CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE

November 13, 1969

Page 33998

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, the U.S. delegation has now left for Helsinki for the first round in the strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union. The negotiations which are about to open are of overriding importance to the peoples of all countries. We all wish our representatives every success in their efforts to halt the nuclear arms race.

The newspaper stories which came out of the administration's background press conference following last Monday's National Security Council meeting indicate that the President has decided to defer substantive proposals until the second round of discussions, hopefully to be scheduled to open in January at the earliest. Accordingly, the discussions in Helsinki are described as "exploratory" and "preliminary" even though it is reported that our representatives can discuss substantive issues during this phase.

Deferral for at least 2 months of substantive proposals may have the most far-reaching consequences. The director of research and development at the Pentagon, Mr. John Foster, has previously stated that our testing program for multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles, the so-called MIRV's, will be completed by May or June 1970. Accordingly, the decision to defer until January at best a proposal to freeze the testing of these new weapons is equivalent to a decision to complete 2 more months of the projected additional tests.

Once these weapons have been tested to the point at which deployment could be undertaken with assurance of success, we will have entered a new and extraordinarily more dangerous and difficult period in the arms race between the two great powers. A freeze on deployment would obviously require onsite inspection to monitor -- a provision which we are highly unlikely to be able to negotiate. Once deployment is possible any agreement coming out of the SALT talks based on an agreed number of launchers on both sides will be of radically reduced value, since each missile may hold an unknown number of warheads, each capable of inflicting immense damage. In addition, we will be committed to a vast new level of expenditure to reequip and deploy the new multiple warheads on each of many missiles in our arsenal.

Some of the stories about the administration's backgrounder indicate that there is still hope in the executive branch that a MIRV moratorium might be possible as a first item of business when the substantive talks do begin. Let us hope that this assumption is correct, and that the administration will decide to put forward such a proposal at that stage if not earlier. I note that none of the stories based on the backgrounder indicate that there was any substantial doubt about our ability to monitor a multiple warhead testing ban, and that no one in a position of responsibility about these talks is characterizing such a proposal as "Russian roulette."

It is my fervent hope that this delay until next year of putting forward substantive proposals in this crucial area will not prejudice an early agreement on this all important subject.

As the stories about the administration's decision also indicate, the Johnson administration was prepared to table concrete proposals at the opening of these talks if that had occurred before last January. This was based on the strong advice of those with longest experience with the Soviets.

They believe that in order to bridge the wide gulf of suspicion between us on a subject of such basic importance a concrete proposal would be needed from the start or encouragement would be given to those in the Soviet military and elsewhere who favor a cautious and limited approach toward us. Obviously the administration has chosen to ignore this advice, and we can only hope that this tactical decision will not adversely affect the outcome of the negotiations.

For all these reasons, Mr. President, I believe it is imperative that the administration give serious consideration to a suspension of multiple warhead testing now. I cannot stress too strongly the importance of halting development of multiple warhead testing before it is too late. The issue is not whether an agreement on MIRV is part of a larger agreement between the United States and Russia on strategic arms control. The question is whether the larger agreement is possible without stopping deployment of multiple warhead missiles. If the administration does not answer that question now, and take action to prevent that deployment, the hope of meaningful arms control can be snuffed out, I urge my colleagues in the Senate to do all in their power to impress this hard fact on the administration and to get action on multiple warheads before it is too late.