CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE

February 24, 1966

Page 3984

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I would like the RECORD to show it was not I, but the acting majority leader, who demanded the live quorum which has just been concluded.

I wish to discuss the present situation in Vietnam.

The Senate of the United States has often been called the greatest deliberative body in the world. On many occasions that reputation has seemed ill deserved -- as when we permitted ourselves not long ago to become bogged down in a full dress debate on the question of amending the Senate Journal to include the Chaplain’s prayer.

But there are also times when the Senate does function in a way which makes it the envy of all the other legislatures of the world. This, I believe, is such a time -- and the debate on Vietnam which we are now conducting demonstrates how great a body this can be when it does its best.

There is one point which has become increasingly clear to me during the course of this debate:

The United States should never have become involved in a ground war on the land mass of Asia.

For the 11 years since the French withdrawal from Vietnam, the United States has been gradually sucked into a situation where 200,000 American troops are presently fighting what is essentially an American war on the Asian mainland. Originally, and indeed until the end of 1963, American policy was to call upon various South Vietnamese governments to win or lose their own war. As President Kennedy said in September of 1963

In the final analysis, it’s their war. They’re the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it.

As late as the fall of 1964 this was still our policy. President Johnson said, during the course of the Presidential campaign that he did not like to be called upon "to send American boys to do the job that Asian boys ought to do."

The State and the Defense Departments still insist today that primarily this is a war for the South Vietnamese to win; but it is becoming increasingly obvious that the 200,000 American troops now in combat have the primary mission of destroying and defeating the Vietcong and those parts of the regular North Vietnamese army which have been committed to battle.

Thus, for the second time in 15 years, we have ignored the sound advice of Generals MacArthur, Eisenhower, and Ridgeway and committed American ground troops in Asia in what is essentially an American war.

In the fall of 1963 there were only 10,000 Americans in uniform in South Vietnam, all acting as advisers to the South Vietnamese armed forces. Today the number exceeds 200,000 and there is talk in the Pentagon and in the Senate Armed Services Committee to the effect that the number may soon rise to 600,000.

If we had learned from the experience in Burma or the Philippines or, even more recently, in Indonesia, we would have avoided the error we have committed. In none of these cases did our failure to intervene in support of non-Communist governments bring the so-called domino theory into effect. In all three instances the Communist advance was repelled by native Asian governments which scorned to call on the United States for assistance. In fact, U Thant, the sagacious Burmese Secretary General of the United Nations, recently said that had Burma requested American military assistance there would now be either a Communist takeover in that country or a civil war equivalent in violence to the hostilities in South Vietnam.

Our sound position should have been to base our air and naval power on the island chain running from Japan to Okinawa, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Borneo to Australia and New Zealand. It is nonsense to think that our only stopping place if we lose Vietnam is the beach at Waikiki.

A sound policy would rest our Pacific defenses on this island chain, rather than permitting our superb fighting forces to get mired down in the mud and jungles of southeast Asia.

Let us consider the capabilities and intentions of the Vietcong, the Hanoi government, and Red China.

It is difficult to know for certain what the intentions or capabilities of any of these three parties are. On the one hand, the Vietcong have recently been taking severe losses. It is said that their desertion rate is increasing, that they are losing their will to win. It is said also that Hanoi, having committed a significant part of its well-trained regular army to battle in South Vietnam, is having second thoughts as the determination of the South Vietnamese and the Americans increases. Assuredly, both the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese forces are under considerably heavier pressure than they were a year ago.

Similarly, China is essentially without air or sea power. There is grave question as to whether the Chinese Army can fight effectively as far away from their national boundary as the Mekong Delta. China has suffered a series of diplomatic reverses. Mao Tse-tung must be concerned at the threat of an American offensive, possibly nuclear in form, against his homeland.

It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that our adversaries will shortly be prepared to turn to the negotiating table under a cease-fire arrangement by neutral powers.

On the other hand, there is not the slightest present indication of a desire on the part of our adversaries to stop the shooting. The Vietcong, with the aid of Hanoi, have either themselves occupied or rendered untenable to the South Vietnamese a majority of the land mass of South Vietnam. While perhaps a majority of the people of South Vietnam are still under the jurisdiction of the Ky government in Saigon, most of them are huddled together in cities and towns overcrowded with refugees. And in that part of the countryside still under South Vietnamese control, there is increasing resentment against the totalitarian form the Ky government takes. The Vietcong appear well on their way to acquiring effective control over most of the people of South Vietnam still living in the countryside. And it is no answer to say that this has, to a substantial extent, been achieved by terror. It is, nevertheless, the case.

