CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE

February 8, 1967

Page 2944

THE CLERGY'S DEMONSTRATION AGAINST ESCALATION OF THE VIETNAM WAR

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, about 35 Maine ministers and laymen came to Washington last week to express their anxiety over the war in Vietnam. They were participating in the mobilization sponsored by the National Emergency Committee of Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam.

I met briefly with the delegation from Maine. I was impressed by their sincerity, their convictions, and their decision to take a public stand on the great issue of our times.

Clearly, the national debate over Vietnam is as spirited among members of the clergy as it is among other groups of Americans.

A report on the division of opinion on Vietnam within Maine's clergy appeared in the Portland, Maine, Sunday Telegram of January 29, in the same article announcing that some members of Maine's clergy were coming to Washington to voice opposition to escalation of the war.

In a speech at St. Fidelis College on February 3, I discussed the implications of the debate over Vietnam. I said, in part, that the debate among Americans of all callings is in keeping with our tradition as an open, democratic society; at the same time, that debate poses some problems in terms of the military and diplomatic maneuvers we must pursue in our quest for a peaceful settlement in Vietnam which will achieve our objectives.

I said:

This is the price we pay, and which we pay willingly for the right to challenge and discuss national policy.

And so, let us debate, let us discuss, let us consider. But, in the process, let us avoid misunderstanding each other.

In the interest of helping to reduce misunderstanding and distrust among Americans resulting from the public dialog on Vietnam, I ask unanimous consent that my St. Fidelis College speech, the Portland Sunday Telegram article about the Maine clergy, and the position paper prepared by the Executive Committee of Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam, for distribution at the Washington mobilization, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE RESPONSIBILITY OF CHOICE (Remarks by Senator EDMUND S. MUSKIE at St. Fidelis College Cultural Series, Herman, Pa., Feb. 3, 1967)

The American people are today engaged in a major and extended debate on our proper role in world affairs. Conscious of our power, we question our use of it. Aware of world opinion, we wonder how much attention we should pay to it.

As in other crisis periods in our foreign relations, there are those who -- directly or indirectly -- suggest we ought to take up the advice of George Washington, who warned against "entangling foreign alliances."

There is one major difference between the questions raised in the past and those raised in connection with the Vietnamese conflict. Those who warned against entangling alliances in the period of World War I and the time of World War II felt they could shut out the rest of the world and concentrate on a Fortress America. Today, curiously enough many of those who oppose our involvement in southeast Asia are the same people who supported our involvement in Europe in World War II and during the Marshall plan, those who support our participation in the United Nations, and those who believe in peace through common action.

The argument against a literal application of Washington's warnings is simple. George Washington spoke to his Nation against the background of domestic division, political weakness and a large but sparsely populated land, all in a world dominated by powers who had large land armies and substantial navies. 

Since the United States had to rely on Europe for capital and most of its population growth, Washington was pleading for some breathing space while the country built up its internal structure and its political and economic strength.

Given the nature of transportation and warfare in his day, his advice could be heeded, although even then, it was impossible for the United States to stay entirely aloof from the backwash of the French Revolution and the imperial contests which surrounded Napoleon’s adventures.

Today our choices are not so easy. Like it or not, America is a major power. Its economy overshadows that of practically every other nation in the world. Its Armed Forces, counting our strategic weapons, are probably greater than any other single power in the world. Our economic and political involvement, dating back to World War II and beyond, in all parts of the globe, cannot be turned off like an electric light switch. Indeed, action or inaction on our part will influence the course of human events.

Notwithstanding that fact, I think most Americans would prefer to withdraw from the world's troubles and difficulties if they saw clearly a way of doing so. I cannot agree with those who suggest that we, as a Nation, have a policeman's complex in the world.

But we are a part of the world. The question we must face is this: If we must be a part of the world, if we are a force which, whether we like it or not, will be felt in the world, and if we have an influence that cannot be isolated from the world, then how should we exert that force and that influence?

