August 11, 1970
Page 28271
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DOMINICK). In accordance with the previous order, the Senator from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE) is recognized for 30 minutes.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, the administration's request for another billion and a half dollars to expand the Safeguard ABM program is most disturbing. It is disturbing because by the administration's own policy guidelines, this request should not have been made. It is disturbing because it comes at a time when pressing domestic needs demand that we in the Congress seek ways of safely reducing our military expenditures. But most of all, the request is disturbing because it threatens to minimize the potential of the SALT talks currently taking place in Vienna.
We should recall that those talks were planned in the hope of ending the nuclear arms race, not merely controlling its rate of expansion.
Both we and the Soviets have learned the costs and the dangers of attempting to win that race.
We have both come to recognize that the runner in first place can never hope to open a comfortable lead over the runner in second place. And neither of us can fail to see that the finish line must be either a mutual halt or a mutual holocaust.
The opening of the SALT talks, then, rested on three fundamental premises: First, that a situation existed in which both we and the Soviet Union had sufficient nuclear armaments to deter each other from launching a successful nuclear attack;
Second, that a situation existed in which both we and the Soviet Union were roughly equal in nuclear technology, and in the destructive power of deliverable nuclear warheads;
And third, that a situation existed in which both we and the Soviet Union recognized that continuation of the arms race would burden the economies of both sides with enormous military expenditures, while providing neither side with increased security.
That is why piling more ABM chips on the bargaining table in Vienna – by further testing and developing of offensive and defensive weapons systems – will, in my judgment, diminish the potential of a SALT agreement and possibly the achievement of any agreement at all.
I voted against the ABM last year, because I thought the chips on both sides were already piled high enough.
I am still of that persuasion, especially since the chips have been piled even higher by both sides in recent months – first, by our initial ABM construction and our MIRV deployments – and second, by Soviet resumption of SS-9 construction and commencement of SS-1l multiple warhead testing.
The fact is, of course, that the "bargaining chip" which the administration appears to deem so essential to its negotiating strategy was made available to the administration last year – the authorization of two ABM sites at Malmstrom Air Force Base and Grand Forks Air Force Base.
It is appropriate to inquire why we are being asked to add still another "bargaining chip" this year. Let us look at the administration's own guidelines of a year ago. On March 14, 1969, the President stated that the program would "be reviewed annually from the point of view of first, technical developments; second, the threat; and third, the diplomatic context including any talks on arms limitation."
All three criteria, I submit, now argue against providing the additional "bargaining chip."
Representatives of the administration have practically admitted that defending our ICBM's with Safeguard makes sense only against a very limited, and therefore unlikely, Soviet threat. The
technical outlook has not only failed to improve, but it has in fact worsened. And the administration has demonstrated through actual expenditures and public statements that the cost of Safeguard has risen and will continue to increase.
Turning to the second criterion, what is the "threat" today, as against a year ago?
The pace and character of Soviet missile buildups over the past year have fallen below the administration's estimates. We are given to understand that no new construction of SS-9 ICBM sites took place for a 9-month period starting last August. Similarly, the latest official estimated date for a Chinese ICBM deployment is now further away than it was last year. Our overall deterrent posture, therefore, is not endangered.
As to the third criterion laid down by the President, has the negotiating situation with respect to SALT deteriorated to the point that we now need to build up our nuclear arms?
The facts are that last year no one knew whether SALT would actually begin; that today both sides are in the midst of these vital negotiations and we hear reports that an agreement is in sight – an agreement which may ban ABM's or severely restrict them. Yet, rather than exercising restraint, as suggested by its own criterion, the administration seems to be using this situation to justify an expansion of our ABM program – an expansion which would make the goal of negotiating limits on nuclear armaments far more difficult to attain.
The administration argues that we must move forward with Safeguard in order to "negotiate from strength." Why, then, was phase I of Safeguard limited to two sites? Why did we exercise restraint before the talks began, only to escalate Safeguard when the prospects of agreement are said to be bright?