While the rate of desertion among the Vietcong is significant, desertions from the South Vietnamese Army are heavy, too. As their losses increase, as they have done during the last year, it is becoming increasingly doubtful how much longer the South Vietnamese Army will remain capable of carrying the brunt of defeating the Vietcong.

In this connection, Mr. President, I refer to an article from the New York Times of this morning entitled, "1965 Desertions Up in Saigon Forces -- Total Is Put Above 96,000 -- U.S. Aides Concerned."

I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the article may be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, it seems clear that the Vietcong, Hanoi, and Peiping are still convinced they are winning the war in South Vietnam and that accordingly they believe there is no need to go to the conference table.

Nor, despite the assertions of Secretary Rusk to the contrary, is it clear to what extent, if at all, the Vietcong are controlled by Hanoi, or Hanoi is controlled by mainland China. What seems certain is that further escalation of the American war effort, particularly a stepping up of the bombing of North Vietnam or a commencement of the bombing of Communist China will bring all three of our adversaries closer together. In my judgment, the risks of further American escalation in the light of the capabilities and intentions of our three adversaries, are not worth running in view of the chance of success which such escalation would create.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CLARK. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Idaho. I am glad to have the Senator in the Chamber on this important matter.

Mr. CHURCH. I congratulate the distinguished Senator on the address he is making.

The Senator raised the question of escalation. I was wondering if the Senator had not been encouraged by the remarks of the President on the subject of escalation in his address in New York last evening.

Mr. CLARK. I was very much encouraged. In fact, with the exception of the last portion of the President’s address, in which he raises the question of whether what we are doing in South Vietnam is worthwhile, I believe it was a most helpful statement of the American position.

The address indicates a disinclination to escalation and continued willingness to negotiate.

Mr. President, I ask that a copy of the text of the Presidents remarks may be printed in the RECORD at the end of my speech.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 2.)

Mr. CLARK. I thank the distinguished Senator from Idaho for calling this matter to my attention.

The tactical military situation in Vietnam is worse than most of the American people think.

Neither the State Department nor the Pentagon have yet been willing to furnish an unclassified map from which the American people could determine just how badly the ground war in South Vietnam has been going in recent years. But maps whose authenticity has not, so far as I know, been denied, showing the steady deterioration of the South Vietnamese-American position since 1962 have been printed widely in American newspapers and magazines.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CLARK. I yield to the Senator from Maine.

Mr. MUSKIE. I apologize for not having intervened immediately following the question of the distinguished Senator from Idaho. I wish to ask another question of the Senator from Pennsylvania.

The Senator from Pennsylvania expresses satisfaction with the President’s speech of last night, with the exception that he has noted.

Does the Senator feel that the President’s explanation of his policy in South Vietnam, especially relative to escalation and restraint of our military effort, reflects a change or constitutes a change from our policy, as the Senator previously understood it?

Mr. CLARK. I have difficulty answering that question categorically because this administration speaks with so many different voices from time to time that no one can be certain who is making the uncertain note on the trumpet.

I would say that since the President is the Commander in Chief and the Chief Executive of the United States his word should be the last word.

We heard from a Member of this body that testimony has been received in the Armed Services Committee that in the foreseeable future we might well increase our forces in Vietnam from 200,000 to 600,000.

We have had some fairly strong statements from the Secretary of State. Yesterday Secretary of Defense McNamara indicated the possibility of calling up the Reserves.

Hanson Baldwin -- and if I may be mildly facetious for a moment, he is a fairly faithful exponent of Pentagon opinion -- indicates that we are spread so thin that we may have to have massive troops called to the colors.

The President’s statement of yesterday was helpful. I have great sympathy for the position in which he finds himself. I know he is subjected to differing views. I know that he listens carefully before he makes up his mind.

The President’s speech of last night does tend to clarify matters in a most helpful way.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. CLARK. I am happy to yield.

Mr. MUSKIE. I believe it is true in this debate, to a greater degree than other debates, that words get in the way of understanding.

Mr. CLARK. One of the real problems is semantics.

Mr. MUSKIE. The Senator is correct. It strikes me, and I would like to have the reaction of the Senator, that the principal concern that resulted in that surge of alarm and present debate on

Vietnam policy is not attributable so much to our ability to manage a war in South Vietnam, as such, as the fear that what we do there mayor may not trigger a direct Red Chinese intervention which would lead to an Asian war. Is this the impression of the Senator?

