March 1, 1966
Page 4406
Mr. HART. Mr. President, we are approaching the end of a debate that has been, in my opinion, a valuable one.
Some of the speeches have been spirited, some subdued, some peevish, some thoughtful. Some have outlined new courses to follow, others have expressed approval of the current flow of events.
The debate has, all in all, been a perhaps predictable response to a difficult, dangerous, and disagreeable problem that to varying degrees has frustrated our eagerness for a solution, has harassed our consciences, has drained our emotional resources and filled our mailbags.
Vietnam is a tough problem and we are all understandably uneasy because we have evolved no formula that guarantees we will be able to bat 1,000 against every new problem that will be thrown at us.
Some of us have dug into rather strongly held positions. Others of us, pressed by the concern of constituents, have made statements that hopefully appear firm and straightforward while not seriously binding the speaker to any course.
There are a set of rules, I think, that should be applied to difficult problems -- rules so universal that I am sure all of us would encourage our children to apply them to whatever difficulties they encounter, now and in their adult years.
Those rules, I would think, go something like this:
Are there people who possess most of the facts in the case? Consult them.
Are there alternative courses? Identify them.
Does history hold a lesson relative to the current problem? Apply it.
Do your opponents have a stated case? Try to understand their circumstances and attitudes.
Are competing principles involved? Establish a priority among them.
Does it appear that no solution will be an entirely happy one? Accept it.
These are, I think, the rules that many of us have sought to apply. These are, at least, the rules that I have sought to apply.
Earlier, I said that I thought this debate has been illuminating and valuable. I have listened to many and have read much. The one thing that strikes me, as it has struck others, is that the spectrum of opinion is really much narrower than many believe.
Our news media, as is natural and understandable, thrives on controversy to the point where even apparent controversy shoulders its way into the headlines. Thus, each new suggested approach to a problem is sometimes interpreted by the public as a new signal of discontent, a new voice of rebellion, a new eruption of dissent.
But how much disagreement has there been among us, anyway?
We all agree that a swift and just peace is desirable. No one advocates unilateral and immediate withdrawal. No one urges unlimited escalation of the war. All recognize the need for effective
social and economic programs even under the difficult existing conditions.
No, we are all walking a parallel course somewhere in the middle of the road searching for a center line that will lead us to a safe, responsible solution.
Now my study of the problem -- and I only wish I could pose as an expert -- indicates that the current administration course is the closest to that center line; after all this debate, no better alternative has emerged.
That course can be stated something like this: Unremitting pressure in a carefully measured response to aggression while, at the same time, trying hard to improve the economic lot of the people most concerned -- in Vietnamese workers and farmers.
No power on earth can guarantee its success, but it seems to me to be the soundest approach under existing facts. In the kind of world in which we live, of course there will be episodes that some will seize on in an attempt to rattle our confidence in it.
There will be a military reverse and the critics will scream that our whole strategy has gone sour.
There will be a case of waste in our economic aid program and someone will shout that the entire plan is a failure.
But in the difficult and unavoidable business of using war as an avenue to peace, it seems to me that the President's course is the wisest. I have said this before and I continue to hold this view.
I have described a few simple rules in decision making that I hope I have applied during these discussions. I know of many others here who have used the same tests.
One of them is a man I greatly respect for his thoughtfulness and integrity, the junior Senator from Maine [Mr. MUSKIE).
Since I have already admired his reasoning, it will come as no surprise that I also agree with his conclusions.
These are succinctly stated in a speech he made before the Philadelphia United Jewish Appeal last night.
I ask unanimous consent that the speech be printed at this point in my remarks.
There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
OUR CHOICES IN VIETNAM
(Speech by Senator EDMUND S. MUSKIE to the 1966 Philadelphia Allied Jewish Appeal,
Philadelphia, Pa., February 28, 1966)
Last fall I was privileged to travel with Senator MANSFIELD and three other colleagues from the Senate on a Presidential mission to 15 countries in Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East. I have been asked to speak of that mission today.
