Muskie Congressional Record: Land Reform amendment

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE

December 12, 1969

Page 38684

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1969

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill (H.R. 14580) to promote the foreign policy, security, and general welfare of the United States by assisting peoples of the world to achieve economic development within a framework of democratic economic, social, and political institutions, and for other purposes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas will state it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. We did agree upon a 1-hour limitation, did we not?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes, on the amendment offered, there will be a 1-hour time limitation, with the time to be equally divided between the distinguished Senator from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE) who is offering the amendment, and the chairman of the committee, the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT).

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I thank the Chair.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I call up my amendment and ask that it be stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to read the amendment.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered; and the amendment will be printed in the RECORD at this point.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

On page 87, line 9, strike "$420,000,000" and insert in lieu thereof "$390,000,000";

On page 87, between lines 9 and 10, insert the following new section:

"VIETNAMESE LAND REFORM

"SEC. 108. (a) The success of land reform programs in Vietnam is a material factor in the future political and economic stability of that nation, and the speed with which such programs are given effect may have consequences with regard to the termination of hostilities there. In order to support and encourage Vietnamese land reform programs, the President may make grants to the Government of Vietnam, out of funds appropriated pursuant to this section, for the purchase and shipment to Vietnam of goods and commodities, manufactured or produced in the United States, which, by their introduction into the Vietnamese economy, will contribute to sound economic development in Vietnam. Such goods and commodities (1) shall be of a type approved by the President for such programs; (2) shall include goods suitable for agricultural supplies and other business inventories in non-luxury enterprises; and (3) may be exchanged for bonds issued by the Government of Vietnam to compensate land owners whose lands are transferred to other persons under such programs, or used in such other way as the Government of Vietnam may determine, consistent with the purposes of this section.

"(b) In order to carry out the provisions of this section, there are authorized to be appropriated $80,000,000 for the fiscal year 1970."

On page 87, line 11 strike "108" and insert in lieu thereof "109".

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on my amendment.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I yield myself 5 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr, President, yesterday, I submitted an amendment, with the same cosponsorship, which I explained at some length and to which the distinguished Senator from Vermont (Mr. AIKEN) and the distinguished chairman of the committee, the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT), responded.

Because of the questions raised during that colloquy, the amendment just called up represents a substantial modification of that which I introduced yesterday.

Perhaps I can explain it best by reading it. It is not very long:

The success of land reform programs in Vietnam is a material factor in the future political and economic stability of that nation, and the speed with which such programs are given effect may have consequences with regard to the termination of hostilities there. In order to support and encourage Vietnamese land reform programs, the President may make grants to the Government of Vietnam, out of funds appropriated pursuant to this section, for the purchase and shipment to Vietnam of goods and commodities, manufactured or produced in the United States, which, by their introduction into the Vietnamese economy, will contribute to sound economic development in Vietnam. Such goods and commodities (1) shall be of a type approved by the President for such programs; (2) shall include goods suitable for agricultural supplies and other business inventories in non-luxury enterprises; and (3) may be exchanged for bonds issued by the Government of Vietnam to compensate land owners whose lands are transferred to other persons under such programs, or used in such other way as the Government of Vietnam may determine, consistent with the purposes of this section.

(b) In order to carry out the provisions of this section, there are authorized to be appropriated $80,000,000 for the fiscal year 1970.

Mr. President, with respect to the funds authorized, this amendment represents a substantial reduction from the amendment I introduced yesterday. What I have proposed in this new amendment is that $30 million be deducted from the supporting assistance program, thus reducing it from $420 million to $390 million, and that $80 million be appropriated for this program. This represents a net increase of $50 million.

The $30 million which I strike from the supporting assistance program is, as I understand it, now related to land reform programs in Vietnam.

Mr. President, as I indicated yesterday, in my judgment, land reform is an important key to the resolution of hostilities in South Vietnam.

May I, in support of that conclusion, quote from a paper prepared by Mr. R. L. Prosterman, who worked with the Stanford Research Institute in making a survey of land turnover in Vietnam undertaken for AID in 1967 to 1968. I ask unanimous consent that the full text of this paper be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the paper was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

BRIEFING PAPER ON LAND REFORM IN VIETNAM, SEPTEMBER 25, 1969

(By R, L. Prosterman)

(The following paper, written after my third extended trip to Vietnam to review progress in the land-reform area, concludes (1) that President Thieu is strongly pushing for adoption of a massive, workable and immediate land-reform program, one that promises to supply major new leverage at the Paris talks and to broaden markedly the base of the Saigon government, but (2) that substantial U.S. financial support for the program -- whose maximum cost of $400 million equals 5-6 days cost of the war, spread over eight years -- is essential if the Vietnamese landlords are to be prevented from eviscerating Thieu's proposals out of fear that promises for compensation will not be met.)

The largest single group in South Vietnamese society -- the bulk of the rural population -- is the tenant farmers. If the South Vietnamese government carries out massive land reform, as planned, prior to this year's main harvest (December-February), it will strike a vital blow at Viet Cong support in the countryside:

Bringing about a spectrum shift towards Saigon in peasant political loyalties.

Cutting down the motivation which still leads 40,000 peasant recruits a year into the Viet Cong.

Sharply raising the fighting motivation of the peasant recruits in the Saigon army.

Striking at the villagers' motivation to support the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese in a variety of ways -- not only joining as recruits, but planting mines, performing reconnaissance, acting as porters, withholding intelligence from our side -- that, directly and indirectly, are responsible for the vast majority of U.S. casualties (mines and booby traps alone directly cause over half the U.S. deaths).

