CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE
December 15, 1969
Page 39168
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question now recurs on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Kentucky and the Senator from Montana.
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from Colorado (Mr. ALLOTT), the Senator from California (Mr. CRANSTON), the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS), and myself, I send to the desk a substitute amendment, which reads as follows
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.
Mr. CHURCH. I ask unanimous consent that I may read the amendment to the Senate instead of the clerk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.
Mr. CHURCH. The amendment reads as follows:
On page 46. between lines 8 and 9, insert a new section as follows:
"SEC. 643. In line with the expressed intention of the President of the United States, none of the funds appropriated by this act shall be used to finance the introduction of American ground troops into Laos or Thailand without the prior consent of Congress."
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the name of the distinguished senior Senator from Arkansas (Mr. McCLELLAN) be added as a cosponsor of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. CHURCH. I ask for the yeas and nays on the substitute amendment.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. CHURCH. I ask unanimous consent also that the name of the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER) be added as a cosponsor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. CHURCH. I am happy to yield.
Mr. TOWER. Does the amendment mean that we would have to immediately withdraw all ground troops we now have in Thailand? Because we do have Army troops and pre-positioned equipment in Thailand. The way the substitute amendment is written, it would seem to mean the troops we have there now would no longer be permitted.
Mr. CHURCH. I think the answer to the Senator's question is clearly contained in the language of the proposed substitute.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senator suspend, so that we may have order?
Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield another half minute? I hope the members of the Appropriations Committee, if we are going to have a discussion on the substitute, will see if they cannot come down to the committee room, and we can come back for the roll call.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I wonder if it would not be possible to vote on this question in 5 minutes. It should not take much discussion. Would that be sufficient, the time to be equally divided?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, we should extend it a little longer than 5 minutes.
Mr. CHURCH. I ask unanimous consent for 15 minutes on each side.
Mr. MANSFIELD. One-half hour, to be equally divided.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.
Mr. CHURCH. Now, Mr. President, I ask for order.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order.
Mr. CHURCH. In response to the question of the Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER), the pertinent part of the amendment reads:
None of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be used to finance the introduction of American ground troops into Laos or Thailand.
It is true that we have personnel there. But the amendment conforms to the expressed intention of the President; it reinforces the presidential position; and yet it asserts the constitutional right of the Senate, in an appropriation bill, to determine how public funds will be used, and makes it clear that the Senate is opposed to the introduction of ground combat troops into either country, unless we first have an opportunity to pass judgment on that question.
Mr. TOWER. Will the Senator yield for a further question?
Mr. CHURCH. I am happy to yield.
Mr. TOWER. The term "ground combat troops" still could include those that are there, because those that we have there are capable of engaging in combat. They are trained for combat. They are not actually in combat, true, and it is not anticipated that they ever will be. We hope they will not be. But they are competent to engage in combat.
Mr. CHURCH. As the Senator knows, we presently have no ground troops in Laos engaging in combat.
Mr. TOWER. That is true.
Mr. CHURCH. The President has said so. The language conforms to the Presidential position, and if there is any question concerning our meaning or intent, it should be cleared up by the discussion we are now having on this floor.
Mr. TOWER. That is all I am trying to do, establish the legislative intent.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. CHURCH. I yield.
Mr. PASTORE. If we have any lingering shadows of doubt, why not use the words "to support local forces"? Why not say "the introduction of American combat troops to support local forces"? Then we will have no ambiguity.
Mr. CHURCH. I respectfully say to the Senator that the bill authorizes money, which is now being used, to support local forces in Thailand and Laos. There is no question about that. What we are trying to achieve here is a limitation on the use of money for the purpose of financing the introduction of American ground forces into these two countries.
I think the amendment should be supported. It is in line with the expressed intention of the President and accords with our constitutional responsibilities. Moreover, it puts the President on notice that, if there is ever a change of policy that might involve the possible introduction of American combat forces into these two countries, then, in accordance with the Constitution, that question should be brought back to Congress, and Congress should exercise its will.
Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. CHURCH. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Arkansas.
