CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE
January 24, 1966
Page 959
THE VIETNAM CONFLICT THE SUBSTANCE AND THE SHADOW
Mr. MUSKIE. Madam President, last fall it was my privilege to be a member of what has since been described in the press as the Mansfield mission.
Under the distinguished leadership of Senator MANSFIELD, it was our objective, in his words, "to look, to listen, to ask questions, and to report" to the President and the Senate
In this fact-finding process we engaged in some 50 formal discussions with the leaders of the countries we visited and with our representatives in those countries.
For us, as Senators, it was an invaluable opportunity to observe conditions in those countries, to hear first-hand the reaction of their leaders to our policies, to state and clarify U.S. positions, and to get in-depth briefings from American representatives in the field.
Our approach to our mission was simple: First, to discuss any subject, any problem, any issue, any point of friction raised by our hosts; second, to state and to clarify, to the best of our ability, any, American policy involved; third, to consider, evaluate, and report to the President any suggestion, express or implied, to deal more effectively with any problem; and fourth, to note any possibility, however vague or remote, for moving toward a reduction of friction.
This approach led to discussions of a wide range of subjects in almost every country. The list included few, if any surprises. The one subject which arose in every instance was Vietnam.
I take this opportunity to pay a personal tribute to the effective and able leadership of Senator MANSFIELD, in developing the maximum utility of this kind of mission. His dignified and courteous, but "no nonsense" approach to our discussions was received with respect and frankness from our hosts without exception. In my judgment, he made a major contribution to better understanding, in places where such understanding is important, of our country’s purposes, intentions, and motivations.
The wise and distinguished Senator from Vermont, Senator AIKEN, performed an invaluable service as "co-leader" of the mission. He was a never failing source of good counsel and sound judgment.
The intelligent, hard working, and dedicated work of my good friends, Senator CALEB BOGGS, of Delaware, and Senator DANIEL INOUYE, of Hawaii, completed the team of which I was proud to be a member.
The report of our mission has received wide attention and comment. Many descriptive labels have been attached to it. It was our purpose to produce a report which was, above all else, "realistic." It is the hope, I am sure, of each of us that the report may contribute to a sound understanding of the realities upon which to base the serious decisions we face
Because there is such widespread interest in the report, Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that excerpts from the report be printed at this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the excerpts from the report were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows
THE VIETNAM CONFLICT THE SUBSTANCE AND THE SHADOW
A. VIETNAM THE SUBSTANCE OF WAR
1. Introductory
The most important new factor in the war in Vietnam has been the introduction of large numbers of U.S. troops into South Vietnam and their direct entry into combat. This augmentation of the U.S. military role in Vietnam was a response to a near desperate situation early in 1965. There is no question that the Government of Vietnam in Saigon was faced with a rapidly deteriorating position at that time.
After the assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem, repeated coups had weakened the cohesiveness of the central authority and acted to stimulate public disaffection and indifference to the war. At the same time, there was a greatly accelerated military drive by strengthened Vietcong forces. Their control expanded over large areas of the country, particularly in provinces adjacent to the western borders. Communications and transportation between population centers became increasingly hazardous, except by Vietcong sufferance. In short, a total collapse of the Saigon Government’s authority appeared imminent in the early months of 1965.
U.S. combat troops in strength arrived at that point in response to the appeal of the Saigon authorities. The Vietcong counter response was to increase their military activity with forces strengthened by intensified local recruitment and infiltration of regular North Vietnamese troops. With the change in the composition of opposing forces the character of the war also changed sharply.
2. Military forces of the Government of Vietnam
The Government of Vietnam now has approximately 635,000 men under arms. Of this number, however, only about 300,000 are regular troops of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines with about 88 percent being Army troops. A general reserve of six airborne battalions and five marine battalions is equipped to fight anywhere in the country
The Vietnamese Government has six fighter bomber squadrons. It also has a small navy, composed of sea, river, and coastal forces.
In the total of 635,000 men there are also regional forces of about 120,000 men which act as a constabulary in the 43 provinces. Each province chief, who has a military as well as a civil capacity has a number of regional force companies under his command. Popular forces number about 140,000. Lightly armed, this group is recruited as a rule from local youth to act as defenders of villages and hamlets. A civilian irregular defense group is recruited by the Vietnamese Special Forces. It numbers about 25,000 and is posted in border areas for patrol purposes. Finally, there is a national police of about 50,000 men.