This kind of perverse persuasion overlooks what seems to me a key factor in the SALT talks – the necessity for at least rough parity – recognized by both powers – as an indispensable condition to successful negotiations.
Any development which threatens to upset that condition can only jeopardize the talks.
Our sincerity in wanting to limit strategic arms could be called into question if we expand our ABM immediately after deploying our first MIRV's. The Soviets could find it hard to avoid making countermoves. It is certainly plausible to view the resumption of SS-9 construction, new SS-11 testing and FOBS development as the first signs of just such a reaction.
Together the administration's MIRV and ABM decisions can undercut the present nuclear parity that made United States-Soviet negotiations possible. An apparent willingness to stabilize this strategic relationship brought the Soviets to SALT. A parallel willingness is in our own self interest. In such circumstances expansion of Safeguard at this time could make a meaningful agreement at SALT much more difficult to obtain and could increase the chance that the talks might fail. All the risks in such a move run against the prospects of an agreement.
In April the Senate went on record overwhelmingly endorsing a resolution for a comprehensive strategic freeze including a ban on ABM's and MIRV's. At that time, I presented a specific proposal for a mutual interim strategic standstill consistent with this resolution. With our deployment of MIRV's we have already jeopardized the opportunity for a broad agreement. Moving ahead with Safeguard could well close the door completely.
By ignoring the Senate resolution, the administration seems to be saying that it prefers only a limited agreement. How else can we explain the administration's reluctance to defer our MIRV deployments and its lack of candor in not disclosing months ago the Soviet's significant suspension of new SS-9 sites?
Despite the Senate's expressed interest and obvious responsibility in these matters, the administration has all but kept us in the dark about the Vienna talks.
In the pending bill, we have a clear opportunity to examine and test the administration's strategic and tactical wisdom. The Armed Services Committee's action in removing the "area" defense portion of the administration's ABM request does not go far enough, although it is a step in the right direction.
Our aim in evaluating Safeguard should be to maximize the potential benefits of SALT. For a meaningful SALT agreement stands to be our best defense and the most effective way of enhancing our security.
Let me examine these points in detail.
I. SAFEGUARD: MORE QUESTIONABLE PERFORMANCE AT GREATER COST
Last year, in the face of criticisms by an impressive array of scientists, the administration maintained that Safeguard could do the job it was supposed to do. For example, many distinguished scientists argued that the Soviets would have little trouble attacking ABM radars and thus blinding the entire system. But the administration brushed aside such criticism. This year, however, Defense Department officials admit that these radars might well be vulnerable. In fact, they have budgeted funds for research and development of better site radars.
The administration also now effectively admits that Safeguard as envisioned will be unable to handle likely future Soviet threats. In his fiscal year 1971 posture statement, Secretary Laird stated:
If the Soviets deploy a MIRV on the SS-9, improve their ICBM accuracy, and do not stop building SS-9's at this time . . . we would then be faced in the mid-70's with a threat which is much too large to be handled by the level of defense envisioned in the Safeguard system, without substantial improvement and modification.
By the Secretary's own estimates, the Soviet capacity to mount such a threat – and to render Safeguard obsolete – is likely.
The cost-inefficiency of Safeguard is also apparent. Nongovernmental experts have calculated that the minimum price of defending one Minuteman ICBM would run between $20 and $25 million, while the ICBM itself is valued at $3 million. Moreover, the Soviets could offset any effect of Safeguard with offensive weapons and penetration aids at a fraction of Safeguard's cost.
Many scientists therefore argue that, even if SALT fails, alternative ways of maintaining a sufficient retaliatory capacity in the future should be considered before moving forward any further with Safeguard missile defenses. This is reason enough for halting Safeguard deployment at the present time.
No wonder the administration is actively exploring other alternatives and is budgeting approximately $160 million for development of land-mobile ICBM's, "super-hardened" missile silos, and advanced sea-based missile systems.
