CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE

November 7, 1969

Page 33544

VIETNAM

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, the essence of the democratic system of government is its constant attempt to reach decisions on the basis of free and open discussions and in a climate of mutual respect and forbearance. I speak today on Vietnam. I do so because I believe the Nation has not yet reached a clear understanding and reasoned decision on what we should do to end our involvement and the war. I do so because I believe we need more free and open discussions on the issue before we can reach such an understanding and such a decision. I hope those discussions will be carried out in a spirit of mutual respect and forbearance.

The deep national divisions over Vietnam and our involvement there reflect sincere differences of opinion. The differences are very wide, ranging from the few who feel that our national interest requires that we persevere there, for whatever period and at whatever cost, to the limited number who regard our presence in Vietnam as immoral and advocate our immediate withdrawal, and those who feel that the cost of our continued involvement is no longer justified by our vital national interests, and should be rapidly, but responsibly, reduced.

Reactions to President Nixon's speech have been prompt and predictable. There has also been a predictable response of support for what the President called his plan to "end this war in a way that will bring us closer to that great goal of a just and lasting peace." However, I believe that the great majority of the American public, that "silent majority" of whom the President spoke, remains unclear as to our present purpose and the practicality of the plan for ending the war to which the President referred, but which he incompletely described.

In short, I believe the great "silent majority" of Americans does not find itself on either extreme of this issue. This is true, I suggest, because the choice before us in Vietnam is not, despite the President's rhetoric, between the continued and indefinite involvement of our military forces and their immediate and disorderly withdrawal. On the contrary, the choice is between continued

American involvement in the war and settlement arrived at by the South Vietnamese people on terms which are acceptable to them.

The path to political settlement is not easy, and it is not obvious. It will require imagination, resourcefulness, and steadfastness by our Government. It cannot succeed without broad understanding and support from among our people -- understanding and support which must be available not only in the days immediately following a presidential address, but in the difficult weeks and months ahead.

I regret to say that President Nixon's November 3 address did not reveal a determination to direct us toward a political settlement, and I do not believe it can sustain the kind of broad, public support the Nation needs in this time of bitter trial.

The President's talk revealed a distressing tendency -- too often present in discussions of Vietnam -- to divide the issue and the American people into two extremes. On the one extreme was a straw man -- "immediate, precipitate withdrawal" -- which the President contends would bring about a "disaster of immense magnitude." Those who support such a course were symbolized by a sign which read, "Lose in Vietnam, Bring the Boys Home." Into this straw man the President bound, by inference, all who dissent from present policy -- the small minority which wants our troops out tomorrow, whatever the consequences, and the many millions who want an end to the fighting and an orderly withdrawal of American combat troops from Vietnam. It was a debater's device. It was not a fair description of public opinion.

At the other extreme the President put his policy of ending our involvement through Vietnamization. But his presentation was long on rhetoric and short on analysis.

There was no explanation of what we hope to achieve at the negotiating table. There was no reference to the need for a political settlement among the Vietnamese. There was no suggestion of an initiative to end the killing and permit the two sides to begin working out political arrangements. There was no talk of the need for reform and wider participation in the Government of South Vietnam.

There was a rejection of any kind of announced timetable for the withdrawal of American troops. Withdrawal will take place, in the President's words, on the basis of three factors: first, the rate at which South Vietnamese forces become stronger; second, the level of enemy activity, and third, progress in American efforts to achieve peace in Paris.

In other words, the rate of withdrawal of American forces is out of our hands. The disposition of our military strength in the world, the commitment of hundreds of thousands of American men, is to be determined by the governments in Saigon and in Hanoi.

All of the President's talk about his policy -- all of his references to his plans for peace -- were hedged about the "if's." If Saigon increases its military strength, we can decrease our presence. If Hanoi and the National Liberation Front do not increase their military activities, we can cut down on the number of our combat troops. If nothing comes of the Paris peace talks, we can pursue our other plans, and increase the Vietnamization of the war.

There is an ominous possibility in the President's speech, the possibility that if our full objectives are not met, in Paris or in Vietnam, on terms acceptable to us and to the Saigon government, we will be committed to supporting a continuation of the war in the belief that a military victory is still possible.

Thus, the President's speech promised continued support for the status quo in Saigon and ignored the central fact that a political compromise on the part of the Saigon government is inevitable if there is to be a genuine political settlement to this war.

Last, there was in the President's speech a verbal reescalation of the definition of our interests in South Vietnam, suggesting that the preservation of the existing government in South Vietnam is essential to the cause of peace "not just in Vietnam but in the Pacific and in the world." That suggests a commitment to military victory by the South Vietnamese and by us.

What we should seek today is neither an American military victory nor simply a Vietnamization of the war. Our goal is not perpetual conflict in which only the Vietnamese continue to die, but genuine peace. What we should seek is peace for the Vietnamese, a peaceful settlement acceptable to the silent and suffering majority of the South Vietnamese people themselves.

The President had sharp words for those who have demonstrated their concern for peace and their doubts about the likelihood that his announced policies could bring peace. He suggested that they are actually prolonging the war. What is prolonging the war is not the desire of the American people for peace. Our people do want the war to end. They want the administration and Congress to understand that fact, and their attitude is consistent with, and indispensable to, the nonmilitary solution which the President has repeatedly stated as our objective.