Because of the highly credible threat that it will accomplish a marked shift in peasant support towards the Saigon government, land reform supplies a powerful lever to move the communist negotiators in Paris towards good faith negotiation and a resolution of the conflict broadly acceptable to the American people.

The communists have mobilized peasant discontent with an initial stage of land distribution to spark every single revolution they have carried out (among the largely landless peasants of Russia, China, Cuba and Vietnam), and then have defeated the peasants' expectations through a subsequent and bloody process of collectivization; but a society of landowning peasants has never supported a communist revolution, and the genuine, non-communist land reforms that have occurred in six countries during the last half century (Mexico, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Bolivia and Iran) have consistently led to political stability. In two of those countries -- Bolivia and South Korea -- land reform has supplied a bulwark against direct communist attempts to start guerrilla wars in the 1960's. Again, in Malaya, Colombia and Venezuela, "spot" land reform programs directed specifically to landless groups among whom the communists had built support have helped crucially in the containment of guerrilla threats; and a central reason why dire predictions about guerrilla warfare in Thailand have not come true is that the great bulk of Thai farmers own the lands they cultivate (in Bolivia, South Korea and Thailand, over 90 per cent of the peasants own the land they farm; in the Mekong Delta, only 30 to 40 per cent).

Owner-farmers, historically, have made the world's least likely revolutionaries. Such owner-farmers, with a stake in the society and equipped with guns in local militia units to defend that stake, can supply the most potent response to the Viet Cong at the village level in Vietnam, and the only long term assurance of a politically viable noncommunist government in that country.

The proportion of farmers who have no land of their own in the Mekong Delta is rivaled only in three places in the world (Hukbalahap country in Central Luzon; Java, where the PKI regularly won elections for a decade; and Northeastern Brazil), and equals or exceeds that in pre-revolutionary China, Russia and Cuba.

The absolutely essential nature of land reform in Vietnam -- where 60 per cent of the people are rural, and most rural people throughout the country are tenants living on two-to-three-acre tracts, paying a third to half their crop in rent and living from year to year without security from eviction -- has been recognized by virtually every serious recent work on Vietnam: by Bernard Fall, Joseph Buttinger, Douglas Pike. Richard Critchfield, William Corson and many others. Today its importance has been fully recognized by President Thieu and by President Nixon, figuring centrally in the Midway communique and the later statement in Saigon. and forming the basis for three major steps by President Thieu in the last year:

(1) He has decreed a temporary end to the regime of "negative land reform", by which landlords formerly returned on the jeeps with ARVN troops to newly-secured villages, making "pacification" a nightmare game of landlords-return for peasants who had thought the land was theirs (sometimes for up to 20 years, going back to the original Viet Minh reforms). The stiffening of peasant support for the Viet Cong that this process brought about over the years undoubtedly cost thousands of American lives.

(2) He has accelerated the distribution of choice former-French lands and other lands which were taken over by the government under Diem's purported land-reform program, and were then allowed to be rented out by local officials who simply stepped into the landlord's shoes. Again, the total identification of Saigon with the land-renting process was deadly.

But now, the eviction of occupants in newly-secured areas has been effectively stopped during 1969 and at least until February 1970, while the collection of rents (a more clandestine activity) has been stopped in law, partially stopped in fact, and close to 90,000 acres of choice lands have been distributed between January and August to 25,000 families, while another 90,000 will be distributed, given the July-August pace, by year's end.

In hundreds of depth interviews of Mekong Delta peasants carried out by the Stanford Research Institute in the AID-sponsored land tenure study in 1967-68 (for which I acted as land law consultant) the peasants listed land ownership as a vitally important concern three times as frequently as physical security and listed credit twice as frequently as physical security.

(3) The biggest step by far was the drafting of the "Land to the Tiller" bill and its presentation, in early July, to the lower house. This bill would affect all of the 3,000,000 acres of land that are cultivated by tenants or non-owners, and would make all Vietnamese peasants the owners of the land they till, promising to end the regime of tenant-farming for a million families in a drastically simplified and rapid way:

All land not tilled by the owner would be affected (so there would be no need to apply a "retention limit" under which each owner would have to make a "declaration" of how much he owns, with the onus on the administrators to find out if he is lying).

The peasant tilling the land would receive it free (so there would be no occasion for corrupt administrators to dun the peasant for payments and the message would be the simplest possible: you don't pay anything to anybody).

The effect would be nationwide (so that peasants tilling land in insecure areas could nevermore be goaded to support the Viet Cong with the threat that landlords would otherwise return: "negative land reform" would be gone for good).

Confirmation of title would come via a highly simplified village-level application procedure, involving only a few days' delay (and requiring neither the shifting of families, the shifting of present boundaries, nor the resurveying of the land).

Landlords would be fully compensated (20 per cent in cash, 80 per cent in 8 year inflation -adjusting bonds). The total cost would be $400 million, equal to between 5 and 6 days' cost of the war.

The bill represents one of the great noncommunist land reforms of the Twentieth Century, comparable, for example. to those of Japan and South Korea. The “Land to the Tiller" program, however, is in deep political trouble, and unless it can be salvaged in the next 60 days, the opportunity will be lost of having the tenancy system ended before the main harvest that begins in December and ends in February; the impact, at best, will then be delayed by a full year, a year during which seven to ten thousand American men will die.

The basic trouble is that the South Vietnamese landlords do not trust the bonds. Because of this, they used their influence in the lower house to eviscerate the bill, and even then added a provision boosting the cash portion of compensation from 20 per cent to 60-70 per cent.

Now the upper house is considering the bill, which President Thieu has asked to be amended back to its original strong version. Under Vietnamese law, the upper house amendments, if any, will prevail unless overridden by two-thirds of the total membership of the lower house; and even then President Thieu can amend, and will prevail unless his amendments are overridden by a majority of the joint membership of the two houses. But whether the upper house amends, and -- if not -- whether President Thieu amends and is not overridden, depends crucially on the credibility of the compensation to the landlords.