II. THE SOVIET THREAT
Let us examine the administration's alarm about a Soviet SS-9 threat. Apparently, no new SS-9 construction was undertaken by the Soviets between August 1969 and June of this year.
The administration's apparent worries about a major SS-9 threat is that the SS-9's will be refitted to carry MIRV's. Last year, it was estimated that the Soviets could have simple MIRV's deployed in 1970 and the more sophisticated MIRV's as early as mid-1972. But there have been no indications that the Soviets did in fact deploy MIRV's last year, and there have been no statements to suggest that they have even flight-tested a MIRV. Since MRV's are considered a technological prelude to MIRV's, it seems even less likely that the Soviets can begin deploying the latter by 1972.
Finally, let us not forget that ICBM's represent only a fraction of our deterrent power. Our fleet of 656 Polaris missiles on 41 submarines, for example, is viewed by the administration as being safe from any attacks the Soviets could conceivably launch in the foreseeable future.
In the case of the supposed Chinese threat, the speculation is still more far-fetched. Last year's estimate of a possible Chinese ICBM level of 10 to 25 by 1975 assumed an initial ICBM test firing in 1970. No firing has yet occurred. Moreover, in his fiscal year 1971 posture statement, Secretary Laird admitted that a force of 10 to 25 Chinese ICBM's is now more likely sometime in 1977 or 1978 – a "slippage" of more than 2 years.
Insofar as possible deployment of Chinese ICBM's is concerned, a "thin" ABM for the United States is not needed to cope with this contingency. Our massive deterrent capabilities are clearly more than sufficient to dissuade Chinese leaders from launching a nuclear attack.
The fact that official cost estimates for Safeguard have increased makes the request to proceed with Safeguard now all the more questionable. Even the administration no longer denies the likelihood of future "cost growth" for a technically suspect system directed to meet a no less suspect threat.
This year, for example, estimates for the full Safeguard deployment are up by $1.6 billion over last year. The official cost estimate of this Minuteman defense system now stands at $10.7 billion. But this figure, the so-called "DOD acquisition cost" does not include AEC costs related to nuclear warheads, operation and maintenance expenses, or the many indirect support costs.
Even without "cost growth," the true cost of Safeguard could easily run above $20 billion. And the full price of the four-site Minuteman defense package alone – based on a DOD acquisition cost of $6.5 billion – would be at least $11 billion.
III. THE ABM: A THREAT TO SALT
Last year, no one could be certain whether the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks would in fact begin and, if they did, whether progress could be made. These were the very real uncertainties which appeared to underlie the President's statement that future safeguard ABM decisions should and would be reviewed in light of SALT. Today, with the Helsinki talks behind us and the Vienna talks in progress, it appears that both sides are seriously seeking ways to contain the strategic competition on a mutually acceptable basis.
At the same time, the administration's present request to expand Safeguard threatens to sharply restrict the range of attainable agreements. It threatens to sweep away the conditions of parity which apparently brought the Soviets to the negotiating table and which make any enduring agreement possible.
The administration argues that the more we deploy the ABM, the more we can negotiate from strength in Vienna. That argument, in my judgment, is both a tactical and a strategic mistake.
What will Moscow's response be if we forge ahead with Safeguard on the heels of our MIRV deployment? We cannot be certain, but we can make educated guesses in terms of negotiating strategy and weapons development.
On the negotiating front, the Soviets could conceivably shift to a harder line. A $1.5 billion request for expanding a system which is clearly a candidate for limitation at SALT may be viewed by the Soviets as evidence that the United States intends to either legitimize ABM deployment under a SALT agreement, or to trade the ABM for reciprocal concessions.
Under either interpretation, the groups within the Kremlin power structure arguing against SALT, or giving it very low priority, may well be strengthened. Rather than induce Soviet negotiators to accept meaningful limitations on their SS-9 deployments, the administration's use of Safeguard as a "bargaining chip" may be more likely to stimulate Soviet missile expansions – to counter our new chip with another chip of their own.