Mr. CLARK. I am afraid that I could not agree with that. I do agree that the concern over getting into a wider war with China is a real and deep one. I believe there is a similar or greater concern about our commitment in Vietnam.

My feeling is that we should not have gotten in there and until the Baltimore speech of last spring we did not make a serious effort to get out.

I mention again the figures which I cited before the Senator came into the Chamber. At the time of President Kennedy’s assassination we had only 10,000 American soldiers in South Vietnam, all of whom were engaged in advisory missions. Now, we have over 200,000 troops there.

The answer given is that South Vietnam might have been overrun by the Vietcong if we had not done that. Then, I say, was the game worth the candle? I doubt it.

I say further to my friend from Maine that the inevitable result of escalation from 10,000 men to 200,000 men is an increase in the rate of American casualties in a cause which I cannot convince myself is essential to our national security .or the defense of our national honor.

Mr. MUSKIE. I understand, of course, that there may be differences of opinion, although not to the extent that there might have been a few years ago, as to whether we should have been involved in the first place. If we were to debate that question today, in terms of the situation when we first became involved in South Vietnam, I suspect that there might be quite a broad consensus as to what our policy is today.

Mr. CLARK. As to what our policy should have been.

Mr. MUSKIE. As to what our policy should have been. As of today, I still feel -- and I am merely conveying to the Senator my view -- that the great concern that grips the country so obviously and clearly today is not related to any doubts as to our ability, eventually, to get out of South Vietnam -- if our problem were confined to South Vietnam -- with honor and still to leave the situation subject to the control of indigenous elements in Vietnam. I think we could manage this.

But my concern is that the means we may have to use in order to achieve that objective may at some point trigger a larger war. This is where my concern focuses, whatever the questions I might have had earlier, about our involvement in Vietnam.

Mr. CLARK. I share the Senator’s concern deeply.

The Senator said something a moment ago about the problem we have about words. I agree with him. What do we mean by "getting out of Vietnam with honor"? What is honor? The Senator and I could discuss that for a long time without coming to any obvious solution.

Mr. MUSKIE. We get some light thrown on that question -- at least, I do when we realize that there are few in this body, or in Congress as a whole or in the country as a whole, who defend unconditional, unilateral withdrawal from Vietnam.

Mr. CLARK. I do not think there is anybody who does.

Mr. MUSKIE. So, at least, honor means that we must get something out of our withdrawal that will serve the national elements, the freedom elements, and the independence elements in South Vietnam.

Mr. CLARK. Let me pose a question to the Senator: Does the Senator: believe that we could negotiate with the Vietcong and still get out of Vietnam with honor? Would that be an honorable thing to do in the light of the terror and the murders of the Vietcong, and their determination to install a Communist regime? Can we tie up our ideas of honor with negotiation with the one people who are fighting with us?

Mr. MUSKIE. The role that the Vietcong would play at the conference table, if we were to get that far, is a sticky problem. If we gave the Vietcong too large a role before we negotiated, we might hamper the ability of whatever government emerged in South Vietnam to develop viability, independence, and the ability to decide its own country’s destiny.

Mr. CLARK. I agree with that.

Mr. MUSKIE. So we are concerned about that. Second, we are not really sure -- and this has been the point of great debate in the Senate and throughout the country -- as to what the Vietcong will do in South Vietnam. To what extent is the Vietcong wholly the agent of North Vietnam? To what extent is the Vietcong made up of indigenous elements in South Vietnam who would truly like to play a role in the destiny of their own country?

Mr. CLARK. It occurs to me that there are both kinds. It is fairly obvious, despite the view of Secretary Rusk to the contrary, that a large part of the Vietcong are indigenous South Vietnamese, sincerely, although mistakenly, believing they are fighting for the freedom of their own country, which they think includes North Vietnam -- and it used to -- in order to repel the white invader from their shores.

Mr. MUSKIE. The Senator would agree, would he not, that this is a point on which we cannot be enlightened under conditions of war?

Mr. CLARK. The Senator is correct.

Mr. MUSKIE. It is not possible to conduct a Gallup poll to establish that point to our satisfaction. This is why I believe there is some reservation on the part of our policymaking leaders in determining the role the Vietcong ought to play, first at the conference table, and then in the subsequent Government of South Vietnam.