Mr. McCLELLAN. In the executive session, I raised some questions about the original resolution. This substitute amendment, together with the statement by the distinguished majority leader in executive session in response to my questions, answers the questions that I had in mind, and I am happy to support it. I commend the Senator for its wording and its purpose, and for recognizing that the President has given his pledge, and that we support the President in that pledge.
Mr. CHURCH. I thank the Senator very much, and I appreciate his support. I now yield to my distinguished cosponsor, the Senator from Colorado (Mr. ALLOTT).
Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I joined in the cosponsorship of this amendment because I believe it is preferable to the very vague, in my judgment, amendment now pending before the Senate. I think it says what the Senate would like to say, and I sincerely hope that Senators will support it.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. CHURCH, I yield to the Senator from New York.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, just 1 minute. I think we are trying hard – and I hope the majority leader is listening – to deal with a situation in which, he, feeling bound by the language of the Senator from Kentucky – and I do not blame him – did not want it interfered with, and yet to express what we sense to be the will of the Senate. I think that has been done best by the combined brainpower of a number of us here, and I hope very much that the Senator from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD) and the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER) will feel they have been successful, rather than that some substitute has been suggested for the idea they presented to the Senate. I am confident that my colleague would agree with me in that.
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I certainly concur in what the Senator from New York has said.
This amendment was really offered reluctantly. The Senate has made its decision to speak out, in rejecting the motion to table. It is now clear that we intend to take a position on this very sensitive and important question. I think we should take that position in clear and precise terms, so that everyone – the President of the United States, the administration, and the American people – will know exactly where the Senate stands. We should avoid a repetition of the mistake we made in the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, when we carelessly drafted it, only to discover later that it was much broader than many who voted for it intended.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. CHURCH. I yield.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That one having been broader than we thought, we ought to be careful lest the one that restricts it be broader than we thought. Is the Senator's proposal to be interpreted as an authorization for continued bombing, or expansion of the bombing, in the north?
Mr. CHURCH. No. I would say, after the debate we had in the Senate during the closed session, that no one was quite certain what the original amendment meant.
This substitute amendment is purely limiting in its terms. The bill provides money for local forces both in Laos and Thailand. All my amendment does is to make it clear that none of the money in the bill is to be used for the purpose of financing the introduction of American ground combat troops into Laos or Thailand.
As such. it is a limitation in the bill. It is in line with our constitutional responsibility. I think it avoids the flaw in the Tonkin Gulf joint resolution which was drafted in much broader language than intended at the time Congress voted in such haste.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, to me the important significance is that that was assumed to be a grant of authority. This is a restriction. I am not at all sure that there is, and I do not believe there is, really authority for doing what we are doing now in north Laos. There is a very great question as to whether there is authority.
I wonder what the effect of this will be on the granting of authority by having only a restricted application to ground; that is, the combat troops only.
Mr. CHURCH. No. Nothing in this amendment grants any new authority to the Government.
The question the Senator raises is a separate one. All this amendment does is to limit the use of the money in the bill to make certain it is not employed for the very purpose the Senator from Arkansas does not want.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. There may be other activities in addition to using ground troops for which I do not want them to employ it.
The Senator from Mississippi said a moment ago that he thought the amendment of the majority leader would restrict bombing disconnected or not directly connected with Vietnam.
I do not know as between the two amendments. I do not wish to authorize the President to use ground troops or air power in a local war in northern Laos which is not directly connected with the Ho Chi Minh Trail and the war in Vietnam.
Mr. CHURCH. I think the Senate should speak plainly or not at all. The substitute amendment is intended to make our purpose plain. The amendment offered by the distinguished majority leader, I think, is ambiguous and unclear.
If we are to act at all, we should act in a way that is understandable to the Government and to the American people. For that reason, I would hope that the Senate would adopt the substitute amendment.
Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, to be precise and clear, does the amendment say ground troops or ground combat troops? I am trying to get to the point of the Senator from Texas.
Mr. CHURCH. It says ground combat troops.
Mr. HOLLINGS. It says only "ground troops" here. Could the Senator by unanimous consent change that to read "ground combat troops"?
Mr. CHURCH. Yes, that is how my amendment reads. In line with the expressed intention, the pertinent part should read:
None of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be used to finance the introduction of American ground combat troops into Laos or Thailand without the prior consent of Congress.