In April, the Pentagon announced that we would begin deploying the MIRV – a weapon which many of us in the Senate had hopefully thought our negotiators in Vienna would try to ban. The Pentagon began deploying this destabilizing new weapon in June. It has since announced that Poseidon MIRV's will be deployed on our submarines in December, and that a contract has been let for construction of a new strategic bomber – the B-1. For those of us who have questioned these moves, the recent Soviet resumption of the SS-9 missile program therefore comes as no surprise.
Continued deployment of Safeguard will almost certainly mean further Soviet increase in offensive missile construction – both land- and sea-based – and in multiple warhead tests. After all, Soviet planners faced with an expanding ABM may well feel the need to maintain their deterrent as a "hedge" against the possibility that SALT might fail. The administration justified our MIRV by contending that we had to fear an enlarged Soviet ABM growing out of their small and vulnerable Moscow defense. Would it be surprising if the Soviet now reacted similarly?
In addition to offensive buildups, the Soviets could also react to Safeguard by carrying forward their own ABM program. While strategic analysts may cringe, the political logic here is simple. The Soviets might rationalize more ABMs for three reasons – to bargain away our ABM, to be able to match our ABM under some kind of SALT accommodation, and to avoid being "secondbest" in ABM if SALT fails.
Uncertainties and ambiguities in our words and our deeds would have to be resolved by the Soviets in a manner consistent with their own security.
Even though the first phases of Safeguard constitute a relatively small deployment, the Soviets would have a justifiable concern that a Minuteman defense system is simply a first step to a larger one with nationwide coverage, which could pose a threat to their deterrent. Regardless of our own doubts about Safeguard's effectiveness, they could not ignore the technological fact that the radar network, production base, and long-range Spartan missiles associated with a Minuteman defense system make an expanded capacity feasible. And they could not easily distinguish between deployments geared for ICBM defense and deployments supporting area defense.
Furthermore, the Soviets could not be expected to trust our good intentions when it comes to curtailing Safeguard. For they undoubtedly would appreciate the difficulty of trying to halt a military system once deployment has begun. Moreover, an area ABM defense purportedly directed against China would make no sense at all as a "bargaining chip" with the Soviets.
The administration's posture on Safeguard is all the more inexplicable when viewed in the light of probable SALT outcomes. If the talks to date indicated that an agreement would permit fairly high ABM levels, one might begin to understand the administration's argument that the decision to continue with Safeguard is consistent with SALT.
But quite the opposite indication has been reported in the press, and at least unofficially verified from many knowledgeable quarters. At most, it looks as if SALT might come out with very low ABM levels, perhaps limited to protection of Moscow and Washington. There is also still reason to hope and work for a complete ABM ban. Such ABM agreements might well be negotiated with the Soviets. Reports from SALT suggest that they favor a total ABM ban or at most very low permitted levels.
The reversal of Soviet attitude on ABM's is one of the great ironies of the nuclear age.
Throughout the 1960's, we based our policies on the premise that ABM's were costly and destabilizing while the Soviets seemed to believe the contrary. Adding up the administration's statements on the importance of ABM's and its request for funds, we may now have a topsy-turvy situation where the Soviets appear to be more interested in limiting ABM's than we are.
The net result of these moves and countermoves can only be harmful to SALT. Rather than bringing both sides toward agreement, the administration's negotiating tactics are moving both sides away from an acceptance of parity and diminishing the likelihood of reaching meaningful limitations.
An atmosphere of sincerity so essential to progress can turn into one of hostility and polemics, as ABM's increase and offensive force levels rise again. The range of possible agreements will narrow, thus leaving the negotiators with less and less to talk about. We would risk losing the opportunity for a comprehensive agreement which could significantly curtail the arms competition. And all that might be left would be an agreement with limits placed on numbers of offensive launchers, perhaps no ban on MIRV's, and ABM's set at agreed levels – in short, no qualitative restrictions or meaningful reductions.