Our mission, as described by Senator MANSFIELD, was to "look, to listen, to ask questions, and to report" to the President.
In the process we engaged in some 50 formal discussions with the leaders of the countries we visited and with our representatives in those countries.
We traveled more than 30,000 miles in 37 days and 50 flying hours. Such a sweeping and swift bird's-eye view clearly presented the picture of a world of great diversity of geography, of climate, of peoples, of opportunities, of resources, of poverty, of wealth, of political systems, of languages, of history, of tradition, of hopes, and of dreams.
Technology has made the world smaller but, in the process, has made the world's problems greater.
It is by no means one world except in the sense that the stability of the whole is now inevitably affected by instability in any part of it.
We cannot escape such a world; we cannot ignore such a world; we cannot avoid influencing such a world; we are inevitably a force in such a world -- good, we hope, rather than evil. But we cannot hope to run such a world exactly to our own specifications.
Whether we like it or not, countries and peoples, friendly and unfriendly, will pursue their own interests, and seek their own destinies, in ways of their own choosing.
Our concern is that, in the process, they do not make it unsafe for others to do likewise.
Our approach to our mission was simple:
1. To discuss any subject, any problem, any issue, any point of friction raised by our hosts.
2. To state and to clarify, to the best of our ability, any American policy involved.
3. To consider, evaluate. and report to the President any suggestion, expressed or implied, to deal more effectively with any problem.
4. To note any possibility, however vague or remote, for moving toward a reduction of friction.
This approach led to discussions of a wide range of subjects in almost every country.
The one subject which arose in every instance was Vietnam. Only the Communist countries urged our unconditional withdrawal from South Vietnam -- with varying degrees of emphasis and harshness in their criticism of American policy.
There appeared to be an underlying regret in Warsaw, Moscow, and Bucharest that the Vietnam problem exists and a wish that it might go away, but the words used consistently placed responsibility upon the United States for the existence of the problem and for eliminating it.
There was a general uneasiness in all countries about the dreadful uncertainties to which the Vietnamese conflict might lead.
There was a general pessimism in all countries about the prospects for a negotiated settlement, but indications of an interest in some countries in contributing to that objective if the opportunity arose.
Support for U.S. policy in Vietnam varied inversely with the distance from southeast Asia.
There was very great uneasiness in all southeast Asia as to the consequences for southeast Asian countries of a complete US. withdrawal; and the strengthened American presence of recent months has been a source of reassurance to them.
All the areas of the world which we visited were a constant source of interest to all of us, but southeast Asia had a particular fascination. It is, of course, the site of our greatest overseas problem. It is an area of great variety and beauty. It is an area of great resources and potential richness.
On the surface, the five countries we visited -- Burma, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and South Vietnam -- have much in common and would appear to have much to gain from a closer association. In reality there are differences and divisions, deep-seated and historic, which are sources of constant friction and instability, even within a given country. And the gap between the rich and poor is as great as anywhere in the world -- and productive of more instability.
There is no love or natural affinity between any of these countries and China, before or since mainland China has gone Communist. And each of them, in its own way, is seeking
to be independent of Chinese domination and control.
There is no question in my mind but that all of them would eventually fall under Chinese domination and control if the United States withdraws or is driven from South Vietnam.
To the leaders of Red China, South Vietnam is just another incident in the long struggle which they have waged for 40 years and which they intend to continue to wage for the ultimate supremacy of their brand of communism in the world. It is, however, an important demonstration of their theory that so-called wars of liberation are a cheap and safe method for the expansion of communism. They will not be diverted from their ultimate objective by whatever happens in Vietnam.
Only the forces of evolution and change, when, as, and if their country emerges as a modern, industrial state, can blunt or eliminate their revolutionary fervor and persuade them to accept coexistence and diversity as the normal condition of the world.
In the meantime, we are faced with the dilemma of Vietnam. Our involvement in Vietnam goes back to 1954 -- and before. The most important new factor in the war in 1965 was the introduction of large numbers of U.S. troops and their direct entry into combat. The second important new factor was the bombing of targets in North Vietnam.