The roadblocks to peace cannot be removed simply by exhortations to the American people to follow their leader. We need instead to create both in Hanoi and in Saigon an attitude of willingness to work toward a political settlement. These attitudes cannot, in my opinion, be brought about by warning Hanoi of new and greater military pressures or by encouraging Saigon in false hopes that no concessions and no compromises will be necessary. Neither can peace be promoted by further polarization of American sentiment.

Since we have renounced any intention to seek a military victory in Vietnam -- and the President here said that we have -- we must accept the fact of a settlement on terms less than ideal from our point of view. Saigon, Hanoi, and the National Liberation Front will have to accept the same kinds of limitations on their own hopes.

Any speech on Vietnam must be considered from the standpoint of its three important audiences -- in the United States, in Hanoi, and in Saigon. To each of these audiences such a speech conveys either a warning or a promise, or both.

In the past, most of the public utterances about Vietnam have warned the American public of the dire consequences of American failure there. That was a major theme of the President's speech last Monday. Such utterances contain little in the way of promise that our costly and divisive efforts can be brought to an end in the reasonable future.

As directed at Hanoi, our statements have usually warned of the application of ever greater military force, but they have promised little hope that their supporters in South Vietnam could genuinely participate in a political settlement.

To Saigon, we have continued to promise much in the way of continuing military and political support, but we have conveyed little warning that American military support will not continue forever and that reasonable political concessions on their part are necessary if there is to be an end to the war and a genuine political settlement in South Vietnam.

It is in this area that President Nixon's speech revealed one of its most serious shortcomings.

There was not one word of incentive for the South Vietnamese to accelerate the strengthening of their forces or to make political efforts to end the war. So long as the United States commits its foreign policy, as well as its ground combat troops, to the successful prosecution of this war by military means, the authorities in Saigon are under no pressure to make the political or military effort that is necessary if they are to take full responsibility for bringing the conflict to a close.

General Thieu and General Ky could have written the three conditions for U.S. withdrawal contained in the President's speech. It is no wonder the speech was so well received in Saigon.

If the President's speech had implemented what he called his "Guam principles," it would have included an announcement to the American people of a schedule of withdrawal of at least all American ground combat troops from Vietnam. This would not mean a "precipitate" withdrawal with all its potentially disastrous consequences. It would not be a signal that we are ready to "lose in Vietnam, and bring the boys home." Instead, it would carry a message to Saigon that it must increase its efforts; it would bring to the military leaders of North and South Vietnam a message that America does not plan to intensify the war, but neither does it plan callously to jettison an ally; and would indicate to our own people that the administration is responding to their deep desire that the loss of American lives in Vietnam be ended. General Ky has felt free to tell us when all U.S. combat troops can be withdrawn from South Vietnam. He did so within the last 2 or 3 days. Why, then, cannot the President himself?

If we are to create the conditions for a political settlement in Vietnam -- a settlement which the South Vietnamese must reach themselves -- we must proceed -- and proceed promptly -- to remove the overwhelming American presence which now appears to inhibit political compromise. An announcement of our intention to do so, and to do so in accordance with a definite schedule, will not erode our bargaining position in Paris.

A timetable for removing our ground combat troops, if coupled with plans for later -- but undefined dates -- for removal of our air support and logistical support forces, will offer incentives to both Saigon and Hanoi to come to terms at the negotiating table. Saigon will realize that it cannot depend on our support indefinitely. Hanoi will realize that the alternative to a negotiated settlement is the possibility of an indefinite conflict.

Any meaningful bargaining position will remain impossible under present circumstances, and it has been rendered more remote by some portions of the President's speech. The speech may, indeed, deepen the impression that the administration is downplaying the role of diplomacy as a means of ending the war, rather than reinvigorating its efforts to reach a negotiated settlement.

Looking back, the President said that "no progress whatever has been made" at the Paris talks since the agreement on the shape of the bargaining table, which occurred before his administration took office. He then went on to disclose a number of hitherto private ventures which had failed to bring results.

He went further, and revealed to the world a private exchange of letters between himself and Ho Chi Minh, last summer. He called this revelation "unprecedented." There is a good reason why such a step is "unprecedented," and one which our Government has traditionally avoided. If all letters between heads of state had to be written with an eye toward early publication by the recipient at a time of his own choosing, the utility of such exchanges would be reduced to mere propaganda. But obviously this is a disadvantage the President decided to accept for whatever advantages he felt he might gain in using the letters for his speech.

Since the President has made us privy to that exchange, I think some comments about the letters are justified. I would note that the President's letter is primarily a restatement of U.S. positions previously made public on repeated occasions. He referred to the reasonableness of the administration's May 14 proposal and stated, as we had declared in Paris and elsewhere, that we were ready to discuss "other programs as well, specifically the 10-point program of the NLF." He urged progress at the conference table. Except for the act of writing the letter, the move contained no new substantive initiatives and he found this a criticism in Ho Chi Minh's reply.