That is why, when SALT resumed in Vienna last April, I proposed a mutual 6-month freeze on the testing of multiple warhead missiles and the deployment of strategic offensive and defensive weapons systems. I offered this as a negotiator's pause – to halt the arms race in all its dimensions so that both sides could determine whether a continuing freeze would be feasible and whether it would facilitate more complex and enduring agreements. At that time, the Senate overwhelmingly endorsed a resolution calling for a comprehensive nuclear weapons freeze.
But these suggestions were ignored, and the administration has instead moved in exactly the opposite direction. The President chose not to defer our MIRV deployments. He is going forward with advanced research and development programs for bombers and missiles. And he has requested funds for expansion of our ABM.
An agreement permitting even limited ABM's and MIRV's would be far less effective than a broader plan. It would codify the balance at higher rather than lower levels. It would be more difficult to verify than an agreement which prohibited these systems completely.
It may be that the administration does not want a comprehensive measure, but is more than willing to settle for a limited one. Why else has it moved forward with major programs which the negotiators are seeking to limit? Why else did the administration fail to inform us that the Soviets had halted new SS-9 construction last August?
But even now there is a chance for a MIRV ban. It is we who have begun deployment of MIRV, not the Soviets. We should be prepared to halt our program and remove the few MIRV's already deployed within the context of an appropriate agreement.
To be sure, a carefully-designed, though limited, agreement would be better than none. But we need not settle for second-best now. We can at least have a shot at the best. We can control our own ABM program to preserve the option for a broad measure of agreement and maximize the chance of a dramatic and meaningful success at SALT.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the Senator from Maine yield at that point?
Mr. MUSKIE. I yield.
Mr. TOWER. Is the Senator suggesting that we should unilaterally disband our efforts to develop a MIRV without exacting anything in exchange?
Mr. MUSKIE. No. I have suggested, in the remarks I have just made, that we halt deployment of MIRV at this point. The weapons system has already been developed. I take it that it has been developed satisfactorily, since we have deployed it. I recommended, almost a year ago – last fall – that the first step we ought to recommend at SALT, in Vienna, should be a mutual halt to further development and deployment of any offensive or defensive weapons for 6 months, as a negotiator's pause, so that we would not be caught in the trap of escalating nuclear arms of one kind or another, offensive or defensive, on both sides, to the point that it would be difficult to reach agreement on a halt, let alone a rollback to some reasonable and responsible level.
Mr. TOWER. Is the Senator suggesting that we initiated the arms race, that we are primarily responsible for escalation – in other words, that the Soviets are not equally responsible for escalating the arms race, that it is we who are doing so?
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I made no such evaluation. The arms race probably started with Adam and Eve.
We are talking about stabilizing the nuclear arms race, having once reached rough parity with one another.
That, I take it, is the objective of the administration. That, I take it, is the objective of the Senator from Texas. That is my objective.
My difference with the administration is that I think, having reached rough parity, we should try to stay at that level for a reasonable time until we have explored the possibility of SALT.
Mr. TOWER. In other words, the Senator contends that we should do that whether the Russians do it or not.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, let me point out that I understand the Russians halted the deployment of SS-9's and did not resume it until this June. In that 9 months, we moved on through deployment of MIRV and through beginning construction of an ABM system. During that 9-month period, there was activity on our part that was unmatched by the Russians, to which they responded with the resumption of their SS-9 program.
Mr. TOWER. Has the United States tested the Fractional Orbital Bomb System – FOBS?
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, may I say that undoubtedly, on both sides, each side is exploring new developments that the other side has not touched.
If we undertake to wait for a SALT agreement until each side has fully explored the number of initiatives it has undertaken, we will never get an agreement on stabilizing the nuclear arms race.
At some point we had to achieve rough parity – and I have used that word advisedly – and that may have created some risks. It will take intelligent, alert, and informed evaluation to maintain that kind of rough parity.
That is what moved both sides to engage in the SALT talks. That made the SALT talks possible.
We ought not to upset the balance or risk upsetting the balance in the course of the talks.