We are talking about a program that represents essentially the last new thing "in the pipeline" to change the negotiating leverage in Paris or dramatically broaden the base with real program, not just by shuffling faces -- nearly all of which are unknown to the peasants anyway -- of the Thieu government. But a clear signal of U.S. support for a substantial part of the $400 million cost is urgently needed if this program is to remain politically viable in South Vietnam.

My recommendation is that we make clear, now, that we are willing to support the program with:

(1) $200 million worth of U.S. commodities, shipped over a four-year period, with preferences for shipment direct to ex-landowners against "payment" with the bonds, and for shipment of commodities that improve the agricultural sector (and get the ex-landowners actively involved in new commercial enterprises) such as fertilizer, insecticide, water pumps and building materials;

(2) a further $50 million in U.S. commodities over the first two years of the program (so the pattern of (1) and (2) combined would be Year 1--$75 million; Year 2--$75 million; Year 3--$50 million; Year 4--$50 million), except the bonds received for these commodities would not be cancelled as a subsidy but would be paid off by the GVN, with the counterpart funds thus generated used to support agricultral credit-direct loans or guarantees of loans -- made to the small farmers, who today pay average interest rates of 60 per cent a year; and

(3) for those ex-landowners who wish to continue to hold the bonds, an underlying U.S. guarantee of payment of the principal and interest on the bond issue, except with the understanding between the U.S. and GVN that the latter remains liable to us for any outlays-- commodities plus bond-guarantee payments -- made in excess of an over-all $200 million subsidy level (in this way, the U.S., rather than the landowners personally, would bear the risk of a GVN political or financial collapse as it affects the bonds).

The maximum cost of the program to the U.S. under these proposals would be some $400 million, spread over an eight-year period; the expected cost would be $200-250 million, spread over four.

The late Bernard Fall wrote in 1967 that, in Vietnam, land reform is "as essential to success as ammunition for howitzers -- in fact, more so." It costs a lot less than ammunition for howitzers; but it saves American lives just as surely, and it may shorten the war by many months.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Maine has expired.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President. I yield myself 3 more minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized for 3 additional minutes.

Mr. MUSKIE. May I read these excerpts from the report:

Bringing about a spectrum shift towards Saigon in peasant political loyalties.

Cutting down the motivation which still leads 40.000 peasant recruits a year into the Viet Cong.

Sharply raising the fighting motivation of the peasant recruits in the Saigon army.

Striking at the villagers' motivation to support the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese in a variety of ways -- not only joining as recruits, but planting mines, performing reconaissance, acting as porters, withholding intelligence from our side -- that, directly and indirectly, are responsible for the vast majority of U.S. casualties (mines and booby traps alone directly cause over half the U.S. deaths).

These excerpts from that report underline my motivation in offering this amendment.

May I read another excerpt from that report, which has to do with the bill now pending in the Saigon Assembly, dealing with the subject of land reform which is entitled, "The Land to the Tiller" program?

The bill to which I refer, and I quote now from the report: "represents one of the great non-Communist land reforms of the 20th century, comparable, for example, to those of Japan and South Korea. The 'Land to the Tiller' program, however, is in deep political trouble, and unless it can be salvaged in the next 60 days, the opportunity will be lost of having tenancy ended before the main harvest that begins in December and ends in February. The impact at best will then be delayed by a full year, a year during which 7,000 to 10,000 American men will die."

Mr. President, this is how important I regard the present effort at land reform in Saigon. I think we have a responsibility in this Congress to do what we responsibly can to give impetus to that land-reform program and to do it before the main harvest which will be conducted from December through February.

Mr. President, this is a small price, representing an additional $50 million to this foreign aid bill, to indicate our concern for this program and our desire to make it work.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. MUSKIE. I yield myself 2 additional minutes.

Mr. President, what is involved is a resolution of the political difficulties in South Vietnam, the possibility of broadening the popular base of that government, the possibility of expediting an end to the war, the possibility of reducing the number of days and weeks during which American boys and Vietnamese boys will die.

This is how important I regard land reform. My opinion in this regard is supported by every knowledgeable person in South Vietnamese affairs.

Over the past quarter of a century, Bernard Fall, now gone, identified this as the root cause of the political unrest and instability in South Vietnam. He always regarded this objective as the indispensable resolution of the restlessness, the militancy, and the violence which is responsible for our presence there now, at a cost to our Treasury and at a cost of American lives.

An additional $50 million is a small and insignificant price to pay for whatever impetus it can give to the land reform program now pending before the legislature of South Vietnam, and I urge my colleagues' support for it.

I am happy at this time to yield to my distinguished colleague from Oregon (Mr. PACKWOOD).

How much time does the Senator desire?

Mr. PACKWOOD. May I have 10 minutes?

Mr. MUSKIE. I yield 10 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Oregon.

Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. President, when we talk about a land-reform program, when we talk about Vietnam specifically, I think it is perhaps necessary, before we look at Vietnam, that we look back at some of the land reforms that have taken place in this century in some countries.

Some of them have been bloody and revolutionary; some of them have been instituted by decree and by dictators; but in all instances, when they have finally been instituted and put in effect, that country has achieved a degree of stability -- not necessarily richness, but a degree of stability – that other countries without land-reform programs do not have.

Mexico, by revolutionary means, instituted a land reform program early in this century, and now has a degree of political stability that probably exceeds that of any other country in Latin America.

We need only look at the examples undertaken after World War II.

In Japan, a land reform program was instituted by General MacArthur by decree.