If the text of the amendment at the desk does not conform with my reading of the amendment, I ask unanimous consent that it so conform.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HART. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. CHURCH. I yield.
Mr. HART. Mr. President, I hope this is not repetitious. We say that the moneys shall not be used to finance the introduction of American ground combat troops. What about American aircraft and American ships? Are we saying that is all right?
Mr. CHURCH. We are simply not undertaking to make any changes in the status quo. The limiting language is precise. And it does not undertake to repeal the past or roll back the present. It looks to the future.
Mr. HART. Is the existing status quo inclusive of the action by air, ground, and ships, and are we saying now we should cut out the ground forces?
Mr. CHURCH. The Senator is aware of the intent. He is aware from the closed debate. In Laos and Thailand, it was never proposed in any amendment offered to roll back or change the existing situation.
We are striving to prevent Laos and Thailand from becoming new Vietnams. That is the purpose of the amendment.
And I think it is well drafted to serve that purpose.
Mr. HART. We could make it more explicit by eliminating the other features of American might.
Mr. GOODELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, how much time remains?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho has 2 minutes remaining.
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I would prefer not to yield the remainder of my time. Could the other side yield some time?
Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from New York.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York is recognized for 2 minutes.
Mr. GOODELL. Mr. President, would the Senator agree that his amendment grants no authority, that it in no way approves or disapproves of what is going on, but that it is simply directed toward making sure that in the future no ground combat troops will be introduced into Laos or Thailand?
Mr. CHURCH. Without the prior consent of Congress.
Mr. GOODELL. That is correct, That will not be done without the prior consent of Congress.
Mr. CHURCH. The Senator is correct. That is the intent.
Mr. GOODELL. That is vital. The implication has been raised that we are giving some kind of approval to the status quo of what is going on. This is a prohibition against the future occurrence of what is now going on. This grants no authority or approves nothing that is going on.
Mr. CHURCH. The Senator is correct. There is nothing in the text of the amendment itself, or the debate upon it, that could give any basis for such an interpretation. The Senator has correctly construed the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Maine.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized for 2 minutes.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, is it the intent of the amendment to prohibit or, at least, to inhibit the introduction of any additional elements of American military strength in Laos beyond the present level of military support for our allies in Laos and Thailand?
Mr. CHURCH. The intent of the amendment conforms with the language used. And the language used, the operative language used, is as follows:
None of the funds appropriated by the Act shall be used to finance the introduction of American ground combat troops into Laos or Thailand without the prior consent of Congress.
Mr. MUSKIE. Let me put this proposition. It seems to me that by being silent on the question of possible enlargement of our land activity in Laos or Thailand, the Senator's amendment may, in effect, approve that kind of enlargement of our activity in Laos or Thailand.
Mr. CHURCH. I think that the exchange between the Senator from New York and myself negates such an interpretation.
The legislative history is being written right here on the floor.
It would not be practical to attempt to legislate in a way that would unduly hamper the President in relation to the delicate problems he faces in Thailand and Laos.
We have only one objective of saying, at this time, that we do not intend any of the funds we vote in this bill to be used for the purpose of introducing American ground combat troops in Laos or Thailand.
There are many other things we might do, but they are not covered here.
Mr. MUSKIE. That indicates one reason why the distinguished majority leader prefers the ambiguity of his language rather than the language offered in the closed session.
Mr. CHURCH. No one was certain of what the other language meant.
If we are going to act, we should act with sufficient certitude that the Government and the people of the country know what we mean.
Mr. MUSKIE. We all respect, and I respect, the intention on that point. I do not challenge it.
I think this colloquy and the other colloquy has suggested the difficulty of reaching an absolute decision.
Mr. CHURCH. There is that difficulty in any action we take. We have tried to draft the language that expresses precisely the intent we have in mind.
I reserve the remainder of my time.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, this evening, with great public fanfare, the President of the United States is scheduled to make a statement in which -- according to all the reports I have seen -- he will announce further withdrawal of troops from South Vietnam.
Similar widely publicized announcements have been made concerning earlier cutbacks in troop levels not only in South Vietnam but also in Thailand.