The total of 635,000 men in all categories is expected to be expanded in the current year, although a substantial increase is not anticipated. The sources of expanded recruitment are not great and, in any event, are shared with the Vietcong. Moreover, a high desertion rate continues, despite determined efforts to reduce it.
3. U.S. and international forces in Vietnam
In 1962, U.S. military advisers and service forces in South Vietnam totaled approximately 10,000 men. This number had increased by May of 1965 to about 34,000. At that time, the American force was still basically an advisory organization. Americans, in regular combat units, were not yet engaged on the ground. U.S. helicopter companies were in use but only to supply tactical transportation to regular Vietnamese units and the U.S. jet fighter bombers in the country, with the exception of two or three squadrons of aircraft, were not yet engaged in support of the Vietnamese Armed Forces.
By December 1965, however, there were approximately 170,000 U.S. troops in South Vietnam. Additionally, there were about 21,000 soldiers and marines from the Republic of Korea, an infantry battalion and a battery of artillery, comprising some 1,200 men, from Australia, and a New Zealand artillery battery of about 150 men.
The augmented U.S. ground forces were composed of two Army divisions, the 1st Infantry Division and the 1st Air Cavalry Division, and two separate brigades, the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, and the 1734 Airborne Brigade. The Australian and New Zealand troops were attached to the latter group. A full U.S. Marine division reinforced by a separate regiment was in Vietnam with the support of six Marine fighter bomber squadrons.
The small Vietnamese coastal force was augmented by a number of U.S. naval ships and Coast Guard vessels. The U.S. 7th Fleet was off the Vietnamese coast. Planes from its carriers were active in the air campaign against North Vietnam. They were also reinforcing the U.S. Air Force and Vietnamese fighter bomber squadrons in operations in South Vietnam.
Ten U.S. Air Force and Marine fighter bomber squadrons were operating from five jet airfields in Vietnam; a sixth field was under construction. B-52 bombers from Guam were providing additional air strength, concentrating on more remote Vietcong bases which had previously been immune to harassment or attack.
The magnitude of the expanded U.S. military effort has required a vastly enlarged support complex. Starting almost from scratch in May of 1965, a logistic system has been built. There are four major logistic support areas. One is in the Saigon region, including Bien Boa and Vung Tau. The other three are located along the coast, at Cam Ranh Bay, at Qui Nhon in Binh Dinh Province, and at Da Nang. The rapid infusion of American forces has strained the facilities of the new logistic system to the utmost, with long delays in unloading and moving equipment not unusual. There have also been and still are shortages of important items of supply despite efforts to eliminate these shortages.
4. Relationship of United States and Vietnamese forces
From the point of view of American policy and practice, the war itself remains a Vietnamese war. The American command emphasizes that U.S. forces in Vietnam are there to support the Vietnamese and their Armed Forces in the effort to resist aggression by infiltration from the north and terrorism and subversion from within. Vietnamese sovereignty and the paramount role of the Vietnamese are meticulously respected and the supporting nature of the U.S. role is stressed.
There is no combined or unified command of the international forces in Vietnam. United States and Vietnamese forces work together through coordination and cooperation. The commander of the U.S. forces maintains close liaison with the Vietnamese Minister of Defense and the Chief of the Joint General Staff. Strategy and plans are devised together. Parallel instructions are then issued to the respective commanders through corps and division to regimental level. In the execution of an operation, a joint command post is set up or liaison officers are exchanged and terrain is apportioned for tactical areas of operation. According to American military commanders, these arrangements have proved to be practical and workable.
5. Vietcong-North Vietnamese forces
In December 1965, the best available estimates placed Vietcong strength in South Vietnam at 230,000 men. This figure is double that of 3 years ago. Total Vietcong strength, apparently, is steadily increasing despite the serious casualties which these forces have suffered during the past few months.
Of the present total, approximately 73,000 are main force soldiers, including 14,000 regular PAVN (Peoples Army of North Vietnam) troops from North Vietnam. The Vietcong forces also include about 100,000 militia, some 17,000 support troops who operate along lines of communication, and approximately 40,000 political cadres. It is estimated that the Vietcong, through local recruitment in the south and infiltrated from the north, have the capability of a substantial increase in their numbers within a short period of time.
Infiltration of men from North Vietnam through Laos has been going on for many years. It was confined primarily to political cadres and military leadership until about the end of 1964 when North Vietnam Regular Army troops began to enter South Vietnam by this route. It is anticipated that with the multiplication of routes through Laos the rate of infiltration is likely to increase threefold from the present estimated 1,500 per month. The monsoon, which earlier was considered to be of great significance in its effect on the reinforcement capabilities of the Vietcong as well as on the ability of both sides to prosecute the war, has proved in experience to be of minor consequence if, indeed, of any consequence at all.