In Korea, it was instituted by Syngman Rhee, by decree, which was begun in 1947 and finished in 1949. So when the Communists invaded South Korea in 1950, the one thing the U.S. forces who were used in helping to fight that war did not have to contend with was a fifth column of South Korean personnel who were overtly or covertly supporting the North Koreans. They supported their government, basically because they owned land, and it was the only piece of action they were going to have in that country.

Then let us go to Formosa, where Chiang Kai-shek learned a lesson he had not learned on the mainland. When he undertook land reform on Formosa, it was a model land-reform program in Asia and transformed that island into a relatively peaceful and relatively stable country.

Or we can look at Iran, where the Shah, after perhaps a few years of contemplation and fiddling around, instituted land reform and undertook it almost with a vengeance, and again by decree -- a land-reform program so sweeping that he sits on his throne without any fear of peasant revolt, because, again, the peasants in that country have the only piece of action they are likely to have in a relatively poor country, and that is land.

We come now to Vietnam, a country of 16 million, 10 million of them being farm families, and half of them, 5 million, living on tenant farms. They pay anywhere from 5 to 10 to 60 percent of their crop in land rental every year. The landlord provides no credit, no seed, no fertilizer, nothing, and the tenant has no tenure. He can be kicked off the land at any time -- hardly a system to win the support of the peasant people for the central government.

As we fight up and down the hamlets and the towns of Vietnam, we find that the Communists move into an area, take it over, and theoretically grant land reform; they give land to the peasant. He pays a tax or collection on it, but he thinks it is his, and the Communists tell him he has the benefit of land reform. Mr. President, you and I know that it is not; that it is phony; that after the Communists have taken over the country, they will probably liquidate the peasants, as they have everywhere else. But the peasant does not realize that.

As U.S. forces move in and occupy the land that was under land reform, we make the peasants move over and make the tenants pay land rent to the landlord, as they did under the previous system -- hardly a system calculated to win their support for our system.

So that is why in South Vietnam most of the tenant farm peasants covertly support the Vietcong.

That is exactly what led to the massacre at Mylai. Our troops, day after day, were being bombed, were running into booby traps, fighting the men and women who were supporting the Vietcong.

They were shot at simply because the peasants thought they were going to get a better deal from the Communists. It is easy to understand why they feel that way.

All we are asking by this amendment is a chance for the Thieu government to be able to undertake what it has not been able to undertake to date; that is, adequate land reform. The reason the government cannot do it is that General Thieu does not quite fit into the dictatorial position or revolutionary position of leaders of other countries who have undertaken land reform in this century. He cannot by decree compel land reform. He has the opposition of the landlords, and they have one basic reluctance. They know they are not going to be in any kind of position if the Communists take over. They will get nothing. But the one reluctance they have to land reform is that they are afraid they are going to be paid in some kind of worthless government bonds that can never be negotiated or sold, and that their land is going to be confiscated.

All we seek to do by this amendment is, not to dictate the terms of land reform, not to dictate that they have to undertake it, but simply to tell President Thieu, so that he will have power in dealing with the assembly, that he has the financial leverage to be able to say to the landlords, "We are going to be able to guarantee compensation for the taking over of your land." With that carrot – and that is all he needs -- we can see an adequate land reform program undertaken in South Vietnam.

I must agree with the distinguished Senator from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE) about the urgency and immediate necessity. The principal rice harvest is now going on. The land-reform program can be undertaken almost immediately.

Three years ago, in reference to the contract with the Stanford Research Institute survey in Vietnam, the Senator from Maine asked the question, "Can it be done? How much will it cost? How soon can it be done? How soon can it be put into effect?" He referred to Prof. Roy L. Prosterman, who is the architect of that plan. The report said it can be done.

All the arable land in South Vietnam -- all of it -- can be purchased for $500 million, and the program can be put into effect immediately. The only reason why it has not been put into effect is not the reluctance of President Thieu, who is not a member of the old land-owning class -- he has no allegiance to the landowners; he does not own any significant land himself -- the only reason he does not put the program into effect is that the U.S. Government has not pushed it; has not said, “We will give you the support necessary to undertake it."

So I am pleased to join the Senator from Maine today in asking that the Senate undertake this relatively minor and relatively inexpensive step, in comparison with the billions of dollars we have put into that country in terms of military weapons, and that we undertake the one step and the only step likely to give the hapless peasantry in that country a feeling of solidarity and a willingness to support the government in Saigon. Without that feeling, we can stay there for 20 years, if we will, and will not be any further ahead than we are right now. The very least we can do, if we are going ahead with the Vietnamization program, is to give the government that remains the peasant support that it needs to keep itself in power.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. MUSKIE. I yield myself 1 minute. Mr. President, I should like to comment upon the statement of the distinguished Senator from Oregon, who, I think, has given a most articulate and clear explanation of what it is we are trying to do.

I find it difficult to understand the reluctance to commit $50 million of American money, after all of the billions of dollars that we have poured into that country, for this objective which, more than any other single objective, can contribute to a political settlement of the problems in South Vietnam. I, too, find it difficult to understand, for the reasons which the distinguished Senator has so well spelled out.

Mr. SAXBE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's minute has expired.

Mr. MUSKIE. I yield to the Senator from Ohio 1 minute.

Mr. SAXBE. Mr. President, I should like to support the amendment. I feel it is represents a beginning on a practical approach to our international problems.

We are the biggest supplier of military arms in the world, and we have taken an attitude that we can support governments -- many times dictatorshipsbecause they offer us some kind of friendship, and we support them by supplying them with vast amount of military arms.