This administration's announced policy of a lessening direct military involvement in Asia has also been given a good deal of publicity.
It is against this chorus of administration public announcements of a policy in one direction that I voice my apprehension over continuing administration silence over policy in Laos where our military involvement appears to be growing rather than declining.
As in Vietnam, the Nixon administration inherited a Laotian policy. Unlike Vietnam, where some changes appear underway, the new administration seems to have accepted everything we have done and are doing in Laos.
Most important for us in the Congress, however, the present administration to date seems determined to continue the potentially dangerous part of that policy -- the official secrecy in which our military activities are wrapped -- instituted during the Kennedy administration and continued during the Johnson years.
Mr. President, at this late date, is it too much to ask that the administration come forward to the Senate, at least, and give to the majority of the Members here the details on our activities in Laos? The Defense Appropriations Act before us finances those activities. This money bill is the only opportunity the Senate will have to discuss and in any way affect these activities in Laos.
To my knowledge there is no treaty on joint resolution granting any President authority to send military air or ground forces into Laos. We have been told by the State Department there are no executive agreements or written commitments of any kind which have led to our involvement.
Why then are we there and what are we doing?
These questions are not unique to me. For almost 2 months -- since the question of Laos was first raised in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee -- I and other members of the committee have received a steady flow of letters from people asking the same question. Most of them are concerned because of what they read in the newspapers. But a few are worried because of their direct personal knowledge.
Last week, for example, I received the following from a young man in the Army:
I recently completed a course at Ft. Huachuca, Ariz., called [deleted]. This is a classified course dealing with a new method of electronic warfare to combat guerilla (sic) warfare.
During this course, I asked an instructor, Lt. [deleted], if there was a good chance we would get sent to Laos or Cambodia. He said there was.
Now, my question is this, "What is our relationship to Laos and Cambodia?" and "Are we allowed to have combat troops in either Laos or Cambodia?"
If the Army's action is illegal, I hope that you will expose to the American people the dangers of spreading the war in S. Vietnam to all of Indochina.
Or, take these words from an Air Force officer in Thailand:
In the last few months we have had dozens of Laotian Army battle casualties in our USAF hospital here. In the last few months, I have looked and listened; I have seen and heard much.
Although I do not have a top secret security clearance (and most of what goes on here requires that), any airman can count the numbers of jet fighter-bombers taking off fully loaded with ordnance. Anyone here can pass the runway and see dozens of unmarked aircraft parked at the Air America and Continental Airlines ramp. Any drunken pilot will tell of the fighting, bombing, and killing for which we, here at Udorn, are responsible. Not in Vietnam, not in an open war, but in Laos, 35 miles to the north.
There are many things which I have learned to accept here. The censorship of our radio and TV station; the application of arbitrary curfews; arbitrary rules and regulations, so that we may not badly impress this foreign country from which we wage war. These I can accept, though I think them regulations of unsteady minds.
What I have much difficulty accepting is a secret war in which non-military, CIA sponsored fighters lay the groundwork for U.S. military destruction.
I appeal to you and your fellow congressmen to stop the foolishness of the American involvement in Southeast Asia. Stop the secrecy, stop the fighting, stop the death.
In a few short months, my presence in Thailand has assured me of the wrongness of our position here. We will never win by supplying arms and soldiers. We will only win by destroying the corrupt governments that we now support and by getting our wealth into the mouths of the people instead of into the hands of dishonest leaders of indigent countries.
Or the following from a Navy man aboard a carrier off Vietnam:
It would be conservative to say that at least half or perhaps three-quarters of our sorties, expended ordnance and time for the past six months has been trained solely on Laos. Yet, current military and administration policy forbids the reporting of such activities. It seems evident that the attack aircraft carrier Navy is no longer a force used against North Vietnam but rather is engaged in a private but related war in another country.
The enormous amount of money expended in keeping these carriers operational plus its manpower consumption obligates the military to make public its mission. But of more importance is the long range effects of becoming more deeply committed in Southeast Asia and perhaps the loss of more American lives in the future. Thus, I encourage you to bring these activities before the public as soon as possible.