6. Current state of the war,
By November 1965, American troops were directly involved in battle to a much greater degree than at any other time in the history of the Vietnamese conflict. At the same time, the intensity of the war itself reached a new high. The Vietcong initiated 1,038 incidents during the last week of November and the total number of incidents which had increased steadily throughout 1965, reached 3,588 in that month., These incidents involved armed attacks up to regimental strength l as well as terrorism and sabotage of various kinds and antiaircraft fire against U.S. aircraft. In the later months of 1965 the trend was toward larger attacks, except in the Mekong Delta where there were numerous small-scale actions.
With the increase in the intensity of the conflict, there were increased numbers of casualties among all participants. In the month of November 1965, alone, 469 Americans were killed in action, a figure representing about 35 percent of all Americans killed in action in the war until that date. In addition, 1,470 Americans were listed as wounded and 33 as missing. During the same month the South Vietnamese Army reported 956 soldiers killed in action, 2,030 wounded, and 355 missing. The Vietcong, for their part, are estimated to have lost 5,300 men killed in the month and, in addition, 595 were taken prisoner. Many of these casualties were regulars of the North Vietnamese Army.
7. The security situation in South Vietnam
The presence of U.S. combat forces has acted to arrest the deterioration in general security in Government controlled parts of South Vietnam. It has also improved the ability of the Vietnamese Government to hold Saigon, the strategic heart of the country, the coastal bases, and certain other key areas in the country. In the latter connection, it should be noted that a strategic route (19) from the coast to the western highlands has been reopened for convoyed ground traffic to Pleiku, a major military strong point in the western highlands. On certain other roads, an improvement in security is also reported.
8. Vietcong reactions
Faced by a blunting of their military efforts, the Vietcong have reacted strongly to the new situation. Beginning in June, an estimated 1,500 North Vietnamese troops per month have entered South Vietnam through Laos and this number is rapidly increasing. The estimates are that at least seven regiments of regular troops from North Vietnam are now in the country with more on the way. At the same time the Vietcong have in recent months greatly stepped up the recruiting, induction, and training of South Vietnamese in the densely populated delta region. They have increased their small-scale attacks in that area, aiming apparently at isolated outposts and at demoralizing the regional and popular forces as well as harassing lines of supply and communication.
The stepped up activity of the Vietcong in the countryside has been paralleled by an effort on the part of the Government forces to strengthen their control over the population in the base areas and their immediate environs. These base areas themselves are held in some force. At the U.S. Marine base at Da Nang, for example, the perimeter of security has been pushed out about 10 miles. The bulk of U.S. Marine forces, however, is now preoccupied in defense within that perimeter. Nevertheless, it is still possible for the Vietcong to bypass the defenders and penetrate the area in sporadic hit-and-run raids. Communications between the base areas along the coast are still subject to Vietcong ambush and attack.
In Saigon, heavily defended as it is, the rattle of automatic weapons fire or the explosion of mortar shells in the outskirts of the city are not uncommon sounds by day or by night. Vietcong ability to carry out terroristic attacks within the city itself is from time to time made evident. Indeed, it is considered by some that Saigon with its many vulnerabilities to sabotage and terrorism and Hanoi with its exposure to air attack are mutual hostages, one for the other.
9. Impact of increased American forces on the Vietnamese
The arrival in Vietnam of American combat troops in large numbers has had an immediate positive psychological effect on Government held areas. Not only has there been an improvement of morale in the Government and the armed forces, there has also been a return of confidence among Vietnamese civilians. This is especially true in Saigon where the increased American presence is taken as insurance against an imminent collapse of the existing structure. Politically and commercially minded Vietnamese, seeing that the United States had so far committed itself, have found renewed courage and confidence.
Of great significance is the fact that there has been a period of government stability in Vietnam following the arrival of additional U.S. troops. This stability is more essential than ever for the maintenance of public confidence after the debilitating consequences of the repeated coups which followed the assassination of President Diem. It is also vital for the effective prosecution of war and the formulation and carrying out of social, economic, and political reform programs.
The illustrative story is told of the Vietnamese professional man who sold his house in Saigon in January of 1965 in despair over the deteriorating situation, only to buy back the same house later in the year, following the arrival of American troops, for twice the price at which he had sold it.