This is a mistake. I believe that we can best support free governments in other countries -- not just Vietnam, which we are talking about now, but many other countries in our own hemisphere by providing some means whereby we can put the average peasant in control of his destiny to a little degree. I do not mean we should dictate to them how they do it, but I think we should help them where it is possible to help them.

It is reported that Che Guevara said that the biggest difficult he found in Bolivia was the stolid indifference of the peasants. Why? Because they had had a very small degree of land reform.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SAXBE. My time has expired.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine has 9 minutes remaining.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield myself 1 minute.

Mr. SAXBE. Just a minute, and then I will yield to the Senator on his time.

Mr. MUSKIE. One minute.

Mr. SAXBE. The reason I feel we should do this is that we could avoid further situations similar to Vietnam by this practical approach. The President is provided with large discretion. This approach means that the bonds that are issued will be issued for goods, and not for war materials.

I believe it is the a beginning on trying to help the countries where land reform is needed -- the poor agricultural countries of the world.

I yield to the Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, does not the Senator know there is $420 million for supporting assistance in this bill?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. How much time does the Senator yield himself?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield myself 2 minutes.

All we would be doing here would be adding $50 million in additional appropriations. There is nothing to restrict the use of the money already provided. As a matter of fact, $30 million of that money already provided is tentatively committed to this purpose, in the sense that if the people in Vietnam pass a satisfactory law in this area, we would supply the money.

All the Senator is doing is using this as an excuse to increase the appropriation for support and assistance. That is all his amendment does. If the amendment is not agreed to, that does not mean there is no money in the bill for that purpose. In either case, however, probably nothing will come about in the way of land reform in Vietnam.

As far back as the time of President Diem, in 1957, they were talking about land reform, and we supported it. This has been a boondoggle in the past. Everyone agrees this land-reform idea is good, just like stopping drinking and smoking; but they never do anything about it. Now all the Senator is doing is trying to put an increase of $50 million in the bill.

If land reform is as important to them as the Senator thinks it is, there is money in the bill to do it. I do not understand why it is necessary to add another $50 million. I do not see it that way. The money is available. If Senators want to put $50 million more in the bill -- I do not think they will -- that is what they will be doing.

Moreover, my impression is that a large part of the land in question belongs to the French. The French still own the great plantations.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield the Senator from Idaho whatever time he wishes.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, first of all, I wish to make clear that I wholeheartedly approve the objective of land reform in Vietnam. I think it would be exceedingly helpful if a land reform program were adopted by the Saigon government, and implemented in a forthright and determined way. I applaud the motive of the Senator from Maine in offering his amendment today.

However, as the chairman has stated, land reform is not a new idea for Vietnam. I can recall offering a resolution in the Senate back in 1963, calling upon the Saigon government to institute a program of land reform. That was during the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem. Now, these many years later, having invested an enormous fortune of blood and treasure in what has now become the longest foreign war in our history, we are still talking about the need for land reform in Vietnam.

We could have purchased Vietnam many times over -- all of it -- the entire country and everything that is in it for the money we have spent on this war. Yet today we are still talking about the need for land reform.

The obstacle to land reform is not the lack of money supplied by the United States over the years.

The obstacle to land reform is not in Washington. The obstacle is in Saigon. It is not for the lack of money that land reform has not been achieved; it is for the lack of resolution in Vietnam itself.

I must concur with the chairman when he says that, after years of fruitless effort to persuade Saigon to adopt meaningful land reform, and to provide the money for that purpose, all that this amendment will do is to add another $50 million to the aid program. Already the bill provides money for land reform. More money could easily be made available if and when the Saigon government ever overcomes indigenous opposition to the program.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CHURCH. I shall yield in a moment.

Our experience with the Alliance for Progress in Latin America, our experience in Vietnam, and in other countries where we have attempted to induce foreign governments to undertake drastic internal reforms, make it plain that such reforms occur only in those cases where there is a disposition within the country to effect them. They cannot be purchased by American money furnished from without, and they cannot be achieved through the insistence of the Government of the United States.

Therefore, I shall vote against the amendment.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CHURCH. I yield.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, the Senator talks about the importance of achieving land reform, and says that there is a lack of resolution in South Vietnam to take these steps. As I understand it, the Government of South Vietnam, particularly its legislative body, is very close to taking a step in that direction.

The additional $50 million involved in this amendment will not be spent unless there is the resolution on the part of South Vietnam which the Senator from Idaho is talking about. If the South Vietnamese Legislature does not pass the legislation -- if they do not take steps to achieve land reform -- then we are doing nothing so far as this amendment is concerned. However, we would be indicating our support.

Such support would be absolutely necessary if any meaningful program of land reform is to take place. Will the Senator not agree?

Mr. CHURCH. There is already money in the bill for this very purpose. If, after so many years, the government in Saigon finally overcomes the vested interests within that country that have so long resisted land reform, if, these obstacles are overcome, there is money in the bill. I am sure that we can find other money as well.

There simply is no need to add another $50 million when no program for land reform has even been enacted in South Vietnam.

I understand that we have reached a point in Vietnam where we are quite willing for the United States to pay for everything that happens there.

No one even suggests that the Vietnamese should pay for their own land reform program.

Naturally, we must pay for it. That is the purpose of the amendment.

But there is already money enough in the bill.

The amendment is unnecessary.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Vermont.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont is recognized.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, what I wish to say is not directly in connection with the amendment offered by the Senator from Maine, although it might be used as a good example for what I have in mind.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senator suspend until the membership gives him an opportunity to be heard?

The Senator from Vermont has attempted to speak over the conferences that prevent even the Presiding Officer from hearing the Senator from Vermont.

Will the Senators please cooperate with the request of the Chair? The Senator from Vermont wishes to proceed. The Senator may proceed.