Or the following from an AID contract employee in Laos who freely discusses the mercenary Lao Army teams that call in U.S. Air Force bombing and concludes:
All of this, although it seems to be more or less common knowledge here, is denied by the Embassy. They have "no comment" on the bombing which is apparently "free" throughout the territory held by the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese, directed at anything they can see, whether military or not. It appears that once again the U.S. is involved in something of which it has reason to be ashamed, which it does not want the world or its own people to know.
I do not like to see an agency of our government maintaining its own mercenary army in Laos, not subject to the public control intended by our Constitution.
I wish to help the people here, and I believe the U.S. should help them. But if we cannot find any way to help them that does not also require indiscriminate bombing of them and maintaining a mercenary army in their midst, then I do not believe we should be here.
Or the following from another AID contract employee who finished his tour and remained in Laos:
While military activity has de-escalated to some extent in South Vietnam over the last year, it has greatly intensified here in Laos. Restraints which were in force on both sides since 1964 have been lifted. The future presages continued escalation and increased American involvement. The recent investigation of your committee could not have been more timely, and I wish to contribute in any way possible to them.
There is another group of letter writers, women who have a different type of firsthand experience with Laos. They are wives and mothers whose loved ones have been killed or are missing in a war they never knew existed.
The following came from a woman whose son was killed flying a combat mission oven Laos:
On May 23, 1969 we buried an unopened casket in Arlington National Cemetery.
We have written repeatedly inquiring more detailed information. We would like to know who recovered our son’s body, Americans or Laotians or whoever it was. We also understand that they were losing OIA pilots like flies in that particular area. We would like to know why they send OIA planes unarmed (like the one our son piloted to his death) in heavily entrenched enemy territory?
We have written to our congressman, but he has been unable to receive much information except that it’s classified information. There seems to be an awful lot of hush, hush about Laos and I would like to see it come out in the open.
Or take the dilemma of this woman whose husband was lost over Laos, is missing and perhaps captured:
Do you see how all of this secrecy jeopardizes any chance of ever hearing about these men? They are no doubt rotting (if still alive) in some jungle stockade probably tended by Pathet Lao. Can you imagine what that is? It is enough to send men off to this questionable "commitment" in Vietnam, but for a military man to then end up missing in a country in which we do not admit to activities, loses him all his rights.
To whom can we turn to beg for information and mercy for these men missing in Laos? My husband has been (if still alive) captured for 3½ years. How much longer can he live? When will someone admit to the truth of the war in Laos? Can we send men to war and then disclaim responsibility far them once they are taken by the so-called enemy?
Mr. President, we are not an Asian kingdom. No President is a king or prime minister, entitled to make secret arrangements and send American men into war with the understanding their activities will not be publicly acknowledged.
Mr. President, the secrecy over our involvement in Laos has gone on too long. It had been my hope that the transcript of the Symington subcommittee's detailed hearings on Laos would have been released by now permitting the Senate and the public an opportunity to study and debate the issue.
The administration, however, has refused to declassify the necessary details and the subcommittee has, correctly I believe, refused to publish a document that it believes would be misleading.
Therefore, because I deeply believe that Members of this body should be aware -- as I am -- of what they are voting on when they approve the bill we have before us, I have sought to have the administration -- through the managers of the bill -- provide basic factual information on our activities in Laos.
I would hope that my colleagues would join me in requesting the administration to provide the information. An executive session can be called -- if it is so desired -- to permit the discussion of that material which the administration considers classified.
I believe the public has a right to know everything it can. But I more strongly believe the Senate and each of its Members has a personal responsibility to his constituents to learn the facts on this matter before he votes.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD a copy of a letter I sent to the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
DECEMBER 12, 1969.
Hon. RICHARD B. RUSSELL.
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: During the past few weeks some members of the Committee on Foreign Relations have examined in depth the nature of American military involvement in Southeast Asia with particular emphasis on Laos and Thailand. It had been our impression that American supported military activities there were directly related to the war in Vietnam and it was with deepening concern that we learned that the United States is becoming directly involved in escalating military activities in Laos.
Furthermore, what once might have been viewed as a small, secret intelligence-type operation has now become of such magnitude that I feel strongly that the Senate should be aware of its size and possible future costs in men and money.
