radars.
If, at the end of the freeze period, we decide that MIRV's and ABM's serve some useful purpose vis-a-vis other nuclear powers, we can make other kinds of agreements which do not ban these systems.
Finally, if the talks make unsatisfactory progress, or if we become dissatisfied with the freeze, both sides can go forward on their own.
The point is that only a mutual temporary, freeze preserves all three of these options.
SALT is a very complicated and sensitive matter. The technical aspects, the intricacies of strategic thinking, the potentialities of different weapon systems, are not easy to comprehend – especially when all the pieces must be fitted together in an agreement. No one can be confident today as to what a good agreement should look like at this time, and we should not commit ourselves to any long-term arrangement without careful negotiations.
At the same time, Mr. President, it would be an enormous tragedy to see reasonable options destroyed because those in positions of responsibility do not have the will to preserve them. We do not need to know all the answers in order to institute a temporary freeze. All we need to know is that our national safety will not be impaired by the freeze, and this we do know.
The best way to decide about the complexities of an agreement and what is necessary to maintain confident mutual deterrence is to talk to the Soviets as we are doing, but also to give the negotiators the chance to talk meaningfully by freezing the strategic situation.
The only risk in this proposal, as I see it, is the possibility that the Soviets might reject the proposal. Such rejection could lead to a chorus of "I told you so's." But those making up this chorus would be the same people who oppose a freeze. I believe the proposal is worth this risk.
II. THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY: THREE ROADBLOCKS To SUCCESSFUL SALT
President Nixon has repeatedly said that we are leaving the era of confrontation and entering "an era of negotiation." With respect to SALT, his mixture of negotiation and confrontation can best be described as "massive ambiguity."
This "massive ambiguity" appears on three fronts: his linking SALT with other political issues, his strategic criteria, and his negotiating tactics.
Let me deal with each of these three points briefly.
First, shortly after President Nixon assumed office, we began to learn that he thought of strategic arms talks with the Soviets as a part of our over-all relationship with the Soviet Union. This was a sensible and admirable thought – except that it was carried to an extreme. Well before Helsinki, he stressed that SALT depended on progress toward settlements in Vietnam, the Middle East, and Europe. In other words, unless the Soviet Union made concessions in those other areas, no real movement could be expected on SALT.
While the President was deciding whether such talks could even begin without progress on these other fronts, precious time was lost. Now that the talks are underway, it is not clear whether the President is prepared to reach any kind of agreement with the Soviets in the absence of these side concessions. To the extent that this approach remains an implicit or explicit part of the President's attitude, it can forestall substantive progress for Vienna and beyond.
By lumping negotiations on the strategic nuclear balance with tenuously related issues, the President makes SALT agreement much less likely. There are real differences of interests and different issues involved, in these separate areas. Should we deny or reject the common interest we have with the Soviets in curtailing the costs and risks of the strategic arms race because our interests conflict in Vietnam or elsewhere? Does the President's phrase an "era of negotiation" mean a complete across-the-board agreement with the Soviets or no agreement at all?
If the "era of negotiations" is ever to arrive in fact, we must try to negotiate what is negotiable.
Second, the President seems to be basing his SALT policies on strategic criteria which, if I guess at them rightly, are incompatible with the goal of negotiating and stabilizing the balance. I stress the guesswork because the President said in his recent state of the world message, "We reached general agreement within the government on four specific criteria for sufficiency." His statement, however, did not explicitly identify those criteria. Withholding of this information, I might add, is a serious departure from the view of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations that the objective of deterrence and the U.S. interest are best served if the Soviets know where we stand and why.
Until the President tells us what he has in mind, however, we can piece parts of the picture together from his own words. He says:
The strategic doctrine that had gained the greatest acceptance by the time my Administration took office was this: According to the theory of "assured destruction," deterrence was guaranteed if we were sure we could destroy a significant percentage of Soviet population and industry after the worst conceivable Soviet attack on our strategic forces.
Then President Nixon went on to say that–
The growing strategic forces on both sides pose new and disturbing problems. Should a President, in the event of a nuclear attack, be left with the single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians, in the face of the certainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans? Should the concept of assured destruction be narrowly defined and should it be the only measure of our ability to deter the variety of threats we may face?
I submit that this statement abounds with errors of fact and logic. As a matter of fact, both Secretary McNamara and Secretary Clifford defined assured destruction "as the ability to inflict at all times and under all foreseeable conditions an unacceptable degree of damage upon any single aggressor, or a combination of aggressors – even after absorbing a surprise attack." This was considered the basis of deterrence. As such, it seemed and still seems a valid and sensible criterion – especially since the basis for calculating assured destruction was a very conservative one. Without even counting the lives lost due to radioactive fallout and the catastrophic disruptions on society and services, it was estimated that after absorbing a full blow on ourselves we still could kill at least 25 percent of the Soviet population and destroy upwards of 50 percent of its industrial capacity. These estimates were made in terms of the highest expected Soviet threat and a greater than expected Soviet threat – that is, under the worst possible circumstances to us.
If we already have this kind of capability, surely we have the capability both to respond to lesser attacks and to give the President more than "the single option" of holocaust. Former Defense Secretary Clifford stated that U.S. policy for years has been to "try" to provide "our forces with characteristics that will permit them to be used effectively in a limited and controlled retaliation as well as for assured destruction, thereby being prepared for any type of Soviet attack."