These two steps were taken because a total collapse of the Saigon government's authority appeared imminent in the early months of 1965. The Mansfield mission undertook to evaluate the first few months of this increased involvement. Some observers have concluded that the report of the Mansfield mission presents a hopeless predicament. This is not accurate. It does undertake to lay the facts on the table and to establish the working area within which our policies should be developed.
What did we find in December of 1965? The presence of U.S. combat forces has acted to arrest the deterioration in general security in Government-controlled parts of South Vietnam. The ability of the Vietnamese Government to hold Saigon, the strategic heart of the country, the coastal bases, and certain other key areas in the country has improved. There has been an improvement of morale in the Government and the armed forces. There has been a return of confidence among Vietnamese civilians. Politically and commercially minded Vietnamese have found renewed courage and confidence. Of great significance is the fact that there has been a period of government stability.
Moreover
1. In addition to prosecuting the war, the Government of Vietnam is seeking to initiate measures to protect and improve the welfare of the population.
2. A new effort is also being made to bring the people of the villages into closer and firmer rapport with the Government.
The dark side of the picture in December 1965 was also covered: The enemy has reacted strongly to the new situation, bringing in rapidly increasing numbers of North Vietnamese troops and greatly stepping up the recruiting, induction, and training of South Vietnamese.
The Vietcong have stepped up sabotage, terrorism, and hit-and-run attacks in the Government-held areas. The ravages of war and terrorism are taking a toll of the country's productive capacity.
Shortages of food and labor, and inflationary pressures resulting from the war and the changed U.S. role are increasing sources of concern. There are also the beginnings of the rumblings of personal discontent and antagonism which generally characterize the reaction in any nation to the sudden infusion of a large body of foreign forces.
The overall control of the country remains about the same as it was at the beginning of 1965 -- 22 percent of the population under Vietcong control, 18 percent in contested areas, and 60 percent under some sort of government control.
This balance sheet of the situation in South Vietnam itself at the end of 1965, while revealing serious and difficult problems, certainly does not suggest an unmanageable situation. To improve it is within the capabilities of the world's greatest power.
Why, then, has there been the sudden surge of alarm since the first of the year among Americans, in and out of Congress?
The concluding comment of the Mansfield report may have contributed to it. Let me repeat it: "the situation, as it now appears, offers only the very slim prospect of a just settlement by negotiations or the alternative prospect of a continuance of the conflict in the direction of a general war on the Asian mainland."
What we must do, of course, and what we are doing is to improve the prospect of the first while avoiding the realization of the second.
The debate in which we are engaged arises wholly out of questions as to whether and by what means we can move toward negotiations while avoiding a general war on the Asian mainland.
I don't believe that we really doubt our capacity to manage the war in South Vietnam and to convince Hanoi that the conference table is the best course for North Vietnam.
Doubts have been raised as to whether what we are doing or are likely to do to achieve that result will trigger direct Chinese intervention.
What, then, are the alternatives before us?
1. Unconditional, unilateral withdrawal? No witness before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has advocated such a course. No Senator to the best of my knowledge has clearly and publicly advocated such a course.
2. Unlimited, unrestrained escalation? No witness before the Foreign Relations Committee has advocated this course. This is not the President's course. There appears to be little, if any, support for this course in the Senate.
A sharply increased military effort, short of unlimited escalation, concentrating especially on an enlargement of our air attacks on North Vietnam.
This course is supported by a number of Senators. They do not advocate indiscriminate bombing of civilians. They do argue that we now avoid many targets that are related to the enemy's war potential: That, by striking them, we could increase the economic price which Hanoi must pay for continuing the war and reduce Hanoi's ability to continue the war effectively.
There are those who believe we should welcome the risk of direct Chinese involvement. They do not necessarily believe in launching a preventive war. However, they believe that, by challenging this risk in a more aggressive prosecution of the war in Vietnam, we might destroy the blackmail effect of the Chinese threat.