THE DANGERS OF MORAL AGGRESSION

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, the role of the Senate to advise the President in the conduct of foreign policy and to grant or withhold its consent to treaties is one of the most precious powers of this body.

At a time when most parliaments in the world have either been suppressed or shorn of most of their real powers, we must cherish ours.

Democracy may not be an ideal form of government, but for us it is an absolute necessity.

I have never thought that this precious power gave to us the right or duty to use the legislative process to impose our moral view on other nations -- to intervene in the political and legislative processes of other nations on behalf of this faction or that.

Yet increasingly under the umbrella of this legislation called foreign aid, we have tried to do just that.

What started out to be an important and a generous instrument to promote U.S. foreign policy has become a kind of diplomatic pork barrel and a subsidy to American industry.

This is a dangerous situation.

It amounts to interpreting "advise and consent" as "oppose and contend."

If the Senate were just a forum for discussion, we might be able to indulge our moral indignation much more freely than we can afford to do in this body now.

But here in the Senate, if our ideals are to be effective, they have to be rooted in real interests – real American interests.

We have real powers and also real responsibilities.

This is one of the lessons we should have learned from our unhappy experience in Vietnam.

I have said many times that our cardinal mistake in Vietnam was to fail to see that the weight of our military intervention was bound to prevent the very self-determination that we so loudly proclaimed we wanted to preserve.

The President's Vietnamization policy is an acknowledgment of that fundamental error.

But it is not only the weight of our military intervention that has prevented self-determination in that country.

We have compounded our error by succumbing time and time again to the temptation of trying to legislate the morality of the authorities in Saigon whose self-determination we have supposedly been trying to preserve.

When elections were held in South Vietnam in 1967, loud voices in this country were raised to discredit them even before they were held.

When the Paris peace talks began, other voices strongly urged that we use our influence to undermine those elected authorities in Saigon in the name of reaching some political accommodation.

And through the medium of this foreign aid bill we have time and time again attempted to use our powers to dictate the kind of government policies South Vietnam should adopt.

The fact that about one half of all the U.S. nationals employed by AID overseas are now working in South Vietnam or Laos makes a mockery, I fear, out of all the noble aims that originally inspired the ancestors of this tattered and tired bill.

It is no wonder that there is a revulsion in the country because of our intervention in the affairs of nations abroad.

We do not have to look for immoralities in Saigon to find the reason, plentiful though they may be. We have been our own worst enemy in that corner of the world.

Those who would intervene in the national politics of other countries must answer the question, "What national American interest is being served?"

No ideal can be effective unless it is rooted in such an answer.

No amount of moral indignation can excuse us from determining what our real interests are.

When moral indignation alone is coupled with appropriations and legislative restrictions which amounts to giving other nations their marching orders -- then we are practicing moral aggression.

And a government that believes its moral view of world affairs is the only true and valid view can only be a deterrent to world peace.

It is not just in Vietnam that we have been morally aggressive under the guise of providing foreign aid.

Much of the talk surrounding this subject and many amendments to the legislation reflect this view.

I maintain that we should approve this authorization bill for this year since it is our basic responsibility to continue appropriations through next July at least.

I hope that this will be the last time we will be asked to treat these vital and delicate international matters in the manner we have done this year.

We must restrain the temptation to use the foreign aid bill to commit moral aggression lest we end up in a country doomed to moral isolation.

In order to make our ideals effective in world affairs, we have to accent the rational dimension in foreign policy and curb our moral pretensions.

If we are to continue to help finance development projects in those countries deep in mass poverty -- and I think we should in some appropriate form -- then let us have legislation presented for that purpose and not intertwined with matters that have no real relationship with development finance.

If it is our real interests to give economic or military assistance to other governments -- even governments that do not reflect our democratic ideas -- then let us have legislation that makes those interests so plain that we will not be constantly tempted to pass judgment on the governments we are helping.

This legislation used to express the moral dimension in our foreign policy in ways consistent with our real interests. It no longer does.

Instead it represents a combination of our frustrations and guilt feelings over past errors and the kind of cynicism so apparent in the phrase "pork barrel legislation."

It is in our vital interests to lead in keeping the peace, but it is not in our interests to try to exert either a moral or a political domination over other governments.

No innocence can protect us from the consequences of our interventions, however good we feel our motives to be. For after we have finished telling other governments what they ought to do to meet our standards of morality or political wisdom, we are certain to end up finding these same governments telling us what we must do to save our face, if not the lives of thousands of young Americans.

Mr. President, as far as this amendment goes, what it does is to take $30 million from the fund which was used to enable us to get the troops out of Vietnam, and it adds $50 million to other parts of our program. Therefore, if one wants to use this money to help get the troops out of Vietnam, then it would not be wise to vote for this amendment. If one wants to keep the troops in Vietnam indefinitely, then he should vote for the amendment.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Tennessee.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee is recognized for 5 minutes.

[Intervening debate omitted]

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1969

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the debate on all amendments, with the exception of the Javits amendment submitted on yesterday, be limited to 1 hour, the time to be equally divided and controlled by the proponent of the amendment and the manager of the bill, and that the debate on final passage be limited to 2 hours, the time to be equally divided between the leaders or whomever they may designate.

This has been cleared all the way around.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield 2 minutes to me?

Mr. MUSKIE. I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Washington.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from Maine. I recently introduced, on behalf of myself and seven other Senators, Senate Resolution 290, urging the Government of South Vietnam to enact needed legislation for land reform. I am hopeful that the National Assembly of South Vietnam will act expeditiously to enact legislation providing for swift and immediate land reform so that the great mass of South Vietnamese tenant farmers may gain ownership of the lands they till. Such legislation has been introduced in the National Assembly and has not yet been given the force of law. It is my hope that such a land reform program, if enacted in time, will have its impact during the forthcoming grain harvest in the Mekong Delta which will begin in December and continue through February. A major land reform effort can be of substantial assistance in ending the Vietnam conflict at an early date and in saving the lives of those now subject to the perils of warfare.

