September 9, 1969
Page 24833
Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. In order to obtain an immediate improvement in airlift capability, we undertook a program that called for 20 squadrons of C-141 jet transport aircraft. While the C-141 was a modern jet aircraft, it was basically a commercial aircraft modified for military applications. It had no capability for the movement of large size Army equipment. With the retirement of the old piston engine C-124's and C-133's, the percentage of Army items air-liftable would drop about 65 percent.
In general, the Army items which could be carried in the older aircraft, but which could not be carried in the C-141's, were the vehicles which gave the Army units their required mobility. The requirement for the air delivery of very large equipment continued to grow during the early 1960's. The Army items which could not be airlifted include a very large portion of the Army's big guns and tanks. We had a new jet transport aircraft in the C-141, but we still had a situation in which we had to tailor Army units for air movement, rather than tailoring these units for their intended missions.
In 1964 a Department of Defense study of our airlift capability requirements reached the conclusion that we must have a new jet transport aircraft with the capability to airlift very large Army equipment such as guns and tanks. This study concluded that a force of 13 C-141 squadrons and six heavy lift (C-5A) squadrons would–
First, provide an improved replacement for the C-124 and C-133 outside capability for one-half the operating cost per ton-mile;
Second, provide significant reductions in reaction time for forces now planned for airlift, or by applying this time-savings to additional tonnages, a marked increase in the effectiveness of those forces;
Third, provide a capability to redeploy large forces rapidly from one area to another, thereby reducing risks to the general war posture in committing major forces to contingency areas; and
Fourth, be capable of airlifting up to eight Army division forces during the early deployment period, resulting in a potential for ultimate savings in casualties, dollar costs, and time required to conduct a limited war.
Based on this study, Secretary McNamara announced a decision to develop the C-5A aircraft, and shortly thereafter he announced that the number of C-141 squadrons would be reduced from the previously planned 20 to 13.
Under our various treaties, this country has military commitments to a number of nations -- and there are far too many. In order to fulfill these commitments, if called upon to do so, we must have an adequate airlift capability. It is the C-5A aircraft that will give us this capability.
For example, Mr. President, I am a strong advocate of sharply reducing the size of our Army in Europe. With the capability we will have through the C-5A, we could easily withdraw two or three divisions from Germany. The C-5A aircraft, which has been requested by the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would make this possible. Earlier I referred to the increase in the cost of the C-5A program. As every Member of the Senate knows, cost increases, or cost overruns, are not limited to aircraft, they are not limited to the Department of Defense, and they are not limited to the Federal Government.
The matter of increases in the cost of weapons systems has been a matter of great concern to me for a number of years in my capacity as ranking minority member of the Department of Defense Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. After giving this matter considerable study, I have concluded that most increases can be attributed to one of three major causes:
First. Including improved capability in systems after they have been approved for procurement, which gives us a better weapons system and should not be considered as a cost increase in the usual sense.
Second. The result of the effect of inflation on the value of the money provided for the procurement of weapons systems.
Third. Frequent changes in production schedules.
At this time it does not look as though there will be any further substantial increases in the C-5A resulting from providing improved capability.
Mr. President, up to this time there has been no major change in the production schedule of this aircraft, and it is my hope that the Senate will not take any action which will cause any interruption in its production.
On July 29, the Secretary of the Air Force appeared before the Department of Defense Appropriation Subcommittee, at which time he discussed this problem of cost increases. He said, in part:
While we have no precise estimate of the dollar effects on schedule changes, we think that it has cost us on the order of ten cents out of every aircraft procurement dollar since the period of 1965-66 ...
The Proxmire amendment would cause a break in the production of the C-5A aircraft which could lead to tremendous further increases in its cost. We need this aircraft, and we need to obtain it for the least possible cost. It is for these reasons, Mr. President, that I urge the rejection of this amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. STENNIS. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Maine.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Mississippi for yielding to me these few moments to state my position on the pending amendment.
Mr. President, I have followed the debate over the military authorization bill with great concern.
In the early stages of the debate I spoke out against and voted against deployment of the Safeguard antiballistic missile. I did so because I doubted its contribution to our national defense, because I had deep reservations about its impact on our efforts to slow the arms race and because I believed it represented a major and unnecessary drain on our resources.
