CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE
July 23, 1969
Page 20450
Mr. CRANSTON. I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for an additional 15 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.
Mr. CRANSTON. This argument ignores all the history of the air age. It has been shown repeatedly that conventional air power alone cannot defeat a nation.
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. CRANSTON. I yield with pleasure to the distinguished senior Senator from California.
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, do I correctly understand that my distinguished colleague will be finished in 15 minutes?
Mr. CRANSTON. I hope to be finished in 15 minutes.
Mr. MURPHY. I ask for a general purpose. I have reserved time, as he has, and I have made a complete schedule. I wonder how long the Senator desires to continue.
Mr. CRANSTON. I believe I can complete my remarks within 15 minutes, particularly if the current moment of time is not deducted.
Mr. MURPHY. I realize that the Senator has been interrupted, and I was concerned. It is not my intention in any way to deny him the floor. I am just wondering about my schedule and my arrangements.
Mr. CRANSTON. I believe I can conclude in 15 minutes.
Mr. MURPHY. I have no objection.
Mr. CRANSTON. If other Senators wish the floor, it may take a little longer than that.
Mr. MURPHY. In this case, then, I am afraid I reserve the right to object.
Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. CRANSTON. I yield.
Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. First, I desire to congratulate the distinguished junior Senator from California on his outstanding speech today. I am in complete accord with many – in fact, most – of the statements he has made. I feel that I know something about the matter, as I spent nearly a month in Vietnam in 1965 and again last year.
Very definitely, in asking for an orderly, negotiated settlement, the Senator is taking a position that all Americans feel is sound. This should not be, as it has become, an American war in Vietnam.
The distinguished junior Senator from California has expressed the factually correct statement that there are at the present time more Americans fighting in the ugly civil war in Vietnam than there were on last January 20. It is to be regretted that while we hear about de-escalation from the White House, one of the first actions of the President was to remove a distinguished negotiator, a truly great American and diplomat, Averell Harriman, and put in his place Henry Cabot Lodge, who is a close friend of Vice President Ky, the flamboyant air marshal.
So it is discouraging to contemplate the situation with which we are now confronted. The period of service of most of the 4½ percent of the Americans withdrawn from Vietnam by order of President Nixon had about expired.
I am in agreement with the views of the Senator from California with respect to escalating the combat. It seems to me that combat has been escalated in recent months despite what has been said. Any person who reads the statistics of the number of troops killed and wounded in Vietnam cannot help but agree. During May, June, and so far in July more Americans have been killed and wounded in Vietnam than the total number of South Vietnamese.
The Senator is also correct in calling attention to bombing by our air power, and what would happen if that is escalated, as some Senators on the other side of the aisle have been advocating recently, and what would happen if we interdict the port of Haiphong, where few supplies come in anyway. The Senator is correct in stating that that course would jeopardize our position there.
I am sure the Senator and I are in agreement that Vietnam is of no importance whatever to the defense of the United States. I shall not take any more of the Senator's time except to say that Gen. James Gavin has said that to increase the bombing and to bomb Hanoi would add to our problems rather than detract from them, and that it would not stop the penetration of North Vietnamese troops into the South. General Ridgway, who was the commander of U.S. Forces during the Korean war, and who is an expert on Asian affairs – he was also my commander during World War II – said:
It is my firm belief there is nothing in our code that requires us to bomb a small Asian nation back into the Stone Age period.
Again, I compliment the distinguished Senator from California. I agree with him. Vietnam is a national tragedy of immense proportions and the war must be brought to an end as soon as possible by negotiation. Then we will have an opportunity to take care of the problems which need our attention so much at home.
Mr. CRANSTON. I thank the able Senator from Ohio for adding those constructive thoughts and useful facts to this discussion on Vietnam.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. CRANSTON. I yield with great pleasure to the distinguished Senator from Maine.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I wish to compliment the distinguished Senator from California for making what I consider to be a very timely speech with respect to the risks and some of the problems connected with possible escalation in the fighting in South Vietnam.
That frustrations do exist is revealed, I suspect, in the mail of every Senator as people contemplate the sacrifices being asked of our young men, and as taxpayers contemplate the burdens imposed upon them without the prospect of an end.