10. The government of Gen. Nguyen Cao Ky
The new leadership in government which is drawn largely from military circles is young and hopeful, but with little knowledge of politics. Gen. Nguyen Cao Ky, the Prime Minister, recognizes that a purely military solution to the problems of Vietnam is not possible. Security and social and economic reform, in his view, must proceed hand in hand in order to gain the support of the people.
The new leaders express the intention of moving toward some form of representative civilian government, taking into account the history and needs of the Vietnamese people. They speak of a consultative assembly to prepare the way for a constitution and hearings throughout the country on the constitution with a view to a referendum at the end of 1966. The referendum, according to their concepts, would be followed by elections to a legislative body by the end of 1967, if by that time elections can be held without intimidation in as much as two-thirds of the country. Some observers believe that perhaps not more than 25 percent of the villages under Government control in South Vietnam would be free from intimidation at an election at the present time.
In addition to prosecuting the war, the Government of Vietnam is seeking to initiate measures to protect and improve the welfare of the population. With the indispensable assistance of U.S. aid, food and other commodities are being imported into the country to meet current needs and to insure that the price of staples such as rice, fish, and canned milk remain within the reach of the people.
11. The pacification or civic action program
A new effort is also being made to bring the people of the villages into closer and firmer rapport with the Government. In the period following the fall of the government of Ngo Dinh Diem, the so-called pacification or civic action program which brought government, police, economic, and social organization into the hamlets, was allowed in large measure to lapse. Due to subsequent changes of government, there were eventually only a very few people left to carry on this work. Military necessity required the Government to concentrate on attempting to stop Vietcong military advances.
The present Government is once again seeking to create an organization to carry out a program of pacification or civic action. Screening the cadres left from the programs of previous governments, a basic group has been selected. Together with additional groups to be trained it is expected that a total number adequate to meet the needs for pacification teams in the priority areas chosen by the Government of Vietnam will be available by the end of 1966.
The present plan for pacification work is regarded by observers as more thorough and more realistic than previous efforts. It contemplates teams remaining in each village for an initial period of several months with subsequent follow-ups over a period of at least 1 year. The belief is that the inhabitants can generally be sufficiently won over to the side of the Government in that period and conditions established where elections for local officials can be held. It is realized, however, that even then the work cannot be considered as completed.
12. Other programs
In addition to giving strong support to the pacification program, the new Government has numerous other plans to better the lot of the people. There are, for example, projects to improve the pay of the troops, construct low cost housing, and redistribute land. In this connection a program has been inaugurated to give 700,000 acres of land to 180,000 farmers. It is generally recognized that Government programs of this kind, many of which have been attempted in various forms before, will require years before any substantial political effect upon the population can be anticipated.
13. Economic aspects of the conflict
The Government of Vietnam has also instituted a resources control program in an effort to restrict the Vietcong’s ability to get the things they need to carry on the war. In most parts of Vietnam, which is a naturally rich and productive country, it is not difficult to obtain enough food to support life. This is particularly true in the fertile and densely populated delta of the south with its great rice fields and network of interconnecting canals. The Vietcong obtain money by many means, including taxation and extortion, and they can and do use these funds to purchase food in the countryside and medicines in district and provincial towns. The Vietcong can and do attack trucks and convoys on the roads and seize the weapons, ammunition, and the other goods which they may carry.
By a system of rationing, identity cards, and resource control, including checkpoints and mobile control teams, however, the Government hopes to stop the Vietcong from obtaining key commodities such as food and medicines in key areas such as the highlands, which is a deficit region. In other areas it is hoped that the system will make goods less available for the Vietcong and more difficult for them to obtain.
It must be said that there is also a reverse side to this picture. The Vietcong, operating in the countryside, have the ability to restrict the flow of food to cities and population centers such as Saigon. Vegetables, for example, come to Saigon from Dalat in the central highlands. Sugar also comes to Saigon along the same road which is controlled in part by the Vietcong. It is common knowledge that commodities reaching Saigon’s markets by road from the Dalat area have paid a tax to the Vietcong before reaching the city and that unless the tax is paid they will not reach the city. The fact is plain: Much of Saigon’s indigenous food and commodity supply depends on the sufferance of the Vietcong and on payments to them.
The ravages of war and terrorism, however, are taking a toll of the country’s productive capacity. Rice fields and rubber plantations in areas that are being bombed and fought over no longer produce their contribution to feed the people and to nourish the economy. Fledgling enterprises in outlying areas, cut off from supplies and from markets by interrupted communications, wither and fall.