Secretary Rusk has put it this way: "Those who are officially responsible for the conduct of our public affairs must make decisions -- and must make decisions among existing alternatives. None of us in the executive or the legislative branch has fulfilled our responsibilities merely by formulating an opinion -- we are required to decide what this Nation shall do and shall not do and are required to accept the consequences of our determinations."

I put it this way last fall in Ottawa in a speech at the Parliamentary Conference of the British Commonwealth Nations, following some rather sharp criticism of our foreign policy:

"What would be the implications if tomorrow the President of the United States were to say to the rest of the world 'We withdraw (from Vietnam)'? If, instead of posing this as a hypothetical possibility you did not expect to come true, you had to face it as a reality, what would you say?"

"We have no choice (but to contemplate such a question) because we must make the decision on whether to withdraw or to stay. If we make the decision to withdraw we have to contemplate the implications, not as someone counseling another country but as someone responsible for the results."

In making our decisions, we must, of course, give consideration to world opinion. But in doing so, we cannot afford to abandon our own views of the world -- or our own national-interest.

There are many areas in which we must choose among unhappy alternatives, none of which are without risk to our national interest. The most critical, of course, is that of Vietnam.

There is no one in the United States Senate, to my knowledge, who advocates the unilateral, unconditional withdrawal of the United States forces from South Vietnam today.

The second choice in Vietnam could be unlimited, unrestrained escalation. I know of no support for this approach in the United States Senate. There are those outside the Congress who have recommended this course, but their numbers seem to be diminishing.

The third choice in Vietnam would be a sharply increased military effort, short of unlimited escalation, concentrating especially on an enlargement of our air attacks on North Vietnam. This course has been supported by a number of Senators. They do not advocate indiscriminate bombing of civilians. But they have argued that there are targets related to the enemy's war potential which we should strike to increase the economic price Hanoi must pay for continuing the war. In recent weeks this point of view has been muffled by the increasing pressure for reduction or cessation of bombing.

A constant consideration involved in such expansion of the bombing at this time, other than its current potential impact on peace negotiations, is the potential enlargement of the war to include China, despite the evidence of internal division in that country.

Our fourth choice would be to make do with what we have in Vietnam, withdraw to secure positions, discontinue bombing of the North, and hold until Hanoi agrees to negotiate. This seems to be the course supported by some witnesses before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate and by some Senators.

The opposition to this course is that it would eliminate options which now leave the enemy in doubt. It would deprive our troops of their unique attributes of mobility and firepower. It is also argued that this would permit the enemy to concentrate on more limited objectives and targets. It would mean abandonment of much of the countryside with an undermining of the morale of the South Vietnamese and a reduction of pressure on Hanoi to seek the conference table.

The fifth choice is the application of unremitting pressure in a carefully measured response to the aggression of the enemy. This is as I understand the policy of the administration. This course has been carefully defined by Secretary Rusk, General Taylor and others before the Foreign Relations Committee.

Let me read you General Taylor's summary of it a year ago:

"In summar,. then, our four-point strategy consists of a complex but coherent package of measures designed to improve the effectiveness of our forces on the ground in South Vietnam, to exploit our air superiority by attacking military targets in North Vietnam, to stabilize the political, social, and economic systems in South Vietnam, and to seek an honorable negotiated settlement of the conflict. It is limited as to objective, as to geographical scope, as to weapons and forces employed, and as to targets attacked. All parts of it are inter-related; all parts are

indispensable; we must be successful on all fronts. The key, I believe, is inexorable pressure at all points, directed at the will, the ability, and the means of the Communist aggressors."

This is the course which I believe can hold the greatest support in the Senate. It is the course which I think makes sense.

The opposition to it appears to make two points: (1) that this course inevitably means expansion of our effort in numbers of troops, targets and in treasure; and (2) that, at some point, it will trigger direct Chinese intervention and unlimited escalation of the war.

The supporters of this course argue that it is the only realistic alternative to withdrawal; that only in this way can Hanoi be made to feel the pressure which will force it to the conference table; that there is a ceiling on Hanoi's ability to respond effectively without direct Chinese intervention; and that, although we should not overlook the risk of direct Chinese involvement, that risk can be avoided so long as the Chinese do not consider that our effort is a direct threat to their security interests.