I wish to emphasize one point which the Senator made in this connection. Hanoi and the other side should not misread this frustration and misinterpret its possible consequence. I think the enemy is relying quite heavily on the hope that this kind of frustration may lead us to panic or unilateral withdrawal, whatever the consequences, in Vietnam. I think the pressure, indeed, to be in the other direction, pressure for the kind of escalation which the Senator is discussing. I think Hanoi should pay attention to what the Senator is saying.
On our side, and indeed among some Senators, there appears to be sentiment for escalation, total military victory, and the big push. That same kind of sentiment exists in Vietnam if we are to believe the evidence available to us. Its existence apparently inhibits movement in Paris on the part of negotiators for Hanoi and the National Liberation Front.
We are not going to achieve a negotiated settlement until each side concludes that a negotiated settlement is in its own best interests.
This factor of the possibility of escalation, it seems to me, is a complicating factor here and it is a complicating factor and influence in Hanoi, as well as the National Liberation Front. So I compliment the Senator for making this point.
Secondly, I wish to compliment the Senator for pointing out the fruitless consequences that escalation would bring. We have not had this kind of discussion of the escalation options that might be considered for a long time. I think it is good for us to be reminded of them. Only one outcome of this war can serve the best interest of all the parties, and that is a negotiated settlement which will convert the conflict from a military struggle to a political struggle. That has got to be our objective. It is in the best interests of Hanoi; it is in the best interests of the National Liberation Front; and it is in our best interests.
I wish to compliment the Senator for making a speech which deals with the frustration and the difficulty of devising a formula, approach, or policy which can contribute constructively and visibly toward the objective of a negotiated settlement. It frustrates us all.
The Senator makes some suggestions in the closing pages of his speech, and I commend him for making them. I have suggested that the President should consider the formal offer of a standstill cease-fire to the other side. I think that kind of offer, coupled with the unqualified offer of free elections, which unfortunately, has now been qualified by President Thieu, could serve as an additional initiative which might just possibly move the other side another step or two toward a negotiated settlement. It is this sort of thing to which we should address ourselves: What meaningful steps can we take in our interests, and those we seek to protect, to advance the possibility of a negotiated settlement? New and continuing initiatives in this direction – an escalation of our efforts to achieve an end to the fighting and a political settlement, rather than an escalation in the fighting – should be our objective.
I commend the able Senator.
Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. CRANSTON. I shall yield to the Senator, but, first, I wish to thank the Senator from Maine and say that he is one of the great leaders of this Nation. I hope that the American people will heed his words today. I hope also, as he suggested, that his words and other words spoken in this Chamber today will be heeded by the men in Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow. If that be the case, today could get a message across that could lead to a solution in Vietnam.
I thank the Senator. I yield to the Senator from Tennessee.
Mr. GORE. I thank the Senator for yielding. I do not ask the distinguished junior Senator from Maine or the distinguished junior Senator from California to agree with the senior Senator from Tennessee. I just must say that I question the validity, probity, and actuality of a so-called peace proposal by which President Thieu offers elections which are to be conducted under his administrative authority, even though observed by an international body, and in which the Vietcong would be permitted to vote only after forswearing force and arms, such elections, we are now told, to be held 2 years after the end of the war.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from California (Mr. CRANSTON) has expired.
Mr. CRANSTON. May I ask my colleague from California what his time situation is.
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I do not in any way wish to impede my distinguished colleague. I think the colloquy and dialog now going on is most important and I also would like to enter into debate. I have no intention of cutting it off. I should like to suggest that, in order not to impede my distinguished colleague, that he be permitted all the time he desires, and, to that end, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my time, which was supposed to begin at 5 minutes after 12 be moved up to 1:30 p.m. instead, in order to accommodate my distinguished colleague from California. I think that would take care of it, would it not?
Mr. CRANSTON. Yes. I am very grateful to my colleague for his suggestion.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. What is the request of the Senator from California (Mr. MURPHY)?