If the National Assembly of South Vietnam enacts a broad-based land reform program, some 7 million South Vietnamese now dependent on tenant farming under almost medieval conditions for their livelihood could receive virtually immediately the ownership of the land upon which they now toil.

It is my conviction that the South Vietnamese Government must act without delay to implement broad-based land reform if they are to secure the support of their people and if the people are to have confidence in the Government of South Vietnam. This action, which I believe so necessary, can be effectuated only by the people of South Vietnam. The people of the United States have paid dearly in an attempt to secure a greater measure of political freedom for the people of South Vietnam. The Government of South Vietnam must be prepared to take the necessary steps to assure a degree of economic freedom for its citizens as well.

It is my belief that land reform will help speed the date at which all American combat troops can be ordered out of Vietnam. Hopefully, this effort will strengthen the desire of the South Vietnamese peasants to resist. Land reform will provide the vital link that will give young peasants a "part of the action" in their own country.

It is my hope that the Senate will adopt the amendment of the distinguished Senator from Maine, indicating the desire of this country to aid the land-reform effort if enacted by the National Assembly. We cannot wait, because each day more American boys are dying in that tragic war. We must explore all options and avenues in de-Americanizing this war.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD the text of Senate Resolution 290, to which I have referred.

There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. RES. 290

Resolution relating to the support of the Senate for land reform in South Vietnam Whereas most of the cropland in South Vietnam is presently vested in the hands of landlords;

Whereas the South Vietnamese tenant farmer does not enjoy the privilege of landownership and the incentives and economic stability derived from such ownership; and

Whereas an effective program of land reform would enhance the economic and political security of the vast majority of South Vietnamese people; and

Whereas the Government of South Vietnam has not succeeded in implementing an effective land reform program; and

Whereas implementation of meaningful land reform in South Vietnam would substantially hasten the termination of armed conflict and the tragic loss of life being suffered by all parties in the conflict: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Senate recommends, urges, and supports the immediate formulation and implementation by the Government of South Vietnam of a broad-based, effective, and equitable land reform program for South Vietnam.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield me 2 minutes?

Mr. MUSKIE. I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Washington.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I rise to support the substitute amendment No. 422 to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1969, which is aimed at encouraging positive action by the Government of South Vietnam in enacting and applying a thorough, effective, and democratic land reform program.

As my colleagues know, a large proportion of the people of South Vietnam make their living by tilling the soil and, like farmers everywhere, desire to own the land on which they work. It has long been obvious that a program to make it possible for landless farmers to become landowners would be in the best interest of the people of South Vietnam and contribute to their economic and political welfare. Yet past and present efforts to carry out a thorough-going program of land reform have not been successful. At this point, President Thieu's start on such a program has been bottled up in the South Vietnamese Legislature.

It is my view that the people of the United States have a proper and legitimate interest in encouraging the Government of South Vietnam to make substantial and rapid progress in extending the benefits of landownership to all of the citizens of South Vietnam who make their living from the land as a means of strengthening the economic and political foundations of the country's independence.

In that spirit, I urge the adoption of the substitute amendment offered by the distinguished and able Senator from Maine.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MUSKIE. I yield.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I think we should call the attention of the Senate to the fact that many of us, at least my colleague and I, are somewhat proud of the fact that some of the greatest theses on this subject have been presented by Dr. Roy L. Prosterman, of the University of Washington, who spent a great deal of time in Vietnam and made many objective reports. I think if this step is finally taken by the Saigon government, he deserves a lot of credit for starting this movement.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I join the Senator in that regard. I also wish to commend the work of Dr. Roy L. Prosterman on behalf of American support of land-reform efforts by the South Vietnamese people. The practical and dedicated contributions to land reform by Professor Prosterman, associate professor of law at the University of Washington School of Law, constitute a notable public service.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I yield myself 2 minutes.

Mr. President, the South Vietnamese have been promising land reform ever since we stepped in as the French left. After giving them $4.5 billion in economic aid over the last 15 years, we still have plenty of promises of reform but no results.

As long ago as 1957 in an official communique issued at Washington by the President of the United States there was this phrase:

Plans for agrarian reform have been launched, and a constructive program developed to meet long-range economic and social problems to promote higher living standards for the Vietnamese people.

Nearly every year since then we have had similar statements, always designed to elicit more money from the American Government.

It is true that there is a land-reform bill pending in the National Assembly. The United States, in fact, committed $10 million in fiscal 1969 and earmarked $30 million in fiscal year 1970 for it, contingent on a workable plan emerging. But with the landlords and moneyed classes controlling Saigon political life, I am no more optimistic that this bill's promises will ever be put into practice than I have been about those of the past.

The point is that the United States has already demonstrated its willingness to put up a large sum to carry out a land reform program. The executive branch can allocate more from the $420 million in supporting assistance authorized in this bill, if it so chooses. The money is there. It is the will of the South Vietnamese that is lacking.

I suppose we could force land reform at least temporarily if we took over the Saigon government completely. But we have repeatedly been told by this, and the past, administration that self-determination is the U.S. goal in South Vietnam. We are already too deeply mired in Vietnam's internal wars -- military and political -- and to go the route the Senator from Maine suggested will only sink us in deeper.

I do not quarrel with the Senator's objective. I do not oppose land reform and think that it is a tragedy that the various Saigon regimes have not attached the importance to this as we -- and the Vietcong -- have. But, if there is one lesson we should have learned from Vietnam, it is that the Vietnamese must make their own decisions.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Maine yield to me for 1 minute?