This course clearly suggests the marginal targets which may or may not trigger greatly enlarged Chinese, and even Russian. involvement -- the bombing or mining of Haiphong Harbor, the bombing of power stations, irrigation dams, petroleum tanks, etc. Some of these targets are more marginal than others. Our policy has been to draw a very careful line which is constantly reviewed.
What would open the floodgates of Chinese involvement?
1. A direct threat to China herself?
2. Invasion of North Vietnam?
3. Clearly threatened destruction of the regime in Hanoi?
We must consider these three possibilities as being in the area which China would probably identify as related to her security interests.
The fourth possibility -- failure of Hanoi's aggression in South Vietnam -- is probably not included in that area. Such a failure would not constitute a direct threat to the regimes in Hanoi and Peiping.
Whether a particular target or a given level of military effort on our part is interpreted by the Chinese as related to the area of her security interests is our constant problem as we seek to defeat the aggression in South Vietnam.
That interpretation may be inhibited and restrained by two factors: (1) Peiping's theory that so-called wars of liberation can be won by elements within the country -- in this case Vietnam -- without overt military action by China herself; and (2) her direct military involvement would subject China, her barely started industrial complex, her newly developing nuclear capability, and her marginal economy to unacceptable destruction.
This brings us to two other alternatives available to us.
4. Make do with what we have in Vietnam and hold until Hanoi agrees to negotiate? This course has been advocated, in one form or another, by witnesses before the Foreign Relations Committee and by Senators.
It is argued in opposition that this course would eliminate options which now leave the enemy in doubt; that to eliminate them would enable him to concentrate on more limited objectives and targets, thus increasing his capacity to continue. It is argued further that this course would result in abandonment of much of the countryside, a consequent undermining of the morale of the South Vietnamese and the stability of their Government, and a reduction of pressure on Hanoi to seek the conference table.
5. The application of unremitting pressure in a carefully measured response to the aggression of the enemy. This is as I understand the policy of the administration. This course was carefully defined by General Taylor before the Foreign Relations Committee. It is the course which I believe can hold the greatest support in the Senate. It is the course which I think makes sense.
The opposition to it appears to make two points: (1) That this course inevitably means expansion of our effort in numbers of troops, in targets, and in treasure; and (2) that, at some point, it will trigger direct Chinese intervention and unlimited escalation of the war.
The supporters of this course argue that it is the only realistic alternative to withdrawal; that only in this way can Hanoi be made to feel the pressure which will force it to the conference table; that there is a ceiling on Hanoi's ability to respond effectively without direct Chinese intervention; and that, although we should not overlook the risk of direct Chinese involvement, that risk can be avoided so long as the Chinese do not consider that our effort is a direct threat to their security interests.
These, then, appear to be the alternatives. As we debate them, I trust that one of the beneficial results of our debate will be a clearer understanding of the implications of each.
One point, especially, I hope we will clearly understand -- that whenever the Soviet Union or Red China choose to force a confrontation upon us to challenge our will, we can never be sure in advance how far they mean to go. And we cannot afford to retreat simply because that point is in doubt.
I have spoken of the uncertainties and unknowns related to the intentions of Hanoi and Peiping; and of the risks involved in a miscalculation of those intentions. This, of course, is a challenge to our wisdom and our policy.
Of at least equal importance is the credibility of our own policy and national will.
We are involved in a searching review of both.
This is in keeping with our traditions as an open, democratic society. Let us not forget, however, that the enemy is closely watching this exercise in national policymaking. Undoubtedly, he is encouraged by every evidence of continuing and irreconcilable division among us which confirms his belief -- that we will tire and quit. Undoubtedly, he is encouraged by every concession to his ultimate objective which may emerge from our debate. Each of there sources of encouragement undoubtedly delays the day when he might otherwise be prompted to move toward the conference table.
This is a price we must pay, and which we pay willingly for the right to challenge and discuss national policy.
And so, let us debate, let us discuss, let us consider. But then, let us decide -- unite -- and press forward in a way that will convince the enemy we mean and support what we say.