I have examined and am examining the other controversial items in the authorization bill using the same criteria I applied to ABM. It would be tempting to vote for every amendment to the authorization as a symbolic gesture toward a reordering of our national priorities -- a reordering I consider to be of utmost importance.
But symbolism can be an uncertain guide, particularly when the symbols are not at the heart of the issue. The amendments pending before us represent substantial sums of money, but taken individually or collectively they do not get at the central issue on national defense policy: that is, our national strategic commitments. For these reasons, I have concluded that each of the amendments must be judged individually on its merits, and that the weapons systems to which the amendments are addressed must be judged on their contributions to our national security interests, as we now perceive them.
My present inclination is to vote for the amendments dealing with the manned bomber and the nuclear carrier where I consider the potential costs far in excess of the potential benefits.
On the surface, the C-5A authorization for a fourth squadron is a likely target. I am concerned as are other Senators, notably the distinguished senior Senator from Wisconsin, with the increased costs associated with the plane, the criticism of the contract between the Air Force and Lockheed, and the disagreements over the meaning of Defense Department cost-effectiveness studies. These argue for delay and study before going ahead with the fourth squadron.
I hesitate, however, to vote for disrupting procurement of the plane in order to correct contractual and cost problems unless there is also convincing evidence that the C-5A is not needed, that it is inconsistent with potential changes in our strategic policies, and that it represents a major portion of our defense budget.
On balance, I think the debate argues for procurement of the fourth squadron, with maximum protection of U.S. interests on costs and renegotiation of the basic contracts. I do not think the General Accounting office is the appropriate agency to advise the Congress on the contribution of the plane to our national deployment capability.
In the final analysis, Mr. President, I believe that the C-5A, with all its contract and cost problems, offers an effective transportation system to meet present commitments and is consistent with proposals the majority leader and others of us have made for withdrawal of major U.S. troop concentrations overseas. That, I submit, suggests that the C-5A offers us the chance to actually cut our Defense costs in that 60 percent portion of our defense budget allocated to manpower.
For these reasons, Mr. President, I shall vote against the Proxmire amendment. However, I wish to add my commendation to the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin for having opened up this issue and having presented to the Senate a case which has made it very difficult for me to choose between voting yea or nay on the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.
Mr. STENNIS. I yield 2 additional minutes to the Senator from Maine.
Mr. MUSKIE. I think the efforts of the Senator from Wisconsin will lead to a refocusing of our attention on military versus domestic priorities and, second, I hope, to improvement in our procurement policies in the national defense field.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. STENNIS. I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Nevada.
Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I am strongly opposed to the amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE) with reference to the C-5A. We should recognize at the outset the fact that this amendment will not merely defer the funding of the 23 additional aircraft during the period of the 3-month study by the Comptroller General. It proposes to eliminate procurement funds for the fourth C-5A squadron from the bill entirely and, if adopted, it would definitely delay the contract for the 23 additional aircraft by 1 full year.
Since we are operating in the real world of hard and practical facts, and not merely in academics and theory, we should recognize another fact. The fourth C-5A squadron which would be deleted by the Proxmire amendment is, despite the discussion on the subject, firmly recommended and supported by the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Air Force, and by our Committee on Armed Services. In fact, I know of no person in an official position of responsibility or authority with respect to the C-5A who takes a contrary view. Certainly, this should weigh heavily with us.
Let me also say at this outset that I doubt very much that the General Accounting Office has the competence to make the military judgment which the Proxmire amendment requires. I become very much concerned when we propose to involve the General Accounting Office in the decision making process in matters of military requirements and systems evaluation. I believe that decisions on the advisable course to follow in the C-5A matter and the best method to satisfy our present and further military airlift requirements transcend the ability of the General Accounting Office, conceding its competence in its own legitimate and assigned sphere of operation.
Now, let me say a few words about the C-5A itself. Our national interest clearly requires that we have the capability to support the rapid deployment of U.S. forces. The C-5A will provide a fast reaction capability which will enable us to airlift combat or support units worldwide under general and limited war as well as peacetime conditions. This capability for rapid deployment will give the Department of Defense an added flexibility in planning for peacetime deployment and basing it has never had before. It may very well permit a reduction in the U.S. forces based overseas and solve problems associated with the pre-positioning of equipment.