Mr. TOWER. Does the Senator from Maine believe that our decision to initiate Phase 1 of the Safeguard system was a positive inhibition on our effort to arrive at some sort of meaningful agreement in the SALT talks?
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I do not know that one would state my position as a belief. I do not have recourse to the intelligence estimates which would give me the basis for a belief. I have an idea, however, that the talks moved forward in spite of the decision made last year and not because of it. There were indications before the Senate acted.
Mr. TOWER. But the Senator will concede that there were dire predictions that SALT would never come about if we adopted Phase 1 of the ABM.
Mr. MUSKIE. I heard predictions today. There will always be predictions. It is a serious debate involving a serious policy question about national security. To a great extent those of us not in the administraton are operating in the dark and perhaps those inside the administration are also operating in the dark.
Dire predictions remain. They are not always borne out. I am afraid that we have to proceed on our best judgments, on the present evaluation of the situation as it exists.
I did not make dire predictions last year. But I felt that the decision to move ahead with the first phase of Safeguard was not a wise step to take. That step has been taken now. We have to evaluate it. I am willing to do so on the basis of the administration's own guidelines which I evaluated in the beginning of my remarks before the Senator from Texas came to the floor. Using the administration's own guidelines of a year ago, deployment of phase II is not justified.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, the administration does not seem to feel that the decision to proceed with phase II of the Safeguard would be somehow an inhibition or disadvantage insofar as it would prevent a successful conclusion of the SALT talks.
Does the Senator from Maine have some intelligence that would lead him to believe otherwise, that is superior to that of the administration's?
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, if the administration believed that deploying phase II of Safeguard would end the SALT talks and it still proceeded to resume deployment, I would be shocked. Of course, I believe that the administration believes in its position. I do not have any intelligence with regard to this matter at all. I have not been advised by the administration of the status of the Vienna talks. I am not in as informed a position as I would like to be to evaluate this with respect to the Soviet attitude on the talks.
I can only proceed on the basis of consultations with people who have been close to the matter for years and who understand its implications better than I did, and perhaps better than I still do, and on their ideas and evaluation of the moves on both sides.
Mr. TOWER. Has the Senator read the classified testimony given before the subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee by Mr. Smith and Mr. Nitze on the SALT talks?
Mr. MUSKIE. No, I have not.
Mr. TOWER. I would suggest that the Senator read it.
Mr. MUSKIE. I would be happy to do so.
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. MUSKIE. I yield.
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, do I understand that the position of the Senator from Maine is that the SS-9, which the Soviets apparently stopped deploying for a period of 8 or 9 months, was resumed by the Soviets because the United States proceeded with phase I of the ABM?
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I stated the facts. The SALT talks began last year, after the Senate had voted on the ABM. Yet, from August until June, the Soviets discontinued new deployments of SS-9s. In the next 9-month period, despite the fact that several in the Senate and in the country urged that we halt MIRV deployment or at least delay MIRV deployment, we went ahead with that system. In July, the Soviets resumed deployment of the SS-9's.
Those are the facts. I think that the conclusion that the Soviet action on the SS-9's was in response to the steps we had taken in that 9-month period is more logical than any other conclusion I have read or heard as to their reason. Maybe the Senator from Iowa has a better reason.
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, the Senator from Maine has been responsive to my question, and I appreciate that. But if the Senator wants to pursue that kind of logic, we can say that since the SS-9 was stopped for a few months, we had the World Series baseball games and we had the Redskins playing a lot of football games. Why, since those are the facts, would I necessarily conclude that those facts had any reference to the resumption of the SS-9 deployment?
I would say that the mere fact that we proceeded with the first stage of the ABM, which will take several years to complete, is certainly no basis for saying that the Soviets therefore began the resumption of the SS-9. I cannot see the relevancy of it.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I am sure that the Senator cannot. I assure the Senator that I do not reach my conclusion on this matter because of the playing of some baseball games. The Senator's remarks regarding my logic is his personal privilege. I suggest it is not as anomolous a sequence of events as the Senator from Iowa logic might seem to suggest.