Along with increased Vietcong activity in the delta in recent months, there has been growing Vietcong restriction on the flow of rice from that region to the Saigon market. The result is that Vietnam, a rice surplus region in 1966, will have to import at least 300,000 tons of rice from abroad under U.S. aid programs to feed the population of the cities and towns under the government’s control.
Although, as has been said, the arrival of large numbers of American troops has gone far to restore business confidence in the cities of Vietnam, there have been adverse effects as well. One of these is the creation of a labor shortage, particularly among skilled workers, as men have been drained away from normal areas of employment to the base complexes and other regions where construction projects are being pushed to create the logistic structure and other facilities required by the American forces.
Inflationary pressures resulting from the war and the changed U.S. role have thus far been kept within bounds. Saigon itself, however, has an overstimulated atmosphere of almost hectic prosperity, in some respects, as the impact of spending by American servicemen and the effect of U.S. defense expenditure make themselves felt. There are also the beginnings of the rumblings of personal discontent and antagonism which generally characterize the reaction in any nation to the sudden infusion of large body of foreign forces.
14. Summation
In sum, the overall control of the country remains about the same as it was at the beginning of 1965. It is estimated that about 22 percent of the population is under Vietcong control and about 18 percent inhabits contested areas. About 60 percent of the population in the country is, at present, under some form of government control, largely because of its hold on Saigon and other cities and large towns.
The population of the cities has been augmented by a great number of refugees. Hundreds of thousands in number, they are for the greater part composed of people who have fled to the cities in an effort to escape the spreading intensity of the war. In this sense, they are unlike the refugees who came from North Vietnam in 1954. These earlier refugees consciously chose to leave their ancestral homes and come south permanently, rather than accept a Communist regime. The new refugees, for the most part, are believed merely to be waiting for an end to the fighting in order to return to their homes and land.
The Vietcong have stepped up sabotage, terrorism, and hit-and-run attacks in the Government held areas which are, principally, cities and major towns and indeterminate, but limited, extensions outward from them. Harassment by United States and Vietnamese air attack and airborne forces has increased in the firmly held Vietcong areas of South Vietnam which are almost entirely rural. And, of course, North Vietnam has been brought under air attack.
In general, however, what the Saigon Government held in the way of terrain in the early months of 1965 (and it was already considerably less than was held at the time of the assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem), is still held. What was controlled then by the Vietcong is still controlled by the Vietcong. What lay between was contested at the outset of 1965 and is still contested.
B. VIETNAM AND THE NATIONS OF ASIA
Other nations of Asia generally view the conflict in Vietnam with great concern.
Those countries nearest to Vietnam see in the spread and increasing intensity of the warfare a heightened danger of a spillover into their territory. They sense that the longer the conflict continues and the more it escalates the greater becomes this danger to themselves. Furthermore, they fear the effect upon their own future should all of Vietnam become a Communist state.
Laos already finds itself deeply although unwillingly involved on the fringes of the war in Vietnam. The fighting within Laos, which continues despite the 1962 Geneva Agreement, is now a closely interwoven part of the Vietnamese struggle. The connection is most pronounced in the eastern part of Laos which lies within the control of the Communist Pathet Lao forces. This region, the so-called Laotian panhandle, is a natural infiltration route for men and supplies from North Vietnam into South Vietnam. A long border abutting on South Vietnam makes it possible for troops and equipment from Hanoi to reach far south through Communist controlled territory in Laos with a minimum of risk before being diverted across the border into South Vietnam by any number of lateral communications routes. New roads have been constructed through this mountainous terrain along which men and supplies can pass, for the most part undetected, protected as they are in some regions by double canopies of jungle foliage. These roads are not easily susceptible to aerial interdiction.
Cambodia, in a different manner and to a much lesser extent than Laos, is already directly touched by the fighting in Vietnam. There are repeated charges that Cambodian territory is being used as a base for Vietcong operations. That is possible in view of the remoteness and obscurity of the border but there is no firm evidence of any such organized usage and no evidence whatsoever that any alleged usage of Cambodian soil is with the sanction much less the assistance of the Cambodian Government. Prince Sihanouk responded immediately to a recent allegation that the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville is being used to transship supplies to the Vietcong by calling for an investigation by the International Control Commission which was set up under the Geneva Accords of 1954.