Ho's reply did, as the President indicated, reiterate "the public position North Vietnam had taken in the Paris talks" and repeated the well-worn charge that the United States should "cease the war of aggression and withdraw troops."

But the Ho letter was not without its points of interest.

It referred to the NLF 10-point program as "a logical and reasonable basis for the settlement of the Vietnamese problem"; not as "the only basis for settlement" or the "only correct basis of settlement" as many earlier public statements of Hanoi had done.

It referred to "the right of the population of the south and of the Vietnamese nation to dispose of themselves without foreign influence." These terms are not dissimilar from the President's own references to the importance of giving "the people of South Vietnam an opportunity to choose their own future." On these two points, then, where did the two letters come into direct conflict?

And Ho's concluding sentence -- that "with good will on both sides we might arrive at common efforts in view of finding a correct solution to the Vietnam problem" -- was probably as forthcoming a generality as the old revolutionary had ever addressed in confidence to a Western leader at any time in his long lifetime.

It seems to me that this reply invited a further communication from us to Ho's successors, building on the stated common goal of self-determination of the Vietnamese people and the final expression of good will.

Some or all of these steps may have been taken in the "other significant initiatives" which the President referred to, but in his speech he described Ho's letter as a flat rejection which I do not think is a fair interpretation of his letter. I cannot see how the goal of a negotiated peace is promoted by the publication of private diplomatic exchanges.

I cannot see how Ambassador Lodge's task of getting meaningful private discussions underway is served by revealing the 11 times he has been able to meet in private with the Communist representative to date.

For the future the President offered nothing new on the diplomatic scales and appeared to place little importance on the effort. He recapped our prior diplomatic initiative. He said we would persist in our search for a just peace through a negotiated settlement "if possible." But the much publicized "plan" which is referred to six times in his speech dealt exclusively with military matters -- our hopes for withdrawal, and only if and when the South Vietnamese "become strong enough to defend their own freedom."

There was no explanation of what we hope to achieve in a negotiated settlement.

There was no reference to the need for a political settlement between the Vietnamese themselves -- an objective toward which we must devote far more efforts than have been evidenced to date.

There was no hint of the terms under which we would seek and accept a cease-fire now that would put an immediate end to the killing and force the Vietnamese factions to begin to work out their political relationships.

There was no talk of the need for wider participation in the Government of South Vietnam, if Saigon's authority is ever to be secure enough to win a political settlement, let alone to stand up unassisted against internal challenge.

Let us hope that this impression that diplomacy has been downplayed is one of those accidental byproducts of speech making.

Let us hope that despite our failures on the diplomatic front, to date, the administration has not wearied after only 9 months in office of the arduous task of pressing new diplomatic initiatives to create the conditions under which the war-weary people of South Vietnam may at long last find, not a Vietnamese war, turned over to them by Americans, but a true peace on political terms of their own choosing.

I have suggested several initiatives we might pursue, including: an orderly, announced withdrawal of our combat troops, coupled with air and logistical support for the South Vietnamese for a longer period; a proposal for a standstill cease-fire; and the possible use of the good offices of United Nations Secretary General U Thant as an "honest broker" in paving the way for the various groups in South Vietnam to reach a political settlement.

The President has said he wants to operate from a position of strength. I believe these proposals would permit him to do that. Unfortunately, I believe his speech of November 3 has weakened his position. He has weakened his long-term support at home by polarizing opinion in the United States. He has weakened his ability to stimulate a broadened and stronger government in South Vietnam by continuing his unqualified support for the status quo in Saigon. And he has weakened his options in Paris by revealing secret letters and secret talks, and by rejecting the letter from Ho Chi Minh and not following through on it.

Mr. President, I had hoped that I would be able to give my unqualified support to President Nixon's Policy in Vietnam as a result of his long-heralded speech of November 3. As President, he is ultimately responsible for the conduct of the war and the search for peace. I wish it were possible to say that the course he has described seems most likely to result in an early termination of the war. But in fact it seems to be a prescription for its indefinite prolongation. It does not contain the vital elements which will, in my view, bring the war to an end and enable the South Vietnamese to determine their own destiny.

I pray, Mr. President, that I am wrong and that he is right, and that his policy will succeed. In the light of my evaluation of his speech, which I have tried to make as dispassionate and objective as possible, I do not think it will. So until the President takes account of those elements, I deem it my duty to speak out.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MUSKIE. I yield to the distinguished Senator from Kansas.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I listened with great interest to the distinguished Senator from Maine.

Apparently I interpret the letter from Ho Chi Minh differently than the Senator from Maine because, in the next to the last paragraph in the letter from Ho Chi Minh dated August 25 and received, I understand, on August 30, the indication is that there can be peace and talk about peace only if we withdraw our troops from Vietnam.

The Senator from Maine indicates there is still room for further response.

But as I read it, there is no reason for any response unless all our American troops are withdrawn from South Vietnam.

In the next to the last paragraph, it says: "For this the United States must cease the war of aggression and withdraw their troops from South Vietnam."