Under these circumstances, I would appreciate it very much if, during Senate discussion of the Defense Appropriation Act, the managers of the bill would provide Members of the Senate who must act on the legislation with answers from the Administration to the questions which I have attached. If the only way this information can be made available to the Senate would be in an executive session, I would hope this could be arranged.
I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to Senator Milton Young as ranking minority member of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee.
Sincerely yours,
J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman.
AGREEMENTS WITH LAOS SECRET QUESTIONNAIRE
1. What treaties, agreements or declarations provide the basis for our defense commitment and military assistance to the Royal Laotian Government?
2. What commitment, written or implied, exists between the United States or its agencies and the present Royal Laotion Government or its Prime Minister, Souvanna Phouma?
3. What military assistance, including manpower, material and training, is the United States providing through this bill?
4. As of today, what is the total number of United States military personnel in Laos and describe the manner in which they operate.
5. Describe in detail activities over Laos of the United States Air Force, including both those activities, if any, based in Laos and those, if any, based in Thailand.
If pertinent, include:
a. What, if any, is the current monthly sortie rate over northern Laos for the United States Air Force aircraft?
b. How does that rate, if any, compared to a year ago and two years ago?
c. The contemplated sortie rate, if any, over northern Laos in the coming 12 months.
d. How these sortie rates, if any, compare to United States Air Force sorties directed toward the Ho Chi Minh trail.
6. What, if any, have been the total number of United States military personnel killed, wounded, and missing in northern Laos since 1962?
7. How does this total compare to personnel lost in operations solely against the Ho Chi Minh trail?
8. What is the amount of personnel, operating and maintenance and military assistance funds included in this bill for Laos and Laos-related activities?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an article entitled, "Rogers Admits Laos Arms Role."
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
ROGERS ADMITS LAOS ARMS ROLE
(By Murrey Marder)
Secretary of State William P. Rogers indirectly conceded yesterday that for years the United States has financed, armed and trained a clandestine army of 36,000 guerrillas in Laos.
In the first acknowledgment ever made on the public record, Rogers treated the U.S. involvement in the semi-secret war in Laos as a matter of common knowledge. But Rogers avoided explicitly stating precisely what he was acknowledging, and said there are no plans to stop or change present operations in Laos.
"I had thought that the Congress was familiar with the developments in Laos," Rogers said. "Certainly they are familiar with them now . . . I thought Congress understood it."
"This is really quite extraordinary," said Sen. J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.). Both were commenting after Rogers testified behind closed doors for three and a half hours before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which Fulbright heads.
"It is quite ordinary for a dictatorship," said Fulbright, "but to be conducting quite as large a war as this (in Laos) without authorization is quite unusual."
Fulbright said in an interview Tuesday that through the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States, under three administrations, has been supplying, arming, training and transporting the clandestine Laotian army of Meo tribesman headed by Gen. Vang Pao.
The cost to the United States for military assistance to Laos, Fulbright said, is between $50 and $160 million this year. Other sources said yesterday that about half this amount is used to finance the Meo guerrilla force, and the rest goes to other military needs in Laos. But uncounted in the $160 million total this year, these sources said, are the costs of U.S, bombing support from Thailand for operations in Laos.
Rogers, when newsmen put Fulbright's specific statements to him. said:
"Well, the operations in Laos, as you know, were started in the time of President Kennedy" and continued through the Johnson and Nixon administrations. When he was asked if they will be halted now, Rogers responded, "No, I don't think there is going to be a change in policy, not now."
There are no U.S. "ground forces in Laos." Rogers reiterated, but there are still "45,000 North Vietnamese forces in Laos." It continues to be the United States' hope, he said, that an end to the war in Vietnam will solve the problems of Communist penetrations into Laos and Cambodia as well.
Newsmen asked Rogers for comment on Fulbright's charge Tuesday that the extent of the U.S. involvement in Laos may be unconstitutional. "I doubt very much if it is unconstitutional," replied Rogers.
"What about the public's 'right to know?'" asked a reporter. Said Rogers, "Well, I think the public, if they have been reading the papers, know."