The design of the C-5A was optimized to accomplish the rapid deployment of effective forces. This huge aircraft will transport almost all of the types of combat weapons and equipment of an Army division concurrently with the personnel associated with the equipment. This permits unit integrity to be maintained -- an important tactical consideration.
No other aircraft can perform this mission. The C-141, currently our largest operational jet transport, has established an outstanding operational record. However, it cannot carry all of the infantry division and armored division vehicle types. Such essential items as tanks, bridge launchers, armored personnel carriers, and helicopters can be carried only in the C-5A.
The Congress has already approved the procurement of 58 of these aircraft through the initial production run A. In January 1969, the Air Force exercised the option to procure not to exceed 57 additional aircraft in production run B, subject, of course, to congressional approval. The fiscal year 1970 request is for authorization to procure the first 23 aircraft in production run B.
This is what is involved in the pending amendment. Under any theory, it appears to me the 23 aircraft in the fiscal year 1970 request are needed. Certainly the overwhelming weight of official and expert judgment supports this. When procured, these will take us only to four squadrons, 81 aircraft, versus the six squadrons, 120 aircraft, approved as a minimum requirement by the Department of the Air Force and Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The Senate Committee on Armed Services held extensive hearings on the C-5A program and, after careful consideration, it concluded that procurement of the 23 additional aircraft in the authorization bill is justified. At the same time, the committee has made it plain that there is no commitment to procure any aircraft over and above the 23 in this year's bill. The fate of the fifth and sixth squadrons will be decided in future years.
As we all know, the C-5A program, for a number of reasons, has experienced significant cost increases. Also, it is rather clear that the form of the contract involved is deficient in a number of respects and has posed problems both for the Government and for the contractors. Despite these facts, however, the Air Force and the Department of Defense have assured us that we will get an aircraft with fine performance characteristics and that the C-5A, when delivered, will meet most, if not all, the operational requirements which have been laid down for it. There is no evidence at this time of any significant performance shortcomings. In addition, the C-5A operating cost per ton-mile will be far lower than any other airlift aircraft. For example, the operating cost per ton-mile will be 2.9 cents for the C-5A versus 5.3 cents for the C-141. Even with the cost increases, it appears that the C-5A will be more cost effective than any available aircraft.
Since the C-5A will have fine performance characteristics and at least four squadrons of this aircraft are needed, I believe that it would be most unwise to incur the added expense which would necessarily result from a delay, deferral, or strechout of the program. This would merely increase the cost overrun and make the cost situation worse than it already is. It might also transfer more of the cost increase to the Government.
The impact of the amendment is clear. The Defense Department advises that if the funding is deferred to fiscal year 1971, the Air Force will have to negotiate a new contract with Lockheed as the sole source and with no contractual commitments or price options available. A 1-year funding delay and a renegotiation of the contract, according to the Air Force, would result in a delay of about 18 months in the production of the first run B aircraft. It is estimated that a delay would increase the cost of run B by $400 to $550 million over the present projection.
Even if the amendment only deferred the procurement of the fourth squadron for 1 year, the financial impact on the contractor might impair seriously his ability to produce the 58 run A aircraft now under contract. This might result in default on the entire contract since, without funds for the 23 run B aircraft, the available money will be exhausted well before January 1, 1970. The Air Force advises us that if the program is killed entirely by failing to fund the 23 aircraft, the added loss to the Government at a minimum will be $102 million -- $72 million in fiscal year 1969 funds for long-lead items and $30.5 million in termination costs.
Therefore, unless the C-5A program is to be cut off definitely and finally at the 58 aircraft which have previously been authorized, I can see little possibility of good and great probability of harm from the adoption of the pending amendment. It appears to be self-defeating and counterproductive since, at best, it will delay the delivery of the 23 aircraft involved and drive up the cost overrun even above that which the Senator from Wisconsin has criticized so strongly.
The C-5A question has been studied exhaustively by several committees on both sides of the Congress and I do not believe that any further study is necessary. It is time for it to be voted up or down.
I appreciate the sincerity and the motives of the Senator from Wisconsin. I commend him on the fine and valuable work he has done on this program. However, I cannot agree with his reasoning with respect to this amendment and I strongly urge that it be defeated.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi will state it.
Mr. STENNIS. How much time remains to those in opposition to the amendment?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Sixty minutes remain.
Mr. STENNIS. How much time remains to the proponents?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Sixty-seven minutes remain to the proponents.
Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Chair.