That is the same story we have heard time and time again from the North Vietnamese. The Senator is indicating that there was a basis, after President Nixon received this letter, for further contact with the Hanoi Government. Certainly not Ho Chi Minh, because he died 3 days after the letter was received so it is not possible to communicate with him. In my opinion Ho was closing the door as he had in the past. Unless we would first withdraw all our troops from Vietnam, they are saying, "we are not prepared to do anything." Perhaps the Senator interprets it differently or the statement he has made would so indicate.

Mr. MUSKIE. In my prepared remarks, as the Senator knows, I analyzed the reason why I think there was a softening of Ho's position in that letter. But I would be glad to respond further. One of the President's criticisms of the whole letter was that it did nothing but repeat positions previously taken by Hanoi. So that criticism, if it is one, could also be directed at the President's letter because it contained nothing but a repetition–

Mr. DOLE. Except in the–

Mr. MUSKIE. Of previous statements which we have made.

Mr. DOLE. Except in the President's letter. As a matter of fact, he made reference to the National Liberation Front's 10 points. The President specifically said, as I remember it, that he would be specifically interested in discussing the 10 points of the NLF, but then they come back in the letter from Ho Chi Minh, saying, "Yes, as soon as you withdraw your troops we will discuss that."

Mr. MUSKIE. The President's reference to our willingness to discuss the 10 points of the NLF had been previously made by the President. That was not a new offer on his part.

Mr. DOLE. In the past, we have stated, "Are you prepared to discuss this," and the President again indicated a willingness to discuss the 10 points. He did this again in his letter to Ho Chi Minh.

Mr. MUSKIE. Then, let us look at Ho's reply. The first point I make is that of the criticism of Ho's letter, and the President's letter being subject to the same criticism, and no new substantial positions offered by the President. I am not saying it could have been. Perhaps the initial step should have been made more than the mere fact of writing a letter; but if there is a basis for criticism of such letter, then the President's letter is subject to that same criticism.

Second, in many previous responses to such an offer, Hanoi has always been "hard line." But let us look at Ho's language in this one, on the question of the 10 points.

He states:

The overall solution in ten points of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam and of the provisional revolutionary government of the Republic of South Vietnam is a logical and reasonable basis ...

Now, this is something different than saying, "You accept the 10 points without change and get out." This is a much softer reference to the NLF's 10 points than any previous reference I can recall.

He talked about "overall solutions," obviously applying the possibility of negotiation or elimination of the 10 points. Then he said, "is a logical and reasonable basis." Well, the "basis" is something different than a blueprint or a rubberstamp.

Mr. DOLE. The communication, in the next paragraph, second sentence, takes the same hard line position taken time and time again by the Hanoi Government: that they will not discuss any settlement until all American troops are withdrawn.

Mr. MUSKIE. But he does not say that here.

Mr. DOLE. He does not?

Mr. MUSKIE. No. Let me read it:

In your letter you have expressed the desire to ask for a just peace. For this the United States must cease the war of aggression and withdraw their troops from South Vietnam, respect the right of the population of the South and of the Vietnamese nation to dispose of themselves without foreign influence.

There is not a word in here to suggest that any part of this must be done before talks began. So many times in the past, they have clearly stated that, "You must stop your aggression and withdraw your troops before we will talk." That qualifying language is not in this letter.

Now when we take that with the last paragraph in the letter -- let me read it: With good will on both sides we might arrive at common efforts in view of finding a correct solution of the Vietnamese problem.

If that language does not suggest the possibility of a solution that is not found in the proposals of either side up to this time, then I do not understand the meaning of language. That is not a hard nosed, flat rejection, as in the words of the President. That language, if it means anything, is an invitation.

May I point out that this letter was received, according to the President, 3 days before Ho's death.

Ho did not publicize this for propaganda purposes. His successors did not. It seems to me that, however pessimistic one might be in interpreting Ho's letter, it gave the President an opportunity to write to the new leader to say, "We have just received this letter from Ho and in it we see some indication of a willingness to discuss these questions. We ask whether you so interpret his letter and, if so, whether you would be willing to pursue this initiative that has been begun by Ho Chi Minh."

It seems to me that, however pessimistically we might interpret the language which the Senator and I have discussed in our colloquy here, such an initiative would have done no harm whatsoever, and it might have opened up a diplomatic initiative of great value.

Mr. DOLE. Let me say to my distinguished colleague from Maine that I suppose we can interpret this letter any way we wish, but how do the Senator's specific proposals for peace in Vietnam differ from those being pursued now by President Nixon.

Where is the difference?

I have just read a document of some interest; namely, the Democratic platform of August 28, 1968, in which Vietnam is discussed. One of the statements is as follows:

We reject as unacceptable a unilateral withdrawal of our forces which would allow that aggression and subversion to succeed. We have never demanded, and do not now demand, unconditional surrender by the Communists.

We strongly support the Paris talks and applaud the initiative of President Johnson which brought North Vietnam to the peace table.

Troop withdrawal -- negotiate with Hanoi an immediate end or limitation of hostilities and the withdrawal from South Vietnam of all foreign forces -- both United States and allied forces, and forces infiltrated from North Vietnam.

