September 18, 1963
PAGE 17424
TEST BAN TREATY
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, the taking of the vote on the question of Senate approval of the nuclear test ban treaty will be a momentous occasion in the history of the United States. Although the treaty is a limited one, with limited objectives, it has serious and far-reaching implications for the future of this Nation and the world. Because of its importance and because of its implications, it is imperative that we cast with care our votes on the question of approval of the treaty.
I have read the treaty, the President's messages, the committee reports, and the various published analyses. I have reviewed the testimony and the debate. My objective has been to test the treaty against the criticisms by its opponents, and to analyze it in the light of the arguments by its supporters.
My hope is on the side of a peaceful and uncontaminated world; my concern is on the side of the security and safety of our country; my mind is focused on the logic of the arguments of both sides to the dispute over the question of ratification.
It is clear that this issue is not one-sided. Some express unqualified support; others urge unqualified opposition. Some would require resolution of the Cuban problem as a condition precedent to approval. Still others, although they applaud the objectives of the treaty, believe its purposes could have been stated more clearly, that its application to our security and defense requirements could have been expressed more precisely, that the application to this treaty of the Senate's constitutional duty to approve treaties is ambiguous.
The proposed reservations and the arguments of those who advance them have served useful purposes. They have served to highlight the pertinent questions bearing upon our security and defense requirements which the treaty raises. They have served to broaden our understanding of the effect of the treaty on our national interests. The discussions they have generated have resulted in definition and clarification of the terms of the treaty as they relate to the points raised by the reservations.
I am satisfied, as a result, that ratification of the treaty will not mean recognition of East Germany or other treaty signers whose governments are not already recognized by our Government.
I am satisfied that we can withdraw from the treaty immediately, in the event of a treaty violation by the Soviets, without a 90-day delay.
I am satisfied that the treaty does not inhibit our use of nuclear weapons in the defense of our country.
I am satisfied that the treaty does not prohibit cooperation with our allies in every way needed to improve their defense, including the realization of a multilateral nuclear force with our NATO allies.
I am satisfied that the treaty cannot be amended without ratification by the United States, which would necessarily require submission of the amendment to the Senate, for its advice and consent to such ratification.
I am satisfied on these points because, as a result of the debate generated by the proposed reservations, I am satisfied that the clear and the reasonable meaning of the provisions of the treaty itself supports the conclusions I have stated. Therefore, I see no need for reservations.
I am satisfied, further, that in the area in which the treaty permits an increase of knowledge, including underground testing, such increases of knowledge will be pursued to as great an extent as is needed f or the safety of the United States.
On the question of whether resolution of the Cuban problem should be attached as a condition of ratification, I am satisfied that the result of attaching such a condition would be destruction of the treaty, but without solving the Cuban problem. To support such a result would be, in effect, to support a policy that we should do nothing to resolve any one of our differences with the Soviet Union, unless we can resolve all our differences at one and the same time. I do not believe that we can achieve such an end, unless and until we are ready to make a beginning.
If the treaty merits our support, it does so on its own, without additions or subtractions, without our making it more than it is or less than it appears to be. If it is to be nullified, that should be with one stroke, on the issue of ratification.
Should we approve this treaty or should we withhold our consent?
That is the central issue; that is the question we must decide.
I would not for a moment detract from the complicated issues surrounding the treaty. I would not suggest that the decision for any one of us is a simple one. But, however complicated, however awesome the decision, it is our duty to face the problem and to make the choice.
As I have thoroughly examined the arguments of the opponents, I find they lead back to two fundamental assumptions: First, that we cannot afford to give up testing in the atmosphere, underwater, or in outer space; and second, that in any event, we cannot trust the Russians, and that any treaty with them is an invitation to delusion and disaster.
The first question involves a judgment on the relative strength of the Soviets and ourselves in nuclear weaponry, the improvements in weaponry which we might gain from further testing in the three environments proscribed by the treaty, the gains the Soviets might achieve from similar testing, the risks of clandestine tests, the hazards of radioactive fallout resulting from further testing, the dangers inherent in an escalating nuclear-arms race involving more nations, and the international political advantages to be gained or lost by such a treaty. The balance of such risks, the President has argued, favors ratification of the treaty.
After reviewing the information provided by the Foreign Relations Committee and the Preparedness Subcommittee, together with other documents and testimony, I agree with the President on this point. We cannot assure absolute security in this world; we can only approach it.