Fulbright, when told later that Rogers said he expects no change in U.S. policy in Laos, said: "I regret it, if that's what he said." Hearings on Laos, which have been conducted in executive session by a subcommittee headed by Sen, Stuart Symington (DMo.), show that the United States is "enormously over-committed" in Laos, Fulbright said, and "I don't think there is any authority for it."
Symington declined to make any direct comment at this time on his Laos inquiry, except to say, "I've never known him (Fulbright) to make a misstatement in this field."
In Rogers' testimony yesterday, Fulbright said, "There was no effort whatever to deny what was in the papers" about U.S. clandestine operations in Laos, and Fulbright's comments on them.
The Symington subcommittee now has finished taking testimony on Laos. The question is how much of a struggle there will be between the subcommittee and the Nixon administration over making the testimony public. A major witness in the inquiry on Tuesday, was CIA Director Richard Helms.
There is disagreement about the degree to which Congress has been aware of the clandestine U.S. operations in Laos in support of anti-Communist forces there. Senate Democratic leader Mike Mansfield (Mont.), a specialist on Southeast Asia, was quoted yesterday as saying that "I've really found nothing new in the (Laos) hearings that I didn't know."
But Fulbright and other senators said they had no indication that covert U.S. activity in Laos was more than what Fulbright called "very minor, peripheral," apart from "the bombing of the Ho Chi-Minh trails." With the present administration's contention that it thought Congress "understood" what was going on in Laos, pressure is now likely to mount for official disclosure of the details of the CIA-run operation there.
Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, it will be recalled that before we went into executive session, I suggested that the amendment be taken to conference, and it seems that this amendment places the Senate in a very confusing position.
I note that this amendment is based on a contingency which is legislative. I make the point of order that this amendment is not in order, in that it is legislation on an appropriation bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HUGHES in the chair). The Chair sustains the point of order.
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, it is the understanding of the Senator from Idaho that the inclusion of the phrase "without the prior consent of Congress" at the very end of the proposed amendment renders it legislative in character and therefore subject to the point of order.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
Mr. CHURCH. I invite the attention of the Senate to the fact that the final phrase is not necessary, in any way, to carrying out the full intent of the Senate in regard to the real question before us. The defect in the amendment, as it is presently written, can be cured simply by striking this final phrase.
Mr. JAVITS. The Senator is correct about that, because this must be read with the commitments resolution, which does call for the way in which Congress may consent to such a situation.
Mr. CHURCH. That is correct. I appreciate the comment by the Senator from New York.
Therefore, I offer the amendment in new form, striking the words "without prior consent of Congress" from the text. So that the revised amendment would read:
SEC. 643. In line with the expressed intention of the President of the United States, none of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be used to finance the introduction of American ground combat troops into Laos or Thailand.
I ask for the yeas and nays on the amendment, Mr. President.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH). On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
The result was announced -- yeas 73, nays 17, as follows:
[Roll call vote listing omitted]
So Mr. CHURCH'S amendment was agreed to.
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.
Mr. ALLOTT. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the Cooper amendment, as amended.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, before we proceed with the vote on the amendment, I would like to announce that we shall try to complete action on the bill this evening. As far as I know there are only two more amendments. One of them is sponsored by the Senator from Missouri (Mr. EAGLETON), and deals with the main battle tank 70. The committee is willing to accept this amendment because of a letter received from the Deputy Secretary of Defense in respect to a cutback of $20 million from the $50 million recommended for this tank.
The next amendment will be offered by the Senator from Maine (Mrs. SMITH), and it deals with the ABM. Since there has been so much discussion on the ABM heretofore, I am very hopeful that we can get through with these two amendments this evening. I understand the distinguished Senator from Maine (Mrs. SMITH) has a speech which she will make.
I hope other Senators will not take too much time in discussing this matter inasmuch as we had this matter before us for 2 months.
Mr. ALLOTT. I have one short matter, not an amendment but a legislative clarification.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the Cooper-Mansfield amendment, as amended. On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered and the clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
The result was announced -- yeas 80, nays 9, as follows:
[Roll call vote listing omitted]
So the Cooper-Mansfield amendment, as amended, was agreed to.