Mr. CLARK.If we are ever going to have the shooting stop, that is a problem we shall have to face up to. Even though our policymakers may not be willing to disclose their hand, they will have to think the problem through and determine whether they are going to demand unconditional surrender by the Vietcong or will sit down and talk with them.

Mr. MUSKIE. From my point of view, we would be in a better position to refine our policy on that score if we were to get some kind of response from the other side.

Mr. CLARK. I could not agree more.

Mr. MUSKIE. I thank the Senator from Pennsylvania for this exchange.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CLARK. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Tennessee.

Mr. GORE. I have found the discussion very interesting, indeed.Was not the first government of France, following the end of World War II, a coalition government?

Mr. CLARK. It was called a popular front, and my recollection is that the Prime Minister was a Socialist, Mr. Blum.

Mr. GORE. Did not, in his previous term, General de Gaulle head a coalition government?

Mr. CLARK. He did. Actually, he had a good deal of trouble in preventing the Communists from taking over that government at the time he first went back into Paris.

Mr. GORE. If the Vietcong is the principal element of our adversary in South Vietnam, would it be possible, in order to get a negotiated settlement, to ignore a principal element of opposition?

Mr. CLARK. I do not see how it would. This is where I find myself, unfortunately, in strong disagreement with the Secretary of State, who takes what I consider to be the oversimplified view that the Vietcong is merely an arm of the North Vietnamese Government, and that we do not have to deal with them directly; that we have to deal only with Hanoi and perhaps with Peiping. : To me, that is utterly unrealistic.

Mr. GORE. Does the Vietcong constitute some 80 percent of the fighting force in South Vietnam?

Mr. CLARK. Of the fighting force against us.

Mr. GORE. Of the fighting force against us.

Mr. CLARK. It is my understanding that while there are several regiments, perhaps as much as one division, of North Vietnamese troops fighting us, the Senator’s statistics are correct.

Mr. GORE. Is the Vietcong a force that is indigenous to South Vietnam?

Mr. CLARK. It is my understanding that it is. The Vietcong have established diplomatic posts abroad in various capitals. I am not aware as to who their leaders in South Vietnam are; but there is not a shadow of a doubt in my mind, that many Vietcong are indigenous South Vietnamese who just do not like what they consider to be the tyrannical and totalitarian government of General Ky.

Mr. GORE. Has there been a coalition government in Italy in recent years?

Mr. CLARK. Yes; but I do not believe Communists have participated in it. The same has been true of recent governments in France. The Senator may recall that the Communist Party

is the largest party in Italy and the second largest in France.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for one observation that bears upon that point?

Mr. GORE. Will the Senator yield to permit me to make one further observation?

Mr. CLARK.I yield first to the Senator from Tennessee, then I shall yield to the Senator from Maine.

Mr. GORE. Following up these questions, will it not be acknowledged that there are dangers in coalition governments if a part of the coalition is a Communist force

Mr. CLARK. If the Senator will permit me to interrupt him, history shows very clearly that that is so.

Mr. GORE. But history is not unanimous in that regard, is it?

Mr. CLARK. No; but I invite the Senator’s attention to the fact that very dangerous coalition governments which were set up initially in certain countries in Europe contained Communists who succeeded in getting hold of ministries of the interior. Czechoslovakia is a good example:

Mr. GORE Whenever Communists in a coalition government have succeeded in obtaining control of the ministries of propaganda and police, and perhaps the ministry of defense -- but at least the former two -- that has proved to be almost without exception, so far as I recall, a coalition fatal to freedom.

If on the other hand, the head of the government succeeds, as I believe did the head of the French coalition, in giving to the communistic element within the government, welfare, social security, or some ministry that does not give them control of a vital ministry, or public information, propaganda, police, or military authority, then it has not proven fatal.

I am not so concerned about who the parties to a negotiation may be. As I understand, President Johnson has said that there will be no insurmountable problem so far as this is concerned. I believe the President is maintaining commendable flexibility in this regard.

The structure of the government that may follow the cease-fire negotiation is, in my opinion, very important.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, does not the Senator agree that there are two quite different things involved here? First, who does one talk to in order to arrange a cease-fire and establish a truce?

Second, what will the composition of the interim government, be while an attempt is being made to hold free elections? The questions are. not the same at all.

Mr.: GORE. I agree: Free elections in the circumstances that prevail in Vietnam is another subject. However; lest I delay the thoughtful intervention of the Senator from Maine, I desist.