Cambodia’s overwhelming concern is the preservation of its national integrity which, in times past, has been repeatedly violated by more powerful neighbors and is still subject to occasional forays from a minor dissident movement (the Khmer Serai) which has been allowed to base itself in the neighboring nations. Cambodia seeks recognition and respect of its borders by all parties to the conflict. It asks to be left to live in peace so that it may concentrate on its own problems and internal development. The Cambodians have made great internal progress, largely through their own efforts supplemented by a judicious use of aid from the United States in the past and from other nations both in the past and at the present time. They have a peaceful and productive nation with an intense sense of national unity and loyalty to Prince Sihanouk.
The fact that fighting in South Vietnam has raged close to the border and there have, as a result, been occasional border incursions and bombing of Cambodian territory has caused the deepest concern to the Cambodian Government. Cambodia can be expected to make the most vigorous efforts to resist becoming directly involved in the struggle surging through South Vietnam and to repel to the best of its capability direct and organized invasions of its territory which may stem from the mounting tempo of the war.
Thailand, the only country on the southeast Asia mainland directly allied with the United States, seeks to cooperate with the United States as an ally while avoiding a spillover of the war into Thai territory.
That course is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain. Thailand has a large number of North Vietnamese living in its northeast region bordering on Laos. This element retains an affinity for Hanoi and is susceptible to its influence. Moreover, in the recent past Peiping has brought to the forefront a Thai leader in exile and has increased the intensity of its propaganda attacks against Thailand. Reports of terrorism and sabotage in the northeast of Thailand are increasing.
The Vietnamese war was brought very close to Thai territory in November 1965. A Pathet Lao military thrust toward the Laotian town of Thakkek on the Mekong, which was supported by North Vietnamese troops, was fortuitously driven back by Government forces. Had it not been repelled, the war, in effect, would have reached the point where it made direct contact with Thailand’s frontier.
Nations in Asia more geographically remote from the war in South Vietnam are nonetheless conscious of the dangers to the entire area as the struggle in South Vietnam becomes more prolonged and ever more intense. These countries range from neutral and nonaligned Burma through such allies of the United States as the Philippines and Japan.
Each of the countries of Asia has its own internal problems. Each has varying degrees of internal stability. Each has as a principal concern, the avoidance of direct involvement in the Vietnamese conflict. With the exception of Korea, there is little likelihood of substantial material help from these sources in providing military assistance in South Vietnam. Others are either unwilling or reluctant to become involved in a military sense or are unable to do so because of inner difficulties or the broader strategic requirements of the Asian situation. Even with respect to Korea, it is obvious that any withdrawal of forces for use in Vietnam creates new problems of military balance as between North and South Korea. It should not be overlooked that peace in the Korean peninsula is still held together only by a tenuous truce.
The Asian nations generally are aware of their own relative powerlessness to influence the main course of events, or, in the final analysis, to control their own destinies should the conflict in Vietnam ultimately develop into a confrontation between the United States and Communist China with all that such an eventuality might imply for the peace of Asia and the world. In Japan, for example, there is a deep anxiety over the possible consequences to that nation of such a confrontation if it should materialize. The memory of the escalation of the limited Manchurian incident of 30 years ago into a seemingly interminable war on the mainland of China is not yet dead in Japan.
To sum up, then, the nations of Asia recognize the immense importance to themselves of what is transpiring in Vietnam. But they also recognize their own limitations in the face of it. Their immediate preoccupation, in any event, is with their own internal problems and development.
Throughout the area there is a continuing interest in activities involving peaceful cooperation for economic development. The Peace Corps is generally welcomed wherever it operates and, notably, in the Philippines. The new Asian Development Bank is being launched with considerable enthusiasm. The Mekong project has warm support throughout the region and considerable interest in Cambodia, which is central to the concept.
It is clear that none of the nations of the area desires the domination of either China or the United States. Given a choice, it is doubtful that any nation would like to see the influence of the United States withdrawn completely from southeast Asia. Generally speaking, the nations of the area welcome peaceful ties with the United States and our participation in the development of the region if that participation does not become overwhelming.
C. THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE
Without exception the Soviet Union, Poland, and Rumania give full and firm support to the position of Hanoi and the Vietcong. They are quick in their denunciation of the U.S. role in South Vietnam and vehement against U.S. bombing in North Vietnam.
Part of this solidarity is undoubtedly derived from ideological affinities. Whatever attitudes they may manifest toward Communist China, and they vary, it is clear that responsibility for the continuation of the conflict in Vietnam is assigned to the United States and this is regarded as an impediment to improvement in political relations with this country.