Mr. MUSKIE. I yield.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, from time to time we hear a great deal of criticism about the Government of South Vietnam and what it has, or has not, done. As a nation, it seems that we are constantly faced with a dilemma. If we seek to influence the Government of South Vietnam we are criticized by some; if we let them go their own way and do not assert ourselves, we are criticized.

I believe the amendment of the senior Senator from Maine, as it has been revised and as is now presented, takes a very reasonable approach. Under his amendment, we would not be dictating to the Government of South Vietnam but we would be making it clear that we support land reform in principle and that we are prepared to help achieve it.

I support the amendment of the Senator from Maine.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Michigan.

I yield myself such time as I may require.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I can generate as much cynicism about the situation in Vietnam and the failure of our efforts there over the years as any Member of this body, but applied to the arguments made against the amendment by the distinguished chairman of the committee and the distinguished Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH). We cannot permit ourselves to be bogged down in our cynicism.

Anybody with an understanding of the problem in South Vietnam knows that land is at the heart of the future aspirations of the people and it has been the failure of Diem and succeeding governments there to deal with that problem that has prolonged the war.

Anyone who expresses the certainty that this amendment would prolong the war is completely without understanding of what we are dealing with there. We are dealing with a condition. We have in the South Vietnamese Assembly in Saigon a land reform bill. The question is whether now, after all the frustrations of the years, we use our efforts in the relatively piddling sum of $50 million to prod that bill loose, to move it toward the objective of achievement and realization.

There is a rice harvest in January and February. If we can accomplish this step before that harvest begins and if we could assure that this harvest would inure totally to the tenants and not the landlords, we would have taken a giant step toward ending the war.

We have poured billions of dollars into Vietnam. Here is an additional $50 million which this amendment would put completely in control of the President at his discretion. He need not spend it unless by spending it he can speed the enactment into law of the bill now pending in the Saigon Assembly.

Let us put our cynicism behind us. Let us put our doubts behind us, and let us take what little risk is involved in approving this $50 million. For years we have talked about taking risks for peace.

Is this such an unconscionable risk to take toward that objective?

AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Arkansas yield to me for 1 minute?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield 1 minute to the Senator from Vermont.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, this appears to be an effort to take money away from the funds necessary to get our boys out of Vietnam and to divert it to American industry. I wish to read one line from the amendment which has been offered by the Senator from Maine:

The President may make grants to the government of Vietnam, out of funds appropriated pursuant to this section, for the purchase and shipment to Vietnam of goods and commodities manufactured or produced in the United States . . .

Mr. President, if that is not American industry getting its foot in the door again, I do not know what it is.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute.

Mr. President, I oppose the attack directed at the amendment by the Senator from Vermont.

American industry had nothing to do with this amendment. We are undertaking to put together commodities which would appeal to South Vietnamese landlords as credible payment for their land. That is all that is behind the amendment. There is no intention to aggrandize American industry or the American commodities having appeal to landlords as payment for their land.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute.

The Senator speaks of our being bogged down in cynicism. It seems to me that could be applied the other way. The Senator really proposes to force those people to do what they promised to do years ago, by holding out more money when there is no reason to believe it will be any more effective now than it was under Diem.

The amendment would simply add more money to a bill which already has sufficient money to accomplish this purpose, assuming there is any reasonable ground to expect it will be used.

The bill already has $30 million in it but it is contingent upon the South Vietnamese Government enacting a bill that is reasonably designed to accomplish this purpose. It is that way because the administration obviously knows of the past disappointment. There is little likelihood the money would not be frittered away.

What they would really like are those goods, those imports which have the greatest appeal in the black market; it is the most active black market in the world.

The cynicism could be equally alleged to the Senator from Maine for thinking he could bribe a people in doing something new.

Mr. MUSKIE. Will the Senator from Arkansas yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield to the Senator on his own time.

Mr. MUSKIE. I have no time remaining.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Maine has expired.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH).

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, do I have any time remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time of the Senator from Maine has expired.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I yield 1 minute to the Senator from Maine.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized for 1 minute.

Mr. MUSKIE. I thank the Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. President, I do not see how the Senator from Arkansas can argue that the $30 million, which he says is provided under the bill for land reform, will be used any more irresponsibly than the $50 million my amendment provides. Where is the consistency in the Senator's observation?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I did not put it in there for that purpose. I have no idea that it will be used any more effectively now than it was in the past. I am opposed to the proposed increase of $50 million. In fact, I am opposed to the authorization being as large as it is.

After all, the United States is having troubles of its own. In some areas we need reform as badly as it is needed in Vietnam. The Senator has made eloquent pleas for antipollution measures, and so forth, in this country, and then he comes in here and says that $50 million is a relatively piddling amount. I think that $50 million is a substantial amount in view of the dire necessities of this country. Yet, we seem to be so generous with our money when it comes to a foreign country.

Mr. MUSKIE. I meant with respect to the relative amount of money we have spent there.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. $4½ billion. It is high time we stopped doing that.

Mr. MUSKIE. The question is whether the Senator's position or my position is more likely to advance the end of the war.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. All the Senator is doing is adding $50 million to the bill. That is what the Senator is doing. He is not accomplishing anything else. There is nothing in the bill to prevent the $420 million in supporting assistance being used for land reform purposes. All the Senator is doing is using this as an excuse, because it has certain appeal to get votes, to increase the amount of the bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Maine.

On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk called the roll.

The result was announced -- yeas 33, nays 51, as follows:

[Roll call vote listing omitted]

So Mr. MUSKIE's amendment was rejected.