If we mean what I think we mean -- to convince our adversary that a continuation of the war is unacceptable in his own interests -- then let us do so in a way that will make our policy and our national will clear and credible to him. Let him not miscalculate either. Only when he is no longer in doubt on this point will he begin to doubt the wisdom of his present course.
As we appraise our own policies and prospects, we should examine the impact of our effort to date upon our adversary. Are we getting results? Are we making him pay a price? Is it a price which drains his resources and his will in a meaningful way? The reply of our intelligence sources is in the affirmative.
"There is," I am advised by the Central Intelligence Agency, "no room for excessive optimism." Nevertheless, "the military situation has been stabilized, the confidence and performance of the GVN has been improved, the attitude of the South Vietnamese people has shifted, and it is our adversaries who are beginning to have serious doubts about the wisdom or probable success of their present courses of action."
They lost 35,400 men killed in 1965, 25,000 in the last 6 months alone. This compares with 11,250 South Vietnamese and 1,365 Americans in the same period.
They are faced with a growing desertion problem among their troops and among the local citizens they rely on for various kinds of support. The Saigon Government's amnesty program brought in 42,522 persons from the Vietcong side in 1965 -- 3 times as many as in 1964. Of these, 10,391 could be identified as VC military defectors and 2,174 of "political cadres," i.e., Vietcong civilian leaders who are among those most strongly indoctrinated.
Communist prisoners, defectors, and captured documents all indicate that the events of the past year have had a material adverse effect on Vietcong morale and shaken confidence in ultimate victory throughout their ranks.
North Vietnam has been forced to pay a price for its continuing aggression -- a reduction in foreign trade earnings of $6 million in 1965; the loss of almost 17 percent of its national bulk petroleum storage capacity and 25 percent of its electric power generating capacity; the postponement of plans for orderly economic development and increasing upheaval of industrial output; the diversion of large amounts of manpower from productive employment to repair and keep open lines of communication and to construct new roads and bypasses in the southern provinces of North Vietnam and through Laos to South Vietnam.
A recent speech -- on February 3, 1966 -- by Le Due Tho, a party politburo member in North Vietnam, indicates that the nature and size of our present effort is beginning to generate doubts within the party itself about the wisdom of the policies of Hanoi's leaders.
This recital of some of the gains which have materialized from our policies and efforts of the past year should be placed in perspective. They have been encouraging but by no means massive. As the Mansfield report indicates, the enemy has increased his forces in the field, his rate of infiltration of men and supplies, his terrorism of the countryside. He takes full advantage of the terrain and the jungle. He is a fierce and resourceful guerrilla fighter. His government is unyielding on the question of negotiations and under pressure from Peiping to remain so.
Nevertheless, he is paying a price in resources and manpower for his continuing aggression.
It is not our objective to conquer any country or to destroy any regime. It is to stop aggression in South Vietnam. Why? The reasons include the same reasons which prompted us to take a stand in Iran, immediately following World War II, in Greece and Turkey, in Berlin, in Korea, in Cuba.
We believe that freedom is at stake.
We believe that the right of small nations to work out their own destinies in their own way is at stake.
We believe that containment of expansionist communism regrettably involves direct confrontation from time to time, and that to retreat from it is to undermine the prospects for stability and peace.
We believe that the credibility of our word and our purpose as a nation is at stake; and that its loss would be an enormous setback for the forces of freedom.
What is happening in South Vietnam in southeast Asia, and its outcome, will exert a strong influence on the shape of the next Asia and its impact upon the lives of hundreds of millions of Asian people and the stability of the world as a whole.
Hedley Donovan, editor in chief of Time, Inc., put it this way, recently:
"If southeast Asia, instead of being a temptation to aggression and a threat to world peace, became a strong point of economically vigorous and fully independent states, the beneficial effects would spread well beyond the peninsula itself. Communist China would be "contained" in the best sense. Not just in military positions but in terms of performance, by the dynamism of Japan on the northeast and this healthy new growth center to the south. South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Burma, Indonesia would all benefit to some degree; even India's staggering problems would look a little less hopeless."
Is it in our interest to try to contribute to such an objective? I believe so.