There is no reason to believe that the Soviet Union, in present circumstances, sees its way clear or, is fact, is anxious to play a significant role to assist in bringing an end to hostilities in Vietnam. The Soviet Union has steadfastly refused to join with the United Kingdom, the other co-chairman of the 1954 Geneva Conference, in calling for a reconvening of that Conference.
They have emphasized repeatedly in public statements as well as in other ways that they have no intention of taking an initiative for peace in Vietnam at this time.
The countries of Eastern Europe have reason for concern over the continuation of the conflict in Vietnam and its escalation. Some of these reasons have to do with their own national preoccupations and the situation in Europe. Both Poland and Rumania, for example, have a very substantial trade with the Western World and remain interested in increased trade with the United States should conditions permit. Both might well be disposed to make a contribution to a settlement of the Vietnam problem to the extent their capabilities permit but only should they see some possibility of success.
D. COMMUNIST CHINA
Behind the war in Vietnam, behind the fears and preoccupations of other Asian nations and through the attitudes of the Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union runs the shadow of Communist China.
Until now the Chinese Communists have not introduced their manpower directly into the conflict although they clearly recognize that the war may reach that point. They recognize, too, that the war may impinge upon China herself at some point and have begun to make preliminary preparations for that eventuality.
For the present, however, the Chinese appear to take the view that their direct intervention in Vietnam is not required since (1) The war in South Vietnam is a peoples’ war which the Vietcong are winning (2) North Vietnam is successfully defending itself (3) the more the United States escalates the war, the higher our casualties will be and the more discouraged we will become and (4) the United States cannot win, in any event, according to Chinese theories.
It is from Communist China that Hanoi and the Vietcong derive the bulk of their outside material support. It is from Communist China that there has also flowed encouragement of resistance to negotiation or compromise. As the war escalates and Hanoi becomes ever more dependent upon Chinese support, a dependence which Soviet aid at best only tempers, the likelihood also increases that North Vietnam will not be able to negotiate a settlement without at least the tacit consent of China. In fact, that point may already have been reached.
E. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
A rapid solution to the conflict in Vietnam is not in immediate prospect. This would appear to be the case whether military victory is pursued or negotiations do, in fact, materialize.
Insofar as the military situation is concerned, the large-scale introduction of U.S. forces and their entry into combat has blunted but not turned back the drive of the Vietcong. The latter have responded to the increased American role with a further strengthening of their forces by local recruitment in the south and reinforcements from the north and a general stepping up of military activity. As a result the lines remain drawn in South Vietnam in substantially the same pattern as they were at the outset of the increased U.S. commitment. What has changed basically is the scope and intensity of the struggle and the part which is being played by the forces of the United States and those of North Vietnam.
Despite the great increase in American military commitment, it is doubtful in view of the acceleration of Vietcong efforts that the constricted position now held in Vietnam by the Saigon government can continue to be held for the indefinite future, let alone extended, without a further augmentation of American forces on the ground. Indeed, if present trends continue, there is no assurance as to what ultimate increase in American military commitment will be required before the conflict is terminated. For the fact is that under present terms of reference and as the war has evolved the question is not one of applying increased U.S. pressure to a defined military situation but rather of pressing against a military situation which is, in effect, open-ended. How open is dependent on the extent to which North Vietnam and its supporters are willing and able to meet increased force by increased force. All of mainland southeast Asia, at least, cannot be ruled out as a potential battlefield. As noted, the war has already expanded significantly into Laos and is beginning to lap over the Cambodian border while pressures increase in the northeast of Thailand.
Even if the war remains substantially within its present limits, there is little foundation for the expectation that the Government of Vietnam in Saigon will be able, in the near future to carry a much greater burden than it is now carrying. This is in no sense a reflection on the caliber of the current leaders of Vietnam. But the fact is that they are, as other Vietnamese Governments have been over the past decade, at the beginning of a beginning in dealing with the problems of popular mobilization in support, of the Government. They are starting, moreover, from a point considerably behind that which prevailed at the time of President Diem’s assassination. Under present concepts and plans, then, what lies ahead is, literally, a vast and continuing undertaking in social engineering in the wake of such military progress as may be registered. And for many years to come this task will be very heavily dependent on U.S. foreign aid.
The basic concept of present American policy with respect to Vietnam casts the United States in the role of support of the Vietnamese Government and people. This concept becomes more difficult to maintain as the military participation of the United States undergoes rapid increase.