These, then, appear to be the choices. As we debate them, I trust that one of the beneficial results of our debate will be a clearer understanding of the implications of each.

One point, especially, I hope we will clearly understand that whenever the Soviet Union or Red China choose to force a confrontation upon us to challenge our will, we can never be sure in advance how far they mean to go. And we cannot afford to retreat simply because that point is in doubt.

I have spoken of the uncertainties and unknowns related to the intentions of Hanoi and Peking; and of the risks involved in a miscalculation of those intentions. This, of course, is a challenge to our wisdom and our policy.

Of at least equal importance is the credibility of our own policy and national will. We are involved in a searching review of both.

This is in keeping with our traditions as an open, democratic society. Let us not forget, however, that the enemy is closely watching this exercise in national policymaking. Undoubtedly, he is encouraged by every evidence of continuing and irreconcilable division among us which confirms his belief that we will tire and quit. Undoubtedly, he is encouraged by every concession to his ultimate objective which may emerge from our debate. Each of these sources of encouragement undoubtedly delays the day when he might otherwise be prompted to move toward the conference table.

This is a price we must pay, and which we pay willingly for the right to challenge and discuss national policy.

And so, let us debate, let us discuss, let us consider. But. in the process, let us avoid misunderstanding each other.

In this connection it may be useful to make some points which, it seems to me, are too often overlooked.

Our policy in Vietnam is the product. not only of the administration and its advisers, but of its critics. Let me illustrate.

The critics asked for a cease-fire. It was provided.

They asked for a lengthy bombing pause. It was provided.

They asked that the controversy be put before the United Nations. This was done.

They called for our reaffirmation of the Geneva accords and our request for the reconvening of the Geneva convention nations to act as intermediaries. This was done.

They called for a vigorous peace offensive. This has been our consistent policy.

They asked that we abide by free elections in Vietnam. We have agreed to do that.

They have asked that the war be limited to military targets and rigorous efforts have been exerted to do just that.

This is but a partial list of the steps we have taken to indicate our flexibility and our desire for a negotiated settlement rather than a military "victory."

To the suggestions that we cease bombing in the north, we have indicated our willingness to do so "the moment we are assured, privately or otherwise, that this step will be answered promptly by a corresponding and appropriate de-escalation on the other side."

To the suggestion that North Vietnam may fear that we intend to establish a permanent military presence in Vietnam. we have offered "to agree to a time schedule for supervised phased withdrawal from South Vietnam of all external forces."

To the suggestion that the Viet Cong take part in the negotiations, we have said that "this question would not be an insurmountable problem."

There has been no remotely comparable response from Hanoi to any of these initiatives. And yet there has been criticism that we have ignored "indications of a desire to negotiate."

Let us look at the most recent alleged indication of such a desire to which Hanoi has been busily calling attention. It takes the form of language used by North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh in an interview on January 28 with Australian Journalist Wilfred Burchett, as follows:

"If it (the United States) really wants talks, it must first halt unconditionally the bombing raids and all other acts of war against the DRV (North Vietnam). It is only after the unconditional cessation of bombing and all other acts of war against the DRV that there could be talks between the DRV and the United States."

Frankly. I see nothing in this language to suggest a real desire for bilateral talks. It reads like the same old insistence upon unilateral concessions by the U.S. without a quid pro quo. However, the fact that Hanoi appears to want us to regard it as a "signal" warrants a thorough exploration of the possibility, and there are ample contacts through which we can and, I am sure, are doing just that.

While we wrestle with the problem of Vietnam, we must try to avoid becoming so involved in the debate over the conflict that we ignore or distort the opportunities for more peaceful forms of competition with the Communist countries. Nowhere is this danger more apparent than in the debate over the consular treaty.

In the past few weeks, what should have been a relatively innocuous policy decision -- initiated, incidentally, by President Eisenhower -- has become a major issue in the Senate.