Mr. MILLER. May I say to the Senator–
Mr. MUSKIE. In the absence of Soviet activity for 9 months, which was followed by resumption of the deployment of the SS-9, following action we took in that period to change our posture offensively and defensively, I say it is a proper conclusion to reach. I have heard similar logic used on the Senator's side of this argument.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired. Under the previous order, the Chair is to recognize the Senator from Washington at this time.
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Maine may have 5 additional minutes so we may conclude our colloquy.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, if I am going to have 5 minutes of time, I would like to finish my speech. We are proceeding, in any case, on the time of the distinguished Senator from Washington. I would not ask for time for either purpose without the agreement of the Senator from Washington, who has been most generous in yielding his place to me this afternoon.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Iowa? Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MUSKIE. I hope I may have some of that time.
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I know the Senator wishes to finish his speech. My point is that I do not believe the Senator made a valid argument by saying that during this 9-month period a fact took place. The fact that took place was that the ABM first stage was commenced, and it will be years before it is completed so that the Soviets would have any basis for increasing their SS-9 capability. I do not believe the Senator's point is well taken.
It would be unfortunate if he based his conclusion on this amendment by the mere fact that the first stage of a longtime ABM program commenced during that 9-month program.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I have 42 pages of reasons for my position. My reasons are not limited to the one with which the Senator disagrees. Also, the RECORD will show the Senator's opinion of my logic, and my opinion. I guess we should leave it at that.
Mr. President, I shall quickly wrap up the remainder of my prepared remarks.
IV. THE CHOICE WE FACE
The administration's fiscal year 1971 budget request of $1.45 billion is for the purpose of first, continuing deployment of Safeguard sites at the Minuteman complexes authorized last year; second, initiating deployment of another site at a third Minuteman complex; and third, preparing five additional ABM sites, one more at a Minuteman complex and four around the country as "area" defense.
If this request is granted, the Safeguard ABM program will have received appropriations totaling over $3 billion.
Of course, if the money were needed to buy us needed security, it would be worth it. But, as we have seen – by the administration's own statements and measured against its own guidelines – further Safeguard deployment at this time is neither necessary nor appropriate to preserve our deterrent. And it poses the gravest danger to real success at SALT.
Looking at the larger budget items associated with the fiscal year 1971 request, we see a requested authorization of $1.027 billion to pay for continued procurement, construction, and direct support of the two phase I sites, and $298.4 million to begin construction of a third Minuteman defense site. Full deployment of the administration "package" for Minuteman defense – which adds to a fourth site – would eventually cost a minimum of $6.5 billion by DOD accounting but almost twice this amount in total real costs.
The smallest item in the ABM request for this year is $40 million to begin advance preparation of five additional ABM sites. Four of those sites would be designated as area defense against China. But such a defense means an ultimate goal of eight area sites for the continental United States – at a total cost of at least $8.5 billion – plus sites for Alaska and Hawaii.
The Armed Services Committee has recommended authorization for the Safeguard sites located at Minuteman complexes, and has rejected the request for "area" defense sites. These recommendations make better sense in terms of their impact on SALT than the administration's request. By eliminating the administration's request for a start on the area ABM sites, the Armed Services Committee has performed a great service to the American public and to the possible success of SALT.
But, as I have pointed out, the committee recommendation does not go far enough:
Continued Safeguard construction of any kind runs the risk of ruining SALT, or at the very least, severely restricting the range of negotiation.
The ability of Safeguard to perform as designed and to cope with a serious Soviet threat is highly questionable.
The total cost for even a marginal amount of short-lived Minuteman protection will be enormous.
And if SALT results in a ban on ABM or a low ABM level perhaps limited to Washington and Moscow, Minuteman defense efforts would have been incredibly wasteful, or at best only highly inefficient.