Now, Mr. President, with reference to what the Senator apparently finds to be a mistake in trying to Vietnamize the war, this is what the Democratic platform had to say–

Mr. MUSKIE. Let me interject there, I did not say I was opposing Vietnamizing the war. I said I was opposed toward making that our objective, or our only objective -- just an arrangement for the Vietnamese to continue to die rather than Americans. I think we should be working toward a settlement of the war.

With respect to the history the Senator has just read, unfortunately, President Nixon gave us no positions, no plan, in the last campaign, that would give us an opportunity to cite his record.

Mr. DOLE. Well, his record is–

Mr. MUSKIE. Wait a minute -- if I may finish, please. President Nixon made clear in his last speech, and in his speech of May 14, that he was carefully reviewing and that he did carefully review our policies, and the underlying assumptions of positions previously taken, and that as a result of that review and his evaluation of that situation, he was proposing the initiatives which he outlined in his May 14 speech, and he has given us this policy statement of November 3.

I take it we have as much right to review what has happened since last fall, to review our policy and its underlying assumptions and what has taken place, and modify our positions as well.

What we are talking about is what our present view of the situation is, and of the problem, and generating the best wisdom we can to come up with solutions.

Mr. DOLE. But in fairness to President Nixon, it should be pointed out that there has been talk on this floor and talk around the country by certain leaders that President Nixon had no plan, he has no plan now, and no plan on Monday evening. I pointed out before that President Nixon is bringing American troops home. That was not the plan of the last administration. I never criticized President Johnson or the Senator from Maine

Mr. MUSKIE. May I point out that Vice President Humphrey, in last year's campaign, announced there would be a troop withdrawal by the middle of this year, and he was criticized by his opposition for holding out such optimistic hopes.

Mr. DOLE. But the point is that there have been troop withdrawals. The Senator has suggested that there should be a timetable. I assume the Senator means bringing home so many thousands this month and so many thousands next month.

Mr. MUSKIE. I have stated my proposal. I do not think it is the only proposal. I certainly have not rejected the President's consideration–

Mr. DOLE. How does the Senator differ with what the President has proposed?

Mr. MUSKIE. I have announced a timetable for the withdrawal of troops -- like that of Secretary Clifford -- by the end of 1970. I can see the value of withholding the date for final and total withdrawal of our forces, but I think we need some kind of commitment to a scheduled withdrawal in order to impose pressure on both Saigon and Hanoi. The President has said he is going to be flexible in all respects in connection with withdrawal. I am delighted he has committed himself to negotiating a settlement. I am delighted with and applaud the decision to begin withdrawal of troops. I do not criticize that. What I am objecting to is the extension of the withdrawal concept and the time to do it in, with the conditions which I have suggested.

Mr. DOLE. One reason why the President recited the secret talks, and the letters, and the private meetings of Mr. Lodge in his speech to the American people, was to point out to the American people what had happened since January 20, 1969. He could have announced on the afternoon of January 20 that we were going to withdraw, on a unilateral basis, from South Vietnam. That was the easy choice from a political standpoint.

Mr. MUSKIE. I do not think it is the easy choice with the "silent majority" behind him. That would be the tough choice.

Mr. DOLE. You stated that President Nixon's speech was going to polarize the people. The Gallup poll showed that 77 percent were for the President, 6 percent were against him, and the rest were undecided. If there is going to be a polarization, I would say it is that of the great majority of the people supporting the President's proposals. He made it clear on Monday that we had not succeeded in negotiations. He has turned from an Americanization of the war under the past administration to a Vietnamization of the war under this administration. We have tried time and time again to negotiate. What has been accomplished? Nothing. Does the Senator believe that is not true?

Mr. MUSKIE. Is it the Senator's suggestion that the President should no longer make efforts?

Mr. DOLE. No. He has to find an alternative course. Negotiation was probably tried yesterday and probably will be tried again next week. If we cannot negotiate, we must find some other honorable way out of Vietnam. I fail again to perceive much difference between the Senator's analysis of how to end the war and what is now being done.

Mr. MUSKIE. If there is not much difference, I would be happy to have the President adopt my plan.

Mr. DOLE. Perhaps the Senator copied it from the President's speech on Monday, because it sounds very much like it.

Mr. MUSKIE. Having just listened to my speech -- and I appreciate the attention the Senator gave it -- I suggest he now read it. I think if he sees no difference as a result of having heard it, he may see some after having read it.

Mr. DOLE. I want to develop the differences on the floor of the Senate, for the benefit of all Americans. If the Senator can expound the differences between his plan and the one being implemented by President Nixon, it may be of help to President Nixon.

Mr. MUSKIE. I am at some disadvantage in this connection, because President Nixon has not told us–

Mr. DOLE. He is doing it by action.

Mr. MUSKIE. The Senator has asked me a question. I would like to answer it. He has not given us the details of his withdrawal plan. One thing that distinguishes our views is the time with respect to withdrawal. I think we ought to announce a date for withdrawal of our combat forces.

Mr. DOLE. What date does the Senator have in mind?

Mr. MUSKIE. As I said a moment ago, the end of 1970.

Vice President Ky, just the other day, in a press conference in Saigon, said that, in his judgment, this could be possible. So he has announced it. I have advocated it.