In simple terms the treaty would authorize both the United States and the Soviet Union to open consulates in the major cities of both nations. But more importantly -- and this is the fact that many people have overlooked -- the consular treaty would allow the United States to give prompt aid and protection to any American citizens who may be arrested or detained in Russia. We have seen the unpleasant -- and sometimes tragic -- results of what can happen as long as we have no consular convention with the Soviet Union. The Mott case is the most widely known example of this.

In testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Rusk recently put it this way:

"Even if no consulates were ever to be opened by the two countries, this convention would give American citizens more rights than any Soviet citizen possesses -- rights which any Soviet citizen already has in our open society without such a treaty."

The importance of American officials' being able to have ready access to assist Americans in Russia who find themselves in trouble is growing every year. From 1962 to 1966 the number of American visitors to Russia increased from approximately 10,000 to 18,000 while the number of Russian tourists in the United States -- approximately 1,000 a year -- remained relatively stable. From these figures it is obvious that the United States has far more to gain by approving the consular treaty than does the Soviet Union.

To those who fear that the establishment of Soviet consulates would lead to increased Soviet espionage in this country, I would say that we already face these risks and that we have numerous safeguards to insure against them. Espionage is one of the risks of an open, free society, and we must be willing to accept it.

In my judgment, the advantages of the proposed consular treaty far outweigh any possible risks involved.

It is another step in our search for a detente in the cold war with the Soviet Union. It is one justifiable means of neutralizing the strains in Russo-American relations caused by the hot war in Vietnam. It is a small -- but important -- step in our search for a lasting peace.

And when I think of these small, but sometimes difficult, steps, I remember President Kennedy speaking at a convocation at the University of Maine in October 1963:

"While the road to ... peace is long and hard, and full of traps and pitfalls, that is no reason not to take each step we can safely take."

Another of those steps would be enactment of the proposed East-West Trade Bill of 1967.

This bill, which the President proposed in his recent State of the Union message, would not mean the opening of unrestricted trade with the Communist nations of Eastern Europe. It would not involve the sale of strategic American goods to these countries. What it would do is allow the President to explore the possibilities of expanding our presently very limited trade with countries behind the Iron Curtain.

Its importance far outweighs its actual dimensions.

Its value would be threefold:

First. Like the consular treaty, the East-West trade bill offers the prospects of further detente with the Communist world. This is a circumstance which I am sure the Governments and peoples of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and other Eastern European nations would welcome. As a sidelight, it might even expand our chances for information on and a dialog with Communist China and North Vietnam through the good offices of one of the East European governments.

Second. It would reemphasize the historic ties of friendship between the people of Eastern Europe and the people of the United States. Anyone who has visited these nations -- as I have -- and anyone who has roots in these nations -- as I have -- knows that the United States has always been a symbol of freedom and hope to these people. We possess an overwhelming reservoir of good will and affection among these people. They still continue to look to us -- not Russia or China -- for leadership. A new trade agreement would provide tangible proof of our continued good will toward them.

And finally, passage of an East-West trade pact, however limited it may be, cannot fail to be in our own national interest. It would, I think, help remove some of the agony which many of our allies, as well as the nations of Eastern Europe, have felt about American policy since Vietnam.

These are some of the choices confronting the President, his advisers and the Congress of the United States. I know each of you has more than a passing interest in them because they can have a profound influence on your own future.

The United States of 1967 is far different from the United States which George Washington exhorted to stay clear of entangling alliances. The United States of 1967 is involved in every part of the world.

It has more responsibility to the world and must make more agonizing choices than ever before.

The Vietnam problem, from its beginning, almost twenty years ago, is a classic illustration of the fact that, so often, foreign policy-making is a matter of choosing among alternatives.

The choices are, all too often, all unhappy ones.

They do not always include a choice which enables us to implement our principles, such as "freedom," "self-determination," and "democratic government."

They, almost always, all include risks to our own national interests.

They almost never carry assurances or guarantees that they will serve the purpose we have in mind.