Finally, it is wishful thinking to believe that approving essentially the entire budget request for Minuteman defense this year will diminish future demands for area defense. The logic of weapons development does not work that way.
For these reasons, we must explore other alternatives.
Even as we explore these alternatives, we must urge the administration to let the Congress and the public know the progress and the prospects in Vienna. The administration's reluctance to do so makes intelligent cooperation most difficult.
The Senate's authority in this area cannot be denied. Its interest and judgment are reflected in resolution 211. And its desire to relate military procurement request to foreign policy is a responsible one.
Of course, we cannot dictate from the sidelines the particular negotiating tactics to be best employed at the SALT talks in Vienna. Indeed, because the administration has undertaken no sufficient consultation with the Congress, we have no complete picture of how these negotiations stand. But we do know enough to be able to reach the sound and sensible judgment that neither our national security nor the prospects for effective control over strategic arms competition can be well served by the expansion of Safeguard at this time.
The question before us, then, is what further restrictions, if any, are appropriate at a time when we are engaged in an effort to put an end to this costly and dangerous expansion of strategic forces.
The logical alternative at this critical stage of SALT would be to withhold any further funds for ABM deployment and limit expenditures to the continuation of a research and development program. If, indeed, it is the fear of an ABM that motivates the Soviet negotiators, then this action could in no sense weaken our bargaining position. Obviously, the Soviets would have to recognize that ABM deployment could be renewed or even enlarged if the negotiations should fail.
The denial of any funds for deployment would prevent further erosion of a truly meaningful SALT agreement and avoid wasting money in the event that SALT succeeds in banning or tightly limiting ABM's. Research and development efforts would focus on carefully testing ABM components, exploring the effectiveness of Safeguard, and looking for better technical solutions.
This is the choice that logic and reason would dictate. Nevertheless, the administration has continued to argue that continuation of ABM deployment is essential as a "bargaining chip" in the SALT negotiations.
Even accepting this argument – which I find most unpersuasive – there is no justification for going beyond deployment at the two sites authorized last year. This is the alternative that has been introduced as an amendment by Senators COOPER and HART. Since it aims in the direction of arms control, I shall vote for this amendment.
It preserves fully the "bargaining chip" which the administration claims it needs in Vienna. It should satisfy those Senators concerned about maximum success at SALT but unwilling to support a total rejection of the administration's request. But it adds no more chips to our side of the table – chips that could and probably would be matched on the other side – chips that neither side may, thereafter, be willing to give up, even to achieve an effective agreement. This chip escalation is now taking place, even as both sides talk in Vienna. The Cooper-Hart amendment, however, recognizes that the way to slow down the arms race is not first to speed it up.
Given our powerful and secure deterrent forces, in the sea as well as on land and in the air, there is no threat which makes expanded deployment of Safeguard either wise or necessary. Indeed, since SALT has the potential of further improving our security, any move to make it pay off is clearly in our interest.
Some years ago, Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer drew the picture of two scorpions, locked in a bottle, aware that a sting by either of them would mean the death of both of them. The question we must, therefore, address ourselves to in the Senate is not how to accumulate more sting, but rather how to open the bottle.
Mr. President, as we review the persuasive scientific and diplomatic arguments against the ABM, I would like to draw attention to the opposition to the proposed weapons systems of a group of concerned citizens in Maine. I ask unanimous consent that the names of the signers and their petition be printed in the RECORD at this point:
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
To THE CONGRESS: STOP THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM
It's Ineffective – It's Dangerous – It's Wasteful – a threat to world peace.
We strongly oppose deployment of the "Safeguard" ABM system because:
1. It would provide little protection for the United States.
2. It would become obsolete before it could be operational.
3. It would be likely to trigger a new escalation of the arms race.
4. It would hinder negotiations for disarmament.
5. Its enormous cost would be highly inflationary.
6. It would prevent the adequate funding of essential domestic programs.
We urge: that the proposed deployment of the Anti-Ballistic Missile System be opposed and prevented.
[LIST OF SIGNATORIES OMITTED]