Neither course open to us -- ratification or nonratification -- can guarantee peace, security, and survival.
Having satisfied myself on the first question, I faced the second: Can we trust the Russians to honor the treaty? There are disagreements as to the number of treaties the Soviets have honored and the number of those they have abrogated. But whatever the detailed figures, the fact which remains is that they have honored some treaties, and have broken more.
In evaluating the treaty, we should, therefore, assume the possibility of its violation by the Soviet Union.
Are we, then, inviting ourselves into another Munich, as some opponents have charged, if we approve this treaty? Are all the arguments about the text of the treaty and its relative values if it were observed meaningless because we cannot trust the Russians to keep a bargain or to bargain in good faith? If the answers to these questions are "yes," if we must accept the proposition that it never pays to enter into an agreement with the Soviets, then we must adopt a pessimistic, not to say hopeless, outlook on the future of the world. Under such a view, we are doomed to a life of suspicion, with accelerated weapons research and testing, hair trigger preparedness, and the ever-present danger of instant, universal annihilation.
I view with horror such a prospect. But in good conscience I must face it, and I have. Having faced it, having realized its possibility, having examined the logic which leads to the abyss, I return to the question: Can we at no time, under no circumstances, reach an agreement with the Russians on any major issue?
I think we can, if the agreement is in the self-interest of each of us, and if we are in a position to protect our interests if the agreement is broken.
I believe it would be in our interests and in the interests of the Russians to abolish all nuclear testing except that designed for peaceful and necessary purposes under international supervision. Each of us has much to gain from the reduction of the hazards of radioactive fallout. We live in the same world; we breathe the same air; we are all human beings. Each of us has much to gain from inhibiting of the arms race. The search for security through better weapons, in this age, leads to greater tension, not less. Each step leads us closer to the point where we go beyond the balance of terror and enter an area where any step is fatal, not to one, but both; not to some, but to all. Further, each of us has much to gain from curtailing the spread of nuclear testing and weapons to other nations. We know independent nations cannot be controlled completely, even by their allies. Khrushchev has learned this, much to his anguish and distress.
The abolition of all nuclear weapons tests would, it seems to me, be in the Soviets' interests as well as ours. This, I think, has been the reason for the groping efforts of both countries on the test ban treaty issue over several years.
The trouble with total prohibition, however, is the loophole the Russians sought through the refusal to allow onsite inspections of underground tests.
Such a loophole would be in their best interests, but not in ours. It would not have given us a clear opportunity to protect our interests in the event of a violation. The present treaty, however, does give us the opportunity to protect ourselves. It offers no opportunity for significant clandestine tests. We do not rely on expressions of good faith; we rely on the technological facts which make the limited agreements possible; we rely on the determination of this Nation to keep its guard up, without panic, without the aggressive stance which stems from fear.
Mr. President, I shall vote for this treaty. I do so without reservations. I do so, not because I expect it to bring the millennium, but because I believe the treaty is what the President says it is: a way to "get back out from the shadows of war and seek out the way of peace."
To do otherwise, it seems to me, would be to reject the possibility of a rational relationship between ourselves and the Soviet Union, and to accept the inevitability of force as the only conceivable arbiter of our differences.
Are we more fearful of negotiation than we are of nuclear war?
Are we less confident of our ability to wage peace than we are of our ability to wage war?
Which course holds the greater promise for peace, security, and survival -- to agree in the circumstances we are considering, or to disagree with the Soviet Union under all conceivable circumstances?
It seems to me that the alternatives, however stated, are clear.
All of us, I am sure, have weighed them carefully, impressed by their grave implications. I choose the course offered by the treaty, in the hope and belief that it holds the greater promise for the future of mankind.
When I have voted for this treaty, I can say to my children, "I have tried to give you a world in which you will not be poisoned by the silent, insidious hazards of nuclear fallout"; I can say to my constituents, "I have voted for this treaty because it is a sensible step toward a rational world"; I can say to the critics of this treaty, "I have faith in the strength of America, in its institutions, in its leadership, and in the wisdom of acting with your eyes open and your feet on the ground."
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I commend the Senator from Maine for a most moving speech, in which the Senator has delineated his philosophy, and which I believe lays the issue very squarely before the Senate. The Senator has performed a magnificent service in doing so.
Mr. MUSKIE. I am grateful to my majority leader.