Mr. MURPHY. That all the time desired be given to my distinguished colleague from California (Mr. CRANSTON) and that the time which had been reserved for me, which I believe was at 5 minutes after 12, be moved up to 1:30 o'clock p.m. in order to accommodate him, and let other Senators continue the colloquy.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair would advise the Senator from California (Mr. MURPHY) that the difficulty is that there are a series of orders already agreed to, one following another after the expiration of each speech, and thus to agree to this new arrangement would throw everything out of order.
Mr. MURPHY. In other words, the Chair rules that he would cancel my request, is that right?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair would point out that following the Senator from California (Mr. MURPHY), the Senator from Maryland (Mr. TYDINGS) will have the floor, and then the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS), and their time, of course, would be contingent upon the conclusion of the remarks of the Senator from California.
Mr. MURPHY. Well, Mr. President–
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair is willing to rule the request out of order.
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President–
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I thank the Chair. I will accommodate myself to my colleague.
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed regardless of the pending order.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. For what period of time?
Mr. CRANSTON. For 20 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I have no intention to ask for the regular order. I congratulate my colleague on being so alert, but I have no intention of asking for the regular order.
Mr. CRANSTON. I am very grateful to my colleague from California.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator from California (Mr. CRANSTON) is recognized for 20 minutes.
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, evidence has just been placed before the Senate that my colleague and I do agree on procedural matters, and I want to say that there are also some substantive matters on which we agree, even though our views may be different on the matter I am presently discussing.
Mr. President, the other day I heard a powerful Senator complaining because we have not interdicted the port of Haiphong.
The U.S. Navy could surely stop all sea shipments to Haiphong and elsewhere into North Vietnam, and could halt most of the local small marine traffic along the coast.
This would require a major step-up in American military activities, however. And, our vessels engaged in this activity would at once be targets for North Vietnamese retaliation.
Soviet-produced land-based and STYX missiles would almost certainly be hurled against our forces.
We would have to step up our air activities to protect our naval operations. The new dimension of naval and air operations would cost us additional billions a year, and additional casualties
We could choose the simpler course of mining the approaches to Haiphong and other North Vietnamese harbors. We would, in either case, face a major confrontation with the Soviet Union the first time we stopped or sank a Russian ship.
For all that, sealing off North Vietnam's ports would not stall the North Vietnamese war machine. The Soviet Union, and perhaps China, too, would simply step up supplies to North Vietnam by land. Even now, virtually all military supplies come to North Vietnam by overland routes, and at the height of our bombing we were unable to cut off these supplies.
Another step many escalationists have urged is unrestricted use of American air power over North Vietnam. The air power alone, they believe, could bring the North Vietnamese to their knees.
This argument ignores all the history of the air age. It has been shown repeatedly that conventional air power alone cannot defeat a nation. It did not work in Vietnam where our earlier restrictions were designed primarily to keep our bombs away from populated areas. It did not work against Germany in World War II when we bombed without restriction, nor did it work against Japan until we went to nuclear bombs.
The evidence is clear that terror bombing does not break a people's morale. In some instances after saturation bombing of populated areas military production actually increased. Short of nuclear warfare, air power alone cannot win in Vietnam.
Suppose, instead, that we invade North Vietnam. Our aims would be to take over all of North Vietnam, and capture Ho Chi Minh if we could. We would want to gain complete control over North Vietnamese production, transportation, and communication facilities. And, by firm military occupation, we would seek to suppress hostile activities of the population to eliminate North Vietnam as a viable military force.
But, clearly, that could not be done without calling up added millions of American troops.
A half million Americans have been sent to South Vietnam where only some of the population is hostile and where a very substantial part is either actively cooperative or neutral.
If we took on all of North as well as South Vietnam, we would be tackling a totally hostile population that has been propagandized for years with an intense hatred of Americans as foreign invaders.
Even with millions of Americans fighting, we still would be outnumbered by people who surely will never meet us in a conventional military engagement of large-scale forces.
There is absolutely no reason to think that the North Vietnamese would ever surrender to us.
Let us admit the best and the worst of our foe: He has demonstrated his willingness to resist until the last man, woman, and child.
The North Vietnamese are now in their 28th year of almost constant fighting: First against Japan, then France, then South Vietnam, and now the United States.
[Remainder of debate omitted]