Mr. DOLE. What advantage is this for anyone to say we are going to do it by the end of 1970, or in fact do it on any specific date?

Mr. MUSKIE. I think the advantage is that it puts pressure on Saigon then to put its ducks in order, militarily and politically. Vietnamization of the war is going to require more than an American effort. It is going to require a Saigon effort. And if there is no commitment for withdrawal of our combat support, I suspect there is not much pressure felt by Saigon to exert that effort which it must exert.

Secondly, such a commitment which would then be credible to Saigon would put the pressure on Saigon to broaden its political base. I just do not happen to believe that the present Saigon government, if it is not changed and broadened, can survive our withdrawal, whether that withdrawal comes as a result of whatever the President's timetable may be, or as a result of some other timetable.

I assume -- and I would be interested to have the Senator's view on this -- that what the President is talking about is complete withdrawal at some point, and not an indefinite prolongation of American support at some level, unspecified and unidentified.

What the Senator is talking about, and what the President is talking about, is complete withdrawal of American forces at some time in the reasonably near future, in 1971, or 1972. Whatever it is, we do not know. Then we have to be concerned, and Saigon has to be concerned, with whether or not it has the political viability and the political strength to survive.

I think that if we announce a date for withdrawal of combat forces, perhaps Saigon will begin to believe that what we are talking about is not an indefinite prolongation of the war, at some reduced level of American support, but an end to American military support -- combat, air, logistical -- and some point for which they must prepare themselves politically. I think that point has to be made clear, and I think they have to accept it as part of their policy.

Mr. DOLE. If I may respond to that, we are not talking about putting pressure on Saigon. We are actually taking troops from South Vietnam. By December 15, the number is going to be 60,000.

Yesterday there was a bipartisan meeting, composed of George Meany and others, who reported to the President that we are making great progress in South Vietnam. There is going to be more. More is being done so far as pacification is concerned. There is more support for the Government. There is a feeling in Saigon that it can take over more military responsibilities.

Mr. MUSKIE. May I respond to that?

Mr. DOLE. In just a moment. Statements have been made about advance notice putting pressure on Saigon. I think we can deal with our allies without advance notice. If we give advance notice, we only give information to the enemy; if we say that, in 6 months, for example, we are going to take our troops out of there, it does a disservice. It does not help Saigon, it does not help us, and it does not help the American troops that are there.

Why should we telegraph our plans to the enemy that by the end of 1970, if they can hold out that long, all the American combat troops are coming home? I think it would be a mistake.

Mr. MUSKIE. May I respond?

Mr. DOLE. I yield.

Mr. MUSKIE. My response to that question, and the Senator's response, must depend upon whether this administration is committed, at some point, to withdrawal of American combat forces.

Mr. DOLE. It is committed now.

Mr. MUSKIE. That has to be in connection with some date, disclosed or undisclosed. The President has permitted our allies in Saigon to announce dates after which they think they can take over the war. He did so the other day -- the end of 1970, the same date I am suggesting here today.

With all this speculation suggesting that some time before 1971 we are going to withdraw our combat forces, there is little element of surprise left for Hanoi. So the question then is -- and I repeat it, and I should like the Senator's answer to it, if he knows -- are we committed, in our policy? Is the President's scheduled program, or scheduled timetable, committed to some date for total withdrawal of our forces, and if so, is it a date that Saigon knows?

He has said that there is a program worked out with Saigon. I am not asking for the date, if the Senator knows what the date is. I am simply asking, is there such a date?

If there is not, then the possibility that the President is holding out to Saigon by his present method of withdrawal is that we will reduce to some level, and then continue American support at that level for some indefinite period, the end of which will depend upon Saigon's ability to take over the war.

If there is such a date, if both sides are committed to it and it is written in bronze, I would be interested to know it.

Mr. DOLE. If I might respond, there is probably no date. The Senator does not have a date, either. There is, however, a commitment and this is the important thing: There is a commitment by this administration to withdraw U.S. combat troops.

The most unwise thing the President could do would be to set some arbitrary date, say September next year or September the following year, to have the last combat soldier out of Vietnam.

I really do not see any difference, the more I discuss the matter with the Senator, between the Nixon position and what he suggests, except for this magic he seems to associate with reference to a specific date:

If the President will just say that on some date next year we are going to bring all the troops, then the Senator would support him wholeheartedly.

Mr. MUSKIE. I did not say "all the troops." I said, "all combat troops."

Mr. DOLE. All combat troops. But if he will not set some specific date, then the Senator is opposed to him.

Mr. MUSKIE. Well, let me say this: The Senator says he sees little difference between our positions. I see a great deal of difference, and the President obviously sees a great deal of difference, because he has so stated. I suggest there is a great deal of difference.

It is a question of how you interpret that difference, what effect that difference would have on the ability and determination of Saigon to broaden its base and take over the war, as well as the determination of Hanoi to continue the war.

The Senator has cited some sort of "new optimism" that seems to pervade the country.

Mr. DOLE. That was in the Democratic platform.

Mr. MUSKIE. No, I am not talking about that. I am talking about the new optimism discussed in recent press stories from South Vietnam, about the state of our military effort in South Vietnam.

