December 16, 1970
Page 41782
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I wish to speak in support of the pending amendment, offered by the junior Senator from Alaska, and to state my reasons for questioning the authorization for $255 million in military and economic assistance to Cambodia.
The pending measure, H.R. 19911, and the manner in which it has been presented, have raised many questions about our future policy in Cambodia which have not yet been answered to my satisfaction or to that of many of my colleagues. I shall vote in favor of the Gravel amendment because I believe these questions can be more satisfactorily answered in the near future.
My principal concern, as I consider this aid request, is to what extent this decision, if made in haste today, will commit us to the long-term defense of the present Lon Nol government in Cambodia. Testimony received before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee indicates that this request is only the beginning of what will be necessary for Cambodia.
I find most disturbing, therefore, that without a clearly defined policy there is a very real prospect that this aid could become the first step toward United States involvement in another Vietnam – this time in Cambodia.
I know that we have received assurances from Secretaries Rogers and Laird, and from the President himself, that this is not so.
Nevertheless, the administration has yet to define just what is our policy toward Cambodia. We have been told only that this aid is essential to the progress of Vietnamization.
I wonder, and I imagine that many of my colleagues wonder, what price we must pay for this program of Vietnamization
A program which neglects the rapid collapse of the economic and social structure in South Vietnam;
A program which leaves unresolved some of the most urgent facets of this war – the release of prisoners, for example;
And a program which extends the duration of the war, not only for us but for the Vietnamese as well.
In short, there are grave shortcomings in the Vietnamization program at present. Its fate, as a purely military contingency plan, is uncertain. On this basis alone, therefore, I would find it very difficult to vote for this aid request.
A second question which has not yet been answered satisfactorily is whether this relatively small amount of aid – which we are led to believe must be appropriated immediately – will be of more than marginal value to Cambodia. Or, once we have made this initial down payment, will we be faced with the yearly argument that we cannot let Cambodia down in the middle of our commitment?
According to the testimony of the Secretary of Defense, this is what we may expect.
The administration has made no case for the urgency of this request.
The administration has told us nothing about the current situation in Cambodia or about the prospects for the Lon Nol government.
Does that government have popular support? Will its army be capable of meeting a determined effort of the North Vietnamese?
On one question there can be no doubt. The war has widened into Cambodia. We ourselves have carried the war into that country on one occasion. Our job now is to see that the United States does not again become directly involved in this expansion.
Therefore, before voting to commit the United States to this program of assistance, we need to know more about the present situation in Cambodia which has prompted this urgent and last-minute request.
I concur with the statement of the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee that this matter should receive a very serious probing before we rush to commit ourselves to we know not what.
Finally, Mr. President, I find it deplorable that the administration has waited until the last minute to come to Congress with this request, leaving us little time to examine the issues and to ask questions. I submit that we cannot make decisions of such grave importance or develop a rational policy on such short notice. Nor should we be expected to do so.
Judgments of such critical importance to our foreign policy should never be made in haste, especially when there is no clear justification of the need for haste. I intend to consider similarly presented requests in a like manner in the future.
I submit, Mr. President, that the experience of the past 6 years has shown that we cannot act and devise a policy afterwards to conform to our actions. We are all too painfully aware of the costs of such a lack of foresight.
The administration has maintained that what they have done and what they will do in Cambodia will make for a more safe and more rapid withdrawal of our forces from Vietnam.
With respect to the safety of our withdrawal, the answer is not clear.
With respect to the rapidity of our withdrawal, our past actions in Cambodia have not appreciably increased the rate of our withdrawal from South Vietnam.
Regardless of whether these administration claims are right or wrong, our decision must proceed from a careful policy review and a clear understanding of the facts of the conflict in Cambodia.
Should immediate action then be necessary, I am certain that the Members of the Senate will assume responsibility and take the necessary initiative.
We are only a month away from a new Congress which could take up this issue in depth. I commend the junior Senator from Arkansas for his willingness to do just that.
Secretary Rogers has testified that an end to the conflict in Cambodia is not in sight. I suggest that 1 or 2 months' delay in our decision will not do irreparable damage to the security of Cambodia.
Numerous sources upon which the administration may draw for aid to Cambodia over the next couple of months were cited yesterday in the Senate. I need not repeat them today.
For those of us in the Senate who voted to commit the United States to a war in Vietnam, the issue of Cambodia is symbolic of the mistake we made in the past. Yet it is also a very real issue which can bear directly on our efforts to disengage from the battle in South Vietnam.
We stand to save ourselves much grief by giving this issue the careful review it demands.
Therefore, I urge my colleagues to weigh this decision most carefully. Although we may disagree individually as to the best policy to follow in ending this war, let us be united in our firm intention that at least one aspect of our policy in Southeast Asia is clear: we will become involved in no more wars there.
Mr. President, whatever the fate of this amendment, I intend to support final passage of House Resolution 19911. I will do so because of the merit of the other items contained in this authorization measure which I feel should be approved:
The restoration of funds for programs in the Republic of China and the Philippines which were diverted for use in Cambodia;
Additional assistance to apply in the disaster relief effort in East Pakistan.
Because I do not feel that these other programs should not be sacrificed – especially the aid for East Pakistan – I will reluctantly support final passage of this legislation, even if the Gravel amendment is defeated.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I wish to state that the amendment dealing with Cambodia should be viewed as very much more important than the money involved. It is an important matter of policy which has been presented to us without opportunity to have adequate hearings. It can go over until next year without any sacrifice of money. They have the money and they will have it available under existing authority. That is all I wanted to say. It is much more important than the money being voted.
I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Idaho and then I will yield the remaining time to the Senator from Alaska.
Mr. CHURCH. If the distinguished Senator from Alaska wishes to proceed I would yield to him first.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska is recognized.
Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, if there were anything I would wish for it would be that everything I say now or have said with relation to our involvement in Southeast Asia were wrong. I would hope that the view I hold that the money being appropriated here as the first step in the web of entanglement is not the first step on the part of this administration to legally broaden the war.
The thing that would make me happiest is for my views to be wrong. Of course, only time will prove that, and I hope time will work against my view; but if not, then Members of this body have been placed on notice that this event did not slip through unheralded and that it was–
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. GRAVEL. I care not to yield. I would like to finish my comment and yield in a few moments.
It cannot be said this event slipped through unheralded or that it was overly complicated as an issue.
At this point in time we have a policy in this country with regard to Vietnam which was initiated by the Chief Executive and up until this time it remains his policy, as an individual, and also as the Chief Executive of the United States. The moment that we appropriate these moneys, and authorize these moneys, that policy is no longer his as an individual – it still remains his policy as a part of his administration – but at that time it becomes the official policy of the United States because it has been verified and sanctioned by this body.
Therefore, when we tell people in Southeast Asia and Paris or any other place in the world that we are withdrawing from Southeast Asia, and they read, not in the newspapers, but in our own budget documents, that we are spending more money, other nations can then look at us and they can judge for themselves whether or not we are truly withdrawing and whether or not we are guilty of rhetoric that says we take one step forward in order to take two steps backward.
The whole thesis that I have maintained, and that I believe my colleague, the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT) maintains, is a very simple one. We are going to get out of Vietnam one day. Some of us would hope that day would be soon. If it were soon it would save not only our money but also, and more importantly, our blood.