Mr. CLARK. I yield to the Senator from Maine.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I believe that the Senator is correct in distinguishing between whom we talk to and the composition of the government. However, the question of whom we talk to must be subdivided. It depends on the role we are willing to accept for the Vietcong in the conference. If we accept them merely as a participant in the war, entitled to a place at the conference table and entitled to engage in the discussion, I believe that would create very little difficulty. However, if we are asked, as the North Vietnamese have insisted, to consider them to be representative of South Vietnam at the conference table, that is another extreme.

There is a sticky situation somewhere in between:

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I call the attention of the Senator from Maine to another solution. One solution might be that neither we nor the Chinese Communists go to the conference table, but that the Vietnamese people settle their problem for themselves. That may be the best way to do it, but it might not be practical.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, in the New York Herald Tribune of Monday, February 21, 1966, there appeared an article by Ferenc Nagy, former Prime Minister of Hungary.

The Senator may have seen this article--

Mr. CLARK. I did not.

Mr. MUSKIE. In this article Mr: Nagy said:

As far as I know I am the only former political leader in exile in America who was the head of a coalition government in Central Eastern Europe after World War II.

On the basis of my experiences in my own country and observations in the whole central and Eastern European area I would like to comment on Senator ROBERT KENNEDY’s proposition of a coalition government for South Vietnam.

In an aside, I suggest that the Senator from New York [Mr. KENNEDY] has since refined his position on those points. However, at the time the article was written, he had not.

I continue to read from Mr. Nagy’s article:

The first thing to know is that if a coalition in an ideologically troubled country is established with the assistance of outside power or powers, then the strength and endurance of the participating political parties or groups is not dependent at all on domestic popular support but on the help of the outside great powers which are behind them politically.

In my government the Communist Party had only 17 percent of popular support while my party alone was supported by more than 60 percent of the voters and the Parliament. Still the Communist Party could get in power in 2 years because they were supported by the Soviet Union and I was overthrown because no outside power gave me any help.

I believe this is a very interesting and useful illustration of the problem of a coalition government.

Mr. CLARK. I believe that it is, too. I have many serious doubts about whether a coalition government could be successful in South Vietnam. However, I. point out that the situation which existed in Eastern Europe is really entirely different from the situation in South Vietnam at the moment. We had no American presence in Hungary. We have a big American presence in Vietnam, a much bigger American presence than Red China has.

The need for leaving the President great flexibility is clear. There are all kinds of possibilities; it might be feasible to have a coalition government of the sort suggested by the Senator from Tennessee, and not unlike the one we now have in Laos. With the existing power concentration and the American physical presence, it would not be nearly so dangerous as the situation which existed in Hungary when we were a long way off.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, what we are discussing is the integrity of a coalition government after the American presence is withdrawn. This is the problem which we are discussing.

Mr. CLARK.I would not for a minute advocate a withdrawal of the American presence until after a free election had determined the composition of government that the people of South Vietnam wanted, and whether it was to be independent, a federation or, indeed, a unified government with North Vietnam.

Mr. CHURCH: Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CLARK. I yield.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President in connection with the exchange that has just occurred, does not the Senator from Pennsylvania feel that there might quite properly develop a role for the United Nations or some other specially established international commission, that could have governing significance in the interim period so that, pending elections, we might be certain that no single element in South Vietnam could come to dominate. In other words, does not the Senator from Pennsylvania see the possibility of a role developing for the United Nations which might even substitute for a time for a local government in preserving the requisite order and in supervising the conduct of the requisite elections, on which an indigenous government could thereafter be formed?

Mr. CLARK. I should hope so. But, frankly; although I was gratified by our decision to go to the United Nations with the Vietnamese problem, we must remember that our adversaries are not members of the United Nations. If we were to have a cease-fire, both parties would have to agree. If we were to have international machinery to supervise an election, both parties would have to agree.

I should be somewhat skeptical as to whether Hanoi -- or Peiping, if they were to inject themselves into the situation, as they well might -- would be willing to turn the conduct of an election over to a United Nations team.

It occurs to me that a far more hopeful course would be to go back to the Geneva Conference or, in the alternative, to the International Control Commission, consisting of, I believe, India, Canada, and Poland, as the international agency for supervision.

Mr. CHURCH. That might be the kind of international.commission that in the end would emerge, but I do think that an article which appeared in a recent edition of the Nation magazine, captioned, "The Tactics of a Truce," written by Jack D. Forbes, is worthy of the consideration of the Senate.