The Senator referred in his remarks to the success of our pacification effort, the growing political stability in the south, and so on. If the optimism is justified–

Mr. DOLE. It is the optimism of the committee which reported to the President yesterday, George Meany, Mr. Gullion, and others -- bipartisan committee.

Mr. MUSKIE. I am not attributing the optimism to anyone. I am simply saying that if it is justified, then I suggest the best way to crystallize Saigon policy and Saigon determination is the kind of commitment to withdrawal that I have suggested. If it is not justified, if we still have to have rubber clauses in our commitment that permit us to modify it with the unfolding of events, that is something else.

I think that we ought to make these decisions about withdrawal of our troops. I do not think we should, any longer, be committed to rubber clauses that leave the control in Saigon and Hanoi. I think it would serve a very useful purpose to make it clear to Saigon that we are determined to withdraw, and that the decision is ours to make and not theirs.

Mr. DOLE. I do not have any great quarrel with that. I did want to again quote another of the statements from the Democratic platform:

Until the fighting stops, accelerate our efforts to train and equip the South Vietnamese Army so that it can defend its own country and carry out cutbacks of U.S. military involvement as the South Vietnamese forces are able to take over their larger responsibilities.

For some reason President Nixon, a Republican, has carried out that plank in the Democratic platform. He has carried out that plank at an accelerated rate.

Mr. MUSKIE. May I say to the Senator again, the President has made it quite clear that his policy of May 14 was responsive to a change from whatever his policy was last fall. I think I have as much right to change my view, of what our current policy ought to be, from what I felt it should be at the time that platform was written, as he does.

Mr. DOLE. I have not quite finished. There has been a change. Maybe a change on both sides.

Mr. MUSKIE. But what the Senator is saying is that the President's policy is now that of the Democratic platform?

Mr. DOLE. No; but he has helped it a lot. I would say this seriously: I listened to the four or five points the Senator recited as suggested ways to end the war. The key to his program apparently is in orderly withdrawal, as of some specific date.

Mr. MUSKIE. Not at all. I think we have to press the diplomatic front. The responsibility here, obviously, to one who is outside the administration, is not that of the administration; but as to the exchange of letters which we discussed earlier, I think there was an initiative which I would have taken, which the President clearly did not take, and I think there may have been others. If the President so interpreted those letters as to call them a flat rejection of his offer, then it seems to me he may not be as sensitive to the possibilities for diplomatic initiative as in my judgment he ought to be. This is one of the points.

Second, I think that the whole idea of the withdrawal schedule that I have suggested, and the standstill cease-fire, and the U Thant approach, are all designed to promote a political settlement in South Vietnam.

The President, in what he has said publicly, has given the Saigon government no reason to change its political structure to broaden its base, to bring in elements and tendencies in the south which are not represented in the current government, to discontinue its repression of those who disagree with it politically, or to lift censorship of the press. There is nothing in the President's speech of November 3 or his speech of May 14 to suggest that he regards this as an important area for initiative and pressure. I think we have to do that. I do not think we are going to end the war -- which I think is a more important objective than Vietnamization of the war -- unless we do something about the political questions without solving which we cannot hope to end the war.

Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I did not have the benefit of being present for the entire speech of the Senator from Maine. I did hear the end of his speech, and I had a chance to look at the text and have listened to the colloquy.

I congratulate the Senator from Maine on his speech and its general approach. We cannot forget, however, that things are better now than they were a year ago. As the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH) put it the other day, we as Democrats will have to wear the hair shirt for a while longer, because the fact is that fewer young men are being killed each day, each week, and each month at this time and fewer American troops are in Vietnam.

The point of difference is whether we are moving fast enough and in a sufficiently certain manner and what our ultimate objective is. If the ultimate objective is a permanent enclave of American supporting forces in the manner of the Korean pattern, I think that would be a great mistake.

The Senator from Maine has made a great contribution because of his emphasis on the fact that we are trying to achieve more than a Vietnamization of the war -- that we are trying to achieve peace for the area.

A couple of times the Senator from Kansas has touched upon the Democratic National Convention's platform at Chicago last year. As the only Member of the Senate who was a member of both the Platform Committee and the Drafting Committee at that time, I was quite familiar with all of the travail that went into our platform.

The Senator from Kansas may recall that the so-called majority platform was not overwhelmingly supported. It passed by a relatively narrow margin. Both sides at the convention were dug in.

I remember that I had a compromise peace plank proposal. I presented it to both the drafting committee and the full platform committee. In each case it was turned down. And in each case individual committee members came to me afterwards and said they believed that while my plank had merit, the lines were drawn too hard and it had to be either one thing or the other.

While platforms are meant to be taken seriously, I was struck by the fact -- if the Senator from Maine will forgive me -- that both the Democratic and the Republican candidates for President and Vice President were eventually following a platform that was more along the lines of the platform that was rejected at that convention.

I was distressed in the course of Mr. Nixon's speech by the way in which he read his letter and more or less glossed over Ho Chi Minh's response.