What kinds of capabilities and what kinds of options is the President really talking about? When the President talks about "the variety of threats we may face" does he mean the Chinese? Both the President and the Secretary of Defense talk about the Chinese threat as if it were something our present and future capabilities cannot fully manage. Again, Secretaries McNamara and Clifford made abundantly clear that our forces are designed to maintain assured destruction against both the Soviet Union and China at the same time. This judgment still seems eminently sensible in view of Secretary Laird's Posture Statement prediction that "If flight testing began in the near future, the Chinese might have as many as 10 to 25 ICBM's in 1975." How does this stack up against our present capability of about 3,000 deliverable nuclear warheads? In calling his area ABM "essential", the President seems to be saying that we need more than 100 to one superiority to deter and cope with the Chinese. If this is not enough, then nothing can suffice – since only the sane can be deterred.
While we can assume that assured destruction is one of the President's four criteria, we must also assume that his other three criteria go well beyond this. Presumably they deal with issues of defense and the fighting and winning of nuclear wars. What else could they be, until he tells us differently?
To the extent that the President would go beyond deterrence and assured destruction, we are brought again into pursuit of the will-of-the-wisp of superiority – whether it is called "relative advantage" or the new phrase "sufficiency."
These latter goals are illusions. They are based on the twin pillars of nuclear absurdity: that a nuclear war can somehow be fought in a controlled way, and that one side can emerge the victor.
Think about it, Mr. President. The one reality in the nightmare world of nuclear arms is mutual deterrence. To the extent either side tries to turn this situation to its advantage, it can lead only to the continuation of an arms race that neither side can win.
Third, the President's actions and his negotiating tactics do not seem consistent with his rhetoric about SALT. He calls MIRV and ABM deployments "essential." Even as the negotiators will meet in Vienna, deployment activities will be going forward. MIRV's will be in some missiles by June and ABM site construction is taking form.
I find it difficult to accept the administration's description of these actions as "restraint."
To justify. "negotiating from strength" as a good negotiating tactic shows a lack of understanding of the negotiating process.
In the first place, it misjudges the Soviets. For years they have resisted negotiations from a position of inferiority. Would they negotiate from such a position now or would they attempt to get parity? In the second place, it overlooks the obvious fact that agreements are based on mutuality of interests, not advantage. Both the Soviet Union and the United States are strong enough not to have to make agreements that are not in their interests.
Another point of concern is the President's leisurely pace, despite his stated interest in SALT.
The Soviets cannot be excused on this point either. Time is running out for agreements on MIRV and ABM. From what we here in the Senate hear about the President's "building block" approach, he intends to take matters slowly and one at a time. With such a view and at such a pace, what will be left to negotiate if deployments and testing continue?
Again, I want to underline my main point about negotiations. Mutually perceived parity is the best and perhaps the only basis for agreement. Agreement at this time may be our last hope against increased dangers of nuclear holocaust and a terrible drain on our resources and our people. Unless we act now to preserve parity and the possibilities it offers, it will vanish through Soviet and U.S. actions and responses.
III. CONCLUSION: ACTING NOW AND ACTING FOR THE FUTURE
President Nixon called this resolution "irrelevant." This choice of word invites two questions. Is it "irrelevant" because it is not feasible and desirable? If so, he should explain. Is it "irrelevant" because it is what he himself really wants? If so, why does he not propose it?
With only slight differences, a mutual interim strategic standstill has been proposed by a group of experts in the American Assembly and by the President's own Arms Control General Advisory Committee. Many men in both of these groups have had and still have access to all the relevant classified information on strategic nuclear forces. They know what they are talking about and they have the facts. Now, I hope that U.S. Senate will add its voice and act favorably on Senate Resolution 211, the resolution before us.
Acting now means making the temporary freeze relevant.
Acting for the future requires that the freeze be temporary. We need the time to negotiate and the time to decide. Five issues need to be thoroughly discussed with the Soviet Union and within our own Nation:
First. What to do about land-based ICBM's which are becoming vulnerable as missile accuracy on both sides improves and which invite attack on our own territory.
Second. Whether MIRV's are necessary to maintain mutual deterrence, giving us enough deliverable nuclear warheads to hedge against unexpected threats or whether a ban is feasible.
Third. Whether ABM's work, and even if they do work, do we want them, given the costs and the strategic dangers.
Fourth. What over-all political and strategic directions should we set in order to guide U.S. choices on these weapon options and on our foreign policy.
Fifth. What are our overall national priorities?
It is only by answering these and other questions that we can be ready for a final agreement. But we must act now with a temporary freeze to insure that these questions are not answered by default. This is why I propose my 6 month interim freeze.
Thoughtful Americans will recognize that this approach, if accepted by both sides, would greatly increase our national security. In no respect would it diminish our ability to protect American interests. The interim standstill would involve no element of unilateral disarmament. Instead, it would involve reciprocal restraint. Although the suspension would apply to all types of strategic weapons systems, it would not affect conventional forces and related capabilities. The breadth of the ban, and the consequent questions about compliance and verification, would be fully offset by the relatively short duration of its initial period.
In making his decision on these matters, the President would do well to remember the war in Heaven which Milton imagined in his Paradise Lost. After the first day of fighting in which the rebel angels suffered the worse, Satan sought to redress the balance of forces. He said:
Weapons more violent, perhaps more valid Armes, when next we meet, May serve to better us, and worse our foes, Or equal what between us made the odds, in Nature none.
To the amazement of his followers, Satan then produced a field gun. And in the next day's fighting, these guns wreaked havoc among the loyal angels. Losing and in their fury, the good angels grasped the absolute weapon. They tore up the hills of heaven and hurled them at the rebels. Not to be outdone, the rebels did the same. Heaven threatened with imminent ruin, God intervened and cast the rebels into darkness.
Angels, unlike men, cannot die. Men, unlike angels, cannot chance and should not want absolute weapons. Without direct divine intervention, men have to fall back on their own good sense.