It envisions a supervisory role by the United Nations, though the article could be read in such a way as to substitute some other suitable international commission for the United Nations wherever that term appears.

Since the article specifies steps that might be taken toward a satisfactory truce, and ultimately toward self-determination for the people of South Vietnam, and since it is, in spirit, an article that conforms to the character and thrust of the excellent address that the Senator from Pennsylvania is giving this afternoon, I wonder if the Senator would mind if I asked unanimous consent to have the article published in the RECORD at a point following the conclusion of the Senators remarks?

Mr. CLARK. I should be very happy to have that done.,

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 3.)

Mr. CLARK. I yield to the Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, there have been several references to Eastern Europe, and particularly to Czechoslovakia. I suppose I have probably had more nuts-and-bolts experience there than any other Senator, because I was in charge of the consulate general in Slovakia at the time of the Communist putsch in 1948.

I remember at that time, or a few months earlier, thinking that this putsch would occur, because an election was about to be held, and one knew that the Communists could not afford the results of an election, because they would have lost ground.

One also knew that when Jan Masaryk indicated that he would like to join the Marshall plan, that would be strong medicine for the Soviets, their immediate neighbors to the east.

So I remember, about 6 weeks before the putsch, I predicted that there would be a putsch, because the Communists could not accept a loss of power through election, which would be the inevitable result.

The powers that be above me in the State Department chain of command did not agree, and thought that the election could be held and all would work itself out. Lo and behold, when the time came, the Communists preferred the putsch to waiting for and abiding by an election.

The governing factor here is whether or not a strong presence would remain to enforce election results. If that presence were there to enforce the elections, one would not worry too much about the results of the election.

Mr. CLARK. If the Senator will permit an interjection, I would worry very much about them.

Mr. PELL. The Senator is probably more experienced in the Far East. I know he was in the Far East in the war. But from my experience in eastern Europe, in most of the countries there, the public will did not seem to go in the Communist direction when there was a truly free election.

Mr. CLARK. I merely point out that if for 11 years you support a totalitarian government, and then you go in with B-52 bombers and heavy artillery and small arms and shoot up the villages; and the other side does the same thing, with terroristic tactics, I think it is a pretty close question who the poor people are going to vote for if they once get a chance to vote.

Mr. President, I return to the subject I was discussing before this most interesting colloquy, and I thank my colleagues for their intervention. That was the question of why we cannot get an accurate map out of either the State Department, or the Defense Department, which will show the territory either controlled by the Vietcong or contested by them.

I was pointing out that they give us classified maps, small in scale, which purport to show some of this information, but then tell us we cannot use them to alert the American people to the situation.

We have seen many of these maps in news magazines and in the daily newspapers, but when I called one of them to the attention of Mr. David Bell in open session the other day before the Foreign Relations Committee, he said the map I was showing him was not accurate, and that he would give me an accurate map, but I could not use it.

I hope that when Secretary McNamara comes before the Foreign Relations Committee next week, he will be prepared to bring with him a meaningful map, and I would hope it would be unclassified. But even if he insists on classifying it, on the ground that this might give aid and comfort to the enemy because it would show them that we know where they are, at least he might let us have a classified map, so some of us on the committee can have some real understanding of what the military situation in Vietnam is with respect to the holding of real estate. If you do not hold the real estate, how can you go through with a social and economic program that is anything more than a rescue operation for refugees and the dwellers in a few overcrowded cities?

Mr. MUSKIE. Will the Senator yield on that point?

Mr. CLARK. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Maine.

Mr. MUSKIE. Simply for clarification. As the Senator knows, like many Members of Congress, this year, I spent some time in Vietnam. While there, we pressed for some enlightenment on the very point the Senator is discussing; in other words, to give us as accurate and precise a pictorial impression as possible as regards the state of control of real estate.

We were told over and over again that although we could be given something that might approximate the situation at a given instant of time, the nature of the war there is so fluid that almost any map that might be offered would in a sense be misleading as to what the situation is at the moment the beholder might be looking at it.

So when we were given maps, we were asked to withhold them, for the reason that they might be misleading at such time as we released them.

This may be too great a sensitivity on this point. I think the Senator is right in raising it, but I simply wished to state what we learned when we were there, and match it against what the Senator has been told.

Mr. CLARK. I thank the Senator for his information. I have been told exactly the same thing.