Yet a change in the basic concept could have a most unfortunate impact upon the Vietnamese people and the world at large. What is involved here is the necessity for the greatest restraint in word and action, lest the concept be eroded and the war drained of a purpose with meaning to the people of Vietnam.
This danger is great, not only because of the military realities of the situation but also because, with a few exceptions, assistance has not been and is not likely to be forthcoming for the war effort in South Vietnam from nations other than the United States. On the contrary, as it now appears, the longer the war continues in its present pattern and the more it expands in scope, the greater will become the strain placed upon the relations of the United States with allies both in the Far East and in Europe.
Many nations are deeply desirous of an end to this conflict as quickly as possible. Few are specific as to the manner in which this end can be brought about or the shape it is likely to take. In any event even though other nations, in certain circumstances, may be willing to play a third party role in bringing about negotiations, any prospects for effective negotiations at this time (and they are slim) are likely to be largely dependent on the initiatives and efforts of the combatants.
Negotiations at this time, moreover, if they do come about, and if they are accompanied by a cease-fire and stand fast, would serve to stabilize a situation in which the majority of the population remains under nominal government control but in which dominance of the countryside rests largely in the hands of the Vietcong. What might eventually materialize through negotiations from this situation cannot be foreseen at this time with any degree of certainty.
That is not, to say the least, a very satisfactory prospect. What needs also to be borne in mind, however, is that the visible alternative at this time and under present terms of reference is the indefinite expansion and intensification of the war which will require the continuous introduction of additional US forces. The end of that course cannot be foreseen, either, and there are no grounds for optimism that the end is likely to be reached within the confines of South Vietnam or within the very near future.
In short, such choices as may be open are not simple choices. They are difficult and painful choices and they are beset with many imponderables. The situation, as it now appears, offers only the very slim prospect of a just settlement by negotiations or the alternative prospect of a continuance of the conflict in the direction of a general war on the Asian mainland.
Mr. MUSKIE. Madam President, since our return from our travels, each of us, of course, has been asked to add our personal impressions to the report.
The report speaks for itself and represents a consensus of the five Senators involved.
Nevertheless, it cannot conceivably encompass the hundreds of reactions and impressions which we experienced and are still digesting.
It may be useful, therefore Madam President, to include atthis point in the RECORD, and I ask unanimous consent to do so, some excerpts from comments I have made since our return.,
There being no objection the excerpts were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows
I have said that Vietnam was the single, consistently recurring subject in our discussions
Only the Communist countries urged our unconditional withdrawal from South Vietnam with varying degrees of emphasis and harshness in their criticism of American policy.
There appeared to be an underlying regret in Warsaw, Moscow, and Bucharest that the Vietnam problem exists and a wish that it might go away but the words used consistently placed responsibility upon the United States for the existence of the problem and for eliminating it.
There was a general uneasiness about the dreadful uncertainties to which the Vietnamese conflict might lead.
There was a general pessimism about the prospects for a negotiated settlement, but indications of an interest in contributing to that objective if the opportunity arose.
Support for U.S. policy in Vietnam varied inversely with the distance from southeast Asia.
There was very great uneasiness in southeast Asia as to the consequences for southeast Asian countries of a complete U.S. withdrawal.
All the areas of the world which we visited were a constant source of interest to all of us, but southeast Asia had a particular fascination.
It is of course, the site of our greatest overseas problem.
It is an area of great variety and beauty. It is an area of great resources and potential richness.
On the surface, the five countries we visited Burma, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and South Vietnam have much in common and would appear to have much to gain from a closer association.
In reality there are differences and divisions, deep seated and historic, which are sources of constant friction and instability even within a given country.
And the gap between the rich and the poor is as great as anywhere in the world, and productive of more instability.
There is no love or natural affinity between any of these countries and China before or since mainland China has gone Communist and each of these countries, in its own way is seeking to be independent of Chinese domination and control.
There is no question in my mind but that all of them would fall under Chinese domination and control if the United States withdraws or is driven from South Vietnam.
To the leaders of Red China, South Vietnam is just another incident in the long struggle which they have waged for 40 years and which they intend to continue to wage for the ultimate supremacy of their brand of communism in the world.
They will not be diverted from their ultimate objective by whatever happens in Vietnam.
Only the forces of evolution and change, when, as, and if their country emerges as a modern, industrial state, can blunt or eliminate their revolutionary fervor and persuade them to accept coexistence and diversity as the normal condition of the world.
This is the reality as we seek a way to resolve the Vietnam dilemma.