They almost always stimulate disagreement among ourselves and our friends. They almost never include an alternative to administration policy as to which all the critics of that policy will agree.

And, whatever our choice, we can count on the criticism of our enemies.

And yet, as Americans, as citizens of the world's greatest power, we must exercise the responsibility of choice. Let us, as citizens, always try to evaluate the choices of our decision-makers as though we were the decision-makers, conscious of the implications, sensitive to the unknowns, aware of the risks, and prepared to accept the consequences of our errors.

Unless we as citizens exercise this kind of oversight; this kind of restraint and understanding, we cannot expect our country to be as wise as she must be to meet the challenges ahead.

For, in the words of Pericles of Ancient Greece

"Here each individual is interested not only in his own affairs but in the affairs of the State as well . . We do not say that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds his own business; we say that he has no business here at all . . . And this is another point where we differ from other people. We are capable at the same time of taking risks and of estimating them beforehand. Others are brave out of ignorance, and when they stop to think, they begin to fear.

But the man who can most truly be accounted brave is he who best knows the meaning of what is sweet in life and of what is terrible, and then goes out undeterred to meet what is to come."

[From the Portland Sunday Telegram, Jan. 29, 19671

OPPOSITION SOUNDED-MAINE CLERGY TO JOIN VIET PROTEST

(By Joseph E. Coyne)

More than a score of Maine clergymen will join in a "national mobilization" of ministers, priests, rabbis and laymen Tuesday and Wednesday in Washington in opposition to escalation of the Vietnam war.

But for every Maine minister going, there are others just as strongly opposed to a peace movement by religious leaders.

According to one cleric the ministerial spectrum runs from hawks to doves "with many shades of opinion in between."

The National Emergency Committee of Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam is sponsoring the Washington gathering.

Heading the Maine delegation are Luther L. Allen, executive secretary of the Maine Council of Churches (MCC), and the Rev. Frederic Hudson, chaplain of Colby College.

Catholic priests and rabbis in the state know about the demonstration but none has announced his intention of going, although there are some doves among both of these groups.

Although Allen's invitation to MCC members brought some acceptances, it also brought some criticism from some pastors. The Rev. Winston Clark, minister of South Portland's First Congregational Church, attacked the move in a letter to Allen and in a sermon to his parishioners.

"There are some things more important, more vital than peace," he said. "One is the dignity of man, and another is the God given right of human freedom . . . . . "

The MCC's letter to clergy and laymen announced that the theme of the Washington sessions will be: "Vietnam: The Clergymen's Dilemma."

The clerical delegation will call on federal officials to express its "deep concern regarding the escalating pattern of the Vietnamese war."

The national body commented further that they would "stand together as religious leaders of all faiths in a vigil for peace as a symbol of protest and penance for our government's involvement in the present crisis, as well as every person's negligence in not speaking out earlier or forcefully enough."

Allen said in his letter that the protesting group wants to make known its "grave concern about the bombing of civilians and the escalation which could lead to World War III."

He said many of the Maine ministers associated with the MCC are concerned about casualties in the Vietnam war, both military and noncombatant.

Among those agreeing with him is The Rev. Joseph I. Craig, minister of the All Souls Unitarian-Universalist Church, Augusta, who said he'd like to go but can't rearrange plans.

He said:

"I think it's important that we make an early effort for a negotiated peace that will resolve this war. I'm for any kind of a negotiated peace we can manage to obtain. A poor peace is better than a good war." The Rev. Canon Wilbur E. Hogg, rector of the Church of St. Mary the Virgin, Falmouth Foreside, is among the clergy who will attend some of the Washington sessions. "I hope there are enough clergy there to make themselves heard," the Episcopal churchman said.

He said he is going as an individual and said his views do not necessarily represent the views of other Episcopal priests.

Canon Hogg said he's not determined on a particular course for the government to follow in the Vietnam situation but feels we should make efforts to negotiate and should do something "short of withdrawal."

The Rev. H. Travers Smith, Portland district superintendent of the Methodist