Perhaps I am dealing more in logic than in common sense, but I do not see why one cannot draw a map which says, "We hold this particular province so firmly that we can go in there and build a school building, or a rural electrification plant, give fertilizer to the peasants, help them harvest their crops, and nobody is going to change it; that is our backyard. Here is another area where the control of the province changes back and forth; perhaps the Vietcong control it at night, we control it in the daytime.

We had an interesting example the other day of what happens when we build these schools. Sometimes the Vietcong burn them down if they are built by the Saigon government. If the local people participate in building them, the Vietcong do not burn them down; they use them for evening meetings, at which they teach the children to sing Vietcong songs.Sometimes they use them as sanctuaries, because when there is an attack on a particular hamlet, they are pretty sure our troops or the South Vietnamese will not attack the little red schoolhouses. Then, as soon as the attack is over, they open fire from the schoolhouses.

Maps would also show that there are other areas which are all jungle and elephant grass, and are virtually uninhabited.

That kind of map, I think, considering our position in having to determine how much to vote in the way of social and economic aid for South Vietnam, is an important source of information to which I think we are entitled.

Mr. MUSKIE.Yet there is no way of determining whether an area identified as a secure area on the map is indeed secure, or controlled to the point where we cannot suffer damage. For example, Saigon itself is a secure area, but there is terrorism going on there all the time. When we were there, a hotel housing American servicemen was blown up.

Mr. CLARK.There is a strong school of thought -- I believe this was mentioned in the Mansfield report -- that Saigon is a hostage for Hanoi, and vice versa.

Mr. MUSKIE. There is a school of thought to that effect. My own feeling is that the reason the Vietcong do not move in on Saigon with greater force is that they are not in a position to do so, not because of any inhibitions tied to the protection of Hanoi. I doubt very much that they consider them mutual hostages, but I understand there is that view held by many people on our side.

Mr. CLARK. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Tennessee.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, more or less attention is being directed to the problem of the Vietcong. Indeed, that seems to be the principal problem.

Now, should our goal be similar to intimations the Senator and I heard earlier today, suggesting the extermination of the Vietcong?

Mr. CLARK. I believe that is a hopeless objective. I do not believe we can ever do it. They can quit, of course. But I saw in the newspapers the other day that we have shot off 25,000 bullets for every Vietcong we have killed. That is not an effective method of warfare, in my opinion.

Mr. GORE. Just what is to be done, then, if the Vietcong are not to be admitted to negotiations, are not to have a part in the government, are not to be permitted to exist? What kind of war is this? What kind of war would it be necessary to wage to achieve the goal of extermination of the Vietcong in South Vietnam?

Mr. CLARK. I can see no other course but to demand unconditional surrender, which I deplore as being neither wise nor feasible. This is a problem which the administration must face.

Mr. GORE. In asking these questions, please understand that I have no fixed conclusions as to how the problem of Vietcong insurgency in South Vietnam should be handled. I doubt whether those who wish merely to ignore it, or to exterminate them, realize the extent of the areas hcld, according to such maps as the Senator and I have been privileged to see; and I doubt whether the problem is quite so simple as that. No attempt was made to exterminate the Communists in France after World War II because of their political affiliations. No attempt was made to exterminate Communist sympathizers in Laos before this settlement was reached.

I raise these questions only for contemplation, not to make an assertion myself as to how it should be done; but it seems to me, that some of the sentiments which the Senator and I and others have been hearing recently are certainly unrealistic and not quite relative to the problem that prevails in South Vietnam.

Mr. CLARK. I agree with the Senator; yet, in all candor, one has to give some thought to the analogy in Malaya after the war where, for 7 years, the British and the Malayans fought against the infiltration of Chinese Communists and, finally, exterminated them or persuaded them that they had so little chance to succeed that they returned to China.

We know of the present efforts of the Belaunde government in Peru to exterminate the Communists in the Andes. They seem to be doing rather well. The Betancourt government in Venezuela has been successful recently in exterminating . the Communist minority. Therefore I agree fundamentally with the Senator since I do not believe that we can do this in South Vietnam. We must examine these analogies with great care.

Mr. GORE. The disturbing problem -- which I believe it truly to be -- is that apparently some of our colleagues have easy and simple solutions to exterminate the Vietcong. I do not believe

that is quite so easy as some appear to think it to be.

Mr. CLARK. I quite agree with the Senator from Tennessee.