When we read both of the letters in context, they do not come out all black and white. I think that the last paragraph of Ho Chi Minh's letter when he said, "With good will on both sides we might arrive at common efforts in view of finding a correct solution of the Vietnamese problem" is not a warlike or belligerent statement. It did leave the doors wide open.

It is for these reasons that I support the thrust of the remarks of the Senator from Maine.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, in closing my part of the colloquy, let me say that I have the greatest respect for the Senator from Maine. I would not want anything that I have said to be construed as an attack on him.

The Senator has been helpful, as I stated earlier. Discussing and debating the issues can be constructive. Certainly the war in Vietnam is something we all want to resolve as quickly as possible.

We have different viewpoints. I happen to be very much impressed by what the President said on Monday. Perhaps I did interpret it differently than did the Senator. However, it does seem that the President did present in a very concise chronological way what had happened from January 20 of this year to the present date. Perhaps there are other things he could have done or said. However, if we look at the whole record, I feel the great majority of Americans -- Democrats, Republicans, and independents -- would give the President an "A" for effort and say that he had been trying to resolve the conflict in Vietnam.

I recognize that when the President announced the withdrawal of 25,000 men, some said it should have been 50,000. When he announced the withdrawal of 35,000 men, some said it should have been 70,000.

We can have these differences of opinion. However, the point is -- and I believe it to be symbolic -- the President is bringing boys home. The one difference is that the Senator says he should have a timetable and that some specific withdrawal date should be set. I believe we should continue to negotiate, and that there should be a political settlement. Perhaps this can be accomplished by negotiation.

I point out that the President is trying to end the war. And when he cannot negotiate a settlement, his alternate was orderly withdrawal.

The negotiation doors are still open. They are as wide open as they ever were. But if we cannot make any progress at the Paris peace table, the President has an alternate plan to withdraw our combat forces in an orderly manner. Perhaps he will have them home before the date the Senator from Maine has in mind. However, it seems to me in all fairness and candor that the solution advanced by the distinguished Senator from Maine is very much in accord with what the President has done or is doing now.

If I misinterpret that, I regret it. However, it appears that there is not much difference at all.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I point out to the Senator from Kansas that I made a conscious effort not to cast the speech in the context of a partisan attack or criticism.

I listened to the speech. I have read it several times. I have taken it apart -- not for disruptive reasons, but to try to identify what I consider to be the shortcomings, not in a partisan or political way, but in a substantive way and in terms of the objective we all share -- to end our involvement and to insist on doing other things which would be useful initiatives.

So I felt the obligation today to make my speech on that basis. I grant the Senator that until we are out of the war, there will continue to be disagreement as to exactly what the tactics ought to be.

As I said in the close of my following remarks, whatever my differences with the President, I pray that his policy will succeed. That is the ultimate test, as he recognized in his closing remarks in which he said in substance, I believe, "If I am right, it does not matter what my critics will say now. And if I am wrong, it will not matter what they say then."

That is what the historic significance will be.

My speech was made for these reasons. First, it pinpoints what I think were the shortcomings of the President's speech. And it may be that those shortcomings do not reflect omissions in the President's speech. They may simply be points that he did not cover in his speech. If so, they will appear. Second, I thought that I ought to make a speech in the hope of lending whatever pressure I might -- and it may not be necessary -- behind the need for diplomatic action and the need for reform in Saigon, broadening its base, and the need to withdraw completely all our forces at some point in accordance with my remarks here.

Finally, I thought I should make the speech to contribute whatever I might to a constructive dialog about our policy on the war.

My speech is not meant to be destructive.

The President is the only instrument we have until 1972 with which to implement whatever policy we have.

Mr. DOLE. It may go beyond that.

Mr. MUSKIE. It may go beyond that; and if it does, we ought to be all the more careful about what our policy should be in the meantime.

I wanted to contribute constructively. I would hope that my efforts to cast this matter in a constructive form will prompt those involved in policymaking to consider the suggestions.

There is nothing new in any of them. I do not think there are any new ideas at all. They may be new combinations of ways to take advantage of our opportunities and events and incidents.

But the basic idea of withdrawal, of cease-fire, of negotiation, and so forth -- all these have been thrown out in any variety of combinations. The distinguished Senator from Rhode Island has suggested initiatives from time to time. So I think we ought to contribute to a constructive dialog -- not to destroy the President's capacity to lead, but in order to strengthen it by putting together a policy which can command the widest possible support.

Mr. DOLE. I agree with what the Senator says, and I know that is what he has in mind. But I am afraid it may be interpreted differently by the American people. I can see the headlines: "Muskie Assails Nixon Policy in Vietnam." That is not the avowed purpose of the Senator's statement.

The Senator indicates that there is nothing new in his speech. Some have indicated that there is nothing new in the President's speech. Perhaps there is nothing new to contribute.

I think there is a sincere desire on the Senator's part and on the President's part to end the war in Vietnam with honor, and this is what I think all of us in this body and everywhere else in America want to do.

So, from that standpoint, I appreciate the contribution the Senator has made, and the fact that I was present to hear the Senator's speech and to exchange some ideas about it.

Mr. MUSKIE. It is always good to have an audience. I thank the distinguished Senator from Kansas.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

(At this point, Mr. SCHWEIKER assumed the chair.)